BrExit?

[Prospero]

:D

 

Kakav brutalan tekst.

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/britain-narcissist-nation

[MancMellow]

Pa da, al ne mozes ti da promenis preko noci narativ koji se u velikom delu populacije stvara 20 i vise godina. 

Edited December 6, 2016 by MancMellow

[hazard]

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/britain-narcissist-nation

Au, još brutalnije :D

[hazard]

Pa da, al ne mozes ti da promenis preko noci narativ koji se u velikom delu populacije stvara 20 i vise godina.

Eh da je samo 20 godina...

 

Mene je frapiralo kada su drugarici neki Englezi od 20 i nešto godina rekli ,,mi ne moramo da učimo ništa o drugim zemljama, jer smo stvorili moderan svet". To je pre nešto što po klišeu očekuješ da čuješ od Amera, ne od Engleza. I ovo su bili likovi sa...Kembridža. OK, naravno da nisu svi takvi, ali da uopšte neko takav izađe sa Kembridža u 21. veku je....brate.

[MancMellow]

Zapravo to je 1 odbrambeni mehanizam. 

 

Brexit je generalno maskiran u formu većeg engagementa sa svetom, a bilo je jasno da je motivacija gasača da za njega glasaju sasvim drugačija, i to May odlično razume. Mada i dalje nisam siguran da li samo jaše na tome ili pokušava da usmeri ka nečem konstruktivnijem više varajući brexitaše nego remainere. Ostaje da se vidi.

[Prospero]

Au, još brutalnije :D

čovek ne staje :D

 

Joris Luyendijk ‏@JLbankingblog 5. дец

one reason UK pundits keep looking for the next EU country to exit is that this would make the UK a pioneer rather than a dumbass nation

[Prospero]

Mej prica o nekakvom plavom, belom i crvenom brexitu, budibogsnama

 

[aram]

Bolje nego red, hot & blue

[MancMellow]

Mej prica o nekakvom plavom, belom i crvenom brexitu, budibogsnama

 

 

pa kao "British Brexit" ali je bez veze da bude dva puta referenca na Brit. Samo je poenta da je ovo prvi exit, nije postoja ni noxit, ni swixit. Kao i da ono posle toga nije exit, nego novi odnos. Ma ceo proces prilagodjavanja novoj situaciji (sa ratifikacijama) ce trajati oko 8 do 10 godina, divota za politicare svih boja, tema koja natkriljuje sve druge.

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

Ajd što natkriljuje, nego svako ima izgovor za svašta, koje god sranje da se desi ovi su pokriveni sa "Morali smo da poštujemo vox populi na referendumu", koji god dođu posle vadiće se sa "Ma dajte, ovi pre nas su bili cirkus".

 

Inače ovde već treći dan danas traje ona žalba vlade pred najvrhovnijim ikad sudom oko toga sme li vlada da okine čl50, ili to mora parlament da odobri. Gledao sam sinoć reportažu, jeste da sam pristrasan, ali kako je ovaj advokat (Lord Pannick, sjajno ime) počistio patos sa ovima koji su predstavljali vladu, tj državu, nevera.

 

A ona dva Prosperova članka... auh.

[MancMellow]

 

 

Lord Pannick

 

Crna guja jbt :D

[Bustin]

Ajd što natkriljuje, nego svako ima izgovor za svašta, koje god sranje da se desi ovi su pokriveni sa "Morali smo da poštujemo vox populi na referendumu", koji god dođu posle vadiće se sa "Ma dajte, ovi pre nas su bili cirkus".

 

Inače ovde već treći dan danas traje ona žalba vlade pred najvrhovnijim ikad sudom oko toga sme li vlada da okine čl50, ili to mora parlament da odobri. Gledao sam sinoć reportažu, jeste da sam pristrasan, ali kako je ovaj advokat (Lord Pannick, sjajno ime) počistio patos sa ovima koji su predstavljali vladu, tj državu, nevera.

 

A ona dva Prosperova članka... auh.

 

ima li na YT?

[Prospero]

Britain is heading for the hardest of hard Brexits, but Theresa May can limit the damage

Charles Grant

 

Issuing threats to Europe is futile. To limit the damage, the prime minister should show what the UK can contribute once it has left

 

Thursday 8 December 2016 06.00 GMT

 

 

Theresa May’s government is heading for the hardest of hard Brexits. That’s what many European officials now believe. In several capitals they have told me that – partly based on their reading of British newspapers – they think May is being pushed by the right of her party towards a deal that will achieve maximum sovereignty for Britain and do maximum damage to its economy.

