svaki krah evra znaci kratkorocno stampanje dolara odrzivim.

taj deo nije sporan. i da smo se tu zaustavili, sve stima. geopolitika, propast evra koji valjda prizeljkuju Ameri (a tome se, gle cuda, odje niko ne raduje), multipolarni svet, ovo i ono, je vec druga prica. propast evra moze da ubrza kolaps US ekonomije, i da taj kolaps ucini mnogo gorim kada se desi.

ponovo Bil Boner:This will leave the feds in need of lots of money. But with so many question marks in Europe, investors think they can sleep easy at night by moving their money to America. All things considered, the dollar and the US bond market looks like the best games in town. This makes it easy for the feds to continue borrowing at low rates…continue going into debt…and keep their bread and circus program going almost indefinitely.The end of this phase may be many years ahead. Japan has been at it for 20 years. The US could pile up debt for another 10 years. But when the end comes…it will be something to see!

Edited November 25, 201113 yr by Gandalf

Merkel i dalje odbija uvodjenje euro bonds i stampanje para u ecb. Engleska, italijanska i spanska stampa kopa prljavstinu o kancelarki i prica o ratu Nemacke protiv ostatka Evrope (Spiegel).Kao informisani laik koji se ne lozi na istocnonemacke babe, zdrav razum ipak kaze: Angela izdrzi. Bolje sad da pukne nego da imamo fed u Evropi.

propast evra moze da ubrza kolaps US ekonomije, i da taj kolaps ucini mnogo gorim kada se desi.

Pa samo se nadoveži na link koji si postavio.Amerika puca pa puca, gotovo izvesno, pitanje je samo koliko će dugo izdržati. Ako je tačno da više od 50% US državnih obveznica drže stranci, propašću evra broj zainteresovanih ulagača u iste bi se samo povećao, što bi prolongiralo taj period i omogućilo im da za isti zadrže postojeće stanje i odnos snaga. U kontraslučaju, stabilizacijom evra (što sigurno implicira jače povezivanje tj. transformaciju EU u nešto nalik državi), taj će se broj sve više smanjivati i bežaće se u evroobveznice. Što može da ima itekakve posledice po njih tj. da taj neminovan kraj umnogome ubrza.U ovome će jedan vrisnuti, ili EU ili SAD. Trenutno su veći izgledi da će to biti EU.

Economist u seriji tekstova opet dize paniku. Stampaj Mario stampaj, daj pare Angela daj, ili mast u propast, katastrofa, kraj, armagedon...Prvo, tekst o Angeli, koji je najoptimisticniji od svih na ovu temu, o tome kako Angela ceka poslednji cas da napravi teske odluke, kako kalkulise, ali je ipak pragmaticna. Takodje spominje se da francuski premijer Fijon hoce da ECB stampa pare tj. kupuje drzavne obveznice ali da je "jedini" problem ubediti Merkelovu. S druge strane, Merkelova nece da "protraci" kriznu situaciju, tj. ocigledno nece da krene sa 'nuklearnom' opcijom do same ivice nad provalijom, dok ne izmuze sve sto moze iz 'nedisciplinovanih' juznih clanica evrozone:http://www.economist.com/node/21540283

