On 10. 11. 2011. at 12:19, Budja said:

Inace, cuh podatak na BBCiju da je Argentina otisla u bankrot sa 50% debt-GDP raciom i 3% deficita. Struktura duga i izbori rasta su vazne determinante.

argentinski dugovi 1990-ih su bili u ogromnom % dolarizovani (skoro 100%), cak su i zajmovi obicnim gradjanima bili dolarizovani. a deficit je finansiran stranim kapitalom. pa je naglim padom upliva stranog kapitala u celoj LatinoAmerici (nakon ruskog kolapsa 98-e), doslo do toga da veliki broj ljudi zeli da kupi dolare kako bi vracali dugove -> pritisak na (fiksirani) peso da devalvira -> ocekivana devalvacija -> ocekivani ogroman skok peso duga nakon devalvacije, sa 50% GDP na najmanje 90-100% GDP-a.italijanski dugovi nisu preterano veliki, pre svega zbog toga sto su Italijani jos uvek u dobroj meri kesendkeri. ali, panika cini svoje = poverenje ne postoji, i Italija ne moze da produzi pozajmljivanje kako bi isplatili kratkorocne obaveze.

Edited November 10, 201113 yr by Gandalf

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Rather than a smaller euro area, “we need it to grow,” Meister said. “That means we mustn’t say that those having problems at the moment get kicked out, but we must see to it that their problems get solved. That has to be the answer.”

Anđa u klin, Majstor u ploču...

Rekao bih da je izbacivanje iz evrozone samo pretnja kako bi se svi doveli u red, jer niko ne zeli da izadje - ni privrednici ni gradjani u clanicama

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Nemačka opstaje i ako ne bude evraIZVOR: TANJUG, BUSINESS.HRBerlin -- Nemački izvoznici mogli bi da opstanu i bez evropske zajedničke valute, kaže prvi čovek njihovog udruženja BGA Anton Berner.

Koji raštimovan orkestar, jbt. Ništa dobro iz ovoga ne može da izađe.

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Nemačka ne čini puno da spasi evro?IZVOR: CAPITALLondon -- Britanski premijer Dejvid Kameron kaže da je teško razumeti zašto Nemačka ne čini više da pomogne zemljama evrozone koje su u nevolji i spasi evro.

Edited November 10, 201113 yr by Tribun_Populi

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 15:11, Tribun_Populi said:

Koji raštimovan orkestar, jbt. Ništa dobro iz ovoga ne može da izađe.

Sve ide po planu. Preuzimanje dugova politicki nije moguce bez menjanja nemackog ustava ali i donosenja novog/pravog EU ustava. Ova kriza ce da dovede ili do raspada Evrozone sa svim posledicama ili do ubrzanih politickih reformi koje bi u normalnim vremenima trajale decenijama. Sada ce to morati da obave u roku od nekoliko meseci ili Nemci jednostavno nece dati pare. Zato kurs koji Merkel drzi od pocetka krize mozda i nije tako los ako uspe tako da natera ostale clanice na reformu sistema kakva ranije nije bila moguca. Ono u sta sumnjam je da ce to biti reforme koje ce takodje ograniciti stapmpanje para/kupovanje obveznica kroz centralnu banku.

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 15:17, Anduril said:

Sve ide po planu. Preuzimanje dugova politicki nije moguce bez menjanja nemackog ustava ali i donosenja novog/pravog EU ustava. Ova kriza ce da dovede ili do raspada Evrozone sa svim posledicama ili do ubrzanih politickih reformi koje bi u normalnim vremenima trajale decenijama. Sada ce to morati da obave u roku od nekoliko meseci ili Nemci jednostavno nece dati pare. Zato kurs koji Merkel drzi od pocetka krize mozda i nije tako los ako uspe tako da natera ostale clanice na reformu sistema kakva ranije nije bila moguca. Ono u sta sumnjam je da ce to biti reforme koje ce takodje ograniciti stapmpanje para/kupovanje obveznica kroz centralnu banku.

To je, u suštini, bila i moja početna premisa - nacije (tj. države) nastaju kad se pojavi common enemy, u ovom slučaju stra' od teške krize. Ono u šta ja sumnjam jeste snaga Nemačke da ostale članice ubedi u tako nešto, pogotovu s pričom o Evropi u dve brzine (tj. core federaciji i rest of konfederaciji). Sad je ili sve ili ništa, tipujem na ništa.

Edited November 10, 201113 yr by Tribun_Populi

Nemacki ustav zabranjuje dublju integraciju EU.

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 16:05, Sirius said:

Nemacki ustav zabranjuje dublju integraciju EU.

Pa upravo je pitanje koliku podršku Anđa ima za promenu ustava koju najavljuje unutar svoje zemlje, a tek pa za promenu teškom mukom skrpljenog lisabonskog ugovora. Sve i da postoji konsenzus (a kao što videsmo, daleko su od toga) procedura je spora, skupa i komplikovana a vremena je vrlo malo. Zato sam i skeptičan.

