Толстый и тонкий

[Zaz_pi]

Za Rusiju je bolje da konkurenti nestanu pa makar trpela u kratko vreme jer posle toga sledi mnogo veca cena od $70 i to je lepo za njih. To je glavno razmisljanje i Saudijaca. Saudijicima nije lepo, nikome nije lepo, na kratko. Saudijci su sredinom '80ih mogli na kolicini da kompenzuju pad cene,  kada je cena pala 60%,1985, jer su oni ubacili 100% svoje proizvodnje. To danas nije slucaj sa KSA, oni nista nisu menjali u proizvodnji, ili je to minimalno, jer oni i nemaju nekakvog znacajnog prostora za tako nesto. Drugo, '80te su potpuno drugacije od ovoga danas jer je tada potrosnja u svetu padala dok ona danas raste.

Sto se tice ruske ekonomije, ona je vec, pre pada cene, krenula u promenu strukture jer je jasno da od rasta proizvodnje nafte nema vise nista, i da ce proizvodnja stagnirati, a cena nece skociti zbog nekonvecionalnih izvora na $100. Zato su usli u STO, zato su prodali deo akcija Avtovaza Reno-Nisan grupi, i ulozili puno novca za razvoj novih modela u saradnji sa Reno-Nisan. Zato su krenuli da prave nove avione, ulazu u elektroniku itd. Planirane su velike privatizacije drzavnih preduzeca, plivajuci kurs, sto se desilo ranije zbog pritiska zapada(tako se deilicno stite) itd.

Ovaj pad ce ih samo naterati da to brze rade.

Edited January 17, 2015 by Zaz_pi

[Кровавый Пастор]

Ali cekajte, ako konkurenti nestanu jer im je neisplativo da vade naftu iz skriljaca po ovakvim cenama, zar se ti isti konkurenti nece povampiriti kad cena nafte ponovo skoci?

[Anduril]

Ali cekajte, ako konkurenti nestanu jer im je neisplativo da vade naftu iz skriljaca po ovakvim cenama, zar se ti isti konkurenti nece povampiriti kad cena nafte ponovo skoci?

 

Pa naravno - ovo posebno vazi za freking. Dok zatvaranje i otvaranje konvencionalnih ili morskih busotina kosta ogromne pare, ovo drugo mogu zatvoriti relativno brzo ali isto tako i otvoriti. Kljuc je u technologiji koja preuzima primat od prostog posedovanja rezervi i time uvodi balans na trziste.

Upravo zato ce i buducnosti biti sve vaznije ko poseduje tu technologiju a ne samo ko poseduje rezerve.

[Zaz_pi]

Predlazem svakome da ulozi novac u nesto sto sustiniski nije isplativo ni na $100 i svakog trenutka opet moze biti oboreno u bankrot. Zelim srecu svakome, ozbiljno mislim to.

 

edit:

Inace, najvece rezerve uske nafte(ono sto zovu skrljci) ima Rusija. Oni time uopste jos nisu poceli da se bave, niti ce skoro osim pilot projekata, kao ni Arktiku, jer imaju jos dosta da izvlace sa konvecionalnih izvora, narocito sa novim tehnologijama povecanja izvlacenja nafte. Rusija jos 30-40 godina nece imati znacajniji pad(do 1mb/d 2035-2040 dole sa danasnjeg vrha i najveceg prozivodjaca na svetu nafte, ne i ostalih kondezata koji nisu nafta).

O gasu nema potrebe da govorim, imaju 20-30% svetskih rezervi gasa, i to da ne diraju van konvencionalnih izvora, inace se procenjuje da imaju mnogo vise.

Edited January 17, 2015 by Zaz_pi

[Zaz_pi]

Razlog rasta hidraulicnog lompjenja je u Energy Policy Act of 2005, Cejni u Bus, koji je izbacio iz Clean Water Act da su hemikalije koriscene za taj poduhvat zabranjene zbog zagadjenja, sto jeste tacno. Drugi razlog je zaduzivanje(kompanije su za par godina 3 puta povecale dug za operacije) i visoka cena nafte nastala zbog nekih vanrednih dogadjaja poput cunamija u Japanu.

Edited January 17, 2015 by Zaz_pi

[Кровавый Пастор]

Pa da ali Rusi nemaju opremu kojom bi mogli da eksploatisu sve te rezerve. Pa nisu oni zvali Ekson i druge zapadne kompanije na Arktik sto ih vole.

 

Licno mislim, da ce se u buducnosti upravo ici na to. Sto vise eksploatacije, pa makar nafta otisla na minimum cene. Bice je tako mnogo i bice toliko jeftina, da ce uticati na privredni rast zemalja kojima je do sada bila skupa i nedostupna, a proizvodjaci ce se utrktivati po sistemu bolje 6 barela po 20 USD, nego jedan od 100.