Angela Merkel and the euroThe new iron chancellorAs the euro totters, the world waits for the German chancellor to act. Will she?Nov 26th 2011 | BERLIN | from the print editionAS A schoolgirl, Angela Merkel spent an entire swimming lesson perched on a diving board. Only when the final bell sounded did she find the nerve to take the plunge. “I am not spontaneously courageous,” the German chancellor later said. “I am, I think, courageous at the right moment,” but “led too much by my head” to leap recklessly in. For Margaret Heckel, author of a book about Mrs Merkel, the story shows that “she goes to her limits and then overcomes them.” She has a “very fundamental confidence in her abilities.”It is not widely shared. Mrs Merkel’s critics say she has reacted too little and too late to the euro crisis, which now threatens to trigger a worldwide recession as well as the single currency’s break-up. France’s prime minister, François Fillon, wants the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy bonds of shaky euro-zone governments on a grand scale. “But there’s a big problem, and that is to convince Germany.” The quip that Mrs Merkel is the only politician who can stop Barack Obama being re-elected attests both to her power and to frustration over how she wields it. Much depends on the right reading of the diving-board story.The chancellor can point to a career built on breaking rules and confounding expectations. The daughter of a Protestant pastor who moved to communist East Germany during her infancy, she worked as a chemist at the Academy of Sciences and largely steered clear of politics until the Berlin Wall fell. She then joined the Christian Democratic Union led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, but she was never going to be one of the boys. She rose to the very top in 2005 by outsmarting rivals with more impressive credentials, greater political skills and bigger power bases.When the world economy was wobbling after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, she was lambasted for doing too little to steady it. Mrs Merkel “does not get basic economics,” declared Adam Posen, an American economist. Yet Germany emerged from the crisis stronger than any other big Western economy. On her desk sits a portrait of Russia’s Catherine the Great, another underestimated east German woman.Many Germans who pay close attention to politics dislike her. Communication is not her thing: her supporters explain that she is a Sachführer, one who leads through mastery of policy, as opposed to an inspiring Anführer. She is given to abrupt changes of direction, suggesting a readiness to abandon principle for political gain. A longtime supporter of nuclear power, she shut down seven reactors after the Fukushima disaster this year. Commentators who cannot abide her frosty pragmatism eagerly predict her demise whenever she faces setbacks. These have been frequent, especially during her two-year-old coalition with the Free Democrats. But Mrs Merkel governs for the majority, which is not usually paying attention. Her aim is to get results, timed if possible to coincide with elections.Now she is the chief figure, along with Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, in an economic version of the Cuban missile crisis. She is said to be courting Armageddon by adhering slavishly to Germany’s sound-money dogmas and kowtowing to taxpayers who cannot see why the preservation of the euro should be worth paying something for. Hence her refusal to endorse unlimited bond buying by the ECB and her dismissal of jointly guaranteed eurobonds, an idea touted again this week by the European Commission. Surely, pray observers, she will blink before doomsday arrives.Mrs Merkel is aware of the talk of catastrophe, but evidently not listening—even after market nerves led this week to a failed German bund auction (see article). In any case, she sees the crisis as too good to waste. No fewer than five euro-zone governments have been toppled but their successors are committed to sounder budgeting and structural reforms. Mrs Merkel wants the euro zone to be a “stability union”, but this understates her ambition. That nearly half of young Spaniards are unemployed worries her almost as much as Italy’s debt. Big Brussels initiatives to arrest Europe’s long-term economic decline have proved ineffectual. What some call foot-dragging Mrs Merkel regards as creative obstruction.Mrs Merkel’s closest advisers are as led by the head as she is. Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, an historian by training, is her senior adviser on Europe, to which he has devoted his diplomatic career. Her economic adviser is Lars-Hendrik Röller, once the European Commission’s chief economist for competition. Even closer to the chancellor are Beate Baumann, head of her office, and Eva Christiansen, her media adviser, who act as sounding boards. Like their boss, both are cerebral strategists. The chancellery often has the hush of a library, not the buzz of a centre of power.None of her close counsellors is expert in financial markets. But Mrs Merkel is hardly cut off. “She talks to many more people than your average politician,” notes Ms Heckel. She is not embarrassed to pepper them with questions in meetings at the chancellery. Her relationship with the europhile finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, rocky in the past, has improved during the crisis. Mrs Merkel also stays in touch with the Bundesbank’s president, Jens Weidmann, formerly her economic adviser, even though he has denounced some of the bail-outs she has backed.As they await her final word on the euro, seasoned Merkel watchers have grounds for both hope and fear. She has no wish to be the chancellor who let the currency fall apart. But to unleash the ECB or to embrace eurobonds could precipitate a domestic crisis that would be almost as catastrophic. The measures already taken should be given a chance to work, she thinks. Meanwhile, she amasses the data needed for her next decision. She trusts her powers of calculation. If circumstances demand it, she is pragmatic enough to alter course. But she is not infallible. When the bell rings, it may be too late to dive.

