BrExit?

[yolo]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8o7K4Yc15ok

 

slab je on LEAVER kad nije nabo crnca koji glumi nemca

[harper lee]

Jebo im je majku.

[MancMellow]

Meni je najbolja faca one crnokose voditeljke dok gleda Faraza, otprilike kao da bi mu muda isekla za dve sekunde :D 

[vememah]

[Friend]

Mashala, ovi ce su prdnuli u cabar ali bas onako jako.

[Anduril]

Bilo je ranije teskih diskusija da je (ekstremna) levica kroz istoriju cesto bila blizu (ekstremne) desnice.

Ili bolje receno - levi populizam uz desni populizam.

 

Sada opet to gledamo u novijoj inkarnaciji:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/upshot/brexit-is-a-reminder-of-how-populism-is-redrawing-us-political-lines.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1

 

Mozemo se nadati da ce ova runda desnih populista sto razbija EU i UK zavrsiti svoje ranije nego sto su razni Cavezi napravili od Venecuele...

Edited June 28, 2016 by Anduril

[Prospero]

Bloomberg TV Verified account ‏@BloombergTV

JUST IN: Draghi sees #Brexit cutting Euro GDP by as much as 0.5%, document shows

[Bojan]

Ne, Kameron se zajebao, kao i BoJo, i to tesko, ali sad je nastupio period damage controla. 

 

S tim sto BoJo ne pripada onoj struji koja vec 20 godina razmislja o ovako necemu. 

 

Pa, da. To su ti elita-momci iz Bulingdon kluba (za one koji su se nedavno uključili u diskusiju).

 

Sada je gotovo izvesno da će EU odlučno odgovoriti i neće dopustiti bilo kakve egzibicije. EU predstavlja glomazan mehanizam koji se možda malo teže pokreće, ali je i njima jasno da moraju imati proaktivnu politiku. Pri tome su svesni da moraju voditi računa o konstruktivnom pristupu i da se prema drugoj strani ne smeju držati neprijateljski (non-zero sum game), ali da ne smeju dopustiti da ih neko preterano ucenjuje. 

 

Videli smo to i na slučaju Grexita (bilo dobrih diskusija na forumu). Grci nisu nastupili sa pričom da neće napustiti euro-zonu, ali je Varufakis popio kontru jer je nastupio sa stavom "ja ću sad da vam pojasnim kako treba dalje da izgleda EU". Mislim da je čak kasnije uvažena teška pozicija Grčke i da je Evropska centralna banka već neko vreme pre toga planirala mere koje bi pospešile rast, ali koje bi se primenile kao celovito rešenje.

 

Recimo, pre više od godinu dana je pokrenuta inicijativa za izradu Globalne strategije spoljne politike i bezbednosti EU. Ta strategija je prošla do sada dosta diskusija i stručnih debata. Dokument je uobličen, Mogerinijeva ga je poslala svim državama članicama, a uskoro će biti objavljen. Predviđa se da će EU iskoristiti neke malo oštrije mehanizme nego što je to do sada bio slučaj. Euroskeptici čak govore da je ovo otvaranje vrata za neku evropsku vojsku.

 

 

Europe must be able to develop its own military autonomy by going beyond NATO, says a new foreign policy and security proposal to be presented Tuesday to European leaders.

 

Kompletan razgovor sa Federikom Mogerini

 

 

The very existence of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before.

 

The world around us looks so fragile, with so many open crises and conflicts. But it is also a world of immense opportunities – people can study and move more than ever before, in a more open and more connected planet.

 

In challenging times, we cannot afford to be hesitant, or divided. A strong Union is one that shares a vision and acts together. And this is even more true after the British referendum.

 

Together we can respond to the threats and seize the opportunities the world offers. None of our countries alone can do so. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens our potential is impressive. We are in the top three of world economies, we are the first trading partner, donor and investor globally. But we should also realise that we aren’t making full use of our potential, yet.

This is why today I am presenting a Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy. Beyond confusion and uncertainty, we can make this Union even stronger.

 

The Strategy focuses on defence capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It is about soft power –because we are the best at it. But in today's world soft power and hard power have to go hand in hand.

 

The Strategy sets out the ambition of strategic autonomy for our Union. But we also know that our priorities are best served when we are not alone. We can only be strong, if our friends and partners are also strong. This is a Strategy for win-win solutions: my neighbour's strength is my own strength.

 

These are interests we all share. And the only way to serve common interests is through common European means.This is a collective responsibility for us – for the European institutions, for each of our countries, and for all the people of Europe. Together we can make this Union a stronger Union. It is no time for fear. It is time for a shared vision, and for common action.

