Sirija

[Eraserhead]

Bilo bi zanimljivo videti sta se izdogadjalo prethodnih par dana.

 

Hezbollah withdrawing fighters from Syria: report

 

https://mobile.mmedia.me/lb/en/newsreports/566739-hezbollah-withdrawing-fighters-from-syria-report

[Prospero]

The Great Debate

 

Why — and how — Russia won in Syria

 

By Josh Cohen

March 15, 2016

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the Kremlin in

Moscow, Russia, March 14, 2016. REUTERS/Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/Kremlin

 

“An attempt by Russia and Iran to prop up Assad and try to pacify the population is just going to get them stuck in a quagmire and it won’t work.” So said U.S. President Barack Obama when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his military campaign in Syria to support the country’s authoritarian ruler.

There’s just one problem, though: A day after Putin announced a Russian withdrawal from Syria, it’s clear that his gamble has turned into a major win for Moscow. Here’s what Russia achieved — and why it was so successful. First — and most importantly — Russian bombing turned the tide of the war in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s favor. When the Russian military deployed to Syria, Assad was in serious trouble, with many predicting the regime could collapse. Five months later, after recapturing key chunks of territory in both the south and north, Assad clearly holds the military upper hand. Even Lt. Gen. Vincent R. Stewart, head of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, admits “the Russian reinforcement has changed the calculus completely.”

Russia’s bombing campaign did more than help Assad recover lost territory. Syria’s “moderate” Sunni rebels from the Free Syrian Army — many supported by Washington — suffer the brunt of the Russian bombing campaign, particularly in the north along the Syrian-Turkish border. Assad’s forces have almost cut supply lines from Turkey to Washington’s Sunni allies, and they are squeezed between Assad on one side and Islamic State on the other. As a result, Moscow verges on achieving a key objective of turning the Syrian war into a binary choice for the West between the horror of Islamic State and the brutality of the Assad regime. Given that American support for Islamic State is unthinkable, Moscow clearly hopes Washington will become more amenable to a long-term role for Assad in Syria — something Stewart himself concedes is likely.

Second, Putin recently achieved an important diplomatic objective by forcing the United States to acknowledge that Russia plays a key role in determining Syria’s future. At the beginning of Russia’s intervention, Washington’s position was that any coordination with Moscow would be limited to military “deconfliction” talks to avoid an accidental clash between American and Russian forces.

The most recent ceasefire beginning on February 27, however, was negotiated in Geneva directly between the United States and Russia. Both sides agreed to act as equal guarantors for the ceasefire, and Obama concluded negotiations by speaking directly to Putin. As icing on the cake, Moscow recently forced Washington to renounce its position that “Assad must go,” with Secretary of State John Kerry stating “the United States and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change,” and that the focus was “not on our differences about what can or cannot be done immediately about Assad.”

Third, Putin responded to Turkey’s shoot down of a Russian jet by humiliating Ankara, an emerging rival in the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia deployed advanced S400 surface-to-air missiles near Turkey. With a range of 250 miles, the Russian military now dominates the skies over Syria and its immediate neighbors, effectively denying Turkish jets access to Syrian airspace.

Putin also grievously wounded Turkey’s key rebel allies and close ethnic cousins, the Syrian Turkmen. Turkmen rebels reportedly killed the Russian pilots shot down by Turkish jets, and bombing the Turkmen allows Putin to both avenge these deaths — thereby playing to Russian public opinion — while degrading the effectiveness of one of Assad’s enemies.

Putin also hit Turkey where it hurts by playing the “Kurdish card” against Ankara. Turkey worries that Syria’s Kurds, the Peoples’ Protection Units, or YPG, are close to establishing an autonomous state in northern Syria, running along the Turkish-Syrian border. Russia, though, plays on Turkish fears by providing air support for YPG efforts to fully control the Turkish-Syrian border, and Moscow even reportedly deployed 200 troops to a Kurdish-controlled town right on the Turkish border.

Finally, Putin’s Syrian campaign has contributed to weakening the European Union. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip Breedlove has said that Russia “weaponizes” refugees by bombing civilian targets and supporting Assad’s troops, thereby causing a substantially greater inflow of refugees into Europe — up to 100,000 from the city of Aleppo alone. Meanwhile, resentment toward Germany’s open-door refugee policy produces rising anger across the EU, with countries such as Austria even suspending participation in Europe’s Schengen agreement, which allows for free passage between member states. Schengen remains a core component of EU unity, and some argue the collapse of Schengen could be the beginning of the end for the EU itself.

Looking at the scope of Putin’s Syrian “wins,” one major question jumps out: How did Russia manage to confound the naysayers by succeeding?