 

They also reckon that, once the article 50 talks start, Britain will be in an extremely weak position. If no deal is struck within two yearson the exit settlement and any transitional arrangements, the UK goes over a “cliff edge”, with only World Trade Organisation rules for support. Service industries would then lack access to EU markets, while farmers and manufacturers would face tariffs. Such an outcome would cause discomfort for EU countries but be much more harmful to Britain: they take almost half of UK exports yet send it less than 10% of their own.

 

Michel Barnier, the European commission’s lead negotiator on Brexit, increased the pressure on Britain this week. He said that because of the time the EU would need to prepare for the talks and then ratify any deal, only 15 to 18 months would remain for proper negotiations.

 

Given such a weak hand, what can May hope to achieve? Staying in the single market is impossible, since she rejects free movement and the authority of the European court of justice (ECJ). Her best bet is to aim for a free trade agreement (FTA) (FTA) that provides zero tariffs on goods, plus some access to EU services markets.

 

Yet a half-decent agreement will require goodwill from Britain’s partners. And the government’s conduct in recent months has eroded that goodwill. May and her ministers need to rethink their style and tactics and then come up with substantive requests that generate a relatively warm response.

 

Ministers should be serious and courteous, while avoiding anti-EU rhetoric. To quote a senior official in one capital: “If you want a good deal, keep the negotiations boring and technical. The more your ministers grandstand, the more we become defensive and unhelpful.”

 

But not all ministers have got the message. When Boris Johnson said last month that the idea of free movement being a founding principle of the EU was “a total myth” and “bollocks”, he was both factually wrong and offensive. Nor does it help when the British make threats. Government sources have told newspapers that if the EU fails to offer a good trade deal, Britain will punish it by cutting corporation tax to 10% to lure overseas investors. That threat has simply ensured the EU will insist on the right to curb market access if Britain makes “unfair” tax cuts.

 

Britain’s partners also noted the media onslaught after the high court ruling on article 50; other governments thought it strange that ministers gave such halfhearted support to the principle of judicial independence. That episode did nothing for Britain’s reputation.

 

It would help if the prime minister made a big speech setting out a positive vision for what the UK could contribute to Europe post-Brexit. For instance, she could offer to make Britain’s expertise on foreign policy, defence, counter-terrorism and policing available to the EU, in pursuit of common policies and objectives. She could offer ships and border guards for policing and strengthening the EU’s external frontier – goals that would evidently benefit Britain. She could aspire to make Britain a closer partner of the EU on security policy than any other non-member.

 

May would also impress the 27 if she aimed for a high level of economic integration. She should make a clear commitment to a transitional deal to cover the several years that will elapse between Britain leaving the EU and the entry into force of an FTA. Businesses and financial firms are desperate for arrangements that could allow them a period in the customs union and parts of the single market while they consider their plans. May’s problem is that the EU’s price for the transition period will be politically unpalatable: free movement, ECJ rulings and budget payments.

 

May has not yet ruled out staying in the EU customs union in the long term, though UK officials think this is unlikely (countries in the customs union share a common external tariff on imports, but trade between them is tariff-free). It would mean that Britain would have to swallow EU trade policy, and that Liam Fox’s new department could not negotiate free-trade agreements with other countries.

 

But the case for remaining in the customs union is strong: many fewer bureaucratic delays and barriers at the UK-EU border, and minimal disruption of integrated supply chains (crucial for industries like cars and aerospace). Staying would also make it easier to avoid restoring controls on Northern Ireland’s border with Ireland. May should offer money for the funds that support the development of poorer EU members. Encouragingly, Brexit secretary David Davis has not ruled this out. If Britain made such payments – as Switzerland and Norway do – it would spur the EU to offer a more generous FTA.

 

The details of how Britain restricts free movement are important. If May offers a less stringent regime to EU citizens than to those from other nations – a policy backed by some of her ministers – she will earn goodwill. But if the new regime cuts the numbers of EU migrants sharply, goodwill will be lost. The 27 other nations, including Germany, would appreciate May consulting them on the details of the restrictions.

 

The 27 may be overly pessimistic in supposing it will be the hardest of Brexits. If the economy turns down sooner rather than later, the advocates of closer ties to the EU – including the Treasury and increasingly vocal business lobbies – will be strengthened. The parliamentary majority in favour of a soft Brexit may yet find a way of nudging government policy; this week ministers avoided a Commons defeat by backing a Labour motion requiring them to state their plans for the negotiation.

 

One of May’s strengths is that she believes in evidence-based policymaking. If she concludes that the national interest requires it, she may find the courage to break with the hard right and go for a not-so-hard Brexit.

 

[Budja]

Guardian.