[Zaz_pi]

Razlog za zvanje Exxona je pre svega poltiicke prirode. Exxon se ni ne bavi servisiranjem polja  vec firme poput Halliburton i Schlumberger, ali i to ce biti reseno. uzgred, zapadne kompanije nemaju nikakve restrikcije na ulaganje u naftna polja van Arktika i skriljaca, i ona ulazu poput BP-BP and Rosneft ‘the surprise 2015 business venture’.

Ako ti smatras da ce tako biti sa cenom nafte, mozda si ti u pravu, onda lepo ulozis novac i zaradis. Ja cu ti prvi cestitati.

[Кровавый Пастор]

Kad bih imao toliko novca, ulozio bih. Tu se bez cetiri, pet nula ne vredi upustati cak ni reda radi.

 

Znaci ipak su ih zvali sto ih vole? Rusi imaju komplet tehnologiju, ali su hteli da pomognu americku ekonomiju i ojacaju bilateralne veze.

 

S obzirom da se radi o najmocnijoj zemlji na svetu i jedinoj pravoj super sili, nije nemoguce.

[Zaz_pi]

Naravno da nije tako sto se tice ulganja.

[Кровавый Пастор]

Ne znam sto ih Putinjuk ne otkaci komplet. Veze sa Zapadom samo stvaraju ranjivost za Rusiju. Rusija moze da se samoizoluje i opet da prezivi. Sto je extrem, naravno. Ali poslovno vezivanje za Zapad i iznosenje kapitala tamo je potpuno promaseno. Kao i dozvoljavanje prodoru njihove tehnologije.

[hazard]

Ali cekajte, ako konkurenti nestanu jer im je neisplativo da vade naftu iz skriljaca po ovakvim cenama, zar se ti isti konkurenti nece povampiriti kad cena nafte ponovo skoci?

 

Naravno da hoće. Kada se cena vrati na odgovarajući nivo, ne(ko će od bankrotiranih firmi za smešne pare otkupiti koncesije, tehnologija je sada već razrađena (dakle potrebne investicije u tehnologiju su već odrađene, firme koje će zbog toga sada ,,pući" su ,,učinile uslugu" nekim budućim) i eto opet nafte i gasa iz škriljaca, peska, itd. Jedini način da se nekonvencionalni izvori nafte ,,ubiju" je da cena trajno ostane ispod $70...što dugoročno ne može da bude, osim ako celu planetu ne pogodi nekakva ekonomska depresija gora od one 30ih ili ako neko ne izumi jeftini nuklearni fuzioni reaktor. Zato je Zazov komentar logike - bez...

Edited January 17, 2015 by hazard

[Zaz_pi]

Ta proizvodnja je trebala da dosegne vrhunac, bez pada cene koji se desio, ove ili sledece godine sa sve ogromnim zaduzivanjem. Naravno da moze da se zadrzi ako cena brzo skoci do npr. $70-80, ali ako cena ostane ispod $60 duze vremena slede masovni bankroti i bezanje investitora odatle. Oni u SAD se nadaju da ce cena da skoci do tamo 3/4 kvartala, pa da se izvuku sa zastitom(hedzom). Nema tu nikakve posebne nove tehnologije, to je sve cena, zaduzivanje i zagadjivanje. To se upravo danas vidi kada masovno seku ulaganja i broj naftnih busotina pada rekordnom brzinom. Kao sto rece direktor Lukoil, to je slicno dot-com balonu. :)

Uostalom, to ludilo nisu vodile vodece svetske naftne kompanije poput Exxona ili Shella, oni su znali od pocetka sta je to(to ne znaci da nisu imali operacije tamo na nekim dobrim mestima) vec male kompanije, sa statusom smeca na obveznicama, koje su dobijale izuzetno povoljne kredite i kamate na obveznice zbog dejstva FEDa. Primera radi, direktor Exxona je za vadjanje gasa iz skriljaca rekao da oni tu gube novac jer je cena na gasu niska :

 

NEW YORK—-Even energy titan Exxon Mobil Corp. is showing signs of strain from low natural-gas prices.

On Wednesday Exxon Chief Executive Rex Tillerson broke from the previous company line that it wasn't being hurt by natural gas prices, admitting that the Irving, Texas-based firm is among those hurting from the price slump.

"We are all losing our shirts today." Mr. Tillerson said in a talk before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "We're making no money. It's all in the red."

 

 

Ovo je bilo 2012 na gasu i gomila ih je presla na naftu. Sada su zakucani na gasu i nafti.

