Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[vememah]

Kako su nezaposleni glasali (po exit pollu):

 

Prvi stubac: Siriza, Nova demokratija, Zlatna zora (neofašisti), Potami, Komunistička partija

Drugi stubac: ANEL, Pasok, Narodno jedinstvo, Unija centrista

[vememah]

Prebrojano 100%, u odnosu na situaciju na trećini prebrojanih Zlatna zora pala na 18, a Potami se podigao na 11, ostalo je sve isto.

 

U parlament dakle ulaze (sortirano po broju mandata) Siriza, Nova demokratija, Zlatna zora (neofašisti), Pasok, Komunistička partija, Potami, ANEL i Unija centrista.

 

Lafazanisovom Narodnom jedinstvu falilo je 0,14% tj. oko 7800 glasova da uđe u parlament.

 

Edited September 21, 2015 by vememah

[Budja]

Varufakis kaze.

 

 

 

1.6 million Greeks who voted in the July referendum did not bother to turn up at the polling stations on Sunday

 

Na referendumu je glasalo znacajno vise ljudi nego na januarskim izborima?

Mozda ta rezignacija objasnjava slabe rezultate Lafazanisa i zadrzavanje status quo-a.

 

Inace, Siriza je dobila 1.9m glasova a ND 1.5m glasova, cisto za poredjenje.

[vememah]

Ukupan odziv:

 

Januarski izbori: 6,3 mil

Julski referendum: 6,2 mil

Septembarski izbori: 5,6 mil

 

Dakle, sad je bilo oko 600.000 glasača manje nego na referendumu.

 

Važećih listića:

 

Januarski izbori: 6,2 mil

Julski referendum: 5,8 mil

Septembarski izbori: 5,4 mil

 

Dakle, sad je bilo oko 400.000 glasača sa ispravnim listićima manje nego na referendumu.

 

Sve u svemu, ako je zaista toliko referendumskih glasača apstiniralo, većinu njihovih mesta popunili su drugi koji nisu glasali na referendumu.

 

Izvori:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_January_2015#Results

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_bailout_referendum,_2015#Results

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_September_2015#Results

Edited September 21, 2015 by vememah

[Budja]

OK, znaci Varufakis lupeta.

 

Ja sam mislio da je mozda na referendumu bilo vise glasaca nego u Januaru. Ozbiljna situacija, biti il ne biti i tako to...

[vememah]

Siriza je izgubila 320 hiljada glasova u odnosu na januar, a manje od polovine toga se prelilo u Narodno jedinstvo koje je uzelo 155 hiljada glasova.

[FERNOUX H]

EDIT 2: Profesor politikologije na Jejlu Statis Kalivas ocenjuje današnje izbore:

 

https://twitter.com/SKalyvas/status/645656837044457472

 

Jebote kolko je ovo glupo.

 

Prvo šta je tačno paradoksalno - kada su glasali dva puta?

 

"The government will implement these policies and thus effectively transform itself into a center-left party" -

[vememah]

Znači i Varufakis greši kad kaže da je Siriza novi Pasok u svom današnjem obraćanju „Renci, izgubio si dušu“? Oni su i dalje radikalna levica? Šta li su onda Varufakis i Lafazanis?
 

A message for Mr Renzi

September 22, 2015 by yanisv




Italian PM M. Renzi (click here for his speech) rejoiced at having “got rid of me” – citing my ‘removal’ from the ‘scene’ as a sign that ‘apostates’ (i.e. those who divide their parties) are jettisoned. His is a motivated illusion. Last July ‘they’ ‘got rid’ of something much more important than me. Here is my message to the Italian PM…
 
Mr Renzi presents me as an apostate who left SYRIZA and is now in the political wilderness. The truth is more sobering. Unlike many of my comrades, I remained loyal to the SYRIZA platform that saw us elected on 25th January as a united party that brought hope to the Greek and European peoples. Hope for what? Hope for a permanent end to the extend-and-pretend bailout loans, which cost Europe dearly, condemned Greece to permanent depression and foreshadowed failed policies for the rest of Europe.

