Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Luther]

Stvarno je OT, ali zasto "evazija" pobogu?

 

http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evazija

[Luther]

Izgleda ideja sa čvorovićima nije naišla na dobar prijem.
 
The list of measures Greece’s government sent to euro-region finance ministers last Friday, including the idea of hiring non-professional tax collectors, is “far” from complete and the country probably won’t receive an aid disbursement this month, Eurogroup Chairman Jeroen Dijsselbloem said on Sunday. German Deputy Finance Minister Steffen Kampeter said ministers are not expected to advance on Greece today.(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-08/greek-tensions-revived-as-creditors-reject-reform-list)

[Budja]

Ciprasu dokurcilo.

 

 

Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has said it is possible that a referendum could be held if the eurozone rejects Greece's debt renegotiation plans.

The comments came ahead of Monday's Eurogroup meeting in Brussels, where Greece is to give detailed plans of its debt and growth terms.

Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras reacted by urging Mr Varoufakis to use "fewer words and more action".

 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31793145

[3opge]

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=03&dd=10&nav_category=78&nav_id=966738

 

kakva degencuga uz vec vrhunska dva!

samo da ne bude kao sa babom i kolom.

[Prospero]

neka se spremi j.v. gete:
 

Greek gov’t to confiscate Goethe Institute

Posted by newsroom in Politics Mar, 10 2015 No Comments Author: newsroom


 
 
According to the Justice Minister, he is ready to sign the Greek Supreme Court’s decision

A direct “Warning shot” has been fired against Germany by the government, while speaking in Parliament on the matter of compensations for WWII Nazi brutality on Greece and the Greeks between 1941 and 1944.
 
Justice Minister Nikos Paraskevopoulos stated he is willing to sign the Supreme Court’s decision to confiscate German state real estate in Greece.
 
He added, however, that his final decision will depend on “how complicated the case is”.
 
If the government, however, decides to proceed with this plan, the Goethe Institute might be confiscated!

full retard mod
 

[Prospero]

cipras juče ponovo u zanosnom naletu na 'naciste':

 

Greece demands Nazi war reparations and German assets seizures as creditor squeeze continues

 

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras revives claims for compensation and the possibility of seizing German assets in return for the crimes carried out by the Third Reich

 

 

 

PM Tsipras spoke during a debate reviving a parliamentary committee that would seek German World War II reparations Photo: AFP/Getty Images

 

By Mehreen Khan

 

1:00PM GMT 11 Mar 2015

 

Greece's prime minister has demanded Germany pay back more than €160bn (£112bn) in Second World War reparations as his country is squeezed by creditors to overhaul its economy in return for vital bail-out funds.

 

 

In an emotive address to his parliament, Alexis Tsipras said his government had a "duty to history, to the people who fought and to the victims who gave their lives to defeat Nazism."

 

The Leftist government maintains it is owed more than €162bn - nearly half the value of its total public debt - for the destruction wrought during the Nazi occupation of Greece.

 

"The government will work in order to honour fully its obligations. But, at the same time, it will work so that all of the unfulfilled obligations to Greece and the Greek people are met," said Mr Tsipras on Tuesday at a parliamentary debate on the creation of a reparations committee.

 

Syriza's leader added the atrocities of the Nazi occupation remained "fresh in the memory" of Greek people and "must be preserved in the younger generations."

 

Greece's demand for reparations centres on a war loan of 476m Reichsmarks the Greek central bank was forced to make to the Nazis. Athens is also calling for wider compensation for the destruction and suffering caused by the occupation.

 

The country's justice minister went further, threatening the seizure of German assets in order to compensate the relatives of Nazi war crimes.

Nikos Paraskevopoulos told Greek television he was willing to back a supreme court ruling which would lead to the foreclosure of German assets in Greece.

 

A spokesman for the German Finance Ministry said there will be no negotiation over the war-time debts. The country's vice-chancellor dismissed the prospect of repayment last month. “The likelihood is zero,” said Sigmar Gabriel.

 

The Third Reich famously subdued Greek resistance in a matter of weeks in 1941, after the country had held out for months against Mussolini’s Italian army.

The Nazi occupation that followed saw more than 40,000 civilians starved to death in Athens alone.

 

Germany has claimed it has already covered its obligations in the post-war reparations it has since paid to Greece.

 

The rhetoric comes as Athens prepares to open its books to its lenders in a bid to release €7.2bn in bail-out funds the country desperately needs to stay afloat.