 

European Union Global Strategy

 

EU očigledno ima problem sa suverenitetom, u smislu kada ga treba snažno zaštiti. No, za razliku od drugih zemalja, koje svoj suverenitet baštine na ratu ili drugom nasilnom događaju, evropski suverenitet je mirnodopski. Otuda i soft power politika. Naravno, uvek ostaje to jako važno pitanje - da li se ljudi ikada mogu osloboditi potčinjenosti? Ljudi se bore protiv nje, ali je potreba za zajednicom uvek na neki način traži.

[Prospero]

Izašla je danas cela strategija -  http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

 

 

Neki komentari samog procesa rada na njoj nisu baš sjajni

 

 

An EU official told EurActiv that the strategy reflects very much Mogherini’s own assessment of global issues. “This is not a traditional Commission’s communication or policy paper from the European External Action Service. It is really her vision,” the official said, noting that the Commission’s services gave input but nothing more.

 

The strategy, drafted by Mogherini and her close adviser Nathalie Tocci, aims to be a political and intellectual framework, a reference, on which to pin future actions, and should be read in terms of competences rather than on geographical terms, a close aide to Mogherini told EurActiv.

 

 

iako se EUISS baš iscimao da da doprinos

 

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Bojan Pancevski Verified account ‏@bopanc
Cameron's last #EUCO supper #Brexit

Edited June 28, 2016 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

Onako cisto politicki za sebe mislim da za sada najbolje poteze vuce Farron, bez obzira na slabe izglede da se ta opcija (novi referendum) ikada desi. On jedini od ove tri engleske stranke ima jasnu poruku, postoji ogroman broj ljudi koji jeste za ostanak u EU. To najverovatnije nece moci da im isporuci, ali ako bi dobio veliki broj glasova mogao bi da bude nezaobilazan za sastav vlade i da utice na to da prihvate EEA i da kaze - ljudi, ovo je najbolje sto moze sad kad su ovi sjebali kako su sjebali. Jeste da Britanija vise ne moze da utice na EU politiku (not my fault) ali obicni ljudi i biznis imaju skoro sve pogodnosti koje je imao i do sada. 

 

edit: Ok, naravno, i UKIP ima jasnu poruku...

Edited June 28, 2016 by MancMellow

[Prospero]

Evo još malo pravnih tumačenja oko eventualnih pokušaja pravne blokade Brexita:
 
 

 

Brexit | Can Scotland block Brexit?

On The Sunday Politics Scotland today, the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, raised the prospect of Scotland placing an obstacle in the path of Brexit, saying: “If the Scottish parliament is judging this on the basis of what’s right for Scotland, then the option of saying we’re not going to vote for something that’s against Scotland’s interests, that’s got to be on the table. You’re not going to vote for something that is not in Scotland’s interests.” So, can Scotland legally block Brexit? The answer is “no”; but before the reasons are explained, some background is necessary.

 

Devolution notwithstanding, the UK Parliament — i.e. the Westminister Parliament — is sovereign. Among other things, that means that Westminster has not given away any of its powers to devolved legislatures like the Scottish Parliament. As a matter of strict law, the UK Parliament has merely authorised the devolved legislatures to make laws on certain matters, without relinquishing its own authority to make law on any matter it chooses — including devolved matters.

Of course, if the UK Parliament, having established devolution, regularly interfered in devolved matters, that would undermine the whole system. But in fact that does not happen, because the legal power of the Westminster Parliament to interfere is usually exercised by reference to a “constitutional convention” — an established and accepted political practice concerning how Westminster will and will not use its power — known as the Sewel Convention. The Sewel Convention says that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters, or on matters affecting the extent of devolved legislatures’ legal powers, without the consent of the devolved legislature. In other words, Westminster will not normally interfere in matters that affect or are within the Scottish Parliament’s authority unless the Scottish Parliament agrees. Importantly, for present purposes, the Scottish Parliament’s powers are limited by EU law. And the argument is that if Brexit legislation enacted by the UK removes those limits — freeing the Scottish Parliament to make Scottish laws that breach EU law — then that alters the Scottish Parliament’s powers, so triggering the requirement to get its consent under the Sewel Convention.

It might seem, therefore, that Scotland can block Brexit by withholding its consent under the Convention. However, for three reasons, the true position is that Scotland cannot legally block Brexit.

 

First, it is logically impossible for there to be any requirement for the Scottish Parliament’s consent Brexit legislation enacted by Westminster unless, in the first place, the Westminster Parliament is in the process of enacting such legislation. The general view, though, is that the Article 50 process — whereby the UK’s departure from the UK would be negotiated — falls to be triggered by the Government exercising its so-called prerogative powers to conduct foreign policy, rather than by Parliament enacting legislation. This means that when (or if) Article 50 is invoked, that could happen without any legislation being enacted by the UK Parliament. What this boils down to is that Brexit could become irrevocable (unless the EU agrees otherwise, it follows automatically two years after Article 50 is triggered) without the UK Parliament ever enacting any legislation to which the Scottish Parliament could object. Of course, at some point, the UK Parlaiment will have to enact legislation relating to Brexit — but if, by then, the Article 50 clock has begun to run, no amount of withholding of consent by the Scottish Parliament will make the UK’s departure from the EU any less inevitable as a matter of international law. That ship will have sailed.

