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 US Special Forces sabotage White House policy gone disastrously wrong with covert ops in Syria

 

https://sofrep.com/63764/us- special-forces-sabotage-white- house-policy-gone- disastrously-wrong-with- covert-ops-in-syria/

BY JACK MURPHY 09.14.2016#FEATURED

 

“Nobody believes in it. You’re like, ‘Fuck this,'” a former Green Beret says of America’s covert and clandestine programs to train and arm Syrian militias. “Everyone on the ground knows they are jihadis. No one on the ground believes in this mission or this effort, and they know they are just training the next generation of jihadis, so they are sabotaging it by saying, ‘Fuck it, who cares?'”

 

“I don’t want to be responsible for Nusra guys saying they were trained by Americans,” the Green Beret added. A second Special Forces soldier commented that one Syrian militia they had trained recently crossed the border from Jordan on what had been pitched as a large-scale shaping operation that would change the course of the war. Watching the battle on a monitor while a drone flew overhead, “We literally watched them, with 30 guys in their force, run away from three or four ISIS guys.”

 

Another militia commander came back to Jordan to be debriefed by CIA case officers stationed at Damascus X, the exiled CIA station now located in Amman, Jordan, since departing Syria’s capital after the civil war began. The Syrian proxy broke down saying that he might as well join ISIS-something the case officer had to talk him out of.

 

But perhaps this was a step in the right direction from a the recent past, when the commander of the now-defunct Syrian Revolutionary Front came in for a debriefing, telling his CIA handler that a helicopter was shot down and destroyed some of his equipment but he also claimed that he had an expensive suit onboard the aircraft that the CIA also needed to replace.

 

While the press has reported extensively on the over 100 armed groups within Syria vying for control, and the occasional report comes out about U.S. special operations troops in Syria and wasteful spending on covert action programs, the wider story about the U.S. Special Forces arming Syrian anti-ISIS forces while the CIA conducts a parallel program to arm anti-Assad regime forces has yet to be told-until now. It is a story of fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as bureaucratic infighting and a disgusting excess, which has only contributed to perpetuating the Syrian conflict.

 

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Ceo tekst na linku, koga zanimaju specnaz tračevi i insajd infoi

 

http://fortunascorner.com/2016/09/15/u-s-special-forces-sabotage-white-house-policy-gone-disastrously-wrong-with-covert-ops-in-syria/

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Ima i komentar na http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2016/09/us-special-forces-sabotage-white-house-policy-gone-disastrously-wrong-with-covert-ops-in-syria-ttg.html

 

 

One of the major points of this article is that the CIA doesn’t give a rat’s ass about the Islamic State in Syria or Iraq. By the end of 2014 there were only twenty CIA targeting officers and analysts were dedicated to IS. By early 2016, it was not much better. Instead, the CIA neurotically focused on removing Assad from power by any means possible. This laser focus was established by Brennan. I surmise this focus is shared by most in the Obama Administration

In spite of this focus, the CIA’s efforts in Syria is plagued by bureaucratic infighting. The CIA has three elements jockeying for power. The Syria Task Force is similar to the Iraqi Task Force and Iranian Operations Group that preceded it. It is Brennan’s baby. Damascus X is the Syrian CIA station now operating in Amman. And then there is the CTC/SI (Counterterrorist Center/Syria-Iraq), which is tragically focused on the Assad government rather than the terrorists. I have seen this kind of food fight for resources and prestige in the CIA and even in the DIA during the fat money days of the GWOT. I’m sure this cat fight is even more intense in today’s leaner fiscal environment.

As many of you know, the CIA conducts a lot, perhaps most, of their operations through liaison with host nation services. While I’m comfortable with working with the Jordanian services, the thought of depending on the current Turkish intelligence service scares the bejeezus out of me. For several years now,the CIA has relied on Erdogan’s boys to determine which unicorns and jihadis were worthy of getting all the TOWs and other goodies doled out by Brennan under his Title 50 authorities(intelligence/covert ops).

The 5th Special Forces Group arrived in Turkey and Jordan by 2015 to begin training anti-IS rebels under Title 10 authorities (military). Although this appears to be a reasonable mission, it was tripped up by a terrible vetting process. Jack Murphy describes the reaction of one veteran SAS operator sent to work with the 5th Group training program. “He quickly recognized the sorry state of the train, advise, and assist programs in Jordan.” The situation in Turkey was/is much worse. Not only did the 5th Group trainers have to deal with the CIA’s ambivalence towards the anti-IS fight, but they had to work along side the Turks while they were enthusiastically supported IS and other assorted jihadis. The 5th Group soldiers were stuck training would-be terrorists while being commanded by a martinet MP officer more interested in making uniform corrections and chasing down speeders. Needless to say, morale was in the toilet. The charade in Turkey became more absurd when the Green Berets were embedded with the Kurds in Rojava.

