Liberalizacija SPC

[Аврам Гојић]

Puklo me sunce u glavu pa izmisljam nove reci, kao sto je homeoterapija. Prastajte.

[radisa]

Puklo me sunce u glavu pa izmisljam nove reci, kao sto je homeoterapija. Prastajte.

Ja mislio da piše homeopatija, tek sad skontao

[Agni]

Puklo me sunce u glavu pa izmisljam nove reci, kao sto je homeoterapija. Prastajte.

Since Hahnemann‘s time, the use of homeopathic preparations has continued to develop in a variety of directions. Variousschools are known today under the umbrella of "homeotherapy" varying from classical, unicist and pluralistic schools ofhomeopathy, to other schools of therapy, encompassing clinical homeopathy, combination product homeopathy, antihomotoxictherapy, anthroposophic medicine, biochemistry according to Dr. Schüssler, spagyric therapy, etc.link

[fonTelefon]

Puklo me sunce u glavu pa izmisljam nove reci, kao sto je homeoterapija. Prastajte.

Sad Sunce krivo sto sto vama smeta sto ste bar u necemu uskladjeni sa Evropom?

[Filipenko]

Kako ste vi tamo usklađeni sa Evropom, tako što vas muštraju i religijski obrazuju/obrezuju? Pa kad ste već obrezani, nije ni čudo što volite crkvu...

[Lord Protector]

Razlike ima, ali ne u onome što je u ovom sporu najbitnije:

http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/3/449.abstractHuman Rights Law Review-2008-Evans-449-73.pdfkoga mrzi da čita u pdf-u