 

Second, the Scottish Parliament cannot anyway “block” UK legislation on Brexit or on anything else. Certainly, it can withhold consent. But because, as explained above, the UK Parliament is sovereign and can do as it wishes, the absence of consent from the Scottish Parliament would not legally disable Westminster from enacting Brexit legislation. This is so because the “requirement” for consent is not a legal requirement at all: it is, ultimately, no more than a political expectation that the UK Parliament will respect the constitutional position of the Scottish Parliament by not riding roughshod over it in certain circumstances. It might be politically difficult — and highly inexpedient — for the UK Parliament to treat the Scottish Parliament in that way. It might even be thought to be “unconstitutional”, in the sense of disregarding the constitutional principle — namely, respect for devolved autonomy — that underpins the Sewel Convention. But because the requirement for Scottish consent is, at the end of the day, no more than a convention, the absence of such consent cannot be a legal obstacle to Brexit.

 

Third, it might be wondered whether the Scotland Act 2016 — enacted in the wake of Scottish independence referendum held in 2014 — makes a difference to all of this. The Act says that “it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”. This appears to place the convention mentioned above — that Westminster does not interfere unless the Scottish Parliament consents — on a statutory footing. Does this mean that what was once a political restraint on Westminster has now become a legal constraint, meaning that Scotland can now block Brexit? No.

 

For one thing, whatever legal force the 2016 Act gives to the convention regarding the need for Scottish consent, it does so in respect of only part of the convention. The Act refers only to Westminster legislation “with regard to devolved matters”. This covers UK legislation that has to do with matters already devolved to Scotland: it is relevant, therefore, if Westminster wishes to make law on a matter that the Scottish Parliament could make (and might already have made) law itself. But the 2016 Act studiously avoids reference to the other aspect of the convention — i.e. the part of the convention that says Scottish consent should be obtained before Westminster adjusts the scope of the Scottish Parliament’s powers. It is that sort of effect that Brexit legislation would presumably have, by removing the requirement that the Scottish Parliament legislates in line with EU law. (Of course, Brexit legislation need not do this — it could leave EU law in place as a restriction on the Scottish Parliament’s powers — but that would be an absurd situation post-Brexit.) The 2016 Act does not therefore give any legal force to the relevant part of the convention concerning the need for Scottish consent to Westminster legislation.

 

But there is a deeper — and, at the same time, simpler — point concerning the 2016 Act. It is not just that it does not give legal effect to the relevant part of the convention: properly understood, it does not give legal effect to any part of the convention. All it says is that it is recognised that Westminster will not normally legislate on certain matters unless the Scottish Parliament consents. This merely reduces to the UK Parliament — through the medium of the 2016 Act — acknowledging the existence of the political convention concerning the obtaining of consent. It manifestly does not represent a legal constraint on the UK Parliament’s power; nor does it alter the status of the Sewel Convention. In reality, the relevant provision in the 2016 Act is a law that recognises a convention, but, in doing so, the Act does not, through some form of alchemy, turn the convention into a law.

 

The devolved politics of Brexit are immensely complex and may turn out to be crucially important to what actually happens. And nothing in this post is intended to deny that. But as a matter of law, neither Scotland nor any of the UK’s other constituent nations can stop Brexit from happening.

 

Edited June 28, 2016 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

Sve to Sturgeon zna, ali ne zaboravimo sta je, zapravo, krajnji cilj SNP...

[Prospero]

Radek Sikorski razbija Sackura na Hardtalk-u, kaže izmedju ostalog "vi u ovoj zemlji ste žrtva višedecenijskog ispiranja mozga od strane neodgovornih medija u pogledu funkcionisanja EU"

 

by Tapatalk

[MancMellow]

Radek Sikorski razbija Sackura na Hardtalk-u, kaže izmedju ostalog "vi u ovoj zemlji ste žrtva višedecenijskog ispiranja mozga od strane neodgovornih medija u pogledu funkcionisanja EU"

 

by Tapatalk

 

Na stranu stvarne mane - u pravu je 100%. I sve to je za cilj imalo ovo grand finale u prethodni četvrtak tj kad dođe takva prilika da se i iskoristi. Ono što je takođe zanimljivo je da su takve tendencije počele da se pojavljuju bukvalno od sredine 70-tih, dakle od samog početka članstva UK u EU, jer se poklopilo sa "mogulizacijom" medijskog vlasništva. Namera je jasna, a jasan je i motiv. 

[Prospero]

Od 9 strana teksta, ne gusto kucanog doduše, u zaključcima sa EUCO samita Brexitu je posvećeno ovo:

 

 

 OUTCOME OF THE UK REFERENDUM
23. The UK Prime Minister informed the European Council about the outcome of the referendum in the UK.