Opšti topik o EU (ex kriza Evrozone)

[porucnik vasic]

 

To sto neko SMATRA da je diversity dobar je vise nego bezvredno ako zivi u 95% belom kraju.

 

"For us African Americans when we see a group of white people move to the neighbourhood we think that's good, we're cool with that. But for many white families that's not the case - they start to get discouraged, they start to worry about the property value and leave."

 

I ovi sto sto se sele kad im se crnje dosele u kraj su kapiram vecinski u tih 58%. Smatraju ljudi.

[Eraserhead]

 

 

Ne razumete vi to porucnice profesore vasicu kod vas je oko 95% jedna rasa.

[ObiW]

 

 

To sto neko SMATRA da je diversity dobar je vise nego bezvredno ako zivi u 95% belom kraju.

A da taj isti smatra da diversity nije dobar, da li bi to onda bilo vredno necega? 

 

Ili da parafraziram pitanje, da li licinjenica da zivi u 95% belom kraju automatski diskvalifikuje njegovo misljenje o diverisity, bilo ono dobro ili lose?

 

Jer dozvolices, da ti neko ko zivi u 95% belom kraju kaze da diversity nista ne valja, odmah bi pomislio da se radi o ksenofobicnoj osobi, zar ne? A ako je tako - a da se ne lazemo jeste - zasto negativno misljenje treba da uzmemo za ozbiljno, a pozitivno jok?

[Venom]

A da taj isti smatra da diversity nije dobar, da li bi to onda bilo vredno necega?

Kredibiliteta u svakom slucaju.

[ObiW]

Kredibiliteta u svakom slucaju.

E ako je to tako onda Stormfront ima kredibiliteta za izvoz, a to je bitno u picku materinu.

Edited October 25, 2016 by ObiW

[Venom]

Pobrkao si. Nije bitno da li stormfront ima kredibilitet, nego da ga 95% white neighborhoods nemaju. Ljudi koji se sele kad darkies pocnu da im ruse cenu nekretnine su u praksi blizi stormfrontu, nego klubu ljubitelja multietnicnosti.

[ObiW]

Aha.

 

Americki white flight je isto sto i evropska bodljikava zica za darkies iz Sirije. Sve je to u praksi stormfront. How yes no.

[Eraserhead]

Ljudi koji su videli Ameriku na TVu uvek najvise o njoj znaju. Pa tako i covek da bi cenio diversity mora da se preseli negde u kraj u koji je sarolik.  Verovatno onda i svako ko zivi u Srbiji ne moze da ceni diversity. Klasicne forumaske mudrosti.

[Budja]

Ljudi koji su videli Ameriku na TVu uvek najvise o njoj znaju. Pa tako i covek da bi cenio diversity mora da se preseli negde u kraj u koji je sarolik.  Verovatno onda i svako ko zivi u Srbiji ne moze da ceni diversity. Klasicne forumaske mudrosti.

 

TI kao ekonomista bar znas razliku izmedju stated i revealed preferences.

Sto je veca razlika izmedju pozeljnog i stvarnog ponasanja, veca ce biti razlika izmedju odgovora u anketama i onoga sto ljudi rade.

Znamo svi za ono cuveno potcenjivanje radiklaskih glasova po anketama tamo negde do 2008.

 

Stoga veca odbojnost u Evropi po onim anketama ne mora (ali moze) da znaci da su Evropljani vise rasisti, vec da je rasizam manje prikriven.

[Venom]

Aha.

 

Americki white flight je isto sto i evropska bodljikava zica za darkies iz Sirije. Sve je to u praksi stormfront. How yes no.

Drugim recima, a sta vi radite sirijcima?

 

Ne moramo medjutim da idemo tako daleko, samo sam doveo u sumnju relevantnost istrazivanja u kojem 58% populacije ima pohvalno misljenje o necemu, a u praksi pakuje kofere kad im to nesto dodje pred vrata. Ako tebe kao americkog rezidenta u tome alarmira sto samo 20% holandjana misli da je diversity dobar za drustvo, onda u redu.