Drugi tekst, pesimistican, evro se raspada dok evrokrate ne znaju sta ce i kuda ce - Barozo predlaze kontrolu iz Brisela nad nacionalnim budzetima zemalja koje su u velikim problemima, ali uz to i evroobveznice za sav dug iznad 60% BDPa, Merkelova nece za taj deo price da cuje, i tako:http://www.economist.com/node/21540244

CharlemagneThe sinking euroDenial and delusion in Brussels, as the single currency foundersNov 26th 2011 | from the print editionTHE designers of the good ship euro wanted to create the greatest liner of the age. But as everybody now knows, it was fit only for fair-weather sailing, with an anarchic crew and no lifeboat. Its rules of economic seamanship were rudimentary, and were broken anyway. When it struck a reef two years ago, the water flooded one compartment after another.“The situation is extremely serious, more so perhaps than at any point in the last 18 months,” José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, said this week. He announced two last-ditch initiatives to avert doom. One is a “green paper” on options for joint Eurobonds. To balance this mutualisation of debt, he also proposed stronger monitoring of national budgets by Brussels, including the right to recommend changes before they are submitted to parliaments, and fiercer oversight of countries “in severe difficulties”.Renaming Eurobonds as stability bonds, the green paper is almost an act of insubordination against Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor. She is strongly against the idea and has also declared that only a treaty change can impose enough rules to ward off another disaster. Eurobonds and treaty change together just might make for a better vessel, but they would take years to put into effect. Why design a safer imaginary ship when the present real one is about to sink?Mrs Merkel speaks often of the need to save the euro, but she acts as if there were no imminent danger. Germany has stayed dry. If other crew members are neck-deep in icy water, she thinks it serves them right; only the fear of God (and the bond markets) will teach them to be responsible. Yet there are clear dangers in this policy. One is that it provokes a mutiny against Germany. The second is that the Germans miscalculate. At some point a listing ship topples over, and Germany would plunge into the sea with everybody else. A German bond sale this week was alarmingly undersubscribed. A paper by Ulrike Guérot, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, expresses the fear that, rather like the Soviet Union, the European Union could go down quickly if the euro starts breaking up.For now, there is a surreal atmosphere in Brussels. Like the band on the Titanic that played on to the end, the EU’s bureaucracy keeps producing studies, policies and regulations. At one briefing this week, officials said “this is a very good day, not just for European sharks, but for sharks worldwide.” This was no allusion to hated financial speculators. Instead, it was about a new ban on shark-finning, ie, the removal of fins from sharks caught in European waters or by European ships elsewhere.European officials now recognise the folly of creating the euro without preparing for trouble. It would be wise to be planning now for what to do if it sinks. But officials have spent so long giving warnings of the horror of a Greek default, not to speak of its departure from the euro, that they cannot. “I prefer not to think about it,” says one.Below decks the chatter is of European fonctionnaires scrabbling around for ways to protect their savings. But as an institution, the EU fears that even a hint of defeatism may spread panic. “If anybody wrote a paper on contingency planning for the break-up of the euro, it would leak out immediately,” says one official. Even now, after decades of “European construction”, many Eurocrats cannot conceive of the euro as a wreck. Those who have worked hardest to keep it afloat are exhausted and know it is not in their power to save it anyway.Even national governments are not masters of their fate. Both Lucas Papademos and Mario Monti, the technocrats running Greece and Italy after their predecessors were cast overboard, came to Brussels this week to meet Mr Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council (representing European leaders). Theirs looked like a council of the powerless.If not the market, what of Merkel and Mario?Nothing that Brussels, Rome or Athens can do is likely to impress the markets. The issue is whether they can impress those with the money: Mrs Merkel and Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank? Many proposals to save the euro—issuing Eurobonds, getting the ECB to act as a lender of last resort to governments (and not just banks) or using the IMF-issued reserves known as Special Drawing Rights—have been rejected by Germany, for both legal and political reasons. The ECB has offered valuable but strictly limited help. It is keeping its distance for fear of dirtying itself by lending to governments and, perhaps, stoking inflation. Salvation must come from political leaders, says Mr Draghi; why have they not acted on their October decision to boost the European Financial Stability Facility? “We should not be waiting any longer,” he says.In Brussels the belief (or perhaps just the hope) is that a show of reforming zeal by weaker members of the euro zone plus a determination by EU institutions to impose discipline could be enough to persuade Germany and the ECB to ease up. At some point, many argue, Germany must come to its senses. The situation is desperate. France may lose its AAA credit rating. Even the rigorous Finns and Dutch have seen bond spreads widen.But no single action can save the euro. This is not just because Germany wants others to feel the pain for a long time, but also because the damage from poor leadership and procrastination is so extensive. The euro will require a full redesign through new treaties, with Eurobonds and possibly much else besides. If this is to happen, though, it must first survive. It is time for Mrs Merkel to grasp that her country risks being caught up in the euro’s catastrophic failure—and for Mr Draghi to admit that he risks finding himself without a job.