Religious Education in Public Schools: An International Human Rights PerspectiveCarolyn Evans**Deputy Director, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies and Associate Dean (Research) Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne (c.evans{at}unimelb.edu.au).Next SectionAbstractThe question of whether and how public schools in Europe (and, indeed, in liberal democracies more generally) should introduce religion into the classroom has become increasingly important. Children need to be given the tools to understand the role of religion in their society and in the world, but they must be protected from indoctrination by their teachers or school officials. This article takes international human rights principles as a standard against which different approaches to incorporating education about religion into public school curricula can be judged. It argues that ‘plural religious education’ is the approach to religion in public schools that best complies with international human rights standards. The recently drafted Toledo Guidelines are recommended as providing useful guidance to States that seek a rights consistent approach to this issue. Both these guidelines and the relevant case-law of European and United Nations human rights bodies are analysed and the key guiding principles relating to religious education in public schools are examined to demonstrate both the utility of the international human rights approach and its current limitations.Previous SectionNext Section1 IntroductionThe education of children in diverse, pluralistic communities is inevitably and deeply involved in controversial value judgements. The school curriculum has become the place to solve a whole range of social ills, as well as to teach an ever growing body of knowledge and skills to equip children for a rapidly changing world. Teachers are warning increasingly of the ‘crowded curriculum’ and the place of any school subject needs to be justified.1 This is particularly so when it is proposed to teach subject matter that has the potential to be divisive or controversial. One such topic is education about religious matters. Some parents and educators believe that a curriculum that includes religious teachings is the only one that will produce morally fit students;2 others see discussion of religions to be a dangerous undermining of secularism in education. Such divisions of opinion can tempt governments to simply leave an area alone; but increasingly in Europe the issue of education in religion has been openly debated and the integration of religious knowledge into the public school curriculum is gaining support.3 Is this support justified?In this article, I answer two inter-related questions. The first is whether religion should be taught in public schools in liberal democracies, with a particular focus on Europe. I answer that there are good reasons for teaching religions even in secular schools with multi-religious student bodies. The next question that arises then is how this can be done in a manner that respects both the religious freedom of the children and parents involved, but also ensures that broader social needs and the rights of the child to a proper education are respected. While there are many approaches to answering these questions, in this article I take international human rights principles,4 including those developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as a standard against which different approaches to incorporating education about religion into public school curricula can be judged.The article begins with a brief overview of the key, relevant human rights at stake in this debate and then moves on to argue that a rights-based approach best fits with integrating religious knowledge into the curriculum. It then examines how this can best be done, including the question of whether and to what extent parents should be allowed to remove their children from classes that deal with religious knowledge.Previous SectionNext Section2 Key Relevant Human Rights Legal PrinciplesWhile there are a range of rights that have some bearing on the question of development of school curriculum and values, the key relevant rights are: the protection of equality; freedom of religion and the right of parents to have children educated consistently with their own values; and the educational rights of children.A Equality and Non-discriminationThe right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination are central to the international human rights regime.5 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, requires that:Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.The prohibition of discrimination and the requirement on States to promote equality have a number of important implications for the construction of curricula and the types of values that are espoused by a school. For example, curriculum design should not force students into particular types of education on the basis of the categories of prohibited discrimination in Article 2. A co-educational school that designed different teaching streams for girls and boys for example (with girls being required to take classes in domestically oriented subjects and boys being required to take more employment-oriented options) would breach the equality provisions.6 This would be the case even if some religious points of view see differentiated gender roles as essential. Nor should students be required to take, or be prohibited from taking, particular courses on the basis of their race, religion, national origin and so forth.7 Schools should not exclude, penalise or create more onerous conditions on participation of students simply because they belong to a minority or disfavoured religious group. While these forms of direct discrimination have been common and continue to cause problems in many places, they are relatively simple as a matter of international human rights law. Such discrimination is prohibited by Article 2.More complex are the types of cases where there is no overt or direct discrimination. Instead, it is argued that the teaching of particular subject matter, the failure to teach certain subject matter, or the teaching of a subject in a particular way has unequal or discriminatory effects on children, parents or teachers. It is this type of discrimination that tends to be the focus of religious education classes. Examples of such claimed discriminatory effects of religious education include: some children feel alienated from the curriculum or face discrimination because they claim exemptions from taking religious subjects; some parents feel that the school system treats their religion or belief as less worthy than other religions or beliefs; or some teachers are unable to teach particular subjects because of their religion or belief. These issues will be discussed further below.B Religious Freedom and Education Consistent with Parental Religious and Moral ConvictionsAnother key right to be considered is that of religious freedom and the right of parents to have children educated consistently with their own values. These rights are protected in the ICCPR.8 As they are dealt with in a single Article of the ICCPR, and as parents and children generally share the same religious values, they are treated together here.9 Article 18 reads:1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.These rights have a number of implications for teaching in religiously plural classrooms. First, religious coercion is expressly prohibited. Schools are a place where students are ‘coerced’ (in the sense of being disciplined to behave in ways that they would not otherwise) in a variety of ways. Teachers enforce certain behavioural requirements, demand attendance in classes that students dislike, set homework that takes up time on the weekend when students would prefer to be doing something else and require students to wear a uniform or comply with a dress code. When it comes to issues of religion, however, the coercive powers of the schools are restrained and schools must ensure that education does not impair the student's choice to ‘have or adopt’ a religion or belief of his or her choice. The fact that a school can force the reluctant maths student to study algebra does not mean that it can require the committed atheist to take religious instruction.A related, but distinct, element of the religious freedom guarantee in Article 18 is that States are required to respect the liberty of parents to ensure that the religious and moral education of children is ‘in conformity with their own convictions’.10 This is an important element of preventing school indoctrination that turns children against their parents’ values—unfortunately a very real phenomenon in some States.11 While indoctrination is prohibited, one of the most complex issues dealt with in the international case-law on this topic is the extent to which school curricula and values need to adapt themselves to ensure that parents’ values are conformed with.C Educational RightsFinally, it is important to remember that education is itself a right. Children have a right to education set out in Article 13(1) of International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.Article 29(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) sets out a more detailed set of objectives for education that develop the principles set out in Article 13(1) of IESECR. Some of the relevant aims outlined in CROC include that the education of the child shall be directed to:(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;© The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilisations different from his or her own;(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin;The right to education and its aims must be borne in mind when balancing the various rights at stake in determining the way in which values are taught in public schools. Sometimes, a simple solution to some issues of religiously controversial material seems to be to allow students to be excluded from certain subjects that they or their parents object to.12 At the extreme, this may extend to allowing children to be excused from the school system all together in order to protect their religious values.13 There is, however, a danger in this