Atletika

[levi]

Jebaće mu rusi mater

[Timmy]

Živeo Vladimir i bratska Rusija!

[Korki]

Ја се надам да хоће јер ово је једини начин да почне да се котрља прича о допингу у спорту. Са тиме у вези, ово је велика услуга спорту што су започели, барем се надам. До сада је владала омерта око допинга између великих, још од времеа Хладног рата.

[levi]

http://rs.n1info.com/a64763/Svet/Svet/AP-Putinova-fabrika-trolova-ima-odeljenja-i-u-Srbiji.html

 

 

[Timmy]

Laž

[teacher]

Ја се надам да хоће јер ово је једини начин да почне да се котрља прича о допингу у спорту. Са тиме у вези, ово је велика услуга спорту што су започели, барем се надам. До сада је владала омерта око допинга између великих, још од времеа Хладног рата.

 

plus se nba igrači ne testiraju na olimpijskim igrama...

[teacher]

Inače, pročitao izveštaj.

 

Laboratorija:

 

With respect to the Moscow laboratory

1. [Chapter 9] Grigory Rodchenko, director of the Moscow accredited laboratory

was specifically identified as an aider and abettor of the doping activities.

2. [Chapter 13] The IC investigation found violations of ISL article 4.1.8 in respect

of the Moscow laboratory.

3. [Chapter 13] The reported presence of the security services (FSB) within the

laboratory setting in Sochi and at the Moscow laboratory, actively imposed an

atmosphere of intimidation on laboratory process and staff, and supported

allegations of state influence in sports events.

4. [Chapter 13] The direct interference into the laboratory’s operations by the

Russian State significantly undermines the laboratory’s independence.

5. [Chapter 13] Many tests that the laboratory has conducted should be considered

highly suspect.

6. [Chapter 13] Assessed as a whole, the IC finds that these investigative reports

demonstrate strong corroborating evidence that the Moscow laboratory has been

involved in a widespread cover-up of positive doping tests.

7. [Chapter 13] The IC further finds that at the heart of the positive drug test cover-

up is Dir. Rodchenkov. He not only accepted, but also requested money in order

to execute the concealment positive test results, which makes him equally

responsible for incidents where coaches or officials extorted athletes even if he

was not personally made aware of the extortion.

8. [Chapter 13] The IC finds that Dir. Rodchenkov’s statements regarding the

destruction of the samples are not credible.

They purport to explain the

destruction of a large number of potentially important samples on the basis of an

alleged inconsistent understanding of the clear instructions received and

acknowledged by Rodchenkov.

9. [Chapter 13] WADA officials and IC members conducted two subsequent

interviews of Dir. Rodchenkov on 26 March 2015 and 30 June 2015, where on

both occasions, he admitted to intentionally destroying the 1,417 samples in

order to limit the extent of WADA’s audit and to reduce any potential adverse

findings from subsequent analysis by another WADA accredited laboratory.

10. [Chapter 13] The intentional destruction of the 1,417 samples done with the

purpose of obstructing WADA’s ability to conduct follow up analysis on the

samples was corroborated by another staff member who heard similar

admissions directly from Dir. Rodchenkov.

11. [Chapter 13] [Regarding unmarked samples of unknown origins] The IC finds

that the testing of samples is a highly improper practice and a violation of the ISL

standards and the Code.

12. [Chapter 13] The only reasonable conclusion is that the unmarked samples were

provided (the documentation in respect of which was ordered to be destroyed)

for purposes of monitoring drug use, clearance times and maintenance of certain

levels below thresholds that might produce Adverse Analytical Findings (AAF)

in proper testing circumstances.

13. [Chapter 13] The Moscow laboratory is not operationally independent from

RUSADA or the Ministry of Sport. Its impartiality, judgment and integrity were

compromised by the surveillance of the FSB within the laboratory during the

Sochi Winter Olympic Games.

14. [Chapter 13] The apprehension of surveillance by the staff in the Moscow

laboratory caused by FSB representatives regularly visiting the laboratory and

weekly discussions occurring between the Moscow laboratory Director and the

Russian Security service affect the impartiality, judgment and integrity of the

laboratory.

15. [Chapter 13] The IC concludes that there was direct intimidation and interference

by the Russian state with the Moscow laboratory operations.

16. [Chapter 13] The Moscow laboratory Director was paid indirectly by one of the

whistleblowers to conceal a doping test taken while the athlete was knowingly

competing dirty.