Inspection teams from the European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund and European Commission are due to cast their eyes over the country's finances and begin technical work over the terms of the bail-out extension in the coming days.

 

Athens is scrambling to pay €1.3bn in loans to the IMF before the end of the month.

ovo postaje već prilično sramoćenje.

[Gandalf]

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/03/why-is-the-greek-government-so-popular-with-left-wingers.html

 

One reason the Greek government is so popular with “the Left” has to do, I think, with theories of social change. I often read or hear it suggested that, if only the truth is spoken in forthright, galvanizing terms, beneficial social change will follow. 

...

The new Greek government of course has done this and more. They have rather flamboyantly staked out extreme positions, insulted their opponents, and warned of the doom that will follow if renegotiations were to run along the lines of EU law rather than the New Old Keynesian economics. They told their citizenry how much they were standing up for them, and how much this was a moral clash of progressive good vs. austerity evil, with the values of democracy and national sovereignty (supposedly) on the side of good.

...

All of this reminds me of the wisdom of Dani Rodrik and his propositions about the incompatibility of democracy, national sovereignty, and global economic integration. Angry words won’t undo those constraints and they are not something you will hear the Greek government mention very often. The broader lesson is this: if politicians are not “speaking the truth to power,” there are usually some pretty good reasons for that. As a political strategy, it doesn’t typically work and it is worse than irrelevant as it very often backfires.

 

[MancMellow]

Da se odmaknemo malo od Grka, koji se ionako nalaze u nemogucoj poziciji (mada je cinjenica da su neki od njih poceli da lupaju najstrasnije)

 

Der Spiegel i Toma P.

 

 

SPIEGEL: You publicly rejoiced over Alexis Tsipras' election victory in Greece. What do you think the chances are that the European Union and Athens will agree on a path to resolve the crisis?

Piketty: The way Europe behaved in the crisis was nothing short of disastrous. Five years ago, the United States and Europe had approximately the same unemployment rate and level of public debt. But now, five years later, it's a different story: Unemployment has exploded here in Europe, while it has declined in the United States. Our economic output remains below the 2007 level. It has declined by up to 10 percent in Spain and Italy, and by 25 percent in Greece.

SPIEGEL: The new leftist government in Athens hasn't exactly gotten off to an impressive start. Do you seriously believe that Prime Minister Tsipras can revive the Greek economy?

Piketty: Greece alone won't be able to do anything. It has to come from France, Germany and Brussels. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) already admitted three years ago thatthe austerity policies had been taken too far. The fact that the affected countries were forced to reduce their deficit in much too short a time had a terrible impact on growth. We Europeans, poorly organized as we are, have used our impenetrable political instruments to turn the financial crisis, which began in the United States, into a debt crisis. This has tragically turned into a crisis of confidence across Europe.

 

SPIEGEL: European governments have tried to avert the crisis by implementing numerous reforms. What do mean when you refer to impenetrable political instruments?

Piketty: We may have a common currency for 19 countries, but each of these countries has a different tax system, and fiscal policy was never harmonized in Europe. It can't work. In creating the euro zone, we have created a monster. Before there was a common currency, the countries could simply devalue their currencies to become more competitive. As a member of the euro zone, Greece was barred from using this established and effective concept.

 

SPIEGEL: You're sounding a little like Alexis Tsipras, who argues that because others are at fault, Greece doesn't have to pay back its own debts.

Piketty: I am neither a member of Syriza nor do I support the party. I am merely trying to analyze the situation in which we find ourselves. And it has become clear that countries cannot reduce their deficits unless the economy grows. It simply doesn't work. We mustn't forget that neither Germany nor France, which were both deeply in debt in 1945, ever fully repaid those debts. Yet precisely these two countries are now telling the Southern Europeans that they have to repay their debts down to the euro. It's historic amnesia! But with dire consequences.

 

SPIEGEL: So others should now pay for the decades of mismanagement by governments in Athens?

Piketty: It's time for us to think about the young generation of Europeans. For many of them, it is extremely difficult to find work at all. Should we tell them: "Sorry, but your parents and grandparents are the reason you can't find a job?" Do we really want a European model of cross-generational collective punishment? It is this egotism motivated by nationalism that disconcerts me more than anything else today.