approach. Children have a right to education and an education that is directed, at least in part, to preparing a child for ‘responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of the sexes, and friendship among all peoples’ (CROC Article 29(1)(d)). Too significant a system of exclusions may end up denying the child an education that fulfils those aims or the aims of developing respect for civilisations other than his or her own and for human rights more generally.Previous SectionNext Section3 The Potential for ConflictWhile international human rights law emphasises the indivisibility and unity of the human rights regime, it is clear that there is potential for conflict between rights and between rights holders. This is recognised in the international instruments themselves which allow for restrictions on most (though not all) rights in certain circumstances.Often, within the debate over school curriculum and religion, both sides will base their argument on different interpretations of the same right. For example, religious freedom is invoked by those who wish to see a greater degree of religiosity in schools and more reference to religious values in the determination of the curriculum. They argue that religious children and parents are alienated by school curricula that are hostile to their values, unsympathetic to their religion and to a school system that refuses to take into account views that have a religious basis when a whole range of other belief systems are taken into account. They see this as discriminatory and a limiting of the capacity of their children to live out their religion faithfully. On the other hand, parents, also citing freedom of religion, argue for the exclusion of religion from the curriculum and religious considerations from education decision making. They see the inclusion of religious materials and viewpoints as foisting the religious beliefs of others on their children and fear the breakdown of secular and non-sectarian education which they consider an essential part of a secular, liberal society.While this is one of the most common areas of conflict, it is not the only one and the potential for conflict between the various stakeholders—parents, children, teachers, the school, educational authorities and the general community—should not be underestimated. The education of children is a subject of such significance, in which so many groups and individuals have a legitimate interest, that it has become one of the primary sites for conflict about the relationship between religion and the State.14Further the State has its own interests in this debate. As Plesner puts it, there is aninherent tension between, on the one hand, the rights of parents to have the last say about the religious and moral education of their children and, on the other hand, the state's obligation to see that all children receive an education in conformity with the aims spelled out in human rights instruments.15The tension becomes particularly acute when parents wish their child's religious instruction to be solely within their own tradition and that tradition is hostile to notions essential to rights such as equality, respect for others and religious freedom for all.Previous SectionNext Section4 Religion as a Topic of StudyDespite the concerns of some parents, teaching about religion is a legitimate topic for public schools in liberal democracies. The various international courts and committees have made it clear that schools need not exclude subject matter, including religious education, from the curriculum simply because some parents or students may have religious or philosophical objections to its inclusion. In a recent challenge to a course in religion and belief conducted in Norwegian public schools,16 the ECtHR summarised its case-law from the preceding decades17 interpreting the guarantees of the right to education in Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European Convention.18 The Court notes that religious education classes are not a special case: the religion or belief of parents must be respected ‘throughout the entire State education programme. That duty is broad in its extent as it applies not only to the content of education and the manner of its provision but also to the performance of all the “functions” assumed by the State’.19The Court acknowledges the rights of parents with respect to the education of their children, but stresses that these are only part of the whole of Article 2 of the First Protocol and that the right to education is the key to understanding the provision as a whole.20 In other words, parental rights are closely linked to the broader right of education.21 The Court recognises that respect for the rights of parents and the religious freedom of children need to be balanced against other legitimate interests. This does not mean that minority interests can simply be subordinated to those of the majority: ‘a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position’.22 Parents do not, however, have a right to have schools created and funded that entirely comply with their educational or religious philosophy. Nor do parents have a ‘right that their child be kept ignorant about religion or philosophy in their education’.23In this complex area, the Court has been prepared to defer to States to some degree and to acknowledge the importance of not micro-managing the curriculum from Strasbourg. In the Norwegian case, it summarised its previous case-law thus:(g) [T]he setting and planning of the curriculum fall in principle within the competence of the Contracting States. This mainly involves questions of expediency on which it is not for the Court to rule and whose solution may legitimately vary according to the country and the era … In particular, the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not prevent States from imparting through teaching or education information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or philosophical kind. It does not even permit parents to object to the integration of such teaching or education in the school curriculum, for otherwise all institutionalised teaching would run the risk of proving impracticable …This conclusion supports the inclusion and even integration of religious knowledge into public school curricula. It is correct for at least three reasons.24The first is that, particularly as classrooms become increasingly religiously pluralistic, attempting to create a curriculum that fully respects all religions and philosophies raises insuperable difficulties. As the European Court notes, approaches that allowed parents to veto any teaching that they objected to run the risk of making institutionalised forms of teaching impracticable. In the area of teaching about religion, for example, some parents may (for profound and well-thought out reasons) be deeply opposed to any classes that teach religion in any form. Other parents may believe (also after long reflection and serious thought) that their children will be inadequately educated if they do not understand at least the basic beliefs held by the various religions present in the society in which they live. Still other parents may believe (also for serious and deeply felt reasons) that religious education is an essential element of any education that will equip a student to live a moral life, but that only the religion that they believe to be true should be taught to their children.25 In these circumstances, there is no solution that easily accommodates every parent's seriously held beliefs—to exclude religion from the curriculum is as offensive to one set of parents as including it is to another set. So schools or educational authorities have to be given some discretion to develop workable solutions for particular countries or school areas. Certain groups of parents cannot be allowed simply to exercise a veto over what the children of other parents are entitled to learn.The second reason that it would be inappropriate to exclude religious material is that one of the objectives of education, as it is envisaged in the international human rights treaties, is said to be thepreparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin.26This requires some level of understanding and education about different ethnic and religious groups in order to counteract the biases, bigotry and misinformation that can easily flourish in relation to religious minorities in particular. If schools were not permitted to explore different religious traditions of the world, then children would likely develop their conception of people of other religions from far less reliable sources.27 It is, presumably, at least in part for this reason that most European countries have some kind of religious education subject in their curriculum.28 A rapporteur's summary of a meeting of the Council of Europe's dialogue on religion in education summarised this concern by arguing:Why is knowledge so important? Of two obvious reasons, it was said: We have to know the other in order to fully understand and respect the other. (And I think that the concept of respect was the one that was repeated most frequently in the groups when the aims of intercultural education was discussed. The respect for the dignity of every individual, the respect for the diversity of convictions, cultures and religions.) By knowing the other, we more easily respect the other, making him a real human being like myself within our common sphere of morality. The second reason is that we can only know ourselves by knowing the other, and we can only know the other by knowing ourselves.29The final reason to permit schools to integrate religious material into the curriculum is that children have a right to an education that will prepare them to live in societies that are increasingly complex.30 The exclusion of religion (out of respect for the beliefs of parents) can undermine the rights of children to an education that will give them the knowledge and insights to understand their own societies and the role that religion plays in the world today. The Council of Europe symposium noted that:It was stated by many that without knowing anything about religions, it would be extremely difficult (to put it the least) to understand and enjoy