Problem je ako krenu bankroti sta ce biti sa derivatima koje su banke finansirale te operacije. Derivati su prodani hedz fondovima itd. kao nekada sa nekretninama i niko ne zna gde sve to moze da pukne a da nikakve veze nema sa naftom. To ej tipicna propganda, hajp, sa Vol strita u koju su usli politicari, zbog potplacivanja sa Vol strita. ;)

Edited January 17, 2015 by Zaz_pi

[Zaz_pi]

Naravno da hoće. Kada se cena vrati na odgovarajući nivo, ne(ko će od bankrotiranih firmi za smešne pare otkupiti koncesije, tehnologija je sada već razrađena (dakle potrebne investicije u tehnologiju su već odrađene, firme koje će zbog toga sada ,,pući" su ,,učinile uslugu" nekim budućim) i eto opet nafte i gasa iz škriljaca, peska, itd. Jedini način da se nekonvencionalni izvori nafte ,,ubiju" je da cena trajno ostane ispod $70...što dugoročno ne može da bude, osim ako celu planetu ne pogodi nekakva ekonomska depresija gora od one 30ih ili ako neko ne izumi jeftini nuklearni fuzioni reaktor. Zato je Zazov komentar logike - bez...

 

Da te pitam nesto, posto vidim da si pobornik slobodnog trzista i njegove logike: da li bi ulozio u kompaniju koja dejstvom spolja, nevezano za samu kompaniju, u svakom trenutku moze da ode u bankrot? Skriljci i uska nafta nisu isplativi, zbog gomile stvari, na ovim cenama danas, a vidimo da OPEC moze da obori u svakom trenutku cene na danasnji nivo. Zasto bi investitor ulazio u tako nesto?

[Meazza]

Sto se kako tacno razlikuje od dosadasnje istorije cene nafte i rizika vezanog za istu?

[borris_]

Evo sta pise Jacques Sapir o ovome. Stavljam ovdje jer se tice i Rusije. Ne kazem da je u pravu ali daje podatke koji su interesantni. Vidjecemo kako ce p^roci njegove prognoze. (da podsjetim, on je ruski lobista).

 

 

The Shale Bubble and its conséquences.

14 janvier 2015

Par Jacques Sapir

Note kindly translated by Anne-Marie de Grazia.

The reduction in the number of drilling installations dedicated to shale oil extraction is accelerating since the beginning of the year. Horizontal installations have made up over half of the decrease registered during the first week of 2015. In fact, one can expect a reduction of over 30% of the number of drilling installations in the United States during the coming 10 weeks. This decrease affects all extraction basins. In those of Texas and New Mexico, where one third of the installations are situated (502 of a total of 1482 on December 31, 2014), the drop in the first week of 2015 has amounted to 28 installations, that is 5,6% of the total. This phenomenon is widespread and affects all basins.

Consequences for the American production, and on prices.

For the time being, production continues to increase in the United States. It should reach 9,5 million barrels/day probably at the end of March-beginning of April.  But we know that the production cycle is comprised between 3 and 6 months. This implies that the decrease in the number of installations, as well as the effects of the first bankruptcies which are going to multiply within the next few weeks, could make themselves felt on the production between June and August 2015, and gain in amplitude during the 2^ndsemester. A reduction of the daily production of 10% at least, and maybe much more, should begin to appear by the end of the year. It cannot be excluded that we will come back towards the end of the 3^rd quarter, or even the beginning of the 4^th quarter, to a production (in the United States) of 8.2 to 8.6 million barrels a day. The effects on the price of the barrel of oil will of course be spectacular and they will moreover be amplified by the considerable speculative activity which banks and various forms of financial institutions are carrying on right now. So that we can expect a strong decrease, the price of the BRENT might reach less than 40 USD and the price of the WTI less than 35 USD, as long as the production will diminish. But, as soon as the production goes down, and of course the more so the more the decrease is strong and rapid, anticipations will reverse themselves. This movement will be the more brutal than the preceding decrease will have been considerable. Nevertheless, it is probable that the big actors on the oil market will not allow prices to go back up above 70 USD a barrel. At such a price, a large part of the production is no longer cost-effective, or is so only marginally. Ce ne serait pas le contraire?

To summarize, the decrease in price should continue until March, or even April. The “rebound” following the inversion in anticipations should occur between May and July 2015 and we should be reverting to a « normal » price of 70-80 USD around the month of November 2015. We must point out here that this is what the managers of the big Russian oil companies are expecting. The scenario has already been written. The only uncertainty resides in the time period (beginning of June and end of July) and on the size of the rebound (a slow rise towards 70 USD a barrel, or a fast rise occurring because it will arrive later and  after a bigger decrease).

Winners and losers

Such movements will have repercussions on the economies, in the United States of course, but also elsewhere. It is already clear that two countries will be profiting massively from this fall in oil prices, Japan and Germany. These countries do not have an oil industry and are big importers of fossil fuels.

As for the case of the United States, the picture is more complex. We must watch carefully for contradictory effects and especially we must be well aware that these effects will not manifest themselves all in the same time.