Treci tekst je vec alarmisticki skroz, propada evro, stampaj pare ili odosmo svi u qratz:http://www.economist.com/node/21540255

The euro zoneIs this really the end?Unless Germany and the ECB move quickly, the single currency’s collapse is loomingNov 26th 2011 | from the print editionEVEN as the euro zone hurtles towards a crash, most people are assuming that, in the end, European leaders will do whatever it takes to save the single currency. That is because the consequences of the euro’s destruction are so catastrophic that no sensible policymaker could stand by and let it happen.A euro break-up would cause a global bust worse even than the one in 2008-09. The world’s most financially integrated region would be ripped apart by defaults, bank failures and the imposition of capital controls (see article). The euro zone could shatter into different pieces, or a large block in the north and a fragmented south. Amid the recriminations and broken treaties after the failure of the European Union’s biggest economic project, wild currency swings between those in the core and those in the periphery would almost certainly bring the single market to a shuddering halt. The survival of the EU itself would be in doubt.Yet the threat of a disaster does not always stop it from happening. The chances of the euro zone being smashed apart have risen alarmingly, thanks to financial panic, a rapidly weakening economic outlook and pigheaded brinkmanship. The odds of a safe landing are dwindling fast.Markets, manias and panicsInvestors’ growing fears of a euro break-up have fed a run from the assets of weaker economies, a stampede that even strong actions by their governments cannot seem to stop. The latest example is Spain. Despite a sweeping election victory on November 20th for the People’s Party, committed to reform and austerity, the country’s borrowing costs have surged again. The government has just had to pay a 5.1% yield on three-month paper, more than twice as much as a month ago. Yields on ten-year bonds are above 6.5%. Italy’s new technocratic government under Mario Monti has not seen any relief either: ten-year yields remain well above 6%. Belgian and French borrowing costs are rising. And this week, an auction of German government Bunds flopped.The panic engulfing Europe’s banks is no less alarming. Their access to wholesale funding markets has dried up, and the interbank market is increasingly stressed, as banks refuse to lend to each other. Firms are pulling deposits from peripheral countries’ banks. This backdoor run is forcing banks to sell assets and squeeze lending; the credit crunch could be deeper than the one Europe suffered after Lehman Brothers collapsed.Add the ever greater fiscal austerity being imposed across Europe and a collapse in business and consumer confidence, and there is little doubt that the euro zone will see a deep recession in 2012—with a fall in output of perhaps as much as 2%. That will lead to a vicious feedback loop in which recession widens budget deficits, swells government debts and feeds popular opposition to austerity and reform. Fear of the consequences will then drive investors even faster towards the exits.Past financial crises show that this downward spiral can be arrested only by bold policies to regain market confidence. But Europe’s policymakers seem unable or unwilling to be bold enough. The much-ballyhooed leveraging of the euro-zone rescue fund agreed on in October is going nowhere. Euro-zone leaders have become adept at talking up grand long-term plans to safeguard their currency—more intrusive fiscal supervision, new treaties to advance political integration. But they offer almost no ideas for containing today’s conflagration.Germany’s cautious chancellor, Angela Merkel, can be ruthlessly efficient in politics: witness the way she helped to pull