most of the art that has been made – and is made today. There are so many references, direct and indirect, to the holy scriptures and religious traditions that not knowing these would be a kind of cultural illiteracy.31Religion has been integral to culture, history and politics in most parts of the world for a long time. Students who do not have a basic ‘religious literacy’ will struggle to understand all these subjects.32 They will also struggle to understand much that is essential to current political debate. As religion becomes a more potent factor in national and international politics, it becomes more difficult to argue that schools should not prepare children to understand religion.33Previous SectionNext Section5 Different Approaches to Teaching ReligionEven once it is accepted that there are good reasons to include material about religion in the curriculum, there remain more complex questions about how this should be done. In late 2007, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Advisory Council of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief produced the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools (Toledo Guidelines).34 They provide guidance as to how religion might be taught in public schools, including how to prepare curricula, develop appropriate teacher education and ensure respect for internationally protected rights. The Toledo Guidelines only deal briefly with the reasons for teaching about religions in public schools35 and merely state that the guidelines are for States that chose to teach about religions (compared, for example, to instruction in a particular religion) without drawing any conclusion about which approach is more appropriate.36 A more robust approach is, however, possible. In this section, I defend the approach of the Toledo Guidelines to the type of religious education that best fits with respect for human rights principles.There are a number of possible approaches to whether religion should be taught about or taught in a public school.37 Outlined here are six broad approaches (compared to the broader division adopted by the Toledo Guidelines between religious instruction and religious education).38Strict secularism: there is no discussion of religion at all in the classroom.39Incidental religious education: religion is taught about only to the extent that it is necessary to understand other subjects (for example, the role of religion in particular wars or religious imagery in certain poems).Plural religious education: students learn about the basic practices, beliefs, rituals etc of a variety of religions. They are presented with information about these religious traditions but are not taught that any of them are (un)true. The instruction may also extend to philosophies and beliefs of a non-religious nature.Sectarian religious instruction: students are broken up into groups (normally sectarian-based) and given instruction in their religion. An alternative class (perhaps in philosophy or secular beliefs) is given to students who do not wish to have religious instruction.Unitary religious education: there are classes about the dominant religion of the State. The classes present information about the religion, but teachers do not claim that the religion is true. However, the classes deal either exclusively or predominantly with a single religion.Religious or ideological instruction: there is only one class in religion available and that is religious instruction in the dominant religion. The religion is taught as true and children may be prepared for participation in religious rituals. Exemptions may be granted to students whose parents object to these classes in some circumstances. A similar approach to indoctrination on religious viewpoints can be seen in curricula that teach the truth of atheism or other philosophical positions that reject religion.The case-law of the international human rights bodies does not have anything to say about either of the first two options, which either exclude or minimise the role of religion in the curriculum. It has not tended to be the exclusion of such topics from the curriculum that has caused disputes in international fora, but rather the ways in which religion can be included appropriately in the curriculum.40 Several recent human rights cases have highlighted the complexities in developing and applying appropriate principles by which to judge the human rights compliance of particular approaches to religious education. Two of these cases involved Norway; one before the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) and one before the ECtHR.41 Both involved the attempt by Norway to move from a sectarian approach to develop a single class in comparative religion and philosophy that all students could study.42 The course, however, focused on the established Norwegian Lutheran Church and created obstacles for parents who sought exemptions for their children from participation in some parts of the course. Another recent case involved Turkey's sectarian religious education and was heard in the ECtHR.43 While Jews and Christians were automatically exempted from instruction in Islam, it was compulsory for all Muslim children even though it focused primarily on Sunni understandings of Islam and not other forms of Muslim belief that were also common in Turkey. In all three cases, the relevant States had tried to make provision for those whose views were not of the mainstream, but in each case the balance that they struck was challenged. In determining them, both the UNHRC and the ECtHR was able to draw on a series of other cases in this area to extract some general principles applicable to public school cases. These principles are discussed here.Previous SectionNext Section6 Key Principles Contained in the Case-lawA The Teaching of Religion must be ‘Objective’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Critical’ and ‘Pluralistic’While allowing religiously controversial material to be covered, both the UNHRC and ECtHR require that it be taught in an ‘objective and neutral manner’ with the ECtHR adding that such teaching should be ‘critical and pluralistic’.44 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has said that religion must be taught in an ‘unbiased and objective way, respectful of the freedoms of opinion, conscience and expression’.45 In the Norwegian cases that came before both the UNHRC and the ECtHR, it was agreed that the fact that one religion was dealt with in more detail and depth than others was not in itself sufficient to say that teaching was not objective and neutral.46 However, it seems that in both cases the predominance of teaching about the established Church of Norway raised the level of scrutiny to which the rest of the legislative framework was subject.While there has been a widespread acceptance of some requirement of objectivity and neutrality in teaching about religion, there has been far less analysis of what this means in practice. There are two levels of difficulty with the principle. The first, philosophical, problem arises from the acceptance of the idea that there is some ‘objective and neutral’ position from which religion can be taught. For some religious parents, teaching about all religions as if they were equally true, for example, is teaching a falsehood (and a dangerous falsehood at that). Others will see such an approach as promoting secularism, which they conceive of as hostile to a religious viewpoint. This difficulty is a significant one and cannot be addressed in the scope of this article. It is notable, however, that the international courts and tribunals have simply assumed that objectivity and neutrality in relation to matters on which there are fundamental disagreements is both possible and desirable.The second problem is less profound, but still raises significant practical difficulties. Even assuming that we accept that ‘objectivity and neutrality’ is the appropriate principle by which to judge curricula, how can those two values be judged? There are some fairly clear cases. If a school engages in religious instruction, that is teaching that a particular religion is true and preparing children for participation in that religion, it is not teaching in an objective and neutral way. In the same way, instructing children that all religions are untrue or superstitious or indoctrinating them with atheist beliefs would also fail the objective and neutral test. Such classes (described above as ‘religious or ideological instruction’) would breach international human rights law, unless there was an exemption from classes given to children and parents who objected to these courses. Most sectarian religious instruction would, for the same reason, fail the test of objectivity and neutrality, but would often be saved by the fact that children are only given religious instruction in the religion that they or their parents chose to be instructed in.That leaves two of the options outlined above for teaching about religion to a whole class: unitary religious education and plural religious education. In both of these forms of education, but particularly for unitary religious education, the dividing line between education about a religion and religious instruction is not always the bright, clear line that international human rights bodies assume. Even a legislative framework or a school curriculum that has the avowed purpose of objectivity and neutrality can be subverted by classroom teaching. This is a danger of allowing for sole or predominant focus on the dominant religion (as the international human rights bodies have). Where there is a religious majority in a State to which most students, parents and teachers belong and where that religion dominates the set curriculum it is quite possible for even well-meaning teachers to begin to blur the line between religious instruction and education about religion.47 Teachers may well have deeper knowledge about, and greater enthusiasm for, teaching their own religion than other religions or beliefs and a teacher with a deep commitment to a religious position may find it personally challenging to teach it in a neutral and objective manner.48 The ECtHR has warned schools that they have to be alert to circumstances