What happened? Under extreme duress by European leaders, including Mr Renzi (who refused to discuss sensibly Greece’s own proposals) my prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, was subjected on 12th and 13th July to unbearable bullying, to naked blackmail, to inhuman pressures. Mr Renzi played a central role in helping break Alexis, with his ‘good cop’ tactic, based on the “If you do not yield, they will destroy you – please say yes to them” narrative.

Alexis and I parted ways because we disagreed on whether ‘they’ were bluffing or nor and on whether we, in any case, had the moral and political right to sign another non-viable agreement, handing over the keys to what is left of the Greek state to the ruthless troika. That was, and remains, a disagreement between Alexis and I.

Following that disagreement, Alexis forced a U-turn in SYRIZA’s policy on extend-and-pretend loans (accepting them for the first time in SYRIZA’s history as necessary evils) and, as a result, a large section of the party’s members decided they could not follow him down that path. And it was not just the Popular Unity segment that left. It was people like Tasos Koronakis, the party’s Secretary, myself and many, many others who never shared Popular Unity’s agenda. We were not apostates – just comrades who disagreed that SYRIZA should become the new PASOK, who refused to join the ranks of splinter parties, like Popular Unity, and who chose to sit out this sad parliamentary election – which could not, and did not, produce a Parliament capable of implementing a viable reform program for Greece.

Back to Mr Renzi now.

Mr Renzi, I have a message for you: You can rejoice as much as you like about the fact that I am no longer finance minister, not even in Parliament. But you did not ‘get rid’ of me. I am alive and kicking politically, as people in Italy remind me when I walk the streets of your beautiful country. No, what you got rid of, by participating in that dastardly coup against Alexis Tsipras and Greek democracy last July, was your own integrity as a European democrat. Possibly your soul too. thankfully this is not irreversible. But you need to make serious amends. I cannot wait to see you return to the ranks of Europe’s democrats.
 
http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/09/22/a-message-for-mr-rentzi/

Edited September 22, 2015 by vememah

[Skyhighatrist]

U nedelju veče bilo ozbiljno slavlje u Uranopolisu, Tripitiju, Nea Rodi i Jerisosu.

Mlad svet, skandiranje "Siriza, Siriza", nose se "Save Halkidiki" i Oxi majice i zastave...

 

Juče i danas jedan deda od 80tak leta sa pištaljkom ide po šetalištu u Nea Rodi i pišti kol'ko mu pluća dozvoljavaju ispred nekoliko kafea i taverni koje su očigledno mesto okupljanja pristalica Sirize. Ne bi znao tačno šta im sve viče, ali često izgovara "malaka"

[vememah]

Prosečna neto mesečna plata za puno radno vreme u Grčkoj 1243 evra. Žene u proseku zarađuju 15,4% manje od muškaraca. Od sve silne levice u Grčkoj, nisam primetio da iko ima volju da se pozabavi tim pitanjem.
 

Average monthly pay at 1,242.89 euros for full-time workers‏

Average daily pay for full-time workers totaled 52.94 euros, while average monthly wages totaled 1,242.89 euros in March this year, official data showed on Friday. 
 
Average daily pay and monthly wages for part-time workers was 23.90 euros and 421.85 euros, respectively, according to the same data.
 
A report by IKA, the country’s largest social insurance organisation, said that average daily pay and monthly wages for construction workers was 42.37 euros and 559.81 euros, respectively in March.
 
The report said that average employment was 21.71 days, while average daily pay for women with full-time employment accounted for 84.62 pct of men and 93.56 pct for part-time.
 
The number of insured workers totaled 1,694,886, of which 1,661,228 in enterprises and 33,658 in construction projects. Men accounted for 53.93 pct of workers in all enterprises.
 