Russia entered Syria with one overriding objective: Preserve the Assad regime. To avoid another Afghanistan-style quagmire, Russia relies on fighters from its Shi’ite allies, including Assad, Hezbollah and Iran. By picking a clear and achievable goal and then ensuring that Moscow and its allies all rowed in one direction, Putin enacted a textbook proxy strategy.

Washington’s Syrian policy, meanwhile, remains a hopeless muddle. At various points the Obama administration insisted that “Assad must go” — and that Assad can stay. Its objectives have been to degrade and destroy Islamic State, reject broader cooperation with Moscow and partner in peace talks with Moscow.

The United States’ search for moderate rebels led it to support the Free Syrian Army. But FSA militias sometimes tactically ally with al Qaeda’s Syrian branch — effectively putting Washington on the same side at times as the perpetrators of 9/11.

Washington’s Sunni allies have not exactly been trouble-free either. Vice President Joseph Biden publicly accused the Turks, Saudis and Qataris of arming Syrian militants, stating “those allies’ policies wound up helping to arm and build allies of al Qaeda and eventually the terrorist Islamic State.” The United States also sees the Syrian Kurds as the most effective local anti-Islamic State force — yet Washington’s Turkish ally prioritizes attacking the Kurds over fighting Islamic state.

The Obama administration’s proxy strategy epitomizes this confusion. One Pentagon program spent $500 million on a train and equip program for Sunni rebels. The end result was a grand total of 60 trained rebels out of a target of 5,400, and even then, the few trainees actually sent into Syria promptly turned their weapons over to al Qaeda.

The apex of this failed strategy occurred when two American proxies recently fought each other. As part of their move to carve out an autonomous state, Syrian Kurds funded by the Pentagon recently attacked a CIA-backed rebel battalion, effectively placing two agencies of the United States government in a proxy war with each other.

As Moscow exits the Syrian morass, the five-month-long military campaign represents a clear geopolitical win for Vladimir Putin.

 

[Prospero]

George Stratfor Friedman:
 
 

 

Why Putin went into Syria

By George Friedman | Geopolitical Futures
 12:05 (updated: 14:11)

 

The Russians intervened in Syria in order to bail the United States out of a very difficult situation, and obtain better understanding for their interests with Ukraine, writes George Friedman.

George Friedman is an American political scientist, author and businessman, and the founder of Geopolitical Futures, a global analysis company.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on 14 March that he would begin withdrawing his main forces from Syria. Russia appears to have deployed about 70 aircraft of a variety of types and more than 4,000 support personnel to protect and maintain the aircraft. It was not a major deployment, but it shifted the situation on the ground rapidly. Before the deployment there had been serious discussion that Bashar al-Assad’s regime had its back against the wall. That expectation dissolved as Russians carried out attacks against those working to overthrow the regime.

It is unclear precisely why the expectations shifted. It is possible that the limited number of sorties the Russians could fly was sufficient to break the operational capabilities of the opposition. It is possible that simply the Russian presence was enough to shift the psychology of the opposition and break their will. It is also possible that the opposition was so fragmented and so fundamentally weak that virtually anything would shatter them. This can be discussed endlessly, but the fact is that the Russians came in and achieved the outcome they wanted.

The question of course remains: Why did the Russians intervene in the first place? Assad’s father had been close to the Soviets, and post-Soviet Russia made gestures at continuing the relationship. But Syria was never central to Russian interests, and having any number of other problems, particularly Ukraine, devoting precious resources to solving what from Russia’s perspective was a relatively small problem is odd. But when you think about it, it made complete sense, even beyond ensuring Assad’s survival.

The first reason Putin intervened in Syria was simply to show that he could. He had two audiences for this: the Russian public and the West, particularly the United States. Russia’s performance in Ukraine was mediocre at best. It “seized” Crimea against no opposition and encouraged an uprising in the east that failed to ignite the region. Its intelligence service failed to understand what was happening in Kyiv and failed to shape it. And even more important, the plunge in oil prices created a massive economic crisis in Russia. It was a critical moment for Moscow domestically and in its foreign relations.

Deploying an air wing consisting of different kinds of aircraft and then maintaining them in combat operations for months demonstrated that Russia had a significant military capability and was able to deploy it effectively. In Russia, as in other countries, successful, short military operations generate massive support. It demonstrated to the United States that it had the ability and will to intrude into areas that the United States regarded as its own area of operations. It changed the perception of Russia as a declining power unable to control Ukraine, to a significant global force. Whether this was true was less important – it needed to appear to be true. And it cannot be denied that there was truth to it.

 

The second point is much stranger and not fully aligned with the prior reason. The Russians intervened in Syria in order to bail the United States out of a very difficult situation. The United States opposed the Assad regime and wanted it replaced by a coalition of opposition forces. It was increasingly obvious that this was not going to happen. Assad might fall but what would replace him was a fractious opposition as much at war with each other as with Assad. This might be preferable to Assad, but the Islamic State was deep into Syria and had already engaged and defeated some of Assad’s armored forces – not to mention that IS controls far more territory than any other rebel group. If Assad fell, and if he was replaced by the opposition, it was conceivable they could in turn be replaced by IS. The US was aware that it had constantly underestimated IS, and the possibility of IS in Damascus was both real and unacceptable to the United States.