The go-between who received the money is a known

performance-enhancing substances trafficker. 

17. [Chapter 13] There is strong corroborating evidence that the Moscow laboratory

has been involved in a widespread cover-up of positive doping tests.

18. [Chapter 13] Director Rodchenkov was also an integral part of the conspiracy to

extort money from athletes in order to cover up positive doping test results.

19. [Chapter 14] The IC discovered the existence of a second laboratory in Moscow,

apparently having the same testing capabilities as the WADA accredited

laboratory.

Its precise use is unknown.

The laboratory is known as the

“Laboratory of the Moscow Committee of Sport for Identification for Prohibited

Substances in Athlete Samples” and is controlled by the city of Moscow

government.

The laboratory Director is Dr. Giorgi Bezhanishvili, a forensic

toxicologist.

20. [Chapter 14] There is sufficient corroborated evidence to conclude that the

second laboratory was assisting in the cover-up of positive doping results by

way of the destruction of samples.

21. [Chapter 14] Pre-screened samples that were not positive could then be sent to

the accredited laboratory.

22. [Chapter 14] Such evidence was given on a confidential basis due to fear of

reprisals against the witnesses providing the evidence.

23. [Chapter 19] Moscow laboratory director Rodchenkov had direct access to the

Minister for purposes of funding requests for laboratory equipment.

 

Ruska AD agencija

 

 

With respect to RUSADA

1.

[Chapter 9] RUSADA had a practice of providing advance notice of out-of-

competition tests.

2.

[Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many examples of inadequate,

incorrect or inexistent whereabouts filings on the part of Russian athletes

participating in athletics.

3. [Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many occasions on which Russian

athletes participating in athletics were given advance notice of proposed out-of-

competition tests and were thus able to avoid being tested or take steps to render

the tests ineffective.

4. [Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many examples of missed tests on

the part of Russian athletes participating in athletics.

5. [Chapter 9] The IC found examples of the use of false identities for purposes of

evading testing.

6. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely accept bribes from the athletes, thereby

ensuring that the doping control test will not be effective.

7. [Chapter 9] There was intimidation of the DCO, both direct and in relation to the

DCO’s family members.

8. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely do not follow the International Standard

for Testing despite being trained as to how to conduct tests.

 

  

16

 

  

 

  

9. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs do not always complete a mission when first given

to them, but await the filing of new whereabouts information reflecting a

location closer to Moscow where they are based.

10. [Chapter 12] RUSADA allowed athletes under current anti-doping sanctions to

compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code

prohibition.

11. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely do not follow the International Standard

for Testing despite being trained as to how to conduct tests.

12. [Chapter 12] A review of a sampling of RUSADA’s reporting procedures showed

significant gaps in reporting and unexplained deficiencies in submissions to

ADAMS. DCFs were either not entered into ADAMS or were significantly

delayed. An increased effort in DCF submissions will assist in generating a

timely and transparent results management process, subject to the integrity of

the overall operations of testing and that process.

13. [Chapter 12] The IC review revealed that RUSADA has a favourable record of

collecting samples and conducting analysis for particular substances that are of

high risk for athletes in comparison to other NADOs, for example EPO and IRMS

analysis.

14. [Chapter 12] RUSADA hGH testing has been insufficient and questions remain

regarding the methods applied by the Moscow laboratory for ESAs on behalf of

RUSADA.

15. [Chapter 12] The inaccuracy and non-compliance of the “whereabouts”

information for Russian athletes is obstructing out-of-competition testing and

timely notification of athletes for other potential violations. An increased effort

in this area will complement effective target testing for RUSADA.

16. [Chapter 12] Allegations of collusion between coaches and RUSADA have

established major concerns about RUSADA’s functioning as an impartial

institution.

17. [Chapter 12] As incidents of inaction regarding reporting and DCF filings are

attributed to RUSADA, a review of the applicable processes, specifically

implementation and enforcement, is required in order to provide the

international community with confidence that the issues discovered are being

suitably addressed.

18. [Chapter 12] Athletes under current anti-doping sanctions were allowed to

compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code

prohibition.

It is highly unlikely that this could have occurred without the

knowledge and consent of both RUSADA and ARAF.