 

SPIEGEL: It doesn't sound as if you are a fan of the Stability Pact, the agreement implemented to force euro-zone countries to improve fiscal discipline.

Piketty: The pact is a true catastrophe. Setting fixed deficit rules for the future cannot work. You can't solve debt problems with automatic rules that are always applied in the same way, regardless of differences in economic conditions.

 

SPIEGEL: People in Germany tend to be critical of the fact that countries are not abiding by the pact. France, for example, has rarely stuck to the agreed rules.

Piketty: Everyone is dissatisfied, because this entire system of negotiations between the governments and the Brussels bureaucracy doesn't work. Countries like Germany complain because we are not abiding by the deficit rules. But the French aren't amused by the requirements being imposed by Brussels. We Europeans are in a bad situation, and minor structural reforms, which we hope will provide us with a little growth, won't do anything to change that.

 

SPIEGEL: What do you propose?

Piketty: We need to invest more money in training our young people, and in innovation and research. That should be the most important goal of an initiative to promote European growth. It isn't normal that 90 percent of the world's top universities are in the United States and our best minds go overseas. The Americans invest 3 percent of their GDP in their universities, while it's more like 1 percent here. That's the main reason why America is growing so much faster than Europe.

 

SPIEGEL: The United States has a uniform fiscal policy. What conclusions can be drawn from that?

Piketty: We need a fiscal union and a harmonization of budgets. We need a common debt repayment fund for the euro zone, like the one proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts, for example. Each country would remain responsible for repaying its portion of the total debt. In other words, the Germans would not have to pay off the Italians' old debts, and vice-versa. But there would be a common interest rate for euro bonds, which would be used to refinance the debt.

SPIEGEL: But that would create the risk of a big debt coalition. Who determines how much debt is allowed?

Piketty: We need a communitization of debts, but it has to be democratically legitimized. I propose a European parliament for the euro zone that would consist of members of the national parliaments. Each country would be represented in this parliament in proportion to its population size. In other words, Germany, with its 80 million inhabitants, would have the largest number of members. These politicians would then vote democratically on how high the deficit could be in the euro zone.

 

SPIEGEL: And the Germany lawmakers, with their aversion for large deficits, would be routinely outvoted by their more free-spending colleagues.

Piketty: I do, in fact, assume that this type of parliament would have saved less in recent years, and would have instead spent more on growth and fighting unemployment. It would have been good for us all. Germans shouldn't be afraid of democracy. If we have a common currency, at some point we have to accept that we also spend money together.

 

SPIEGEL: How do you intend to ensure that a country like Greece doesn't just return to living beyond its means?

Piketty: Greece would be subject to greater fiscal discipline. The amount of debt would be fixed by a European parliament in which Greek members would only play a subordinate role. In the long run, we need a fiscal union in Europe that is democratically legitimized.

 

SPIEGEL: Do you expect France to take the initiative? The country seems to be focused more on itself these days.

Piketty: That's true enough! I believe that many of the ideas that could push us forward come from Germany. I deeply distrust the French way of thinking in national categories. Our elites, regardless of their political leanings, are incapable of thinking in truly European terms. Germany is different in that respect.

 

SPIEGEL: Now that sounds like praise for German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Piketty: The truth is that France hasn't really played a role since the crisis began. We are afraid -- of the markets and of democracy. But fear doesn't get us anywhere. France has internalized Germany's dominant role to such an extent that it no longer feels capable of doing anything.

 

SPIEGEL: Why does President François Hollande seem so weak?

Piketty: We always have the same types of people at the top here, and it doesn't do our country any good. There is no renewal anywhere. Hollande still feels traumatized by the referendum over the European constitutional treaty in 2005. He fought hard for the treaty, but the French rejected it. It would be good for us and for Europe if he would slowly get over it.

 

SPIEGEL: The draft treaty would have shifted some responsibilities from European member states to Brussels, but it was scuttled by voters in France and the Netherlands. What should Hollande tackle now?

Piketty: I believe that we need to reform our country to a far greater extent than the government currently intends to. It's critical that we simplify our complicated social security system. But what happens instead? With each new law, the government tries to make it even more complicated.

 

SPIEGEL: What exactly are you referring to?

Piketty: Immediately after taking office, the new government overturned a measure adopted by the previous government to reduce non-wage labor costs, only to reintroduce it under a different name a year and a half later. That's crazy. Costs to employers are twice as high in France as they are in Germany. But instead of addressing truly important issues, Hollande introduces a 75-percent tax on wealth that's completely ineffective -- which is why it too has been scrapped. Everything boils down to symbolic policies -- but the wrong ones.