When Obama authorized the direct support to the Kurds in Syria, the CIA wanted Delta to perform the mission. Delta turned to 5th Group. The fact that the new 5th Group Commander was a former Delta Commander was probably a major factor in that decision. It seems like a no-brainer to me, but politics and bureaucratic rivalries colored even this decision. Even here, with a mission that is dear to my heart, there are problems. The Kurds have their own combat training program. They resent the efforts of the U.S. to impose a Special Forces training program on them. However they dearly appreciate the weapons and air support. I noted something similar in 1983 Lebanon. We were providing basic combat training to many Lebanese who have been in combat for quite some time. There were times we thought it was a mutually embarrassing situation. That’s what happens when the training programs are planned in Bragg and D.C. rather than by the teams on the ground.

AS a final example of our hot, covert mess in Syria, Jack Murphy notes the plight of Delta which worked under CIA’s Title 50 in Syria. “Delta Force had also been stymied by red tape and bureaucracy as they tried to get into the fight and knock ISIS down a peg… With the CTC at war within itself, they were both trying to prevent their own people from collecting intelligence (lest they find something threatening) and stonewalling any and all Delta Force operations from going forward against ISIS.”

Jack Murphy published this article on his subscription website, SOFREP.com. It was also published on another website without his permission. I read the article on that site before I realized it was done without permission. Jack Murphy is a fellow Green Beannie. Out of courtesy to him, I will not provide a like to that site. Although I am not a joiner by nature, I may break down and subscribe to the SOFREP site. It seems to have some quality content not readily available elsewhere.

TTG

 


 

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I malo iranskog faktora:
 
 


IRAN PULSE
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نبض ایران

Why Iran never counted on US-Russia agreement

Many are the regional and international parties involved in the conflict in Syria, yet only two seem capable of making big decisions. On Sept. 10, Russia and the United States reached a tentative agreement for a cease-fire in Syria, imposing full adherence on all involved parties. However, the truce came to an end Sept. 19 as both Washington and Moscow exchanged allegations of noncompliance. Russia raised questions over the Sept. 17 American-led air raid that reportedly killed at least 62 Syrian soldiers in Deir Ez-Zor, suggesting that it might leave the whole peace process in tatters. Meanwhile, the United States held Russia fully responsible for the attack on a United Nations aid convoy near Aleppo by the Syrian air force Sept. 19.

There was much hope that Russia and the United States could show more compliance with the agreement to help move toward a new level of understanding — a milestone that might facilitate a comprehensive peace plan to end almost six bloody years of a conflict that has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and driven more than half of Syria’s population from their homes. Such a goal couldn’t be fulfilled without the help of two other main regional players, Iran and Turkey — both of which have military presences in Syria and strong influence on militants fighting on opposite sides of the conflict.

“There’s no reason to believe the Americans. It’s only because of our Russian ally that we are ready to cooperate,” an Iranian military source told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “To secure this truce, there were men fighting and dying in Aleppo and they helped make it happen,” said the source. Iran’s official stance, as expressed by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Ghasemi, welcomed the US-Russia deal. On Sept. 11, Ghasemi told reporters in Tehran, “Iran has always welcomed a cease-fire in Syria and the facilitation of humanitarian access to all people in this country.” He added, “The cease-fire needs to be sustainable and enforceable, not providing the terrorists with any opportunity to beef up [their forces] and [re-equip].”

Iran is always cautious when dealing with these kinds of situations. Indeed, one previous experience was bloody enough to raise concerns. The Khan Touman battle on May 6, following the Feb. 27 cease-fire, saw dozens of soldiers fighting under Iranian command being ambushed, killed and some captured. Back then, Iranian officials thought that the cease-fire was “merely an opportunity for the recruitment and reinvigoration of the terrorist groups by the governments that support them.”

The Iranian military source who spoke to Al-Monitor stressed that his country isn’t ready to tolerate any similar incident, referring to the Sept. 17 US-led raid on the Syrian army. “For more than half an hour, the US planes were bombarding the Syrian army while Daesh [islamic State (IS)] was advancing. Now what can we call this?” asked the Iranian military source. “Regrets won’t bring back the killed soldiers nor the lost positions. What if the Syrian army did a similar mistake? They’d call them war criminals. Still, this excuse [of a mistaken attack] is frail and implausible."