[Venom]

Ljudi koji su videli Ameriku na TVu uvek najvise o njoj znaju. Pa tako i covek da bi cenio diversity mora da se preseli negde u kraj u koji je sarolik. Verovatno onda i svako ko zivi u Srbiji ne moze da ceni diversity. Klasicne forumaske mudrosti.

Dezinformisali su me americki domaci izdajnici i strani placenici preko propagandnog glasila britanske vlade.

[Prospero]

Ceta debacle heralds a period of disintegration for the EU

 

Weak on Putin, absent in Syria, baffled by the eurozone — now it can’t do trade deals

 

Wolfgang Münchau

OCTOBER 24, 2016

 

 

Do not underestimate the Walloons. The No vote by the francophone region of southern Belgium to the EU-Canada trade agreement is neither a cry for help nor an effort in rent extraction. They simply do not want it. A combination of EU voting rules and the Belgian constitution allows this rather small European province to cast an effective veto. I applaud them.

 

The Walloons want Ceta renegotiated. If Canada refuses, as the Canadian government said it would, then we have to consider that Ceta could fail for good — a possibility that virtually no one in Brussels dares contemplate in public.

 

The Walloons first rejected Ceta in April. With the usual arrogance, the European institutions dismissed the vote of the Wallonian parliament as an insignificant local problem. Over the past two weeks, the Walloons have said No another three times. It is not clear what part of the No the EU authorities did not understand, but their reaction has always been to try to patronise the Walloons into submission. The commission faxed more and more pages of clarifications to Namur, more voluminous than the original treaties, and progressively harder to understand.

 

The Walloons rejected Ceta out of a combination of domestic politics and genuine disagreement with the agreement itself. The prime minister of Wallonia, Paul Magnette, is a former professor of European politics at the Free University of Brussels who wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject of European citizenship.

 

Mr Magnette is not your average local politician. He knows better than most that defiance of modern-style trade agreements is a vote winner, and that centre-right and social democrat parties are losing everywhere in Europe because of their addiction to these agreements. The problem with modern-day trade deals like Ceta is that they are no longer primarily about trade. Ceta also reduces tariffs on a few agricultural goods, such as maple syrup. But the economically most important bits are those on investment. And this is what makes it politically sensitive.

 

The overriding problem with Ceta is the proposed creation of arbitration tribunals, with judges funded by the EU and Canada, that are not part of any country’s legal system. Ceta establishes a parallel legal universe for multinational investors. If you want to provoke anti-globalisation protests, this is the way to go. For an economy the size of the EU, a trade deal with an economically insignificant North American economy is simply not worth that massive risk. Ceta should have been negotiated as a much less ambitious trade agreement that could easily have been passed by EU’s institutions without any need for national ratification.

 

Will the Walloons relent? I do not believe that they will easily be bought off by some pork-barrel spending from Brussels. Mr Magnette and his francophone Socialists have more to gain by forcing a renegotiation of Ceta or by allowing the deal to collapse.

 

For the EU, the Ceta debacle is serious. I can think of the following implications:

 

1. Ceta is dead in its current form — but can be revived if the treaty provisions for investor tribunals are changed — or if the ambition of the treaty is scaled down.

2. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an even more extensive trade and investment deal in the final round of negotiation between the European Commission and the Obama administration, is dead.

3. The only deals the EU can reliably strike in the future are those that lie inside the EU’s own competence of trade only. Jean-Claude Juncker, the commission president, wanted Ceta to be approved in the usual fast-track fashion, but the European Council of member states insisted on national ratification. Mr Juncker’s instincts were right, though I doubt it would have been legally possible. The problem is that the agreement exceeded the EU’s narrow competences.

4. The EU will not be able to negotiate a bilateral free-trade agreement with the UK post-Brexit. A UK deal with the EU would be even more wide-ranging than Canada’s. It would include sections on financial services that would almost certainly be blocked by someone — not only Wallonia. Britain’s best chance to reach a trade agreement with the EU is to fold as much as possible into the Article 50 negotiations, which would constitute a quasi-fast-track procedure that circumvents lengthy ratification.