19. [Chapter 12] TDPs, no matter how well designed, can be compromised by

advance notice of out-of-competition testing, false or inaccurate whereabouts

information, interference by coaches and officials, evidence of all of which was

discovered by the IC investigation.

20. [Chapter 13] RUSADA is routinely requesting limited benchwork examination in

completing testing of samples.

21. [Chapter 14] It is not credible to believe that the existence and capabilities of the

second laboratory were unknown to ARAF and RUSADA.

22. [Chapter 17] In the later stages of the IC investigation, IDTM DCOs proved

themselves to be more reliable and effective in their role than their RUSADA

counterparts.

23. [Chapter 18] RUSADA acted in a manner that enabled athletes to continue

competing by declaring samples to be negative for AAFs and not cancelling

certain competition results – leading to further appeals to CAS.

24. [Chapter 18] The ARD documentary allegations that there was a scheme to

provide Russian athletics athletes having abnormal ABPs with delayed testing

notification cannot be confirmed at this time on the evidence the IC possesses.

[teacher]

Ruska atletska federacija

 

 

With respect to ARAF

1. [Chapter 9] The athlete Anastasiya Bazdyreva aggressively refused to cooperate

with the IC investigators.

2. [Chapter 9] [Regarding Anastasiya Bazdyreva] The athlete’s coach, her doctor

(Igor Gubchenko) and the interim ARAF president (Mr. Zelichenok) refused to

cooperate with the IC investigators.

3. [Chapter 9] The athlete interview of Ekatrina Poistogova was interrupted after

the athlete spoke with her doctor (Igor Gubchenko).

4. [Chapter 9] The interim ARAF president (Mr. Zelichenok) demanded that the IC

investigators not speak with the athletes.

 

  

19

 

  

 

  

5. [Chapter 9] [Regarding the DCO mission to the Yunost training camp] The

responsible team official denied that most of the athletes were present, thereby

obstructing the doping control process.

6. [Chapter 9] [Regarding the DCO mission to the Yunost training camp] The

responsible team official asserted that the DCO had no right to test the athletes

(in a private hotel), such ill-founded contention further obstructing the doping

control process.

7. [Chapter 9] Medications and syringes were present in the athletes’ room.

8.

[Chapter 9] Coaches and athletes had received instructions following the ARD

documentary not to speak with the IC and not to sign any documents.

9. [Chapter 9] Coaches claimed that the DCO had no right to test athletes who were

not in the Registered Testing Pool (notwithstanding IAAF rules).

10. [Chapter 9] Coaches were complicit in attempting to prevent access to athletes

for testing, thereby obstructing the doping control process.

11. [Chapter 9] There are clear cases of refusals to be tested involved, which should

be investigated and acted upon, including Dyldin.

12. [Chapter 9] Athletes were instructed to record information that was not true in

their DCFs, such as times of notification.

13. [Chapter 9] The fact that 9 AAFs for EPO resulted from the tests on that Saransk

training camp mission underscores the reasons for the resistance to the tests.

 

  

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14. [Chapter 9] The dates of the reported events at the Saransk training camp make it

clear that, contrary to some assertions, the practice of doping in athletics in

Russia remains very much current, even following the ARD documentary.

15. [Chapter 9] Athletes deliberately gave their coach’s number as their whereabouts

contact, to avoid direct contact by DCOs and to provide additional time before

giving a sample.

16. [Chapter 9] No athletes answered the DCO calls. The IC considers it likely that

this conduct was based upon instructions from the coaching or support staff.

17. [Chapter 9] Deliberate efforts were made to stretch the time between notice and

the provision of samples for analysis, to provide opportunity for obstructive

actions in relation to the tests.

18. [Chapter 9] The doctor/observer refused to provide his name when requested to

do so by the DCO.

19. [Chapter 9] Coaches have a financial interest in protecting their athletes from

doping tests that might produce positive findings.

20. [Chapter 9] Coaches attempted to intimidate and threaten the DCO in the course

of his duties as DCO.

21. [Chapter 9] Coach Nikitin lied about the presence of targeted athletes at the

Saransk training camp, in an effort to prevent the athletes from being tested.

22. [Chapter 9] Having considered the two circumstances involving Ms. Pecherina,

the IC prefers the statements made in the first ARD documentary, when she was

not being influenced by one or more off-screen parties.

 

  

21

 

  

 

  

23. [Chapter 9] There is insufficient evidence to support the figure of 99% of

members of the Russian national athletics team as dopers.