 

SPIEGEL: How could Hollande and Merkel inspire voters to support more Europe?

Piketty: They need to explain to voters, for example, that even Germany and France can no longer manage to efficiently tax multinational companies, because the companies are playing countries off against each other. To this day, many major corporations from the United States and Europe pay less in taxes than small European companies. A common corporate tax for the euro zone, which would be determined by the new euro-zone parliament, would be helpful and would certainly be popular among voters.

 

SPIEGEL: At this point, voters don't seem overly keen to shift more power to Brussels. On the contrary, EU-skeptic parties are becoming popular everywhere.

Piketty: No matter what you think of Syriza's election victory, it could serve as a shock therapy of sorts for those in power. Suddenly they'll realize that what they've been doing isn't working, and that they have to take a different approach. But a leftist party like Syriza or Spain's Podemos isn't nearly as dangerous as the extreme right. The National Front here in France is more popular than ever at the moment. That's why it's so dangerous for the established parties to continue fueling these nationalists. Constantly berating the lazy Greeks or Portuguese is irresponsible.

 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Iz Politike

 

 

Sebe vidim pre kao istraživača o društvu nego kao ekonomistu. Ekonomija zapravo ne postoji, ona je deo društvenih nauka. Ekonomisti su izgubili mnogo vremena pokušavajući da nas ubede da su izmislili ekonomsku nauku, toliko naučnu da ostatak sveta ne može da je razume, da funkcioniše kao zatvorena celina. To nema nikakvog smisla. Ne možemo da povučemo jasne granice između ekonomije, sociologije i istorije. Ima mnogo onih, naročito u Evropi, ali i u drugim delovima sveta, kojima je dosta da im objašnjavaju kako su pitanja finansija, javnog duga, poreza, kamatnih stopa, stopa rasta, suviše komplikovana za njih i da je jedino rešenje da slušaju eksperte. Moja knjiga omogućava svakome da se bavi ovim ekonomskim pitanjima koja su u srcu našeg demokratskog suvereniteta i javnih rasprava.

 

Naročito u Evropi imamo utisak da je kriza javnog duga nepremostiva. Ali u mojoj knjizi pokazujem da su u prošlosti već postojale krize javnog duga, čak mnogo veće. Javni dug u Velikoj Britaniji 19. veka je prelazio 200 odsto BDP-a, više nego što je to danas slučaj u Grčkoj. Nemačka je 1945. imala javni dug veći od 200 odsto BDP-a, kao i Francuska, i svaki put smo pronašli rešenje. Taj dug nikada nije bio plaćen, već je drastično smanjen otpisivanjem i inflacijom. Zato je čudno slušati Nemačku i Francusku kako objašnjavaju Grčkoj ili Italiji da treba da otplate javni dug do poslednje pare, bez inflacije. Da su Francuska i Nemačka na to bile primorane posle Drugog svetskog rata još bi otplaćivale javni dug. Upravo zato što su ga se brzo oslobodile, između 1945. i 1950, mogle su da ulažu u privredni razvoj pedesetih i šezdesetih, što se pokazalo kao dobra strategija. Ali u Nemačkoj i Francuskoj danas vlada istorijska amnezija. Delimično je u pitanju neznanje, ne mislim da je u pitanju zavera, a delimično nacionalizam. Zadovoljni smo da dajemo lekcije drugim zemljama i odbijamo da pronađemo zajednička rešenja.

Da li Grčka može da održi svoju politiku?

Hitno je da evropske zemlje, naročito Francuska, Nemačka i Italija priznaju veliki deo odgovornosti za sadašnju katastrofalnu situaciju. Hteli smo da Grčkoj nametnemo režim štednje, daleko oštriji i brži nego Španiji i Italiji, i vidimo rezultat. Naravno da treba smanjiti deficit, da treba pronaći bolji poreski sistem u Grčkoj. Ali ako smanjujemo deficit takvim tempom koji smo nametnuli poslednjih godina, potpuno ubijamo privredni razvoj i na kraju nismo rešili problem deficita. Francuska i Italija se suviše često zadovoljavaju time da se žale na Nemačku, a ništa ne predlažu. Treba iskoristiti priliku koju pruža grčka kriza, uspeh Sirize u Grčkoj i sutra možda Podemosa u Španiji i da se napokon prizna da budžetski sporazum koji je usvojen 2012. godine u evrozoni ne funkcioniše, da ti automatski kriterijumi za smanjenje deficita ne daju rezultate.