in which teachers might use their influence over students as an occasion for improper proselytism, but have gone no further than that. The issue of the approach of teachers is a delicate one where the need to protect the right of teachers to their own freedom of expression and religion needs to be balanced against the potential for coercion or indoctrination in religious matters.49Even plural religious education raises difficulties. A class in religion may cover more than one religion and claim that its aim is to educate students about a variety of religions or beliefs, but may still be said to contravene the objective and neutral requirement. In this context, the decision of the UNHRC in the case against Norway gives some indication of educational approaches that might be problematic. The UNHRC made the following points in holding against Norway:In the object clause [of the Act] in question it is prescribed that the object of primary and lower secondary education shall be “in agreement and cooperation with the home, to help to give pupils a Christian and moral upbringing”. Some of the travaux préparatoires of the Act referred to above make it clear that the subject gives priority to tenets of Christianity over other religions and philosophies of life.50The UNHRC thought that an emphasis on Christianity was understandable in a predominantly Christian country, but the preference given to Christian values and the entanglement of sectarian religious instruction with education about all religions rendered it problematic. Further, instruction in Christianity was required by the law to be ‘thorough’ whereas only familiarity was required with other religions. In line with this, much more detail was given about the types of teaching required for Christianity than other religions.51Combined with these factors that suggested that the course had veered too close to instruction in Christianity with a little comparative religion appended, there was another issue that does raise difficulties with teaching of religion more generally. Students in Norway were not only instructed about religion, they also engaged in activities to do with religion, for example singing religious songs, participating in plays of religious scenes and attending religious celebrations and ceremonies. It was from these parts of the course—that the Norwegian government recognised could be perceived as forced religious practices—that students were permitted an exemption.52 Similarly, in the Turkish case of Zengin v Turkey, students were required to memorise certain sura from the Koran and were examined on their knowledge of them—a practice that begins to look more like religious instruction than education.53While the ECtHR did not deal with it in any detail, this issue is one that potentially renders the assumption that religion can be taught in a neutral and objective manner problematic. Modern educational theory is based around models of teaching that tend to be active, participatory and creative. Neutral and objective education can perhaps most easily be imagined being taught from a carefully prepared textbook which gives equal space and detail to all the major world religions. Perhaps some suitable videos or materials can also be introduced. Once greater participation by children is required, the issues become more complicated.Children, particularly in the older age groups, can be encouraged to engage with the material ‘critically’ to use the terminology of the ECtHR. But this in itself is not without danger. Putting children in a position where they are asked to reflect in a critical manner on their own religion may cause real tensions between the values taught at home and in the school. Reflecting critically on the religion of others could well be a source of tension and conflict in the classroom. Such critical engagements can be most worthwhile, but they are not without potential cost and require very high-level skills from teachers to be handled well.54For younger children, however, the types of abstract thinking and critical reflection that may be suitable at a higher educational level are not always achievable.55 If children are being taught about another culture, for example, they would often be encouraged to sing songs from that culture, perhaps dress up in traditional clothing, act out scenes of daily life or draw pictures of important historical figures from that culture.56 Once the subject matter is religion, however, all of these otherwise perfectly good teaching methods become more problematic. Jewish parents may object to their children taking part in a nativity play; Christian parents to their children visiting a mosque; and atheist parents to their children singing religious songs. These activities—which some parents may welcome—may be perceived by others as alienating to children who are not adherents to the religion being taught or, even worse, as forms of indoctrination or religious coercion. The UNHRC noted the validity of taking into account parental or children's perceptions of the way in which a course was taught when it held that one reason the Norwegian religious subject was not objective and neutral when it noted that: ‘the research results invoked by the authors, and from their personal experience that the subject has elements that are not perceived by them as being imparted in a neutral and objective way’.57These issues do create difficulty in developing an appropriate curriculum to teach about religion while not indoctrinating or supporting particularly religious viewpoints. However, as Paul Clarke argues, there is controversy in many parts of the curricula, and to shy away from topics in classrooms simply because they are controversial would be ‘the death knell of all serious teaching’.58 While we should not have unrealistic expectations of teachers, it is better to give teachers proper training, well-prepared materials and other resources, than to simply exclude difficult religious material from the curriculum.B Exemptions for Parents and Students who ObjectOne of the ways in which some States and the international tribunals try to cut through the difficulties with teaching religious materials discussed above is to require that exemptions to such classes be offered where the material might not be taught in an objective or neutral manner or even where there is a perception by some parents that the classes are not objective and neutral. The international human rights bodies have perhaps been a little too willing to assume that such exemptions render even religious instruction classes unproblematic and, until recently, have not been inclined to question how they work in practice. The Norway cases, however, led both the UNHRC and the ECtHR to more detailed consideration of the circumstances in which exemptions are an acceptable way of dealing with controversial religious education.The Norwegian case in the UNHRC raised particularly complex issues because it only allowed for partial exemptions for the religion and belief classes which permitted children to be exempted from activities that might have been seen to require religious participation. In order to benefit from the exemptions, the Act set out that:on the basis of written notification from parents, pupils shall be exempted from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life.59The UNHRC criticised this system for the following reasons:The Committee considers, however, that even in the abstract, the present system of partial exemption imposes a considerable burden on persons in the position of the authors, insofar as it requires them to acquaint themselves with those aspects of the subject which are clearly of a religious nature, as well as with other aspects, with a view to determining which of the other aspects they may feel a need to seek – and justify – exemption from. Nor would it be implausible to expect that such persons would be deterred from exercising that right, insofar as a regime of partial exemption could create problems for children which are different from those that may be present in a total exemption scheme. Indeed as the experience of the authors demonstrates, the system of exemptions does not currently protect the liberty of parents to ensure that the religious and moral education of their children is in conformity with their own convictions. In this respect, the Committee notes that the CKREE subject combines education on religious knowledge with practising a particular religious belief, e.g. learning by heart of prayers, singing religious hymns or attendance at religious services. While it is true that in these cases parents may claim exemption from these activities by ticking a box on a form, the CKREE scheme does not ensure that education of religious knowledge and religious practice are separated in a way that makes the exemption scheme practicable.60 (citations omitted)The Committee also noted the ‘loyalty conflicts’ experienced by children which were exacerbated by the partial exemption scheme and the lack of clarity about what constituted reasons for exemptions.61 In dealing with a modified version of the same scheme, the ECtHR noted the potential problems which arise when requiring a parent to justify their child's non-participation in certain classes. Members of religious minorities might feel intimidated into not providing such information and requiring parents to explain their religious beliefs (the adequacy of which would be judged by the school) could in itself be a breach of religious freedom.62An even more problematic exemption scheme was criticised by the ECtHR in Zengin v Turkey where the Turkish government gave automatic exemptions for Christian and Jewish children from the religious education course, but did not permit exemptions for Muslims (whether Sunni, Shia or other).63 This created two difficulties. The first is that parents and children were expected to disclose their religion to school authorities so that they were either automatically enrolled in religious instruction or not enrolled in such instruction. The Court was critical of this approach as requiring the disclosure of the child's religion to State authorities—something that is prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights.64 Second, the