Al-Monitor received Sept. 11 a rare statement from the “Syria media warfare group” — the media wing of the Resistance Axis — quoting the “field commander for forces allied with Syria,” remarking on the Sept. 10 announcement of an impending truce. The statement read, “The Syrian army and its allies will continue their open war on takfiri terrorists of [iS] and JFS,” calling on the armed opposition to rethink its political calculations and military bets. “The Russians and the Americans should make sure all parties are committed to the agreement, yet any violation won’t be tolerated and we’ll respond with the maximum power possible,” the statement read, concluding, “The US-Russian-Turkish-Iranian understanding will uproot the hopes of the terrorists after it was agreed on closing the Turkish borders.”

On Sept. 17, an Iranian diplomatic source told Al-Monitor that the new truce seemed to be promising, but that “the latest raid by the US on the Syrian soldiers makes things more complicated.” Another Iranian official who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity said, “If the US wants others to be committed to the agreement, then they themselves have to commit. The Russians consulted us on the truce, and we had one main concern: The Americans never stick to their word.” The Iranian official explained that the only reason his country’s allies agreed to the truce was for humanitarian reasons. “Why would we accept a cease-fire when we are advancing and the other side is retreating? It is only because we want to contribute to peace efforts. The only real war taking place is in Aleppo; in the south, there’s nothing serious going on. In the countryside of Damascus, agreements are reached with the militants and they are leaving. In Homs, the situation is good; in Hama, the situation was contained. They [militants] have Idlib, and Aleppo is contested.”

Indeed, the level of optimism in Tehran over Syria has fallen drastically over the past 48 hours. A second Iranian military source who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity said that given the latest developments, “It’s obvious that the US isn’t serious about ending the crisis. ... They say the [sept. 17] attack on the Syrian army was a mistake. Having been a military officer for years, I can’t but laugh at such claims. The raid continued for more than 40 minutes. Didn’t anyone discover during all these long minutes that they were opening the road for [iS] to advance? I tend to believe that it was the work of the Pentagon, and that Mr. Kerry wasn’t aware of what was going on. It might be also that the hawks in Washington are spreading their wings for a new policy under a different administration. These [remaining] few months [of the current US administration] are only for wasting time.”

Iran is assessing the situation in accordance with its agenda and interests, which may not necessarily be fully congruent with those of Russia — but both countries are nevertheless trying to make use of their common interests in Syria to solidify their front. Their main objectives include keeping defiant Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power, preserving the structure of governance in Syria and combating terrorism. One of the main requests the Iranians made during the many negotiations over Syria was the designation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, previously Jabhat al-Nusra, as a terrorist entity, just like IS; this request was fulfilled in the US-Russia agreement. This step was enough for Tehran to at this stage abide by the deal despite all the concerns, as the latter alone could be seen as a blow to its regional rivals, who saw the rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra as a way to place it along with other Syrian opposition factions on the other side of the negotiating table.

Ultimately, to Iran, the collapse of the US-Russia agreement — as the deal itself — will not change anything in its only plan on the table, which involves supporting Assad until he survives the tide. Indeed, the visit by Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Jaber Ansari to Damascus on Sept. 19 reflected this stance. After meeting with Assad, Ansari said, “Iran is determined to provide Syria with all the facilities it needs in its critical fight against terrorism."

 

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Le Monde

 

Syrie : l’ex-Front Al-Nosra, pierre d’achoppement des tentatives de trêves

Le Front Fatah Al-Cham, qui prétend avoir rompu avec Al-Qaida, mais que Washington considère toujours comme terroriste, occupe une place centrale sur l’échiquier rebelle. D’où la difficulté à départager « bons » et « mauvais » rebelles.

 

La trêve en Syrie n’aura tenu que sept jours. Lundi 19 septembre, l’armée syrienne a décrété la fin du cessez-le-feu, en accusant les rebelles de ne pas avoir respecté l’accord de cessation des hostilités négocié entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie, le 10 septembre à Genève. Un accord également violé par Damas. Entre autres griefs, la Russie a notamment reproché aux Américains de ne pas suffisamment faire pression sur les groupes rebelles syriens pour qu’ils se dissocient du mouvement djihadiste Fatah Al-Cham, ex-Front Al-Nosra. Ce dernier affirme avoir rompu ses liens avec Al-Qaida, mais est toujours considéré comme un mouvement terroriste par Washington.