That said, Ms.

Pecherina was a member of the national team and can be taken to be aware of

significant doping going on around her.

24. [Chapter 9] Evidence of extensive PED use is supported and confirmed by audio

and video evidence.

It is also documented by witness statements that

corroborate the original allegations of the German television documentary and

which provide further details regarding the extensive use of PEDs and blood

doping within the Russian federation.

25. [Chapter 9] Within the scope of this investigation, there is clear evidence of a

“Systemic Culture of Doping in Russian Sport” perpetuated, in part, although

not exclusively, through coaches and administrators, whose collective actions at

times extended beyond mere administrative violations into potentially criminal

acts.

26. [Chapter 9] This network created an atmosphere in which an athlete’s choice was

frequently limited to accepting the prescribed and mandated doping regimen or

not being a member of the national team.

27. [Chapter 9] The coaches wrongfully encouraged their athletes, or athletes chose

to believe that all other nations were following similar illicit training methods,

thereby creating a self-justification that ‘sport doping’ and the non-enforcement

of violations were competitive necessities and perhaps even patriotic obligations.

28. [Chapter 11] There has been cover-up and delay by ARAF in the investigating of

athletes with abnormal passport profiles who should have been banned, and

 

  

22

 

  

 

  

prevented from participating in the London Olympics. Several of these athletes

were allowed to compete and some went on to win medals.

29. [Chapter 11] The IC investigation found overwhelming evidence against a

number of senior national team coaches who were involved in collusion to

illicitly obtain details of suspicious ABP testing results against their athletes.

Such conduct demonstrates an embedded and institutionalized process designed

to secure winning at any cost.

30. [Chapter 11] The IC found evidence that several coaches at senior level and the

ARAF Chief Medical Officer were committing violations of the Code articles 2.6,

2.8 and 2.9 over many years.

31. [Chapter 11] Former President Balakhnichev is ultimately responsible, both

individually and as an ARAF representative, for the wrongful actions that

occurred while he was President.

32. [Chapter 11] The examination of the conduct and standards of ARAF senior

coaches has revealed that a number of them were found to be in violation of

WADA Code 2.8 and 2.9 and subsequently recommended for appropriate

sanctions.

33. [Chapter 11] For at least two coaches, digital recordings and forensic analysis

confirm their involvement in the trafficking of prohibited substances.

34. [Chapter 11] On the secret whistleblower recordings, coaches discussed with

athletes, in their own words, how ABP testing can be circumvented, the

problems ARAF has had with preventing ABP from capturing violations of their

athletes and what they can do about it in the future, including the suggestion of

administering newly developed PEDs that will escape detection.

 

  

23

 

  

 

  

35. [Chapter 11] As a result of the IC investigation, ARAF Chief Medical Officer, Dr.

Portugalov, has been reported for committing offenses under articles 2.8 and 2.9

of the Code, which not only undermines his position as a medical professional,

but also demonstrates a complete disregard for the health and well-being of the

athletes.

36. [Chapter 11] As of June 2015, there continues to exist widespread doping taking

place at the OTC in Saransk, despite the ongoing and well-publicized

investigation into doping on the Russian athletics team.

Russian coaches

apparently felt it was safe enough for six out of ten race walkers, who tested

positive, to continue doping as part of their training program, supporting

cheating within athletics.

37. [Chapter 11] There was active use of blood transfusion equipment at the OTC,

which is supported by forensic analysis demonstrating systematic use of this

type of equipment to gain sporting advantage.

38. [Chapter 11] The former Director of the OTC was sanctioned for the possession

of the blood transfusion equipment at the Center.

39. [Chapter 11] OTC Head Coach, Viktor Chegin, who is the subject of separate

IAAF and RUSADA investigations, is responsible for the events that have

occurred at the OTC and will be formally reported by the IC for offenses and

recommended for sanctions.

40. [Chapter 11] The intentional delay and obstruction of the DCO’s mission that

was created by the coaches at the OTC during the unannounced ITDM doping

mission in June 2015 possibly assisted some of the remaining four athletes to

escape a positive sample detection.

 

  

24

 

  

 

  

41. [Chapter 12] Athletes under current anti-doping sanctions were allowed to

compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code

prohibition.

It is highly unlikely that this could have occurred without the

knowledge and consent of both RUSADA and ARAF.