Parlamentarni suverenitet je zakon

jedino ako si Britanija ili neki derivat

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 16:25, hazard said:

jedino ako si Britanija ili neki derivat

Znam, ali odmah posle toga dolazi superiornost common law u odnosu na ovaj rimsko-germanski. Toliko da bode oci.Ovo ne toliko povodom Nemacke, koliko povodom necega sto je tek u nastajanju (ili nestajanju) kao sto je EU

Edited November 10, 201113 yr by MancMellow

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 16:28, MancMellow said:

Znam, ali odmah posle toga dolazi superiornost common law u odnosu na ovaj rimsko-germanski.

  On 10. 11. 2011. at 16:25, hazard said:

jedino ako si Britanija ili neki derivat

;)

Kako ono rece Pekic, ili ko vec, pitao prijatelja Britanca, "je li dovoljno biti mudar da bi se imao nepisani ustav" a ovaj odgovara "ne, dovoljno je biti Englez"

http://www.economist.com/node/21538161

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Italy and the euro zoneThat’s all, folksFor the euro to survive, Italy must not fail. That will require leadership and courageALTHOUGH it came after scandal, scheming and a truly dismal record as prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation pledge was no more cathartic than any other of the remedies that the euro zone has so far concocted. The gesture was too little because Mr Berlusconi is so distrusted, after a total of eight and a half disastrous years in charge, that even now some fear he will find a way to hang on to office or stand again. It was too late because, by the time he promised to resign, Italy’s bonds were consumed by panic. At one point yields gapped up towards 7.5%—a level that would eventually pitch Italy into insolvency and long before that triggers a run on its banks.When the world’s third-largest bond market begins to buckle, catastrophe looms. At stake is not just the Italian economy but Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the euro, the European Union’s single market, the global banking system, the world economy, and pretty much anything else you can think of. Greece is important because it sets precedents for the euro—over such things as debt write-downs and rescues (see article). Italy matters much more because it is so vast.It is clear now that Italy will be the crucible which tests the euro to destruction—or survival. Only a few weeks ago, that test still seemed avoidable. Now it is at hand. If the euro zone wants its currency to survive, it must stem the panic and make Italy’s vaudeville politics credible. Both acts are still within Europe’s compass. But with each lurch of the euro zone towards contagion, with each bungled change of government, and with each reluctant intervention in the financial markets, the task becomes harder and more costly. As the grim scene unfolds, you can almost feel the euro’s chances draining away.Presto panicoThe urgent task is to stanch the financial panic—if only to give politicians a chance to show that, now they understand the stakes, they can do better. This panic took hold on November 9th when, against the background of rising Italian bond yields, LCH Clearnet, a clearing house, raised its margin calls—meaning that anyone dealing in Italian bonds now needs to set more capital aside against possible defaults. That extra capital raised the cost of dealing in Italian government debt, causing a wave of selling as investors quit the market (see article).Nothing can now prevent a debt crisis in Italy. Borrowing costs are set to remain well above their levels before the crisis. The finance industry will not soon reverse its extra margin call and even if it did, investors are not about to treat Italian debt as “risk free”. Ratings agencies will surely downgrade the country. If its debt is left to spiral down, Italy will be shut out of the bond markets. Its banks will become vulnerable, as their depositors and lenders conclude that they and the Italian state are likely to become insolvent. Contagion will spread across the euro zone. The end will come soon enough.But Italy is not yet insolvent. Although the rescue plan set out by the euro zone last month is in tatters, the European Central Bank could still gain time by pledging to buy Italy’s debt in unlimited quantities and to protect European banks, as The Economist has argued. The signs this week were that the ECB had stepped in to ease Italian yields. But it has not yet made that vital public pledge to do whatever it takes, without limit, to create a proper firewall and stop the panic.The truth is that the risks of the euro splintering really have mounted. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, acknowledged at the recent G20 summit for the first time that they might abandon Greece to its fate—a devastating shift from leaders who had always insisted that the euro would survive intact at any price. There is chatter that they are contemplating a new club of core euro countries that can live within the rules, and jettisoning the rest.Such talk will make it harder for the ECB to convince markets that the euro is here to stay. But it may just put the fear of God into Europe’s politicians—indeed, that may be the idea. Ultimately, politicians are the only people who can put this right. If the ECB creates a breathing space, then politicians must use it to convince the world that the euro zone’s democracies have the capacity to deal with their debts and reform their economies—as set out in this issue’s special report on the future of Europe (printed early this week, before Mr Berlusconi’s news). If the politicians fail, so eventually will the euro.The man who screwed an entire currencyWhile the fate of the euro was resting on Mr Berlusconi’s follically enhanced head, the chances of success were slim. He liked to portray himself as a pro-business liberal reformer but under him Italy has utterly failed to abandon a model that used lira devaluations to offset inflation and stagnant or falling productivity. Between 2001 and 2010 Italy’s unit-wage costs soared and its economy grew by less than any other country in the world, except Haiti and Zimbabwe. The Economist has long argued that Mr Berlusconi was unfit to govern, but even we have been shocked by how, as the euro crisis drew closer to Italy, he partied and politicked, brushing off the need for reform.Without Mr Berlusconi, Italy stands a chance. Its stock of debt, though high, is stable. It suffered no housing boom or associated banking bust. Italians are good savers and government tax receipts not too dependent on finance or property. Before interest payments, Italy is even running a fiscal surplus.Much of the talk in Rome is now of finding a technocrat to run a new government committed to reform—Mario Monti, say, who was a respected European commissioner. Such a caretaker government will have a part to play over the coming months. But reform needs to be sustained for years, and that requires democratic legitimacy more than anything else. So any technocratic caretaker should prepare for urgent elections that could produce a government for reform.For the euro to survive, Italy must succeed. For Italy to succeed, its squabbling politicians must find unaccustomed reserves of unity and courage. That depends on ordinary Italians being willing to make sacrifices, the ECB backing Italy, and France and Germany standing resolutely behind the euro. It is a dauntingly long list of things to go right.

