Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[MancMellow]

Pa...Rusija isto ko Austro-Ugarska, odugovlačila, odugovlačila, odugovlačila dok na kraju vrag nije odneo šalu u uslovima koje niko nije mogao da predvidi. I, naravno, na kraju su drugi dobili ideje kako to rešiti. Ali jeste beskrajno zanimljivo paraleliziranje :)

[namenski]

Ovako se proslavlja jubilej  -_-

 

[smorenko]

Captain Herbert Sulzbach,
German Artillery

"One summer evening soon after the battle of Somme had started, the guns were rumbling and there was a terrible noise on the battle in our ears. Yet where we lay, just thirty metres from the trenches, there were mountains and peace, and hardly any shooting. We could see the French soldiers, and one night a Frenchman started to sing – he was a wonderful tenor. None of us dared to shoot and suddenly we were all looking out from the trenches and applauding, and the Frenchman said 'Merci'. It was peace in the middle of war, and the strange thing was, that just a few kilometres northwards the terrible battle of Somme was going on."

 

"Forgotten Voices of the Great War"

Edited April 20, 2015 by smorenko

[MancMellow]

Ovako se proslavlja jubilej  -_-

 

 

Možda bi mnoge stvari bile drugačije da je to uspelo. E Winstone Winstone...

[čekmeže]

Za sve je kriv 1 Nusret

 

[hazard]

Možda bi mnoge stvari bile drugačije da je to uspelo. E Winstone Winstone...

 

Na šta misliš tačno? Da su saveznici potukli Turke i onda....?

[Radoye]

Na šta misliš tačno? Da su saveznici potukli Turke i onda....?

 

Jedna od verovatnih posledica bi bilo da nema Oktobarske Revolucije u Rusiji.

[MancMellow]

Na šta misliš tačno? Da su saveznici potukli Turke i onda....?

 

Da su ih potukli do kraja kraja avgusta npr, ulazak Bugarske u rat na strani Centralnih sila bi bio pod mnogo većim znakom pitanja

[bigvlada]

Na šta misliš tačno? Da su saveznici potukli Turke i onda....?

 

Još gore po Turke od ovoga. Verovatno bi Grčkoj dali i narandžasto. Plus Kurdistan i Jermenija. 

 

[Prospero]

Zanimljiva crtica iz prikaza knjige Ričarda Baseta For God and Kaiser: The Imperial Austrian Army, 1619–1918 (knjigu sam skinuo ali nisam još pročitao):
 

The volatile army chief of staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf drafted a telegraph never sent to his German counterpart that complained, “We asked for our back to be guarded while we liquidated Serbia, and you have brought upon us the Weltkrieg.”

[Prospero]

Listam malo knjigu, str. 442-3
 

Not all voices were clamouring for war. As the decisions of 7 July were discussed, some news of what was afoot leaked out. Five days later, on the 13th Count Lützow, the half- English former Imperial and Royal Ambassador to Rome, called on Berchtold and Count Forgách at the Ballplatz. Thanks to the cohesiveness of Viennese society, Lützow had picked up that a series of stiff demands of Belgrade was being formulated, and he was keen to ventilate his concern. By 12 July, the mood in Vienna had clearly hardened.
 
On being received warmly by Berchtold, he said he had heard that a strong note was being prepared but he believed that if the demands were unreasonable Serbia would reject them. ‘The idea of a local war was a pure mental aberration’ (‘Lokaliserung ist ein reines Hirngespenst’). Lützow grimly warned Berchtold that, with Serbia’s rejection of the demands, a world war would ensue and ‘with that you are putting the survival of the entire Monarchy at risk’ (auf eine karte). As Lützow recalled, ‘Berchtold fell silent at these words and did not respond.’

As an experienced colleague, Lützow understood the significance of Berchtold’s silence. Later the same day discussing the risks with another senior colleague he was appalled to hear him say: ‘Why worry? The worst that can happen to us is that we might lose Galicia.’ Alarmed, Lützow took the unusual step of inviting the British Ambassador, Maurice de Bunsen, to lunch two days later, on the 15th, leaving the startled Englishman in no doubt that the situation was ‘serious’ and that ‘a kind of indictment’ was being framed against Serbia. This indictment would require ‘unconditional acceptance within a short time- limit’, otherwise force would be used. ‘Austria was in no mood to parley.’ The military option was being readied.

As was no doubt intended by Lützow, Bunsen immediately on the 15th telegraphed this information to London though he discreetly did not reveal the identity of his informant. Indiscreetly, the Foreign Office in London responded the next day, demanding the source’s name. Even when Bunsen complied with this, London’s reaction remained aloof, dilatory and recklessly relaxed. Nicolson, the Permanent Under- Secretary, in one of the more crass of his annotations minuted that he ‘doubted’ Austria would resort to action. Nicolson appeared to have forgotten that Austria had mobilised twice the previous year and, as recently as October 1913, had sent a successful ultimatum to the Montenegrins.

Nicolson, who really should have known better, did nothing to inform his chief Grey that matters were really serious. More than a week before the final Austrian Note was delivered, and indeed even before it was receiving its final draft at the hands of Musulin, London had all the information it needed to see that Vienna meant to impose on the Serbs an ‘ultimatum’ with a time limit, after which force would be deployed. It would be pleasant to record that Nicolson and other Germanophobes in the Foreign Office simply ignored this vital piece of information. Unfortunately, the evidence points to Nicolson having told the Russian and Serbian envoys the significance of the intelligence from Vienna while suppressing its importance at home. It was hardly the first or indeed the last time that a piece of information entrusted to a diplomat would end up in precisely the wrong place. Rarely has such valuable diplomatic intelligence from so faultless a source at such an important time been so ill- used. Grey would only hear about the ‘ultimatum’ a week later; the British Cabinet only after it had been delivered. If London had wished to exercise some restraint on Vienna, here was the moment. Like many other moments in the July crisis, it came and it passed.

 

Manče, kako komentarišeš Licova i Nikolsona? Kako je Nikolsonu promakao mehanizam koji će uvući sve u rat (štaviše i važnost teme, jer nije obavestio Greja) a Licovu je manje-više odmah sve bilo jasno?

[MancMellow]

 

The volatile army chief of staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf drafted a telegraph never sent to his German counterpart that complained, “We asked for our back to be guarded while we liquidated Serbia, and you have brought upon us the Weltkrieg.”

 

:(

 

pa trebalo je lepo da ih puste same, sto jes jes  ^_^

Edited June 15, 2015 by MancMellow

[Prospero]

On 24 July, the German minister bumped into a Serbian politician in Belgrade and said: ‘You cannot accept it.’ In Paris, the German ambassador Schoen urged the Serbs to ask for ‘further clarification’. Even when Austria eventually declared war, her ally, who had urged her into this step, now refused to ‘pass on’ the declaration of war as requested by Vienna in the absence of the Austrian minister, who had left Belgrade three days earlier. A new German narrative was already emerging. Prince Bülow expressed it perfectly when he later wrote: ‘Austria’s German ally on behalf of and through the instrumentality of the Habsburg monarch had allowed itself to become involved in the most terrible of all wars’.

Kakvi su im to saveznici?

[Dr Arslanagić]

bumped into a Serbian politician? na koga li je naleteo?

[Prospero]

Ko zna. citira memoare fon Bilova iz 1931.