42. [Chapter 13] There was collusion between the President of ARAF and the

laboratory Director Rodchenkov to conceal positive drug tests by swapping clean

samples for known dirty “A” samples at the Moscow lab. Athletes paid both the

President and the Director for the benefit of such services.

43. [Chapter 13] At least one elite world marathoner paid her coach, Melinkov and

the medical director of ARAF, Portugalov, annual sums of money, a portion of

those monies being to protect her from receiving a positive drug result from her

doping activities.

44. [Chapter 13] Interviews with athletes and secret recordings led to the finding

that within Athletics, (which is the only sport that the IC was mandated to

investigate) there were a series of high-level individuals involved, who, for

monetary payments, conspired to conceal positive doping samples, leading to

the conclusion that there was likely a system in Russia for cover-ups in doping.

45. [Chapter 14] It is not credible to believe that the existence and capabilities of the

second laboratory were unknown to ARAF and RUSADA.

46. [Chapter 15] The Deputy Director General of the Russian Federal Research

Center of Physical Culture and Sports (VNIIFK), Dr. Sergey Portugalov, who is

also the Chief of the ARAF’s medical commission, provided banned substances

to Russian athletes and was very active in the conspiracy to cover-up athletes’

positive tests in exchange for a percentage of their winnings.

 

  

25

 

  

 

  

47. [Chapter 15] The IC finds that not only did Dr. Portugalov supply PEDs to

athletes and coaches, but also administered the doping programs and even

injected athletes himself.

48. [Chapter 15] The IC finds that it was demonstrated that Dr. Portugalov’s actions

over many years are in violation of Code Item 2.8 “Administration or Attempted

Administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Substance

or any Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-Competition” and Code Item

2.9 “Complicity - Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering

up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule

violation, attempted anti-doping rule violation or violation of Article 10.12.1 by

another person.”

49. [Chapter 15] Dr. Portugalov was the subject of a sanctions package containing

evidence the IC had gathered which it turned over to WADA, recommending a

lifetime ban from sport. The IC is informed that its sanctions package has been

submitted to IAAF with the acceptance by WADA of the proposed IC

recommendation. The sanctions package and report was forwarded to ARAF on

08 August 2015 for further consideration.

50. [Chapter 18] There was no interaction between ARAF and RUSADA once IAAF

notifications were given, leading to CAS proceedings later withdrawn.

51. [Chapter 19] There was evident institutional knowledge that coaches expected

Russian sports officials to protect their athletes from the consequences of doping.

[teacher]

Ministarstvo sporta

 

 

With respect to the Russian Federation (Ministry of Sport)

1. [Chapter 9] Russian law enforcement agencies were involved in the efforts to

interfere with the integrity of the samples.

2. [Chapter 12] Regardless of Ms. Zhelanova’s statement that RUSADA acts

independently, although financed by the Ministry, the IC has serious doubts that

it is truly independent. Various sources reported to the IC that there is more

influence than structurally indicated by the Ministry of Sport.

3. [Chapter 19] There are inconsistent versions of what has happened within Russia

regarding investigation and actions subsequent to the ARD documentary.

4. [Chapter 19] Ms. Zhelanova stated that an investigation had occurred and that a

report was expected by the end of the year (2015).

5. [Chapter 19] Another version was that all of the athletes implicated had been

interviewed, that they had all denied any complicity and that the matter was,

therefore, dropped.

6. [Chapter 19] The Minister said that investigations had occurred and that certain

people had been fired.

7. [Chapter 19] It is inexplicable that Minsport would allow RUSADA, as the

subject of several of the allegations in the ARD documentary, to investigate itself. 

8. [Chapter 19] Minsport did nothing to investigate the serious allegations of

criminal conduct on the part of Russian sport officials.

9. [Chapter 19] Many individuals were unwilling to speak candidly regarding

relationships between Minsport, RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory out of

fear for reprisals.

10. [Chapter 19] The IC was unable to corroborate allegations of direct influence by

Minsport on the activities of RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory.

[teacher]

IAAF

 

 

With respect to the IAAF

1. [Chapter 9] There was potential interference with the integrity of the samples,

thwarted only by the extraordinary evasive actions taken by the DCO.

2.

[Chapter 9] The IC found examples of outright refusals by athletes, despite

notification and evidence that the tester was an official DCO.

3.