"Dragi vodja" Kim Jong-il pise Berluskoniju ^_^Dear Mr Silvio Berlusconi: I really envy and admire you for the ideal position in which you have placed your country. For decades, I have tried to be in the same political spot, but I failed while you managed it. I salute you. ostatak:

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Italy is now very weak, but it is the fuse that may start a global economic wildfire - one that could burn down the whole global economy as we know it. The default of Italy could bring down the euro, which in turn could kindle a second deeper recession on the old continent. This could push overboard the already shaky American GDP, and as a consequence, it could cause a global economic meltdown. The chain reaction is uncertain, but the size of Italy and of its problems makes it possible if not likely. Developed and developing countries have got too much to lose to risk to starting this chain reaction. They are better off by simply trying to prevent it. Therefore, they know a crisis in Italy must be averted. The November 3 u-turn in Greece, whose premier decided to scrap the proposed referendum on the acceptance of the reforms imposed by the EU, leaves Italy alone on the frontline of the crisis. Rome alone can start the chain reaction leading to the meltdown. This is a huge responsibility - but also offers Italy immense power to blackmail other countries. For decades, I tried to thrive by blackmailing Japan, South Korea, the US, or China. I told them, "give me money, or else I'll throw a missile on Tokyo, explode an atomic test near Seoul, bomb a US garrison or a ship, or starve my own people to death." But unfortunately, I managed to get little. My threats were at best local, and thus they could only bring small, limited disturbances to regional economies that grew bigger and ever more confident of their strength and smug before my threats. A one-day crash in the Tokyo stock exchange prompted by a missile flying over Japan would get me a pittance in return. If I decided to press ahead, I would be invaded and toppled, so what could I do? I would have had to step down, give up my grand brinkmanship, and satisfy myself with less and less. But you are in a very different position. If you play your brinkmanship well, you can blackmail the whole world and get whatever you want from it. The other European powers and America demand deep cuts and reform of your system? [Exclamation deleted] them, why didn't they wake up earlier, and why did they dither for months over the tiny Greek problem? They want you to step down and give more guarantees to the markets? [Exclamation deleted] them, why did they let you rule for many years and ignore for a long time growing signs of a political cancer devouring Italy from the inside? They think they can split you from the Italian people? Ah! Do they think the Italians would agree to be de facto invaded by their northern neighbors and become a second-rate junior partner under Franco-German tutelage? No way. They don't believe it? You can call general elections and have a referendum asking democratically if the Italians want to suffer while other countries save their skin. They think they can expel you from the EU? Let them try it. Even if an expulsion from the euro were to mean the temporary collapse of the Italian economy and skyrocketing inflation, you can explain that Italians have decades of experience in finding a way out of a crisis through inflation. You can promise the Italian people that inflation today means more jobs tomorrow. What have you got to lose? They, the other countries, have got a lot to lose, as they have no firewall to protect against a crisis that starts in Italy. They have to come to terms with you, and you can blackmail them. Moreover, you can clinch a powerful deal on the way out of the crisis and the future situation of Italy in Europe and in the world. What can happen to you? The two most powerful Europeans, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, do not need a strong Italian counterpart. And you, Berlusconi, beleaguered by scandals and blunders, are weak enough to make them to think you will buckle under their pressure. Therefore, they can have an interest in keeping you in power. The motley and confused congregation of Italian parties and cumbersome electoral law make it possible that no clear result could come out of a general election. The only real way out for Europe or Italy would be to directly elect a prime minister who would select his government without blackmail from different parties. The parliament should then control the premier but not hold him hostage. Are Italian parties or their European counterparts willing to walk this path? Will President Giorgio Napolitano take the lead in pushing reform in this direction? Can he do it? It is very unlikely. All of them are mired in thousands of problems that obstruct the picture. But this is the best situation for your brinkmanship and blackmail. Is it unethical? Nonsense. The only ethical politicians are the dead ones, and you have to play the cards you were dealt by life. Certainly, you have to be very prudent. You will have many enemies hunting for your scalp, and in brinkmanship you can easily walk over the brink. But you are a survivor like no one else, and you can do it. Reselect your team and fight. I wish you well. With admiration, Jong-il Kim