the rug from under Silvio Berlusconi. A credit crunch is harder to manipulate. Along with leaders of other creditor countries, she refuses to acknowledge the extent of the markets’ panic (see article). The European Central Bank (ECB) rejects the idea of acting as a lender of last resort to embattled, but solvent, governments. The fear of creating moral hazard, under which the offer of help eases the pressure on debtor countries to embrace reform, is seemingly enough to stop all rescue plans in their tracks. Yet that only reinforces investors’ nervousness about all euro-zone bonds, even Germany’s, and makes an eventual collapse of the currency more likely.This cannot go on for much longer. Without a dramatic change of heart by the ECB and by European leaders, the single currency could break up within weeks. Any number of events, from the failure of a big bank to the collapse of a government to more dud bond auctions, could cause its demise. In the last week of January, Italy must refinance more than €30 billion ($40 billion) of bonds. If the markets balk, and the ECB refuses to blink, the world’s third-biggest sovereign borrower could be pushed into default.The perils of brinkmanshipCan anything be done to avert disaster? The answer is still yes, but the scale of action needed is growing even as the time to act is running out. The only institution that can provide immediate relief is the ECB. As the lender of last resort, it must do more to save the banks by offering unlimited liquidity for longer duration against a broader range of collateral. Even if the ECB rejects this logic for governments—wrongly, in our view—large-scale bond-buying is surely now justified by the ECB’s own narrow interpretation of prudent central banking. That is because much looser monetary policy is necessary to stave off recession and deflation in the euro zone. If the ECB is to fulfil its mandate of price stability, it must prevent prices falling. That means cutting short-term rates and embarking on “quantitative easing” (buying government bonds) on a large scale. And since conditions are tightest in the peripheral economies, the ECB will have to buy their bonds disproportionately.Vast monetary loosening should cushion the recession and buy time. Yet reviving confidence and luring investors back into sovereign bonds now needs more than ECB support, restructuring Greece’s debt and reforming Italy and Spain—ambitious though all this is. It also means creating a debt instrument that investors can believe in. And that requires a political bargain: financial support that peripheral countries need in exchange for rule changes that Germany and others demand.This instrument must involve some joint liability for government debts. Unlimited Eurobonds have been ruled out by Mrs Merkel; they would probably fall foul of Germany’s constitutional court. But compromises exist, as suggested this week by the European Commission (see Charlemagne). One promising idea, from Germany’s Council of Economic Experts, is to mutualise all euro-zone debt above 60% of each country’s GDP, and to set aside a tranche of tax revenue to pay it off over the next 25 years. Yet Germany, still fretful about turning a currency union into a transfer union in which it forever supports the weaker members, has dismissed the idea.This attitude has to change, or the euro will break up. Fears of moral hazard mean less now that all peripheral-country governments are committed to austerity and reform. Debt mutualisation can be devised to stop short of a permanent transfer union. Mrs Merkel and the ECB cannot continue to threaten feckless economies with exclusion from the euro in one breath and reassure markets by promising the euro’s salvation with the next. Unless she chooses soon, Germany’s chancellor will find that the choice has been made for her.