The number insured workers grew 1.34 pct in March from February and rose 4.81 pct in construction projects.

http://www.gazzetta.gr/plus/article/810238/average-monthly-pay-124289-euros-full-time-workers

[Prospero]

Mere kontrole kapitala, na sitno, a u vezi fiskalne discipline   
 

A shock-measure: civil servants and pensioners will be subject to stricter capital controls than the rest of the Greeks. They will be able to withdraw only €150 per week – with the cash withdrawal cap being €420 per week – that is a total of €600 per month. The rest of their wage or pension they will have to spend by using debit or credit card.

 

The news fell like a bombshell on Saturday evening and spoiled the weekend of millions of Greeks. It will probably spoil the rest of their lives too.
Greek media revealed, that the Finance Ministry plans to impose such a measure in order to combat tax evasion, but of course, not the tax evasion committed by the civil servants and pensioners as this is not possible as the state deducts their share on tax before they receive wages and pensions but the tax evasion committed by business owners.

 

According to the Finance Ministry plan, civil servants and pensioners will be able to withdraw in cash only part of their wages and pensions and the rest will have to remain in their bank deposit account. This remaining amount they will have to spend only through the compulsory use of debit or credit card.

 

“The measure will affect 2.65 million pensioners and 600,000 civil servants,” notes newspaper To Vima that revealed the shocking plan.
The newspaper adds that with this measure, the compulsory use of plastic money, the business owner , whether a shop or a professional like doctor, plumber etc will not be able to evade taxes since all transactions will be recorded in the banking system.

...

[Budja]

Zanimljiv clanak iz politikologije u Ekatimeriniju.

O tome  kako glasaci nagradjuju "effort" cak iako je "outcome" katastrofa, i time objasnjavaju sirizin septembarski uspeh.

Taj okvir se verovatno moze primeniti i na Vucica (skidanje sakoa, lupanje vratima), i to je ta slicnost u politickoj strategiji koju sam bezuspesno pokusavao da objasnim.

 

Sa druge strane, ako je glasac racionalan onda se racuna samo credible effort a ne fingiranje. Kako razluciti izmedju te dve vrste?

U ekonomiji je to jasno - signaliziranje je kredibilno ako iza toga stoji potencijalni trosak. Ne znam kakva bi analogija vredela u ovom politikoloskom eksperimentu.

 

 

 

 

Tsipras reaps benefits of brinkmanship politics COMMENT  13.10.2015 : 17:42

• 

 

TAGS:Peripheral Vision, Politics, Analysis

The state of the economy has always been a pivotal issue in electoral campaigns. Political commentators, spin doctors and journalists tend to agree with former US president Bill Clinton’s 1992 slogan: “It’s the economy, stupid [… that wins elections].”

Political scientists have tried to put this claim to the test. Despite the diversity in political systems and contexts, a stubborn empirical pattern has emerged: Incumbents tend to get re-elected in good economic times and voted out of office in bad economic times. In other words, positive economic evaluations help governments stay in office, whereas negative economic evaluations make it difficult for governments to stay in power.

The economy, thus, became the exemplary paradigm of what is known as “retrospective voting”: Voters form voting preferences based on their assessment of either the incumbent government’s overall macroeconomic record (“sociotropic voting”) or the impact of the incumbent’s policies on their own personal economic well-being (“pocketbook voting”).

Few elections have challenged this conventional wisdom more than the September 2015 election in Greece. The coalition government formed after the January 2015 election dedicated all seven months in office to the renegotiation of the country’s bailout agreement with its creditors. As the process dragged on without any agreement in sight – thus igniting fears of an impending deadlock – the primary surplus evaporated and the overall state of the economy deteriorated. The situation became even worse after the bank holiday and the imposition of capitalcontrols. Still, the incumbent won what ended up being an easy landslide, seeing only infinitesimal losses in its vote share. How can one explain this paradox?