5. The fundamental problem with the EU these days is that it needs a federal state structure simply in order to exert its basic functions. The EU 28 is a dysfunctional mess in virtually everything it does. The eurozone is stuck in a perma-crisis. The EU is pathetically weak towards Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, and largely absent in Syria. Now we know that it cannot even do trade deals.

 

My overall conclusion is that the next phase of European integration — which will happen eventually — will have to be preceded by a period of disintegration. Brexit was only the start.

[bigvlada]

European commission to resurrect overarching corporate tax proposals

 

Proposed legislation is designed to curb the profit-shifting multinationals use to reduce tax liabilities on their income in Europe

 

 

The European commission will redouble its crackdown on multinational tax avoidance next week with the relaunch of proposals to create an overarching corporation tax regime across all member states.

 

The proposed legislation would subject companies to a single set of rules for calculating their taxable profits, according to drafts seen by the Guardian. It would be compulsory for corporations with annual turnover of more than €750m (£670m) and which are tax-resident in a European country.

 

Designed to curb the profit-shifting that has allowed multinationals such as Apple, Starbucks and Amazon to avoid corporation tax on substantial amounts of their income in Europe, the proposals were launched in 2011 but ran into opposition from Ireland and the UK, with the then British prime minister, David Cameron, saying he would “simply say no” to the plan.

 

The rules are designed to ensure “business profits are taxed in the jurisdiction where value is actually created”, according to the drafts, making it harder for multinationals to avoid tax by transferring intangibles such as brand or intellectual property to low-tax jurisdictions. European commissioners describe the proposed rules as “an extremely effective tool for meeting the objectives of fairer and more efficient taxation”.

 

All member states would have to sign up to the proposal for it to become law. While the UK may leave the EU before the legislation is passed, it retains a seat at the discussion table while it is still a member. If Britain remains in the single market, the new tax rules will apply to it too.

 

The commission plans to introduce two pieces of legislation. The first, known as the common corporate tax base, would introduce new ways of calculating where a company actually makes its money. The formula looks at where the value is created, based on three equally weighted factors: assets, labour and sales.

 

The second, the common consolidated corporate tax base, would put a single member state in charge of collecting all European taxes due from a particular company. Those revenues would then be shared among the other member states according to where the profits were made. This second piece of proposed legislation will be held back until the first has been agreed.

 

The rules are designed to target only the largest companies, and those with cross-border activities, accounting for 64% of business turnover generated within the EU. But smaller companies could elect to join the scheme, if they feel being taxed only in one country could cut red tape.

 

Large companies spend about 2% of taxes paid on doing the paperwork, according to the commission’s estimates, while for smaller firms the estimate is about 30% of taxes paid. The more subsidiaries a company has, and the more it trades across borders, the higher itgo s administration costs. If all multinationals paid tax through one European country, the saving could be €800m a year.

 

The proposals are likely to be resisted by Ireland, which has a low corporation tax rate of 12.5% and relies on tax competition to attract multinationals to set up head offices on its shores. Dublin is still reeling from a European commission ruling in August that it had granted €13bn in illegal benefits to Apple.

 

In May 2011, the Irish parliament passed a motion denying the legality of the commission’s original proposals, with politicians branding them an assault on the country’s tax sovereignty. A similar parliamentary motion was backed by the UK government that year.

 

As a next step, the proposals are likely to go to the European parliament for discussion and amendment, before being put to the council of ministers for approval.

 

“Britain is at a crossroads,” said the Green MEP Molly Scott Cato. “Will we follow Europe in promoting action on tackling corporate tax avoidance, or follow the route being pushed by some hard-Brexit supporters and become one of the globe’s leading tax havens? It is clear that the public interest will be best served by remaining as close as possible to Europe on tackling the scourge of corporate tax dodging.”

 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/19/european-commission-overarching-corporate-tax-proposals-profit-shifting

[porucnik vasic]

 

Ceta debacle heralds a period of disintegration for the EU

 

Weak on Putin, absent in Syria, baffled by the eurozone — now it can’t do trade deals

 

Wolfgang Münchau

OCTOBER 24, 2016

 

 

Do not underestimate the Walloons. The No vote by the francophone region of southern Belgium to the EU-Canada trade agreement is neither a cry for help nor an effort in rent extraction. They simply do not want it. A combination of EU voting rules and the Belgian constitution allows this rather small European province to cast an effective veto. I applaud them.

