whistleblowers: wikileaks, snowden i...

[3opge]

jel se 3X bez vadjenja racuna ko 3 silovanja u Svedskoj?

[Musharaf]

Роштиљање све у шеснаест.

[steins]

samo još Džulijan da bude pametan, da se ne opire apšenju....

[DarkAttraktor]

QUESTION: But PJ, how can you say that diplomats are diplomats when we're talking about collecting DNA data? You want to know how many times these UN officials are flying, you want to know the credit card details. Can you at least acknowledge that after 9/11 there is a blurring of lines between diplomacy and espionage, that the role of –CROWLEY: No, there –QUESTION: – a diplomat has expanded?CROWLEY: I will specifically reject that idea. Nothing in the role of a diplomat at the state department has changed because of any one document or any one event. What we do here at the state department, we do – we've done it the same way for a number of years, and our role in helping to formulate and execute the foreign policy of the United States did not change on 9/11.QUESTION: So you always collected DNA data? Nothing changed?CROWLEY: Again, I'm … nothing in any document that is allegedly in the tranche of WikiLeaks – or in the possession of WikiLeaks – changed the role of any diplomat anywhere in the world.

Uuuhuhuhu, superfunhappyslide Jos cu poceti da strimujem te konferencije iz Bele Kuce

[DarkAttraktor]

“That evil Wikistan must be stopped before they cause more harm to our interests, our troops, our way of life! Irregardless, that Assange really gets my caribou hot and bothered. Isn’t he a dream-boat?”

[Roger Sanchez]

OT...

KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE-------------------4. © Burns noted at the outset President Bush's strong stance on Kosovo, in private and in public, during his recent visit to Pristina and Sofia. Burns said the President had made clear to President Putin at the G8 Summit that Kosovo would become independent. Russia could perhaps delay this outcome, but it could not stop it. The UN had already taken Kosovo away from Serbia, and it was the Europeans and U.S., not the Russians, who had troops on the ground to keep the peace and were providing financial assistance. Burns termed the Russian threat to recognize Abkhazia in retaliation for Western recognition of Kosovo hollow, given that other members of the international community would not follow (with the possible exception of Belarus; Saakashvili suggested that only Venezuela would support Russia). Burns and Wisner reiterated that Secretary Rice had made clear to Putin and FM Lavrov that it would be a grave mistake to recognize Abkhazia.IMPACT ON ABKHAZIA------------------5. © Saakashvili worried about the implications for Georgia of Kosovo independence and related that Putin, in the course of a recent fifty-minute bilateral meeting, had invited Georgia to coordinate with Russia on a response to the U.S. position on Kosovo. Continuing that Putin had a highly personal interest in Abkhazia, Saakashvili claimed that Putin had recalled Russian diplomats in Georgia to prepare documents on Abkhazia. This had led to some strange proposals, including a Russian proposal at the last CIS summit that Georgia approach the IOC to host the Olympic games in Abkhazia. More seriously, a Russian move to recognize Abkhazia risked setting off a powder keg in the Caucasus. Georgia was not interested in provoking the Russians, but emotions were high. The Russians, who only understood frank language, would interpret any flexibility from others as weakness. They needed to be told that they risked setting off an explosion in their own backyard thatPARIS 00002725 002 OF 004could easily rebound against them.6. © Saakashvili asked if there were quid pro quos other than Abkhazia that Russia was seeking for Kosovo independence. Burns said that the U.S. was currently focused on finding ways to encourage a Russian abstention, for instance through the eventual appointment of a UN envoy for Serbian refugee affairs or extending negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians for another 3-5 months. The USG was willing to meet the Russians half-way, provided the end result would be independence. Wisner added that the USG was not proposing a division between Kosovo's Serbian and Kosovar Albanian communities. Saakashvili said it was important that "nothing" in any eventual Kosovo decision be viewed as a precedent for other conflicts; nor did Georgia want to be associated with the process in any way. He worried that Russia would use any negotiations on an amended UNSCR to insert language that could later be cited as justification for its actions on Abkhazia. Burns reiterated the U.S. position that the record of UN involvement in Kosovo put it exactly opposite from the situation in Abkhazia.EU DYNAMICS, FRENCH PROPOSAL----------------------------7. © Saakashvili asserted that Putin had promised him to veto Kosovo independence. Burns responded that Putin had stopped short of using the word "veto" in his discussions with the President; Wisner pointed out that the Russians had been careful in their language, saying they were "ready" to veto "this" resolution (as opposed to another one). Burns commented that the Europeans in general were "too" obsessed with the threat of a Russian veto, mainly because of the divisions it would likely engender within the EU itself. For instance, Slovakia and Greece had said they would oppose recognizing Kosovo's independence. Burns reviewed his meetings with French officials in Paris and other aspects of the state of play on Kosovo.8. © Picking up on an earlier comment by Burns that Kosovo was 95 percent ethnic Kosovar Albanian, Saakashvili noted that 500,000 ethnic Georgians had been forced out of Abkhazia. He asked how the USG and others would respond to possible Russian parallel demands for an international presence aimed at postponing until some point in the future a decision on independence for Abkhazia. He urged Burns to reject such arguments out of hand, given that the Russians were responsible for the war in Abkhazia and that this was a merely a stratagem to re-absorb their lost empire piece by piece. They had recovered Chechnya and would like to recover Georgia; failing success on the latter, they would take Abkhazia.RUSSIAN DESIGNS ON ABKHAZIA---------------------------9. © Wisner responded that breaking off Abkhazia would call into question the consensual break-up of the former Soviet Union. He urged Tbilisi not to make the same mistake as Belgrade had in refusing to engage, and encouraged the Georgians to have informal contacts with the Abkhaz. Saakashvili responded that the Abkhaz were refusing contact with the GOG, were fully under the control of the Russian FSB, and were already effectively isolated. Georgia's best hope was to develop economically and internationally in a way to show the Abkhaz that they would be better off associating themselves with Georgia rather than the Russians. For the moment, however, Georgia had little leverage. He noted ominously that Putin had once spoken of a possible negotiated solution to Abkhazia, but no longer mentioned it as a possibility.10. © Saakashvili asserted that Putin had originally bet on regime change in Georgia, but that this had failed. His current plan was therefore to use Abkhazia to destroy Georgia. This also served Russia's broader interest in interrupting any alternative energy corridors in the Caucasus. Saakashvili indicated, in contrast to Abkhazia, that the Russians had given up playing the South Ossetia card against Georgia. Putin had told him that he did not care about South Ossetia, so long as Georgia avoided bloodshed and solved the problem quietly. The downside was that this left Abkhazia as Russia's last bargaining chip.