fact that there were no exemptions available for Muslims, even those who were not Sunnis and objected to the emphasis on Sunni thought and beliefs in the curriculum, was held by the ECtHR to be impermissible.65 The argument of the government that this was necessary to prevent fundamentalism was dismissed by the ECtHR with little by way of reasoning.66While the rather complicated partial exemption scheme in Norway was held to be inadequate by both the UNHRC and the ECtHR, and the lack of an exemption scheme for Muslims in Turkey was held to be in breach by the ECtHR, these bodies have not engaged in particularly detailed scrutiny of more comprehensive exemption schemes in the past. The provision of exemptions appears to have rendered even religious instruction unproblematic, with the international human rights bodies failing to engage in issues such as the alienating effect of exemptions on students who claim them (even when students were expected to wait in the corridor during the classes) or on the potential for discrimination where students did not take religious instruction courses in a country where discrimination against religious minorities was a significant issue.67 The Norway cases signal a possible shift from the rather formalistic approach that had previously been taken to exemptions with greater consideration of the practical and emotional burden that they can place on students and parents.68As discussed earlier, however, it is important for States and schools not to become too reliant on exemptions as a way of circumnavigating controversial areas of curriculum. Exemptions work best when they can be for a whole subject and when a meaningful alternative class is available to substitute for the one that is being missed. The ECtHR has, however, accepted that religiously controversial material can be integrated into the curriculum in areas in which exemptions become much more complicated and often will be inappropriate. The particular case69 in which this question arose dealt with sex education, but the principle has been accepted as having more general application and makes sense given the moves in many States toward more integrated and holistic curricula.70 The areas that have the potential to raise religious controversy—everything from biology71 to sport72 to literature73 to sex education74—are extensive. The possibility of producing a wholly non-controversial curriculum that is anything other than anodyne and educationally inadequate is remote. In those circumstances, schools need to find ways of dealing with controversial topics, including religion, in ways that are sensitive to the equality of all students, their right to education and their claims to religious freedom and non-discrimination.75 Sometimes exemptions will be part of such an approach, but it is not the answer to all problematic questions.76Further, too extensive a series of exemptions or an educational approach described above as ‘sectarian’ (i.e. an approach where each student learns only about their own religion or belief in classes separated from those of children with other religions or beliefs) can lead to what the former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has described as a ‘ghetto’ approach. In supporting a more comprehensive religious education programme in which all students can participate, he emphasised the potential for such a subject to foster ‘understanding of the others, of cultural and moral differences, and contribute to the creation of a culture of peace, human rights and tolerance’.77Previous SectionNext Section7 The Toledo Guidelines: A Partial Way ForwardGiven the level of generality of the principles developed by the international human rights bodies, States have increasingly recognised the need to work on ways of taking more concrete steps towards developing appropriate, plural religious education. In this context, the Toledo Guidelines provide a welcome development. They are sufficiently detailed to be useful, and sufficiently general to recognise the great variety of historical, cultural, political and educational systems to which they might apply. The guidelines take into account not only the substance of what is taught, but also emphasise the importance of appropriate teaching, training and pedagogical standards, and also the vital role of consultation and community involvement in decision making.78 The approach taken by the guidelines to the substance emphasises the importance of teaching that is ‘fair, accurate, and based on sound scholarship’ (principle 1) and that religious freedom and respect for human rights should also be taught and practiced (principles 1 and 2). They acknowledge the co-responsibilities of schools and parents in teaching about religion and touch on the possibility for tension between the two [although they do not give much guidance about their resolution (principle 3)].The Toledo Guidelines also underline the importance of education that is ‘inclusive, fair and respectful’ to both religious and non-religious views and suggest that ‘care should be taken to avoid inaccurate or prejudicial material, particularly when this reinforces negative stereotypes’ (principle 7). While this is unobjectionable in its terms, the emphasis on respect and the avoidance of prejudice and stereotypes does raise the danger that teaching about religions may become too bland or even celebratory, thereby ignoring the ways in which religions have undermined human rights, betrayed their own values or caused human sufferings in both historical and modern contexts or reproducing in uncritical fashion some of the discriminatory teachings of religions.79 In the desire to avoid negative stereotypes and offence, the views of those who are more critical of religion can be lost.Moreover, the desire to be ‘fair and accurate’ can lead to curricula that are dense with facts but that do not leave students space to engage with and be challenged by the material presented.80 In a useful analysis of some of the potential pitfalls of education about religion, Professor Robert Jackson argues that the best religious education encourages the ‘engagement of pupils with their own beliefs and values in relation to understanding others’.81 The danger, as he sees it, with much religious education in practice is that it becomes loaded with so much information (driven by the focus of religious leaders) that it allows inadequate time for ‘pupils to initiate ideas, to reflect, to interact with ideas and to engage in critical discussion’. This comment reiterates the importance of involving teachers and educational experts from the earliest stages in developing any religious education curriculum to ensure that the limits and possibilities of classroom teaching are not ignored by a well meaning inter-faith group seeking to create comprehensive content on comparative religion.The Toledo Guidelines, of necessity for guidelines developed in the context of an inter-governmental body, are general and avoid some controversial issues such as which approach to religious education in schools is most appropriate. As this article has argued, the option of education about religion that is inclusive and pluralistic is most compliant with States’ human rights obligations. This is the option explored (and hence implicitly supported) in the Toledo Guidelines, but never explicitly adopted or defended. The Guidelines therefore provide a very useful set of criteria against which States seeking to assess the way in which teaching about religion in public schools complies with human rights obligations can test themselves. They build in no small part on the international human rights case law discussed, but in many ways approach the issues involved with more sophistication than the human rights bodies and may prove more useful for many States. The Toledo Guidelines are but one part of a complex, ongoing discussion in international and domestic courts, governments and the academy about the best approach to these issues; much remains to be done. For now, however, they make a valuable contribution to a complex area.Previous SectionNext Section8 ConclusionQuite some thought, in many countries, has been put into the question of how to develop a rights-respecting approach to religious education that allows students to engage fully with other religions and beliefs while still being mindful of the religious freedom of both students and parents.82 This is by no means easy. It is a task that requires the combined skills of teachers and educational administrators, human rights experts, religious leaders, representatives of secular belief systems and governments. Creating a sophisticated, educationally sound and religiously respectful model of education is a time consuming and complex process. It requires States and educators to engage in careful consultation with parents and other stakeholders (including children themselves, whose views are sometimes ignored in these debates.)83International human rights treaties and case-law are certainly a useful reference point in the debate over the principles that should inform school approaches to religious education. They remind us that education is a right that no child should be denied and that education should be aimed at creating children who can live together and respect human rights. They remind us that public schools are not the place for indoctrination in religion or belief, even if they are places where religion or belief may be legitimately explored. They remind us that all children have a right to education without discrimination on bases such as their religious belief and that care needs to be taken to ensure that minority religious viewpoints are not ignored or marginalised.84 However, they do not, and cannot provide a detailed prescription for the way forward in all States. The Toledo Guidelines are another important development in providing international guidance on both how to develop curricula on religious education and some issues of substance that need to be dealt within developing such curricula. They are an important step forward on what promises to still be a long journey towards making sure that students can learn about a variety of religions without their other rights being violated.

Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schoolshttp://www.osce.org/odihr/49220teksthttp://www.osce.org/odihr/29154

Edited April 29, 2013 by slow

[Turnbull]

Jebem li ga šta ti misliš da u ovom tekstu piše, ali to nema veze sa ovim za šta se ti zalažeš. Igrom slučaja, tekst mi odranije poznat, pa znam da se zalaže za:

(3) Plural religious education: students learn about the basic practices, beliefs,rituals etc of a variety of religions. They are presented with informationabout these religious traditions but are not taught that any of them are(un)true. The instruction may also extend to philosophies and beliefs ofa non-religious nature.

Što ja naravno smatram sasvim neproblematičnom i verovatno najboljom opcijom.Ono što mi u Srbiji imamo, i što i ti branio kao ljudsko pravo jeste:

(4) Sectarian religious instruction: students are broken up into groups (normallysectarian-based) and given instruction in their religion. An alternativeclass (perhaps in philosophy or secular beliefs) is given to students who donot wish to have religious instruction.

O njemu, pak, autorka ima da kaže sledeće:

If a school engages in religiousinstruction, that is teaching that a particular religion is true and preparingchildren for participation in that religion, it is not teaching in an objective andneutral way. In the same way, instructing children that all religions areuntrue or superstitious or indoctrinating them with atheist beliefs would alsofail the objective and neutral test. Such classes (described above as ‘religiousor ideological instruction’) would breach international human rights law,unless there was an exemption from classes given to children and parentswho objected to these courses. Most sectarian religious instruction would, forthe same reason, fail the test of objectivity and neutrality, but would oftenbe saved by the fact that children are only given religious instruction in thereligion that they or their parents chose to be instructed in.

Obraititi posebnu pažnju na:

International human rights treaties and case-law are certainly a usefulreference point in the debate over the principles that should inform schoolapproaches to religious education. They remind us that education is a rightthat no child should be denied and that education should be aimed at creatingchildren who can live together and respect human rights. They remind usthat public schools are not the place for indoctrination in religion or belief,even if they are places where religion or belief may be legitimately explored.

Dobar savet za ubuduće: pročitaj tekst pre nego što ga okačiš.Edit: I umalo da zaboravim:

(1) Strict secularism: there is no discussion of religion at all in the classroom.39(2) Incidental religious education: religion is taught about only to the extent thatit is necessary to understand other subjects (for example, the role ofreligion in particular wars or religious imagery in certain poems).The case-law of the international human rights bodies does not have anythingto say about either of the first two options, which either exclude or minimise the role of religion in the curriculum. It has not tended to be theexclusion of such topics from the curriculum that has caused disputes in internationalfora, but rather the ways in which religion can be included appropriatelyin the curriculum.

Edited April 29, 2013 by Syme

[burazer]

liberalizacija

Sad Sunce krivo sto sto vama smeta sto ste bar u necemu uskladjeni sa Evropom?

Tvoja superijornost je ovisna. Evropa to ne uskladjuje već leči. Sunčevi zraci paralelno putuju istom brzinom, a razlika je u istorijskoj starosti čestice. pračestica proizilazi iz samog jezgra i ima mnogo duži put do odredišta. pusti i sretno (srećno) nastavi put u svom istorijskom trenutku.

[MayDay]

fontelefone, ako bi gradjani masovno poverovali u homeoterapiju, da li bi osnove homeoterapije trebalo uvrstiti u plan i program medicinskih skola?