1. There are beneficial effects, considering the importance of fuel prices for the population and the small level of taxes levied on these prices. The fall in price at production rapidly translates into a decrease of the price « at the pump. » It also has an impact on the industries which are big consumers of energy and fossil fuels (such as the chemical industry). This impact is already making itself felt.
2. BUT, we must take into account the direct and indirect effects of the crisis which is at present hitting the shale oil industry. From the direct point of view, it will translate into numerous bankruptcies (which will occur between April and early November) of companies involved in the production and of their sub-contractors. Already, US Steel has announced the closure of a production site because of the rapid decrease in the demand for steel to make drilling equipment. Moreover, it must be said that the shale oil (and gas) economy represented, directly or indirectly through its induced effects on consumption and through the income of households working in it, approximately half of the jobs created during these past three years. If we are to witness, as can be expected, a wave of bankruptcies, they will translate into massive job losses. These job losses will have a multiplying effect on the service activities (a multiplier which can be estimated at 2.3/2.7 associated jobs for each job destroyed). Given the very high flexibility of the job market in the United States, part of the dismissed persons will find a new job within 6 to 9 months following the loss of their job, but not at the same level of salary as before. In fact, salaries paid in the shale oil industry are higher, at the same level of qualification, by 15% to 25% than in the rest of the economy. Between the unemployed “strictly speaking,” and persons forced to accept a less well paid job, one might see a drop of 1% to 2% in the mass of the global payroll of the United States, and a considerable decrease (2% to 3%) in the consumption of households because there will be a shifting towards savings, as happens every time one is confronted with considerable economic difficulties. This phenomenon will spread itself from the end of the Summer of 2015 to the Summer of 2016. But the impact will combine with the rise in oil prices. As a result, the contraction of consumption in the 4^th quarter of 2015 or in the first quarter of 2016 could be greater than expected.
3. The indirect effects of this crisis, particularly in the banking sector, will be important as well. It is estimated that the net indebtedness of companies specialized in the production of shale oil amounts to 200 billion dollars. If we add to this the sub-contractors, and also the indebtedness of companies for which shale oil is not the main, but an important activity, this indebtedness reaches 310-330 billion. If one finally adds derived goods and activities financed by the incomes of the shale oil industry (such as the construction of housing to face up to the real estate boom occurring in the extraction basins) we reach amounts of 420 to 450 billion dollars. Of this amount, about 300 to 350 billion at least will become “bad debts” in the coming months. The impact on bank balance sheets will be very noticeable, for these debts are heavily financiarized. It is clear that this will last heavily on the actions of the FED which will have to display extreme prudence in managing interest rates.
4. In the longer term, one must expect a decrease of the Dollar and a return to an exchange rate USD/Euro at around 1.25/1.30 between now and the beginning of the next year. The downward trend of the euro could find itself reversed as a result during the 4^th quarter of 2015, which would jeopardise yet more the timid (and very fragile) “recovery” one seems to be noticing in the Eurozone.

All these factors make one expect a persistence of the growth context in the United States during the first quarter of 2015, followed by a reversal and ever increasing deterioration in the 3^rd and 4^th quarter.

The situation in Russia

In this context, we must then consider the economic and financial situation of Russia. First of all, we must know that the level of all-around cost-effectiveness of oil (and associated) activities is at 3000 rubles per barrel. This means that if the price of the barrel of BRENT goes below 50 USD a barrel, the exchange rate of the ruble cannot be above 60 rubles per dollar (on an inverted scale). In fact, we must expect exchange rates to reach levels comprised between 65 rubles and 70 rubles for one dollar if the price of the barrel continues to plummet. Still, perspectives are not bad in the middle term.

On the other hand, with a price per barrel which should climb back up to around 70 USD, the exchange rate of the ruble should rise back up to around 45 rubles for one dollar by the end of the year. Moreover, the decrease in the repayments to be made by Russian companies to non-resident financial institutions will considerably pacify the situation on the currencies market.

 

 

However, the quarterly trade surplus of Russia amounts to at least 40 billion dollars. We can see that the trade surplus (Exports min. Imports) will largely cover the financing needs of Russian companies. From this point of view, it is clear that the financial situation of Russia will improve during the current year, particularly from the 2^nd semester on, with the very probable increase in the price of the barrel. In reality, Russia appears to be a country with little vulnerability to a temporary decrease in the price of oil. In the contrary, the bursting of the“shale oil bubble” which is now profiling itself on the horizon could have consequences on the American economy which are otherwise more serious. (correct, mais un peu special. Vous pouvez mettre: quite a bit more serious).

 

 

Edit: tabla ne moze da se iskopira. Evo link za tekst.

 

http://russeurope.hypotheses.org/3283

 

Edited January 17, 2015 by borris_