The United States had a political problem. Not only had it opposed Assad, it had been deeply aligned with anti-Assad factions. It could not suddenly become the protector of the Assad regime. At the same time, the United States, at that moment, could not afford the fall of Assad. The Russian intervention solved the problem for the United States. Assad was saved. IS was blocked and a situation that was spiraling out of control was contained.

Was this a formal deal or merely the unexpected outcome? I doubt that papers were signed but I also doubt that it was unexpected by either side. The Russians certainly knew the American situation in Syria: the US didn’t trust its own sponsored opposition, was unnerved by IS and helpless to do what it had to. The Russian intervention followed directly from Moscow’s public position and posed no problem for it.

By doing this, in the face of massive American air power, Russia either assumed that it could coordinate with the United States in time or that coordination was discussed in the beginning. The solution to the American problem in Syria is one of those things that you find out about 50 years later when documents are declassified. I am not saying there was an agreement. I am saying that, agreement or not, the Russians knew they were solving an American problem, and the Americans, for all their rhetoric, knew their problem was being solved. And that bought the Russians some points on their second biggest problem.

Their biggest problem is of course oil, for which there is no solution. Their second biggest problem is Ukraine, a fundamental interest of the Russians, which they cannot permit to become part of the Western alliance system – a matter we have extensively discussed. The core Russian interest is the military neutralisation of Ukraine. Their secondary interests are some degree of autonomy in the east and some settlement on Crimea that gives Russia more extensive rights there than it had before.

Syria was intended to do two things. The first was to demonstrate that – whatever the diplomacy – Russia was a military power to be taken seriously. Second, it was designed to put the United States in a position where publicly, opposing Russia was seen as too risky and privately, the Russians would be viewed as a partner and not a hostile force. The Europeans already wanted some sort of deal to abandon the sanctions, and this would help.

Syria was not about Syria. The future of Assad was not a major Russian strategic issue. Reshaping perceptions of Russian power and demonstrating that it was prepared to deploy, solve a problem and leave was. In contrast to the Americans who deploy, stay and sink in the mud, the Russians did what they came to do and are now leaving.

We should not overstate the Russian military achievement. But it was adequate for the political task, which is all that can be asked of it. It did not solve Russia’s Ukrainian problem, but it did not harm the chances of a negotiated end. In any case, it was well done and, I suspect, not something the US was nearly as appalled by as it pretended to be. The problem for Putin is that it is now over. He must turn it into solutions to strategic problems. And the question is whether this success turns into respect or simply slips between the waters of political memory.

 

 

 

Putin kao 7th Cavalry

 

Šalu na stranu, mislim da je logika načelno tačna, stvar je u prestižu, percepciji, uslugama i poenima.

[dillinger]

Obrni okreni 'oslobodili' nekoliko procenata teritorije i Asadu produžili život za godinu dve. Usput, Nusra, ID i ostali...i dalje jašu.

Ako je i od Rusa, mnogo je.

[Prospero]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V28SDigCLek

[Prospero]

Syrian moderate rebel 'spymaster' slams CIA for 'ignoring' detailed intel on Isil since 2013

 

Free Syrian Army agent says his agents have been providing the US agency with GPS positions of its leaders and headquarters but the US has failed to act

 

By Henry Samuel, Paris

9:19PM GMT 15 Mar 2016

 

 

The "spymaster" of a key moderate Syrian rebel group has accused the CIA of failing to act on reams of detailed intelligence his network has been supplying the US on Isil since 2013 - including GPS coordinates of its leaders and headquarters.

 

The Free Syrian Army’s spy chief insisted proper use of the intelligence his agents provided from within Isil’s ranks, and often at grave risk to their life, could have critically damaged the jihadist group on several occasions.

 

Speaking to Le Monde in Turkey, “M”, as the French newspaper dubbed the man for security reasons, said: “From the moment Daesh (the Arab acronym for Isil) had 20 members to when it had 20,000, we have shown everything to the Americans. When we asked them what they did with this information, they always gave evasive answers, saying it was up to their decision-makers”.

 

The Free Syrian Army, or FSA, was founded by a group of defected Syrian Armed Forces officers and soldiers in July 2011, and received backing from Britain and the US for its moderate line.

 

Le Monde was shown photographs of a training camp in the northern province of Latakia frequented by foreign Isil fighters. “Naturally I transmitted this to my Western contacts with the GPS coordinates but had not response,” he is cited as saying. “Agents of mine also managed to get hold of phone numbers of Isil officials, serial numbers of satellite equipment and IP addresses. But once again, zero response.”