----------------------------------

 

Jedno bar 80% ovoga je do sada pomenuto ovde, no nije lose za nekakvo sumiranje pozicije

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Prospero]

pazi, prvo napiše ovo:
 

We mustn't forget that neither Germany nor France, which were both deeply in debt in 1945, ever fully repaid those debts. Yet precisely these two countries are now telling the Southern Europeans that they have to repay their debts down to the euro. It's historic amnesia! But with dire consequences.

 

 

a onda par redova kasnije ovo:

 

Do we really want a European model of cross-generational collective punishment?

 

 

u prevodu - što bi nemačke štediše danas plaćale zato što njihovi dedovi nisu platili u potpunosti nakon 45? čemu taj "cross-generational collective punishment"?

 

 

 

i još jedna stvar - piketi je evrofederalista, što je sve ok, samo da li mu je jasno da sa ovakvim postupanjem grčka vlast zapravo ubija mogućnost pravljenja širih evropskih koalicija oko evrofederalističkih ideja? ko je lud da sa takvom vlašću razmatra federaciju?

[MancMellow]

pazi, prvo napiše ovo:

 

 

a onda par redova kasnije ovo:

 

 

u prevodu - što bi nemačke štediše danas plaćale zato što njihovi dedovi nisu platili u potpunosti nakon 45? čemu taj "cross-generational collective punishment"?

 

 

 

i još jedna stvar - piketi je evrofederalista, što je sve ok, samo da li mu je jasno da sa ovakvim postupanjem grčka vlast zapravo ubija mogućnost pravljenja širih evropskih koalicija oko evrofederalističkih ideja? ko je lud da sa takvom vlašću razmatra federaciju?

 

pa jbg, federacija je federacija, u federaciji oni sami fakticki vise i nisu vlast u pravom tj punom smislu reci. to je, s druge strane, cena koju je pitanje da li je Grcka spremna da plati. 

 

sto se tice ovog gore, ja to nisam tako shvatio, nego vise kao pouku iz proslosti, u tom domenu konkretno je jasniji ovaj tekst iz Politike

[Prospero]

dugovi iz 2sr su tema samo zato što ih je grčka vlada izbacila, inače nemaju nikakve veze sa današnjom situacijom.

 

besmisleno je porediti nivo evropske solidarnosti kroz ta dva primera, jedno je najkatastrofalniji rat u istoriji a drugo je višedecenijsko puzajuće loše upravljanje i prikriveno nezasluženo plutanje na moru jeftinih kredita od koje je koristi imala ogromna većina najobinijeg grčkog sveta a ne samo zli brodovlasnici i kroni-kapitalisti.

 

štaviše, otpis srpskih dugova pariskom i londonskom klubu i donatorska konferencija iz 2001. su uporediviji sa otpisima dugova nakon 2sr (i katastrofalnog iskustva sa insistiranjem na punoj otplati istih nakon 1sr) nego što je sa istim uporediva grčka situacija.

 

 

grčka se može porediti praktično samo sa današnjom španijom ili portugalom, jer ih vezuje pravljenje mehura na niskim kamatama usled zajedničke valute. to bi bilo pošteno poređenje i kamen mudrosti iz koga se izvlače pouke, a ja ne znam da postoji uporediv slučaj u istoriji (XX vek) usled specifične strukture eu, postojanja monetarne ali ne i fiskalne unije itd itd.

 

piketi ne deluje baš toliko nesvestan toga pa samo pedlovanje teme o nemačkom dugu (koji je regulisan na razne načine i postao završena priča) u kontekstu današnje grčke odaje ružan antiintelektualni utisak.

 

 

nemačka postaje laka meta trivijalnih argumenata i neutemeljenih emotivnih ispada a sve oko jedne fundamentalno jednostavne stvari - dok grčka ne pokaže da neće nastaviti istim putem mora da vraća pare koje je prethodno uzela. ili da napusti eurozonu. oba rešenja su legitimna i fer. 

Edited March 11, 2015 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

dugovi iz 2sr su tema samo zato što ih je grčka vlada izbacila, inače nemaju nikakve veze sa današnjom situacijom.