Edited November 26, 201113 yr by hazard

Da, ocigledan je pritisak a razlog je mislim jednostavan - ukoliko nemacki plan uspe i na ovaj nacin nateraju brze izmene u EU pravilima, pre nego sto pocne brzopleto stampanje ili izdavanje Euro-bondsa, koje bi u suprotnosti potrajale godinama ili decenijama, onda bi se u roku od godina dana stvorio verovatno najvece i veoma brzo najstabilnije trziste obveznica na svetu. Nezavisna Bundesbanka je vec pokazala u proslosti da je mnogo bolji garant za stabilnost novca od FED-a ili BoE a ako se cela Evro-zona uspostavi na tim principima i ustavnim garancijama oko zaduzivanja onda je prvo funta a onda i dolar (kao i njihove obveznice) srednjorocno u ogromnim problemima jer su deficiti SAD i Britanije mnogo veci cak i od sadasnjeg EU proseka a prospekti za rast su slicni. Ukoliko Spanija i Italija uvedu pod pritiskom i protiv unutrasnjeg otpora brzo reforme na trzistu rada poput nemackih od pre 6-7 godina + dodatne strukturne reforme smanjenja birokratije (u cemu je nova spanska ali i italijanska vlada na punoj nemackoj liniji) i limit na zaduzivanje do recimo samo 60% drzavnog garantovanog duga (o cemu se prica u nemackim modelima) u evro obveznicama, to ce ujedno postati najveca i najbolja sigurnosna investicija na planeti u sadasnjoj situaciji stampanja dolara i funti bez ikakvog ogranicenja. EU samit je 9. decembra cini mi se i tu ce biti reci upravo o brzoj promeni EU/EZ pravila sto ce ujedno biti i izuzetno vazan politicki signal. Onog trenutka kad Merkel stane pred publiku i objavi da je dil postignut i road-map potpisana, da je rok implementacije recimo godinu dana a da ce do tada ECB uciniti sve da stabilizuje sistem dok sve ne prodje kroz parlamente i referendume, kamate ce poceti da padaju i politicko-duznicka kriza ce biti zavrsena skoro preko noci. No, do tada ne cudi tvrda linija ni Nemacke a ni ECB da prakticno koriste pritisak trzista na Spaniju, Italiju i pre svega Francusku jer pravila koja ce se dogovoriti sada treba da vaze sledecih 50 godina i imace veliki uticaj na buducnost kontinenta.

Edited November 26, 201113 yr by Anduril

Moze jedno pitanje? Koja vlada (koje vlade) su najodgovornije za ovoliki dug Nemacke? Da li je odgovornost ravnomerna ili postoje oni koji su posebno zasluzni za ovoliki dug?

zak atali sada tvrdi da evro broji bukvalno poslednje nedelje. jeste, to je alarmizam, ali on nije neki tamo anonimus i verovatno postoji osnova za to sto prica.mene kao duduka za ekonomiju zanima: kako bi taj kolaps tacno izgledao? drasticna pad vrednosti evra, manicno povlacenje depozita iz banaka, sta? kako bi to izgledalo iz dana u dan?edit: Foreign Office nalozio ambasadama da se pripreme za nemire velikih razmera u Evropi.

Edited November 26, 201113 yr by Marko M. Dabovic

Толике сам године причао против ЕУ и предвиђао им пропаст, а сада ми жао људи.

Толике сам године причао против ЕУ и предвиђао им пропаст, а сада ми жао људи.

mozes slobodno i sebe da zalis, nase poslovanje je potpuno vezano za evro i evrobanke. cenim da je dovoljno da Intesa i Credi Agricole odu u kurac, pa da pola zemlje ne vidi plate 6 meseci.

mozes slobodno i sebe da zalis, nase poslovanje je potpuno vezano za evro i evrobanke. cenim da je dovoljno da Intesa i Credi Agricole odu u kurac, pa da pola zemlje ne vidi plate 6 meseci.

+1Kontam da našim ljudima nije jasno, da ako oni propadnu, mi idemo zajdeno sa njima, samo mnogo, mnogo gore...Ali, sve se nešto nadam, da nisu baš toliko ludi, a da su ove vesti bullshit, a da se u pozadini ozbiljno radi na sređivanju situacije...