 

L’accord américano-russe – dont les clauses précises étaient restées secrètes – prévoyait que, si la trêve était respectée de façon durable sur les différents fronts syriens, Moscou et Washington procéderaient à des échanges de renseignements en vue de mener des bombardements conjoints contre l’organisation Etat islamique (EI) et le Front Fatah Al-Cham. Mais, si l’EI ne dispose plus d’alliés sur le terrain en Syrie, le cas des djihadistes de Fatah Al-Cham est plus problématique, notamment à cause de sa présence à Alep.

Pari d’un nouvel échec
La partie orientale rebelle de la grande métropole du nord de la Syrie est à nouveau assiégée par l’armée syrienne et ses alliés. Au cours du mois d’août, ce blocus avait été brièvement levé grâce à l’offensive d’une coalition rebelle dirigée par… le Front Fatah Al-Cham. Cette coalition (surnommée l’« Armée de la conquête ») comporte l’autre grande force militaire rebelle, les salafistes d’Ahrar Al-Cham, et une myriade de petits groupes dont certains se revendiquent de l’Armée syrienne libre (ASL), la branche modérée de l’opposition, aidée par les Occidentaux.
 
5001418_6_ad80_2016-09-19-7543111-13876-
 
Tout l’objectif de la trêve, négociée par les diplomates américains et russes, était d’obtenir qu’Ahrar Al-Cham, tout comme les groupes armés de l’opposition modérée, se dissocient des djihadistes du Front Fatah Al-Cham, permettant ainsi de cibler ce groupe. Mais l’annonce du cessez-le-feu n’avait recueilli qu’une reconnaissance du bout des lèvres, voire des critiques proches du rejet. Dans un communiqué conjoint diffusé le 12 septembre, 21 groupes rebelles ont ainsi dénoncé les menaces américano-russes contre le groupe djihadiste : « Toute attaque contre le Front Fatah Al-Cham ou tout autre faction combattant le régime aurait pour objectif d’affaiblir les forces militaires révolutionnaires et de renforcer celles du régime et de ses alliés. »
Echaudée par l’échec de la trêve de février, violée par les avions du régime comme par ses troupes au sol qui avaient bloqué toute aide humanitaire aux enclaves rebelles assiégées, l’opposition armée pariait sur un nouvel échec de la trêve dans la région d’Alep et sur une reprise des combats à grande échelle. Les groupes modérés et Ahrar Al-Cham n’ont, de fait, ni l’envie ni les moyens de se priver du soutien des djihadistes de l’ex-Front Al-Nosra, fer de lance des opérations offensives et défensives de la rébellion dans la région.
 
« Piège militaire »
L’élimination, le 8 septembre, du chef militaire de Fatah Al-Cham, Abou Omar Sarakeb, tué dans une frappe aérienne, a été vu comme un exemple de ce qui les attendait par les rebelles syriens. Alors que sa mort a probablement accéléré la conclusion des discussions entre le secrétaire d’Etat américain, John Kerry, et son homologue russe, Sergueï Lavrov, à Genève, c’est une perte importante pour la rébellion. Abou Omar Sarakeb, tué alors qu’il présidait une réunion destinée à préparer une nouvelle offensive pour rétablir une jonction avec les quartiers assiégés d’Alep, était le coordinateur des opérations militaires de l’Armée de la conquête.
 
Le Front Fatah Al-Cham, tout comme ses alliés, y a aussitôt vu la preuve d’une conspiration destinée à geler le blocus d’Alep au profit des forces du régime et pousser l’opposition à accepter, sous la contrainte, une trêve en position défavorable. Un « piège militaire destiné à nous tuer encore plus », a ainsi décrit le commandant de la Division 13, un groupe estampillé ASL, aidé par les Etats-Unis et ayant eu maille à partir avec l’ex-Front Al-Nosra au printemps, donc peu suspect de sympathies envers les djihadistes.
 
LE FRONT D’ALEP EST ASSEZ REPRÉSENTATIF DE L’ENCHEVÊTREMENT DE GROUPES ARMÉS AUX AGENDAS POLITIQUES ET AUX SOUTIENS INTERNATIONAUX DIVERGENTS
Si Alep est le front le plus important et le plus décisif du conflit syrien, il est assez représentatif de l’enchevêtrement de groupes armés aux agendas politiques et aux soutiens internationaux divergents, qui coopèrent ou cohabitent sur les lignes de front face au régime syrien. Dans le nord-ouest du pays, les brigades de l’ASL, l’Armée de la conquête, ou encore les djihadistes ouïgours du Parti islamique du Turkestan tantôt attaquent les fiefs alaouites du régime près de Lattaquié, tantôt 
défendent la province d’Idlib, contrôlée depuis le printemps 2015 par l’Armée de la conquête, face aux avancées loyalistes.
Dans le centre du pays, des groupes de l’ASL et des djihadistes du Front Fatah Al-Cham et de Jund Al-Aqsa (un groupe qui vient d’être placé par Washington sur sa liste des organisations terroristes) menaient, ces dernières semaines, une offensive commune en direction de Hama, avant de la suspendre. Enfin, dans le Nord, une offensive militaire turque appuie des groupes rebelles syriens dont les alliances, comme les désaccords, illustrent bien le chaos syrien et les contradictions de la politique américaine en Syrie.
 