 

The Walloons want Ceta renegotiated. If Canada refuses, as the Canadian government said it would, then we have to consider that Ceta could fail for good — a possibility that virtually no one in Brussels dares contemplate in public.

 

The Walloons first rejected Ceta in April. With the usual arrogance, the European institutions dismissed the vote of the Wallonian parliament as an insignificant local problem. Over the past two weeks, the Walloons have said No another three times. It is not clear what part of the No the EU authorities did not understand, but their reaction has always been to try to patronise the Walloons into submission. The commission faxed more and more pages of clarifications to Namur, more voluminous than the original treaties, and progressively harder to understand.

 

The Walloons rejected Ceta out of a combination of domestic politics and genuine disagreement with the agreement itself. The prime minister of Wallonia, Paul Magnette, is a former professor of European politics at the Free University of Brussels who wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject of European citizenship.

 

Mr Magnette is not your average local politician. He knows better than most that defiance of modern-style trade agreements is a vote winner, and that centre-right and social democrat parties are losing everywhere in Europe because of their addiction to these agreements. The problem with modern-day trade deals like Ceta is that they are no longer primarily about trade. Ceta also reduces tariffs on a few agricultural goods, such as maple syrup. But the economically most important bits are those on investment. And this is what makes it politically sensitive.

 

The overriding problem with Ceta is the proposed creation of arbitration tribunals, with judges funded by the EU and Canada, that are not part of any country’s legal system. Ceta establishes a parallel legal universe for multinational investors. If you want to provoke anti-globalisation protests, this is the way to go. For an economy the size of the EU, a trade deal with an economically insignificant North American economy is simply not worth that massive risk. Ceta should have been negotiated as a much less ambitious trade agreement that could easily have been passed by EU’s institutions without any need for national ratification.

 

Will the Walloons relent? I do not believe that they will easily be bought off by some pork-barrel spending from Brussels. Mr Magnette and his francophone Socialists have more to gain by forcing a renegotiation of Ceta or by allowing the deal to collapse.

 

For the EU, the Ceta debacle is serious. I can think of the following implications:

 

1. Ceta is dead in its current form — but can be revived if the treaty provisions for investor tribunals are changed — or if the ambition of the treaty is scaled down.

2. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an even more extensive trade and investment deal in the final round of negotiation between the European Commission and the Obama administration, is dead.

3. The only deals the EU can reliably strike in the future are those that lie inside the EU’s own competence of trade only. Jean-Claude Juncker, the commission president, wanted Ceta to be approved in the usual fast-track fashion, but the European Council of member states insisted on national ratification. Mr Juncker’s instincts were right, though I doubt it would have been legally possible. The problem is that the agreement exceeded the EU’s narrow competences.

4. The EU will not be able to negotiate a bilateral free-trade agreement with the UK post-Brexit. A UK deal with the EU would be even more wide-ranging than Canada’s. It would include sections on financial services that would almost certainly be blocked by someone — not only Wallonia. Britain’s best chance to reach a trade agreement with the EU is to fold as much as possible into the Article 50 negotiations, which would constitute a quasi-fast-track procedure that circumvents lengthy ratification.

5. The fundamental problem with the EU these days is that it needs a federal state structure simply in order to exert its basic functions. The EU 28 is a dysfunctional mess in virtually everything it does. The eurozone is stuck in a perma-crisis. The EU is pathetically weak towards Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, and largely absent in Syria. Now we know that it cannot even do trade deals.

 

My overall conclusion is that the next phase of European integration — which will happen eventually — will have to be preceded by a period of disintegration. Brexit was only the start.

 

Одличан је ово текст. Само последња реченица је напросто прилепљена. 

[Prospero]

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Belgian compromise – a four-page text that sits alongside the 1,600-page treaty – must be vetted by ambassadors from 28 EU member states and endorsed by Belgium’s regional parliaments. If these hurdles are cleared, the treaty can be signed and come into force on a temporary basis.

Edited October 27, 2016 by Prospero