[Chapter 10] The IC investigation ultimately corroborated the whistleblower’s

allegations of a multifaceted and complex conspiracy involving members of the

athletic community within the IAAF and ARAF.

4. [Chapter 10] The IC investigation found evidence of breaches of processes and

rules of the Code and ISL Standards, as well as IAAF rules and processes by

IAAF officials.

 

  

28

 

  

 

  

5. [Chapter 18] For the reasons mentioned above, and given that the IAAF only sent

the ARAF official notification of Sergey Kirdyapkin’s abnormal ABP on October

1, 2012, which is nearly one year after the IAAF initially informed ARAF of his

abnormal ABP (Kirdyapkin was an athlete included on the list of November 18,

2011), the IC considers that there was an excessive time delay.

6. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Vladimir Kanaykin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to

have expedited the results management report to ARAF because of the pending

London 2012 Games.

7. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Vladimir Kanaykin] The IC finds that following initial

contact there was an excessive delay of 18 months before the IAAF followed up

with ARAF.

8. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Valeriy Borchin]The IC finds that following initial

contact there was an excessive delay of 21 months before the IAAF followed up

with ARAF regarding the potential ADRV.

9. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Olga Kaniskina] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to

have expedited the results management report to ARAF because of the pending

London 2012 Games in which the athlete competed.

10. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Sergey Bakulin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to

have expedited the matter to an ABP expert panel prior to the pending 2012

London Games.

 

  

29

 

  

 

  

11. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Asli Cakir Alptekin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to

have expedited the matter to an ABP expert panel prior to the pending 2012

London Games.

12. [Chapter 18] There was considerable delay by the IAAF Anti-Doping

department, varying between 18 months and 25 months, in informing the athlete

and the ARAF of the investigation into an athlete’s potential ADRV based on the

ABP.

This resulted in athletes being able to compete in the London 2012

Olympics and other world athletics events. Furthermore, the notification letters

were not always consistent in offering a two-year sanction in exchange for a

prompt admission.

13. [Chapter 18] If an athlete chose a provisional suspension, if it was offered, then

the IAAF took anywhere from 18 months (Bakulin) to 25 months (Kirdyapkin) to

follow up to determine if ARAF had investigated or initiated disciplinary

proceedings.

14. [Chapter 18] After initial notification by the IAAF of a possible ADRV the ARAF

took up to more than 2 years to take action the notifications it received.

15. [Chapter 18] IAAF was inexplicably lax in following up suspicious blood (and

other) profiles.

16. [Chapter 18] ARAF was inexplicably lax in following up notifications from IAAF,

equally the IAAF failed to act expeditiously in following up on results

management.  

17. [Chapter 18] The delays by both the IAAF and ARAF led to athletes competing in

the London 2012 Olympics who should have been prevented from competing

(and who were/are later sanctioned).

18. [Chapter 18] There are inconsistencies in the proposed sanctions by IAAF and

the eventual sanctions.

19. [Chapter 18] There are unexplained delays in getting the CAS appeals argued

and decided.

[Korki]

Mnogo je nesto ljutih ljudi ovde.

Super je sto je stavljen ovaj izvestaj. Ovaj deo, posle one spijunske drame sa FSB, zanimljiv, jer on jedini moze da govori da je to na drzavnom nivou planirano.

Ministarstvo sporta

 

With respect to the Russian Federation (Ministry of Sport)

1. [Chapter 9] Russian law enforcement agencies were involved in the efforts to

interfere with the integrity of the samples.

2. [Chapter 12] Regardless of Ms. Zhelanova’s statement that RUSADA acts

independently, although financed by the Ministry, the IC has serious doubts that

it is truly independent. Various sources reported to the IC that there is more

influence than structurally indicated by the Ministry of Sport.

3. [Chapter 19] There are inconsistent versions of what has happened within Russia

regarding investigation and actions subsequent to the ARD documentary.

4. [Chapter 19] Ms. Zhelanova stated that an investigation had occurred and that a

report was expected by the end of the year (2015).

5. [Chapter 19] Another version was that all of the athletes implicated had been

interviewed, that they had all denied any complicity and that the matter was,

therefore, dropped.

6. [Chapter 19] The Minister said that investigations had occurred and that certain

people had been fired.

7. [Chapter 19] It is inexplicable that Minsport would allow RUSADA, as the

subject of several of the allegations in the ARD documentary, to investigate itself. 

