How I lost my religion

[Krošek]

kant se oblacio u sive, sivo-smedje tonove, nije voleo jarke boje i govorio je da covek uvek treba da se trudi da ne bude upadljiv i da se ne istice izgledom. gotta love the guy

[Lord Protector]

Kant je hteo da kaze da se ljudima ne trebamo koristiti radi postizanja nekog cilja u smislu da ih ne trebamo iskoriscavati na njihovu stetu. To zovemo nemoralnim ponasanjem i svako bi se slozio s tim. Seks koji zeli i druga osoba je nesto sasvim drugo - tu niko nikog ne iskoriscava (osim ako seks nema za cilj nesto drugo osim uzivanja ili je u pitanju neka igra moci), vec obe osobe "saradjuju" u cilju uzivanja i ugadjaju jedna drugoj. Tu nema ni govora o nekom nemoralnom ponasanju. O masturbaciji da ni ne govorimo, to je kao kad bi proglasio cesanje mesta gde te je ujeo komarac za nemoralan cin.

 

 

1. The Nature of Sex

 

The Nature of Sex On Kant’s view, a person who sexually desires another person objectifies that other, both before and during sexual activity. This can occur in several ways. Certain types of manipulation and deception (primping, padding, making an overly good first impression) seem required prior to engaging in sex, or are so common as to appear part of the nature of human sexual interaction. The other’s body, his or her lips, thighs, buttocks, and toes, are desired as the arousing parts they are, distinct from the person. As Kant says (about the genitals, apparently): sexuality is not an inclination which one human being has for another as such, but is an inclination for the sex of another. . . . [O]nly her sex is the object of his desires. . . . [A]ll men and women do their best to make not their human nature but their sex more alluring.4 Further, both the body and the compliant actions of the other person are tools (a means) that one uses for one’s own sexual pleasure, and to that extent the other person is a fungible, functional thing. Sexual activity itself is a strange activity, not only by manifesting uncontrollable arousal and involuntary movements of the body, but also with its yearning to master, dominate, and even consume the other’s body. During the sexual act, then, a person both loses control of himself and loses regard for the humanity of the other.

 

Sexual desire is a threat to the other’s personhood, but the one who is under the spell of sexual desire also loses hold of his or her own personhood. The person who desires another depends on the whims of that other for satisfaction, and becomes as a result a jellyfish, vulnerable to the other’s demands and manipulations. Merely being sexually aroused by another person can be experienced as coercive; similarly, a person who proposes an irresistible sexual offer may be exploiting another who has been made weak by sexual desire. Moreover, a person who willingly complies with another person’s request for a sexual encounter voluntarily makes an object of himself or herself. As Kant puts it, “For the natural use that one sex makes of the other’s sexual organs is enjoyment, for which one gives oneself up to the other. In this act a human being makes himself into a thing.” And, for Kant, because those engaged in sexual activity make themselves into objects merely for the sake of sexual pleasure, both persons reduce themselves to animals. When a man wishes to satisfy his desire, and a woman hers, they stimulate each other’s desire; their inclinations meet, but their object is not human nature but sex, and each of them dishonours the human nature of the other. They make of humanity an instrument for the satisfaction of their lusts and inclinations, and dishonour it by placing it on a level with animal nature.

 

 

2. Sex and the Second Formulation

 

Michael Ruse has explained in a direct way how a moral problem arises in acting on sexual desire: The starting point to sex is the sheer desire of a person for the body of another. One wants to feel the skin, to smell the hair, to see the eyes—one wants to bring one’s own genitals into contact with those of the other. . . . This gets dangerously close to treating the other as a means to the fulfillment of one’s own sexual desire—as an object, rather than as an end. We should add, to make Ruse’s observation more comprehensively Kantian, that the desire to be touched, to be thrilled by the touch of the other, to be the object of someone else’s desire, is just as much “the starting point” that raises the moral problem. Because this sex problem arises from the intersection of a Kantian view of the nature of sexuality and Kantian ethics, let us review the Second Formulation: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” Or “man . . . exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end.” So the question arises: how can sexual desire be expressed and satisfied without merely using the other or treating the other as an object, and without treating the self as an object? How can sexual activity be planned and carried out while “at the same time” treating the other and the self as persons, while treating their “humanity” as an end, while confirming their autonomy and rationality? Of course, the Second Formulation directs us not to treat ourselves and others merely as means or objects. It is permissible to treat another and ourselves as a means as long as we are also treated as persons or our humanity is treated as an end. How can this be done? A person’s providing free and informed consent to an action or to interactions with other persons is, in general for Kant, a necessary but not sufficient condition for satisfying the Second Formulation. In addition, for Kant, treating someone as a person at least includes taking on the other’s ends as if they were one’s own ends. Thus Kant writes in the Groundwork, “the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends.” And I must take on the other’s ends for their own sake, not because that is an effective way to advance my own goals in using the other. It is further required, when I treat another as a means, that the other can take on my ends, my purpose, in so using him or her as a means. Kant likely expressed this condition in the Groundwork: “the man who has a mind to make a false promise to others will see at once that he is intending to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not share. For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share the end of [my] action.”

[braca]

Sta uradi nejebica od coveka...