 

 

Russian involvement in US vote raises fears for European elections

CIA investigation may have implications for upcoming French and German polls, even raising doubts over integrity of Brexit vote

[Prospero]

 

We’ll get a Brexit that suits Europe, not one that suits us

 

William Keegan

 

The process of leaving is descending into a farce that reminds one of The Fast Show – except that it is happening so excruciatingly slowly

 

Sunday 11 December 2016 07.00 GMT

 

 

 

The Fast Show, which ran on BBC television from 1994 to 1997 – the last few years of Ken Clarke’s chancellorship – has been voted the second-best television sketch show ever, after Monty Python.

 

What we are now witnessing is the Slow Show – this excruciating, drawn-out process of Brexit, which shows every sign of eventually proving the most dangerous and self-defeating political tragicomedy of our age.

 

Towards the end of his memoirs, Kind of Blue, Clarke writes: “I have been repeatedly asked whether I could remember any madder period of political life in the United Kingdom during my career. I have pondered this … but the answer is obviously ‘no'.

 

He goes on: “David [Cameron]’s chancer-like gamble, taken for tactical internal party-management reasons, turned out to be the worst political mistake made by any British prime minister in my lifetime.”

 

Last week Clarke, who is a giant among the current breed of politicians, was the only Tory to vote against the motion to trigger Brexit by the end of March. Clarke believes, as I do, that the government has no strategy, and that leading Brexiters do not agree among themselves. They have pushed the prime minister into a position where she is finding it difficult to cope.

 

In the past fortnight we have been treated to news that David Davis (whose role in this farce is to play Secretary of State for Exiting the EU) appears to have no problem with the thought of paying a price for retaining some of the current advantages of EU membership, and that Boris Johnson is flexible on migration, at least on some occasions. Yet many of the people who were misled by the Brexit propaganda, indeed by the Brexiters’ outright lies, during the referendum campaign reportedly voted to stop payments to the EU and reduce migration from the EU – migration, by the way, which in every year since we joined the union in 1973 has been less than inward migration from outside the EU.

 

The political analyst John Curtice calculates that three-quarters of Labour supporters voted Remain. Yet most of the parliamentary Labour party voted last week, with every Tory except Ken Clarke, to trigger article 50 by the end of March. In keeping with the farcical undertones of the way Brexit has divided the nation, both the government and the Labour party claimed victory over the vote.

 

Labour, deeply concerned about the threat from Ukip in the north, may be playing a long game. When the seriousness of the prospective damage from Brexit becomes more apparent – almost certainly hitting the very people who felt “left out” and ignored by the so-called “metropolitan elite” – Labour may summon the courage to be more forthright about the folly of Brexit.

 

In which context I was particularly struck last week by an interview in the Times with the playwright Michael Frayn. He told his interviewer, Andrew Billen (like himself, a former Observer man), that Boris Johnson had said during the campaign: “There’s not going to be another war in Europe if we pull out.” Frayn added: “Well, I agree. We can be absolutely confident that there won’t be – but why can we be confident? Because of the painfully slowly constructed structure of agreements and treaties that have been set up in Europe to preserve the peace.”

 

For, let us face it, this is not just about economics, and voting to make our country poorer while Brexiters fantasise about the freedom to trade with non-EU nations with whom we already trade. The EU was set up primarily to unite a continent that had been tearing itself apart for centuries. And there are now uncomfortable echoes of the 1930s in the rise of extremist parties in mainland Europe.

 

The last thing that the Europeans we are supposed to be “negotiating with” are prepared to do is let Britain off lightly: they are rightly terrified about a domino effect. It is “Brexit or nothing”. Yet in the fantasy land of current British politics, Brexiters and others are kidding themselves into believing that the others do not mean what they say. All this stuff about “soft Brexits” and “medium Brexits” is pie in the sky. I can hear Paul Whitehouse, in a revival of The Fast Show, asking: “How do you like your Brexit, madam? Rare or medium – or perhaps well done?”

 

The fact is that at present, by being members of the EU but not of the seriously troubled eurozone, Britain has the best of both worlds. Too many people are caving in to the view that, in a non-binding referendum, “the people have spoken”.

 

Yes: despite the objections of some readers, I repeat that only 37% of the adult population voted for Brexit, and only 28% of the entire population. And to those who say the latter figure is misleading, because it includes children ineligible to vote, I commend a recent letter in the New European from Mr Warwick Hillman.

 

He points out that if we leave the EU in March 2019 – the government’s “plan” – some 2 million of the 2016 referendum electorate will have died, being replaced on the electoral roll by a similar number of 18- 20-year-olds.

 

He concludes, devastatingly, that given the known voting preferences of each group, “at some point in the negotiating process we shall acquire a majority wanting to remain. In this context, does not a repeat referendum in advance of any act of leaving become a democratic imperative?”

 

Mr Hillman adds that he will be 74 in March.