8. [Chapter 19] Minsport did nothing to investigate the serious allegations of

criminal conduct on the part of Russian sport officials.

9. [Chapter 19] Many individuals were unwilling to speak candidly regarding

relationships between Minsport, RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory out of

fear for reprisals.

10. [Chapter 19] The IC was unable to corroborate allegations of direct influence by

Minsport on the activities of RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory.

 

 

Sve se vrti oko par trenera i jednog glavnog doktora u anti-doping komisiji, sve ostalo je rekla-kazala. RUSADA je bila pod kontrolom WADA i to je njihova greska ako se desavala masovna korupcija unutar nje. Naravno, oni to znaju, zato su ubacili onu spijunsku dramu sa FSB, da bi nekako povezali drzavu, jer bez toga ne moze da prodje ova cela prica.

Edited November 15, 2015 by Korki

[Muwan]

Ima li neko objašnjenje zbog čega nisu suspendovali konkretne prekršioce (pa koliko god da ih je) nego sve atletičare onako djuture?

[teacher]

Ima li neko objašnjenje zbog čega nisu suspendovali konkretne prekršioce (pa koliko god da ih je) nego sve atletičare onako djuture?

 

ima. sprega atletske federacije sa ruskom ad agencijom i laboratorijom, pod pokroviteljstvom ministarstva sporta. uništeno je preko 1400 uzoraka po iskazu samog direktora laboratorije. izjave whistleblowera govore o sistemskom dopingovanju koje potiče od trenera, gde direktori laboratorija i zvaničnici RUFADA-e uzimaju novac kako bi napravili kvalitetan doping program, a država preko ministarstva sporta šalje ko može a ko ne biti optužen. da ne govorim o nepravilnostima u procesu uzimanja uzoraka, upozoravanju sportista da će biti odabrani, izbegavanje davanja uzoraka WADA-i, itd.

 

teško je sažeti preko 300 strana u par rečenica. gore su ti taksativno navedeni problemi zbog kojeg su kažnjeni, a u samom izveštaju se detaljno navodi kako i šta. 

[teacher]

Mnogo je nesto ljutih ljudi ovde.

Super je sto je stavljen ovaj izvestaj. Ovaj deo, posle one spijunske drame sa FSB, zanimljiv, jer on jedini moze da govori da je to na drzavnom nivou planirano.

 

Sve se vrti oko par trenera i jednog glavnog doktora u anti-doping komisiji, sve ostalo je rekla-kazala. RUSADA je bila pod kontrolom WADA i to je njihova greska ako se desavala masovna korupcija unutar nje. Naravno, oni to znaju, zato su ubacili onu spijunsku dramu sa FSB, da bi nekako povezali drzavu, jer bez toga ne moze da prodje ova cela prica.

pa ne baš.

 

par trenera = svi glavni treneri reprezentacije, pre svega Meljnikov.

1 glavni doktor = jedini glavni doktor, ruski dr Fuentes + direktor laboratorije

rekla-kazala = izjave whistleblowera i pisani dokazi

RUSADA je bila pod kontrolom WADA = sve nacionalne AD organizacije deluju kao autonomne organizacije. WADA nema pravo da menja ili postavlja izvršne ljude ili da naređuje gde će biti slati uzorci.

[Korki]

O, da, itekako je rekla-kazala, citava konstrukcija koja je vodila ka prljavoj rasistickoj kampanji u zapadnim medijima protiv Rusa, djuture.

Russia slammed for “cheating culture” in anti-doping report

WADA report into doping finds "deeply rooted culture of cheating" and recommends Russia's suspension]

 

Russian cheating culture...pa ovo je nivou onoga koji vas nervia.

To meni smeta a ne sto su uhvatili par ruskih atleticara na dugim prugama, i njihovih trenera, narocito hodaca, jer je to logicno jer se oni slabo takmice na medjunarodnim mitinzima, a onda djuture ubacili 99% ruskih atleticara koji se takmice na takmicenjam Diamond league sirom sveta, bullshit.

Sta tek onda reci o WADA, ovo otvrara potpuno disreditaciju cele organizacije jer ona ocigledno ne kotrolise svoje labaratorije.

Ili prica da su Rusi krivi sto nisu promenili svoje metode rada posla ARD dokumentarca, a da su promenili onda bi rekli, evo dokaza, promenili zbog dokumentarca, bullshit.

Edited November 15, 2015 by Korki