 

In 2014, FSA fighters under the banner Hazzm Movement were supplied anti-tank missiles in a covert CIA programme and received US military training in Qatar on their use.

In the summer of 2014, while Isil besieged Mossul in Iraq, “M” helped devise a secret plan presented to the Americans to rout Isil from northern Syria on the Azaz-Alep line. The plan was detailed street by street, hour by hour, and included the precise itinerary of fighters and their refuelling points. “In every village held by Daesh, knew the number of armed men, where their offices and hideouts were. We had located snipers and mines, we knew where the local emir slept, the colour of his car and even the brand. From a tactical and strategic point of view, we were ready,” he said.

However, the Americans failed to give the green light, he said.

“They were reluctant to provide us satellite images. They said their planes couldn’t help once the fighting with Isil started. All they offered us was to get rid of a few obstacles before the start of the offensive,” he said.

He then provided the US with details of the Isil command structure in Raqqa, from the emir to those in charge of checkpoints and pages of GPS coordinates. “That was a year and a half ago and Raqqa is still the capital of Daesh,” he said.

 

[Geo]

Obrni okreni 'oslobodili' nekoliko procenata teritorije i Asadu produžili život za godinu dve. Usput, Nusra, ID i ostali...i dalje jašu.

Ako je i od Rusa, mnogo je.

Realno, totalno su preokrenuli situaciju na gotovo svim fronotovima i ostavili (sada) dobro naoruzanim asadovcima (irancima,hezbulahu) i Kurdima da zavrsavaju posao (sto zna u ovakvim prilikama bas da potraje ) .  Po meni , sasvim konkretna  pomoc

Edited March 16, 2016 by Geo

[Geo]

 

 

ISIS Found on Russia'n soldier mobile; some photos: Palmyra Homs cs Syria :D

 

EDIT: Navodno su ubili neke ruske vojnike u Palmiri danas, pa je ovo iz njihovog telefona ... Naravano da je najverovatnije izmisljotina, odnosno ko zna kako su dosli do slika, ne bi se sigurno ustrucavali da slikaju leseve i to prvo objave ...

Edited March 17, 2016 by Geo

[Prospero]

Ima snimak, navodno je 1 vojnik je ubijen, ima krš ruske opreme kod sebe pa je negde logično zaključiti da je Rus, mislim da je to (zvanično) 5. i  poslednji vojnik koji je stradao

 

 

https://vid.me/2Dv9

 

NSFW

[Geo]

Oni kazu da su samo juce ubili pet u Palmiri ...  NIje bas najjasnije koji ce q. ruska pesadija tamo , kada se vec nalazi brdo mehanizacije i elitne sirijske i iranske jedinice. Danas po Palmiri masovno desjtovala i ruska avijacija, tako da je ovo "povlacenje"  vise neko pregrupisanje snaga, odnosno odlazak viska vojske kuci ,,,

[vathra]

Ако су снимци тачни, на слици је припадник тима за везу за авијацијом, за бирање циљева и коректуру ватре. То не знају и не могу да раде Сиријци.

У истом својству има и Американаца у Сирији.

[Prospero]

Izgleda da je počeo malo ozbiljniji napad SAA ka Palmiri (do sada se borba vodila za okolna brda), a gotovo je izvesno da i dalje na terenu ima ruskih vojnika

 
 

Evgeny Poddubnyy ‏@epoddubny  14 сатипре 14 сати

Начался штурм Пальмиры Нанесены удары по складам боеприпасов ИГ САА и ополченцы ведут бои с целью войти в город Следим на месте #Palmyra

Evgeny Poddubnyy ‏@epoddubny  17. марSyrian Arab Republic

До Пальмиры 3,5 км #Syria #palmyra #badcompany @ تدمر - Tadmor https://www.instagram.com/p/BDDu3gwHWKK/ 

[Ayatollah]

Trenutna situacija kod Palmire. Neki izvori (asadovski orijentisani) tvrde da će je SAA zauzeti u narednih par sati, meni to ne izgleda baš tako, pre su dani u pitanju

 

 

 

[Geo]

AKo planiraju da se brane do zadnjeg, onda moze potrajati i nekoliko meseci jer jos nisu ni krenule ulicne borbe ... Mada gledajuci na predhodne slicne situacije, islamisti vise praktikuju da u vojno beznadeznim situacijama u toku noci kompletno napuste krizno podrucje.

 

edit: Sad bacio pogled, ulicne borbe se izgleda vode uveliko, tako da mapa vise i nije toliko aktuelna ...

 

 

 

ISIS requests all civilians to leave Palmyra due to Syrian Army advances

Edited March 24, 2016 by Geo

[Geo]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpjyrQY7i3Q