steins Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 Nisu na vreme uveli ograničavanje dolazaka putnika iz zaraženih područja.Zapravo mislim da, osim za Kinu, ni za jednu drugu zemlju nema ograničenja putovanja. Nije im bilo dovoljno upozorenje kad je onaj britanski kliconoša što he zakačio virus u Singapuru ili Tajvanu zarazio 9 ljudi u tri evropske zemlje.Debili.Sent from my SM-N960F using Tapatalk
Redoran Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 Turska privremeno zatvara granicu sa Iranom i obustavlja međunarodne letove zbog zaraze i smrtnih slučajeva u pograničnom pojasu. U Vanu je petoro Iranaca zadržano u bolnici zbog prehlade ali su testovi pokazali da imaju običan grip. U međuvremenu je par hiljada stanovnika u panici pobeglo iz grada što letovima što drumovima. Ići će se ujutro u nabavku, vidim ja.
Leia Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 2 hours ago, Arkadija said: A kod nas stiže u jeku predizborne kampanje. Kako će sendvičari da se okupljaju? Jedino da država ignoriše postojanje virusa. "Narode, bezbedneo je da se vozite s mitinga na miting autobusima, da pljujete po ulici i tresete nos na pod." Super, barem korona virus radi za nas
duda Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 (edited) gledan nešto ovu interaktivnu mapu pa jbt, u iranu, od 43 zaraženih, umrlo 8, pa to je više od 20% Edited February 23, 2020 by dùda
duda Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 haha, moja matematika to je zapravo nešto manje od 20%
mlatko Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 brojke su varljive, realno se mali broj ljudi prijavljuje da/kad ima grip ili stosta. jedino ako bas mora...bice da je zarazenih oko hiljadu da smrtnost bude na 2% Inviato dal mio Mi 9 Lite utilizzando Tapatalk
vememah Posted February 23, 2020 Posted February 23, 2020 (edited) https://ncov2020.org/en/en/predict-2020-02-23/ (tabela sa brojevima dostupna je na linku) Edited February 23, 2020 by vememah
toceje Posted February 24, 2020 Posted February 24, 2020 ^ pdf>txt Systemic Risk of Pandemic via Novel Pathogens – Coronavirus: A Note Joseph Norman†, Yaneer Bar-Yam†, Nassim Nicholas Taleb ∗‡ †New England Complex Systems Institute, ∗School of Engineering, New York University ,‡ Universa Investments THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS emerging out of Wuhan, China has been identified as a deadly strain that is also highly contagious. The response by China to date has included travel restrictions on tens of millions across several major cities in an effort to slow its spread. Despite this, positively identified cases have already been detected in many countries spanning the globe and there are doubts such containment would be effective. This note outlines some principles to bear in relation to such a process. Clearly, we are dealing with an extreme fat-tailed process owing to an increased connectivity, which increases the spreading in a nonlinear way [1], [2]. Fat tailed processes have special attributes, making conventional risk-management approaches inadequate. GENERAL PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE The general (non-naive) precautionary principle [3] delineates conditions where actions must be taken to reduce risk of ruin, and traditional cost-benefit analyses must not be used. These are ruin problems where, over time, exposure to tail events leads to a certain eventual extinction. While there is a very high probability for humanity surviving a single such event, over time, there is eventually zero probability of surviving repeated exposures to such events. While repeated risks can be taken by individuals with a limited life expectancy, ruin exposures must never be taken at the systemic and collective level. In technical terms, the precautionary principle applies when traditional statistical averages are invalid because risks are not ergodic. NAIVE EMPIRICISM Next we address the problem of naive empiricism in discussions related to this problem. Spreading rate: Historically based estimates of spreading rates for pandemics in general, and for the current one in particular, underestimate the rate of spread because of the rapid increases in transportation connectivity over recent years. This means that expectations of the extent of harm are under-estimates both because events are inherently fat tailed, and because the tail is becoming fatter as connectivity increases. Global connectivity is at an all-time high, with China one of the most globally connected societies. Fundamentally, viral contagion events depend on the interaction of agents in physical space, and with the forward-looking uncertainty that novel outbreaks necessarily carry, reducing connectivity temporarily to slow flows of potentially contagious individuals is the only approach that is robust against misestimations in the properties of a virus or other pathogen. Reproductive