To answer this question, we commissioned a phone survey (fielded by the University of Macedonia and funded by the universities of York and Cambridge) with a random sample of 1,018 Greek citizens on September 7 and 8 (the election took place on September 20). The survey results reveal some interesting insights on how voters evaluated the performance of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s first government and why the government did not get punished in the election.

Before addressing this question, let us illustrate the puzzle. Voters re-elected a government which had avowedly had a disastrous economic record. Figure 1 shows three graphs. The first two confirm that the vast majority of respondents provide a negative evaluation of the government’s economic performance over its period in office. In the first graph we see that more than 60 percent of them characterize the government’s economic performance as either bad or very bad. Less than 20 percent of them gave a positive evaluation. The second graph shows that more than 70 percent of respondents believe that the economic situation had been better one year earlier. Finally, the third graph shows that, despite these negative evaluations, most respondents from the same survey declared their intention to vote for SYRIZA.

Figure 1: Economic evaluations and vote intention.

We believe that the explanation of this paradox lies in the distinction between effort and outcome. Effort here refers to how strongly citizens believed that the government had tried to achieve a positive result, whereas outcome here refers to the final agreement of the negotiation process.

Although the outcome was clearly negative, the Tsipras government repeatedly claimed that it was trying really hard to get a better deal. We argue that the government's electoral success is rooted in the fact that it was successful in distinguishing between effort and outcome and in deflecting the blame for the negative, growth-sapping aspects of the new bailout agreement to factors beyond its control, namely theintransigence of its creditors and the structural flaws of the eurozone. By assuming responsibility for the effort and attributing the bad economic outcome to institutions and agents operating at the European or even international level, it managed to escape the electoral defeat that usually awaits governments presiding over economic downturns.

To test this claim, we designed a survey experiment. We randomly assigned respondents to four different groups. Apart from the control group, the other three received a statement (“cue”) about the government. In the first group, respondents received information about the government’s effort. It emphasized that the agreement was the result of a long and difficult negotiation process between the government and the creditors, but provided no information about the content of the agreement. The second group was informed about the negative outcome with a statement pointing out that the agreement would bring further austerity (taxes and expenditure cuts), but made no mention of the government’s effort. Finally, the third group of respondents received information about both the negative outcome and the government’s effort. The control group received no such prompting statement. After each of these preambles, respondents were asked how likely they were to vote for SYRIZA (on a scale from 1 to 5), the government party that assumed full responsibility over the negotiation strategy.

The results are shown below. The first column represents the condition with no reference either to the effort put in by the government or to the final outcome. It thus serves as a benchmark against which the other conditions can be compared. The second column shows how likely respondents are to vote for SYRIZA when emphasis is placed on the effort put by the government throughout the negotiation period (effort column). It can be seen that there is a substantial increase in the propensity to vote for SYRIZA as a reward for its effort. The third column, in contrast, shows that respondents are less likely to vote for SYRIZA when they are told that it achieved an agreement that prolongs austerity (outcome column). Finally, the last column of the graph suggests that, when effort is emphasized, pointing to the negative aspects of the agreement does not change things much compared to the standard effort treatment. If anything, it makes one even more likely to vote for SYRIZA. Our interpretation of these results is that the negative outcome signals both the difficulty of the task and the intention of the government to keep trying for a better agreement.



 

Figure 2: How vote intention for SYRIZA changes when thinking about effort and outcome.

The same picture emerges when we look at more specific reactions to the final agreement. After the question on vote intention, respondents were asked to denote their level of agreement with the following sentences: “The government defended our national pride better than previous governments,” and “The government achieved a better agreement than previous governments.” Figure 3 below shows the percentage of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with these statements.

We see that pointing to the negative aspects of the agreement does not make people more critical toward the government. On the other hand, pointing to the difficulty of the negotiation process makes people more favorable to the government and Tsipras in particular. Emphasizing that the government tried to improve conditions for Greek people in a very adverse environment seems to trigger two effects: Voters on average become more convinced that the government defended Greek national pride and that no better deal could have been achieved. This might help explain the increase in the likelihood to vote for SYRIZA described above. Finally, when both effort and outcome are mentioned, attention seems to be placed only on the former. Rather than causing a decline in the incumbent’s evaluation, reference to the introduction of new austerity measures seems to operate as yet another signal of how difficult the renegotiation task was and how committed Tsipras was to improving the conditions of the previous bailout program.