[Meazza]

+1

[Lord Protector]

[Meazza]

Svaki filozof je imao svoje WTF momente. Recimo Aristotelovi ili Sopenhauerovi stavovi o zenama. I sad ja mogu da kazem da su lupali gluposti na tu temu, a neko pametan ce napisati poput tebe "Ma da, jebo Aristotela i Sopenhauera, sta oni znaju." Tako se ne vodi diskusija, jer za bukvalno bilo koji opiceni stav mogu da ti nadjem relevantnog filozofa koji ga je propagirao. Moras sam, iz glave, da obrazlozis zasto je seks nemoralan, ovo sto je pisao Kant nema veze s vezom. Ja sam napisao zasto ja mislim da seks nije nemoralan i to sam obrazlozio, a ti samo vadis citate i ne diskutujes sa mnom.

Edited September 29, 2016 by IndridCold

[Lord Protector]

Objasnio sam ti ali nisi shvatio. To što kažeš da Kant nema veze sa etikom je isto kao da kažeš da Ajnštajn nema veze sa fizikom. Problem je u tebi a ne u Kantu.

Edited September 29, 2016 by slow

[Meazza]

Ti ozbiljno mislis da je Kant poslednja rec u etici i da se nije doslo ni do kakvih dostignuca posle njega? Onda je problem u tebi, sta da ti radim.

Edited September 29, 2016 by IndridCold

[Meazza]

I ozbiljno pokusavas da prodas pricu da je sud jednog coveka jedini merodavan za nesto tako metafizicki neuhvatljivo kao sto je etika?

 

Nemamo onda o cemu da pricamo.

[Lord Protector]

I ozbiljno pokusavas da prodas pricu da je sud jednog coveka jedini merodavan za nesto tako metafizicki neuhvatljivo kao sto je etika?

 

Nemamo onda o cemu da pricamo.

 

Etika nije metafizički neuhvatljiva. Etički principi se nalaze u svakom čoveku, to je praktična stvar, svakodnevna. Ne govori on o Duhu Svetome nego o moralnim načelima. To ti je kao priča o Maksvelovim jednačinama u fizici.

 

I slažem se sa tobom, iscrpli smo temu.  

Edited September 29, 2016 by slow

[Meazza]

Etika nije metafizički neuhvatljiva. Etički principi se nalaze u svakom čoveku, to je praktična stvar, svakodnevna.

 

Dobro^TM, objasnio si. Kant je rekao poslednju rec, ovi pre i posle njega neka jedu govna.

Edited September 29, 2016 by IndridCold

[Krošek]

ne moze tako sa idejama, ideje nisu procesori da se kontinuirano i neumitno usavrsavaju. 

imas tri greske u razmisljanju: prva je fallacy of novelty (primer sa procesorima), druga je (nenamerno) podmetanje da ako neko smatra da je kant najbolji da taj smatra da je kant i apsolutno dovoljan i da su ostali nebitni, a treca je pogresna pretpostavka da ako je kant ("samo") jedan u nizu, u skupu istovrsnih clanova, da taj jedan clan ne moze biti jedini adekvatan za nesto, jedini nuzno potreban i sl vec mora deliti tu osobinu sa ostalim clanovima...tako mozes imati kosaru jabuka u kojoj samo jedna jabuka nije crvljiva. s druge strane ako neko kaze da je jabuka koja nije crvljiva najbolja, to ne znaci da nece jesti ostale jabuke. opet, s trece strane, za taj isti ce za kompot koristiti samo jednu jabuku, onu koja nije crvljiva.

 

sto je najgore, primenjujuci te greske dovodis se u metodolosku kontradikciju jer novelty of fallacy podrazumeva da se u novim generacijama "proizvoda" stvaraju bitno bolja, kvalitativna poboljsanja, a onda kazes "pih to je samo jedan u nizu".

pa neces reci bas za i7 da je samo jos jedan procesor u odnosu na intel 8080.

[Meazza]

Ja nisam ni govorio o idejama vec o saznanjima.

 

Uostalom, tvoj post jeste nacelno tacan, nisi morao detaljno da objasnjavas logicke greske, bio sam ih savrseno svestan. Samo sam diskutovao na istom nivou kao Slow koji je pravio drugaciju logicku gresku (argument from authority).

[Meazza]

Nego, na temu:

 

 

On this date in 1902, Nobel Laureate John Steinbeck was born in Salinas, Calif. He studied marine biology at Stanford, but did not graduate. His long list of humanistic novels include the 20th century classics Of Mice and Men (1937) and The Grapes of Wrath (1939), which won a Pulitzer Prize He also wrote To a God Unknown (1933), The Red Pony (1937), East of Eden (1952), and The Winter of Our Discontent (1961). Near the end of his life, he wrote his personal physician, Dr. Kenny Fox: "Now finally, I am not religious so that I have no apprehension of a hereafter, either a hope or reward or a fear of punishment. It is not a matter of belief. It is what I feel to be true from my experience, observation, and simple tissue feeling." Steinbeck was awarded a Nobel Prize for Literature in 1962. (Cited in Who's Who in Hell, edited by Warren Allen Smith.) D. 1968.

Edited September 30, 2016 by IndridCold

[Lord Protector]

Ja nisam ni govorio o idejama vec o saznanjima.

 

Uostalom, tvoj post jeste nacelno tacan, nisi morao detaljno da objasnjavas logicke greske, bio sam ih savrseno svestan. Samo sam diskutovao na istom nivou kao Slow koji je pravio drugaciju logicku gresku (argument from authority).