Odlična paralela. Mislim da osnovno obrazovanje mora da bude nekakva konstanta, onako globalno, u grubim crtama. Tu nema političkih ustupaka, niti da stadržaj zavisi od toga šta roditelji žele, pa da se generacije formiraju u zavisnosti od toga kakav je duh vremena. Mislim, barem ne ovde, kad već dečica nisu poštedjena na drugim mestima.Oprostite na offu, ali gledam u poslednjih par nedelja sve na kašičicu seriju Borgen o danskoj premijerki, koja je takav jedan divan lik. Ma u svemu se slažem s njom! I onda naravno maštam o svojoj političkoj karijeri. Ako ikada postanem premijerka, Vasudeva će da bude moj Kasper Jul, tj čovek koji je tamo zvanično spin doktor, ali zapravo se sa njim konsultuje o svemu. Jojjj, baš bih volela Vasua u kabinetu. Uzela bih i Kampokeia da mi bude ministar za socijalu i dala bih mu Gordanu Matković da mu bude pomoćnica. Imam ja spremne već ministarku policije, ministra pravde, ministra finansija, mislim da bih postavila onog Dulićkinog Živkova za poljoprivredu, ministra nauke, ministarku medicine i još neke. Moja sjajna prijateljica koju spremam za predsednicu je viša od mene 3cm i onda kad bismo otišle u CG Milo i Filip bi za nas bili malci. Vasudeva bi morao da mi nadje ministra vera. I, jbt, ja stvarno ne znam nikog koga bih stavila kao ministra odbrane.

[fonTelefon]

Odlična paralela.Mislim da osnovno obrazovanje mora da bude nekakva konstanta, onako globalno, u grubim crtama. Tu nema političkih ustupaka, niti da stadržaj zavisi od toga šta roditelji žele, pa da se generacije formiraju u zavisnosti od toga kakav je duh vremena. Mislim, barem ne ovde, kad već dečica nisu poštedjena na drugim mestima.Oprostite na offu, ali gledam u poslednjih par nedelja sve na kašičicu seriju Borgen o danskoj premijerki, koja je takav jedan divan lik. Ma u svemu se slažem s njom! I onda naravno maštam o svojoj političkoj karijeri. Ako ikada postanem premijerka, Vasudeva će da bude moj Kasper Jul, tj čovek koji je tamo zvanično spin doktor, ali zapravo se sa njim konsultuje o svemu. Jojjj, baš bih volela Vasua u kabinetu. Uzela bih i Kampokeia da mi bude ministar za socijalu i dala bih mu Gordanu Matković da mu bude pomoćnica. Imam ja spremne već ministarku policije, ministra pravde, ministra finansija, mislim da bih postavila onog Dulićkinog Živkova za poljoprivredu, ministra nauke, ministarku medicine i još neke. Moja sjajna prijateljica koju spremam za predsednicu je viša od mene 3cm i onda kad bismo otišle u CG Milo i Filip bi za nas bili malci.Vasudeva bi morao da mi nadje ministra vera. I, jbt, ja stvarno ne znam nikog koga bih stavila kao ministra odbrane.

Mesto Kena pravicemo Vasine lutke.

[burazer]

eto.

[MayDay]

Jao, Ken. Opet trolujem, ali dade mi šlagvort. Skoro sam došla do zaključka sa svojim prijateljicama da smo mi uvek imale po 5-6 Barbika, a po samo jednog Kena i onda kad ti neka dodje u goste ustupiš joj da Ken bude njen muž, a ti improvizuješ sa nekim plišanim rakunima ili tako nečim sličnim. Meni je jedan ogavni klovn služio kao Barbikin muž kad nisam mogla da imam mog Kena. Možda sam zato uboga za muškarce danas.

[fonTelefon]

Jebem li ga šta ti misliš da u ovom tekstu piše, ali to nema veze sa ovim za šta se ti zalažeš. Igrom slučaja, tekst mi odranije poznat, pa znam da se zalaže za:Što ja naravno smatram sasvim neproblematičnom i verovatno najboljom opcijom.Ono što mi u Srbiji imamo, i što i ti branio kao ljudsko pravo jeste:O njemu, pak, autorka ima da kaže sledeće:Obraititi posebnu pažnju na:Dobar savet za ubuduće: pročitaj tekst pre nego što ga okačiš.Edit: I umalo da zaboravim:

To sto ti smatras prihvatljivo pojedine drzave nude kao alternativu recimo jednom dominantnom katehezisu ili u nedostatku mogucnosti da se organizuje za neke vrlo malobrojne denominacije (nijedno medjunarodno telo bez velike nuzde nece isterivati pojedina prava malog broja ljudi npr jogi letaca) time se pokrivaju pred UNna zalbe roditelja kao i Srbija sa gradjanskim. Za razliku od rigidnih stavova pojedinaca odgovarajuca tela su na stanovistu da skoro svi oblici poducavanja religijeili poducavanja o religiji u Evropi su u skladu sa pravima o tome iznetim u povelji. Sustina je da su mnoga dokumenta iz ove oblasti nastala teskim pogadjanjem i dasu zato ispala fleksibilna, a ne dogmatska i dobro je sto je nasa drzava potpisnica vecine njih.Jednu liniju koju si pomenuo ranije znaci da drzava moze da propise nastavni program koji ne mora da bude uskladjen sa necijim verskim osecanjima ili moralom i da se to ne moze smatrati povredom necijeg prava na versko ili moralno opredeljenje dokle god ne primorava pojedince da se odreknu svojih.I drzave ne moraju da odgovor i ako dobiju negativno misljenje ne postoje sankcije.

[fonTelefon]

Jao, Ken. Opet trolujem, ali dade mi šlagvort. Skoro sam došla do zaključka sa svojim prijateljicama da smo mi uvek imale po 5-6 Barbika, a po samo jednog Kena i onda kad ti neka dodje u goste ustupiš joj da Ken bude njen muž, a ti improvizuješ sa nekim plišanim rakunima ili tako nečim sličnim. Meni je jedan ogavni klovn služio kao Barbikin muž kad nisam mogla da imam mog Kena. Možda sam zato uboga za muškarce danas.

Jao crna ti ne znam da li je ovo grozni poligamni patrijarhat ili zoofilija.

[Lord Protector]

Igrom slučaja, tekst mi odranije poznat, pa znam da se zalaže za:

Tako ti Kim Jong-una, nisam znao da vi u Pjongjangu pratite literaturu iz oblasti religioznog prava. Zadivljen sam, iskreno.