People did buy their core narrative, namely that they had fought hard to relax austerity measures for Greece. In fact, rather than driving down support, economic adversity seems to have served as a signal for the government’s resolve – after all,brinkmanship requires that one is actually willing to go to the brink.

Elias Dinas is an Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Oxford.

Nikitas Konstantinidis is a Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of Cambridge.

Also contributed to this report:

Ignacio Jurado, Lecturer in Politics at the University of York.

Stefanie Walter, Professor in International Relations and Political Economy at the University of Zurich.

[Budja]

Karmen Rajnhart o grckoj krizi, spoljnom dugu vs. unutrasnjoj stednji.

http://www.nber.org/papers/w21664.pdf

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

Two centuries of Greek debt crises highlight the pitfalls of relying on external financing. Since its independence in 1829, the Greek government has defaulted four times on its external creditors – with striking historical parallels. Each crisis is preceded by a period of heavy borrowing from foreign private creditors. As repayment difficulties arise, foreign governments step in, help to repay the private creditors, and demand budget cuts and adjustment programs as a condition for the official bailout loans. Political interference from abroad mounts and a prolonged episode of debt overhang and financial autarky follows. We conclude that these cycles of external debt and dependence are a perennial theme of Greek history, as well as in other countries that have been “addicted” to foreign savings.

[vememah]

Grčka vlada ne ispunjava obaveze, pa kreditori odlažu isplatu novca, piše Zidojče cajtung.

 

"Odlaže se za oktobar planirana isplata prve dve od preostale tri milijarde evra iz prve tranše", izjavio je visoki službenik EU Zidojče cajtungu.

...

Prenos sredstava Atini će verovatno biti obavljen tek u novembru.

...

Ispunjeno je samo 14 od predviđenih 48 koraka.

...

Stoga će, između ostalog, razgovori o reformi bankarskog i finansijskog sektora kasniti u odnosu na dogovoreni raspored.

 

Pregovori između vlade u Atini i pregovarača Evropske komisije, Evropske centralne banke i MMF-a završili su se bezuspešno prošle nedelje. Grčki ministar finansija Cakalotos je izjavio da vladu čeka još mnogo posla.

 

U pregovorima pre svega postoji nesaglasnost o tome šta banke treba da urade sa lošim kreditima. Brojni dužnici nisu više u stanju da otplaćuju dugove. To je razlog kolapsa banaka. Prema procenama, oko 320.000 vlasnika stanova kasni sa plaćanjem rata. Kreditori žele da olabave pravila po kojima je glavno prebivalište zaštićeno od prinudnog izvršenja. Prema grčkim medijima, prinudno iseljenje preti osam od deset domaćinstava ako kreditori uspeju u svojoj nameri.

 

Premijer Cipras je pri ponovnom izboru obećao da će ublažiti teškoće koje reforme donose stanovništvu. Pre nekoliko dana je objavio da neće dozvoliti da dođe do "masovnih prinudnih iseljenja". Premijer je naglasio da neće dopustiti da o tom pitanju odluke donose drugi.

...

Rokovi su tesni. Grčka za rekapitalizaciju banaka ima vremena samo do kraja godine. Od 2016. na snagu stupa nova evropska smernica po kojoj štedni ulozi veći od 100.000 evra mogu biti iskorišćeni ako banke nije moguće sanirati na drugi način. To bi mnoga mala i srednja preduzeća oteralo u bankrot.

 

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/schuldenkrise-glaeubiger-verweigern-griechen-neues-geld-1.2708605 (na nemačkom)

[vememah]

Danas na Malti:

 

Danas u Atini:

Edited November 12, 2015 by vememah