Kak ga je Vladimir zajebo!

[dragance]

Priblizavamo se nama interesantnim stvarima...Odoh po pop-corn

[Musharaf]

Сакашвили презентира свој 'нот со јуник кејс' са мало превише жара. Уби га то на крају...

[Shan Jan]

OT...Kak ga je Vladimir zajebo!

Pa ako dobro razumem sam se zajebo. Lepo mu medjed reko pod kojim uslovima Ovo oko Kosova nista novo. Cekamo pikanterije.

[Budja]

Vidim da je i u UKju pukla afera između guvernera BoE i HMGa.

Pa, ne bas. Doticni Blanchflower je odavno poznat kao mrzitelj Kinga i peglanja deficita. Ja nikako da nadjem taj bias o kome govori.

[Aca]

Tadić, Jeremić i Koštunica najčešće su spominjani u tajnim spisima SADAmeričkim diplomatama je od svih regionalnih političara najzanimljiviji predsednik Republike Srpske Milorad Dodik, bar ako je suditi po ukupnom broju tajnih i poverljivih depeša koje se bave isključivo njime i njegovom politikom a koje je provalio Vikiliks. Dodik je predmet čak 79 tajnih američkih analiza, a poređenja radi, o predsedniku Srbije Borisu Tadiću ima 31 dokument, o bivšem predsedniku Hrvatske Stjepanu Mesiću 29 dokumenata, dok o doskorašnjem funkcioneru BiH Harisu Silajdžiću postoje 33 depeše.

[3opge]

da je Bota neki Broz dao bi Asandju srBski pasos i onda nema izrucivanja

[Weenie Pooh]

Slušam sad da Asanž ne da je jebo bez kondoma, nego mu je dotični pukao, a on ga nije na vreme izvadio. I tras, silovanje, Interpol on the case! Pa posle ko se usudi da ima posla sa tim precenjenim Skandinavkama, svaka mu čast.

[3opge]

da joj je svrsio u usta tuzila bi ga za nasilno narusavanje dijete

[Indy]

Slušam sad da Asanž ne da je jebo bez kondoma, nego mu je dotični pukao, a on ga nije na vreme izvadio. ...

Znači, ipak ga jure zbog 1 leak-a :o