 

besmisleno je porediti nivo evropske solidarnosti kroz ta dva primera, jedno je najkatastrofalniji rat u istoriji a drugo je višedecenijsko puzajuće loše upravljanje i prikriveno nezasluženo plutanje na moru jeftinih kredita od koje je koristi imala ogromna većina najobinijeg grčkog sveta a ne samo zli brodovlasnici i kroni-kapitalisti.

 

štaviše, otpis srpskih dugova pariskom i londonskom klubu i donatorska konferencija iz 2001. su uporediviji sa otpisima dugova nakon 2sr (i katastrofalnog iskustva sa insistiranjem na punoj otplati istih nakon 1sr) nego što je sa istim uporediva grčka situacija.

 

 

grčka se može porediti praktično samo sa današnjom španijom ili portugalom, jer ih vezuje pravljenje mehura na niskim kamatama usled zajedničke valute. to bi bilo pošteno poređenje i kamen mudrosti iz koga se izvlače pouke, a ja ne znam da postoji uporediv slučaj u istoriji (XX vek) usled specifične strukture eu, postojanja monetarne ali ne i fiskalne unije itd itd.

 

piketi ne deluje baš toliko nesvestan toga pa samo pedlovanje teme o nemačkom dugu (koji je regulisan na razne načine i postao završena priča) u kontekstu današnje grčke odaje ružan antiintelektualni utisak.

 

 

nemačka postaje laka meta trivijalnih argumenata i neutemeljenih emotivnih ispada a sve oko jedne fundamentalno jednostavne stvari - dok grčka ne pokaže da neće nastaviti istim putem mora da vraća pare koje je prethodno uzela. ili da napusti eurozonu. oba rešenja su legitimna i fer. 

 

bold - i tu dolazimo do onoga sto sam napisao pre jedno 10 strana: sto vece sranje napravis to ima vise sanse da se lakse dogovore ti finansijski progledaju kroz prste i pomognu u iole dovoljnoj meri :D No, ok, TP pominje i Francusku posle WW2, a to je ipak totalno drugacije od danasnje Grcke. 

 

Ali mislim da nije to njegova ideja, bar mi se cini. Mislim da ti primeri njemu sluze da pokaze kako treba gledati unapred pre nego unazad ALI u jednom drugacijem okviru u kome Grcka vise nece ni moci da pravi takva sranja sve i da hoce (kao sto je uostalom i Nemacka strpana u jedan novi okvir u kome nece moci da pravi ono sto je pravila). Mislim da se te dve stvari u njegovom intervjuu ne mogu gledati odvojeno. 

 

Nemacka jeste laka meta tzv populistickih argumenata, ali trebalo bi da ih brine to sto nisu preterano teska meta ni malo ozbiljnijih kritika. Mislim, ako uzmemo da su oni onaj najvazniji glas u EZ...nemaju zadovoljavajuce rezultate iza sebe u tom smislu. Na nacionalnom nivu imaju, nije sporno. 

Edited March 11, 2015 by MancMellow

[Prospero]

pa do novog okvira treba doći, to je u eu relativno spor proces (mnogi se projekti nikada i ne završe ili počnu 20 godina nakon što je neka komisija rekla da treba da se započne što pre), a u međuvremenu zna se - keep buggering on.

[MancMellow]

Ne ok, objasnjavam kako sam ja shvatio njegov model resenja, s tim sto se slazem sa njim da onako kako ide - ne ide, kao i sa tim da nema bas puno vremena. Videcemo. 

[Budja]

 

Der Spiegel i Toma P.

 

 

 

 

Ima dosta tacki za razmatarnje, Piketijeva pozicija je vrlo zanimljiva.

 

Medjutim, ovo:

 

 

SPIEGEL: What do you propose?

Piketty: We need to invest more money in training our young people, and in innovation and research. That should be the most important goal of an initiative to promote European growth. It isn't normal that 90 percent of the world's top universities are in the United States and our best minds go overseas. The Americans invest 3 percent of their GDP in their universities, while it's more like 1 percent here. That's the main reason why America is growing so much faster than Europe.

 

je sranje.

 

Da li je rast US uzrokovoan R&D gde su decenijama vec bez premca ili mozda sopstvenim izvorima energije (Zaz je na jugu za svoju omiljenu temu)?

 

I da li je taj RD finansiran drzavnim ili privatnim parama u SAD?