+1

iskreno, nadao sam se da ces mi reci da lupam gluposti i da nije tako crno

Пола земље ни сада не види плату месецима. Али, ми смо ионако ћао. Када се сетим само протеста у Грчкој и пензионера који се залећу на мурију јер су им пензије замрзнуте на 500 јура... Нама је већ сада горе него Грцима, шта може следеће да буде? Ако пригусти, држава ће да штампа паре и биће нека инфлација коју ће добар део народа да слави јер ће им појести дугове за инфостан и струју. Ко ће да нас пегла што ми опет правимо глупости у нашој селендри док се у исто време руши практично неизграђена империја? Мада морам да признам и да ми је овај апокалиптични сценарио који предвиђају Британци некако превише. Можда амерички копнени носач авиона пумпа фрку из жеље да одбрани своју уздрману фунту и из потребе да се додатно увуче у буљу својој бившој колонији.

+1Kontam da našim ljudima nije jasno, da ako oni propadnu, mi idemo zajdeno sa njima, samo mnogo, mnogo gore...Ali, sve se nešto nadam, da nisu baš toliko ludi, a da su ove vesti bullshit, a da se u pozadini ozbiljno radi na sređivanju situacije...

ozbiljno se radi jer su sudbine desetina, ako ne i stotina miliona ljudi u pitanju, ali vesti nisu bullshit. Ima par stvari koje ovu krizu razlikuju, na pozitivan način, od one između dva rata, ali nekako mi se čini da ovo nije trenutak za optimistične reči...

Мада морам да признам и да ми је овај апокалиптични сценарио који предвиђају Британци некако превише. Можда амерички копнени носач авиона пумпа фрку из жеље да одбрани своју уздрману фунту и из потребе да се додатно увуче у буљу својој бившој колонији.

Pa dobro, to je telegraph. Kako da propuste priliku da seire što je na kontinentu gore i što oni nisu odbacili tuntu...

Пола земље ни сада не види плату месецима. Али, ми смо ионако ћао. Када се сетим само протеста у Грчкој и пензионера који се залећу на мурију јер су им пензије замрзнуте на 500 јура... Нама је већ сада горе него Грцима, шта може следеће да буде? Ако пригусти, држава ће да штампа паре и биће нека инфлација коју ће добар део народа да слави јер ће им појести дугове за инфостан и струју. Ко ће да нас пегла што ми опет правимо глупости у нашој селендри док се у исто време руши практично неизграђена империја? Мада морам да признам и да ми је овај апокалиптични сценарио који предвиђају Британци некако превише. Можда амерички копнени носач авиона пумпа фрку из жеље да одбрани своју уздрману фунту и из потребе да се додатно увуче у буљу својој бившој колонији.

Da, mi imamo dinar sa kojim možemo da sjebemo barem interne dugove i ionako siromašno stanovništvo još malo osiromašimo... Ali nam ostaju eksterni dugovi... Koje nemamo ideju kako vratiti, jer se to inflacijom ne rešava... A nemamo šta ponuditi svetu, napraviti i izvesti, kako bi vratili te dugove... Privreda nam je 0, uslužni sektor možda malo malo manja 0...Uzgred, nama jeste apsolutno gore nego Grcima, ali ne i relativno... Ovde se nikada nije dobro živelo(valjda Hella ne čita ovo :) ), ali u Grčkoj poslednjih 10-ak godina jeste... I onda je njima njihov sunovrat strašniji nego nama... Mene kolege Grci ubeđuju da, štogod se desi, nama i recimo, Bugarima, je bolje... Kao, mi imamo perspektivu, a oni svoju ne vide... To je bullshit, ali ne mogu ja to njima objasniti, jer je svakom svoja nesreća najgora...Ovo za Britance si mislim u pravu... Kenjaju kao foke...Ne znam, ja očekujem neko rešenje, slično Andurilovom, sa stvaranjem jedne jake, prave centralne banke, i u suštini federalne Evrope... Ko ostane napolju, neće ući skoro, a možda ni nikad unutra... ALi, to je cena zajabavanja i laganja od strane Grka i Italijana... To što će najebati i drugi, jbg... Nije Nemačka kriva...