Echanges peu amènes
Le 16 septembre, l’arrivée de 25 membres des forces spéciales américaines a ainsi donné lieu à des échanges peu amènes entre deux groupes rebelles, les premiers qualifiant les seconds, qui escortaient les soldats de Washington, de « porcs et d’agents de la coalition croisée qui combat [leurs] frères dans le sud d’Alep ». Une référence au raid – attribué par les rebelles aux Américains – qui a tué Abou Omar Sarakeb au début du mois. Selon Charles Lister, analyste au Brookings Doha Center, le groupe Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh, qui s’est rapproché de l’Armée de la conquête, dont Abou Omar Sarakeb était le chef militaire, avait pourtant été jusqu’à récemment soutenu et armé par le CentCom (commandement des forces américaines au Proche-Orient)… Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh a contraint ses anciens parrains américains à rebrousser chemin.
Dans cette cacophonie, les djihadistes du Front Fatah Al-Cham ont eu beau jeu de s’engouffrer dans les brèches ouvertes par l’opacité de l’accord Kerry-Lavrov. Dans un entretien à la chaîne qatarie Al-Jazira, samedi 17 septembre, Abou Mohamed Al-Jolani, le chef djihadiste de l’ancien Front Al-Nosra, s’est fait le chantre de l’unification de toute l’opposition armée face aux tentatives de division fomentées selon lui par l’attelage américano-russe. Des tentatives qu’il dit être menées au profit du régime syrien et d’un « projet » chiite qui chercherait à éradiquer les populations sunnites de Syrie.
« Les Américains veulent frapper le Front Fatah Al-Cham, car nous sommes une faction puissante. Après nous, les autres subiront le même sort les unes après les autres », assure Al-Jolani. Une rhétorique qui commence à porter ses fruits, prévient l’analyste syrien Hassan Hassan, coauteur de EI, au cœur de l’armée de la terreur (Hugo Doc, 2015), dans une tribune publiée par le quotidien émirati The National :« Pour beaucoup de Syriens ordinaires, à tort ou à raison, les Etats-Unis ciblent Fatah Al-Cham non pas à cause de son idéologie, mais parce qu’il apparaît comme une force rebelle puissante, estime-t-il. Au final, Fatah Al-Cham pourrait même être le bénéficiaire de cet accord bâclé. »

 

 
 
Edited by borris_
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Kazu da je postalo nemoguce izdvojiti Nosru i islamiste od FSA. Jednostavno ovi prvi su najdominatnija frakcija pobunjenika. Ni FSA ne zeli da se odvoji od njih. Sve grupe su bile protiv prekida vatre (barem u izjavama).

Iznenadila ona prva karta koja pokazuje nesto sasvim drugo od dosadasnjih karta. Nosra i islamisti (+ Ujguri) dominiraju skoro citavom Idlib provincijom . Mozda je greska u bojama u pitanju, to ne znam.

Nosra pokusava da predstavi sukob kao borba Siita protiv Sunita.

Edited by borris_
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Da, progutala je Nusra odavno sve te manje grupe na tom podrucju , jedino se odrzali izvorni umereni™ po nekim enklavama i uz tursku granicu ...

 

@

Eraserhead

Opet treniras za olimpijadu  trolova ?  Ove godine  si bas u formi , tako da nema potrebe da trujes vise temu idiotskim komentarima, uzimas medalju sigurno ...

Edited by Geo
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strane u Siriji su Rusija/Asad/Hezbolah/Iranci vs. Ameri/S. Arabija/Turska/Džihadisti raznorazni od kojih se poneki povremeno odmetnu ili pobiju međusobno čisto zbog $$$ i uticaja

 

tako da FSA ili Nusra samo su finese u pitanju što se tiče razlike

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strane u Siriji su Rusija/Asad/Hezbolah/Iranci vs. Ameri/S. Arabija/Turska/Džihadisti raznorazni od kojih se poneki povremeno odmetnu ili pobiju međusobno čisto zbog $$$ i uticaja

 

tako da FSA ili Nusra samo su finese u pitanju što se tiče razlike

Gde se ondaK broje Kurdi??

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