ratio: Estimates of the virus’s reproductive ratio R0—the number of cases one case generates on average over the course of its infectious period in an otherwise uninfected population—are biased downwards. This property comes from fat-tailedness [4] due to individual ‘superspreader’ events. Simply, R0 is estimated from an average which takes longer to converge as it is itself a fat-tailed variable. Mortality rate: Mortality and morbidity rates are also downward biased, due to the lag between identified cases, deaths and reporting of those deaths. Increasingly Fatal Rapidly Spreading Emergent Pathogens: With increasing transportation we are close to a transition to conditions in which extinction becomes certain both because of rapid spread and because of the selective dominance of increasingly worse pathogens. [5] Asymmetric Uncertainty: Properties of the virus that are uncertain will have substantial impact on whether policies implemented are effective. For instance, whether contagious asymptomatic carriers exist. These uncertainties make it unclear whether measures such as temperature screening at major ports will have the desired impact. Practically all the uncertainty tends to make the problem potentially worse, not better, as these processes are convex to uncertainty. Fatalism and inaction: Perhaps due to these challenges, a common public health response is fatalistic, accepting what will happen because of a belief that nothing can be done. This response is incorrect as the leverage of correctly selected extraordinary interventions can be very high. Conclusion: Standard individual-scale policy approaches such as isolation, contact tracing and monitoring are rapidly (computationally) overwhelmed in the face of mass infection, and thus also cannot be relied upon to stop a pandemic. Multi-scale population approaches including drastically pruning con-tact networks using collective boundaries and social behavior change, and community self-monitoring, are essential. Together, these observations lead to the necessity of a precautionary approach to current and potential pandemic outbreaks that must include constraining mobility patterns in the early stages of an outbreak, especially when little is known about the true parameters of the pathogen. It will cost something to reduce mobility in the short term, but to fail do so will eventually cost everything—if not from this event, then one in the future. Outbreaks are inevitable, but an appropriately precautionary response can mitigate systemic risk to the globe at large. But policy- and decision-makers must act swiftly and avoid the fallacy that to have an appropriate respect for uncertainty in the face of possible irreversible catastrophe amounts to "paranoia," or the converse a belief that nothing can be done. Jan 26, 2020. Corresponding author: N N Taleb, email [email protected]. REFERENCES [1] Y. Bar-Yam, “Dynamics of complex systems,” 1997. [2] ——, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world„” 2016. [3] N. N. Taleb, R. Read, R. Douady, J. Norman, and Y. Bar-Yam, “The precautionary principle (with application to the genetic modification of organisms),” arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.5787, 2014. [4] N. N. Taleb, The Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails. STEM Academic Press, 2020. [5] E. M. Rauch and Y. Bar-Yam, “Long-range interactions and evolutionary stability in a predator-prey system,” Physical Review E, vol. 73, no. 2, p. 020903, 2006.
Lo Zingaro Posted February 24, 2020 Posted February 24, 2020 Da se ne ljubimo... Prva 2 slucaja u Parmi gde sam ja. U Italiji preko 200. Juce stampedo u supermarketima, prazni rafovi.
gone fishing Posted February 24, 2020 Posted February 24, 2020 - mene mnogo više brine iran, malo je prijavljenih slučajeva a već su putnici preneli bolest iz irana u druge zemlje, što bi značilo da je tamo mnogo više zaraženih Quote 58 new cases in Italy [source] Civil Protection chief Angelo Borrelli to hold press conference at 12:00 noon local time (11:00 GMT). - 165 cases in Lombardy - 25 in Veneto (including 1 death) - 16 in Emilia Romagna (7 new cases today) - 3 in Trentino Alto Adige (tourists from Lombardy) - 3 in Piedmont (3 previously confirmed cases were later retracted). - 3 in Rome (including 1 person who had been repatriated). 4 new deaths and 4 new cases in Iran. [source] - Iranian officials said that people who illegally entered Iran from Pakistan, Afghanistan and China were the source of the outbreak. - Canada, Lebanon, and now Kuwait have all confirmed cases of travelers from Iran. - Daily sanitization of Tehran’s metro and public transportation implemented. - Schools closed in at least 10 provinces. University classes suspended. - Attendance at soccer matches, movie theaters, and other public venues suspended.
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