Sirija

[Takeshi]

Representatives of the Free Syrian Army have agreed to meet representatives of the Russian Defense and Foreign ministries in Abu Dhabi at the end of next week, one of the coordinators of the event told Sputnik.

 

The main topic of the meeting will be intensifying the joint operative center, which was agreed on in Moscow, directed at fighting IS [islamic State] and the Nusra Front, as well as the search for a political solution after IS is defeated,

 

rusi i fsa vec razmatraju sta nakon poraza islamske drzave. 

daj prvo asada i fsa da razdvoje.

[Bane5]

uhhh, vrlo je pogresno nesto suditi na osnovu vesti koje donosi sputnik.

nema nikakvih informacija da ce bilo koji deo fsa da ide u moskvu.

govorim o izvorima koji su njima bliski, a ne o ruskim medijima.

najverovatnije i nasigurnije je da bi tamo mogao ici neko ispred nedavno osnovane arapsko-kurdske koalicije sa severa sirije. 

[barrcode]

Bane, ispravi me ako grešim, ali mi se čini da bi Asadu dani bili odbrojani da rusi&iranci nisu intervenisali?

koliko vidim, uprkos rusima i irancima, SAA trpi (velike) gubitke ovih dana severno od Hame.

[Bane5]

ne znam.

to pitanje o asadu i njegovom opstanku u odredjenim sutacijama je pitanje za nagadjanje 'sta bi bilo'.

za sada im ne ide dobro sem delom u zoni juzno i istocno od alepa gde su asadovci uz bas veliku pomoc irackih i iranskih siitskih milicija imali odredjenih uspeha.

u hami su pretrpeli totalni fijasko, u zaledju homsa je status quo, a u zaledju latakije dobici postoje, ali su jos uvek relativno mali.

u isto vreme im je IS izbio bukvalno na par kilometara od vitalne komunikacije damask-homs.

 

mislim da je celu kopnenu strategiju asdovih snaga i alijanse siitske bulumente kreirao totalni idiot.

[Muwan]

Da li su sunitski pobunjenici takodje bulumenta ili je ta počast rezervisana ekskluzivno za šiite?

[Bane5]

Da li su sunitski pobunjenici takodje bulumenta ili je ta počast rezervisana ekskluzivno za šiite?

 

svaka s koca i konopca skprljena vojska je bulumenta.

sunitski pobunjenici su to bili na pocetku rata.

nakon cetiri ipo godine oni su to ostali samo u tragovima.

[Eraserhead]

Posle partizana i cetnika, karadjordjevica i obrenovica, zvezde i partizana, prve i druge srbije, imamo novu podelu u Srbiji na siitiste i sunitiste.

[Bane5]

naravno to bi tako bilo moguce kvalifikovati kada bi simplifikovali stvari ili cak banalizovali kako to neki rade ovde na forumu navijajuci za jednu stranu.

 

evo ga jedan od tekstova koji se bave time kako i koga iran regrutuje da gine u siriji za asada.

vredi procitati.

[nautilus]

Posle partizana i cetnika, karadjordjevica i obrenovica, zvezde i partizana, prve i druge srbije, imamo novu podelu u Srbiji na siitiste i sunitiste.

 

Nije problem u tome što ljudi navijaju u nekakvom xy ratu za ovu ili onu stranu. Problem je kada počnu ubijati diskusiju vređanjima, propagandom ili nekritičnošću prema "svojoj" strani. Onda imamo nadjacavanje dve propagande, ko je glasniji, kojih ima vise za toplog zeca, ko socnije vredja.... kao da imas sastanak udruđenja Seselja na forumu.

 

Bane5 je, za razliku od mnogih sa suprotne strane, uvek gledao stranu koju on favorizuje sa dozom kritike i činio je ovu diskusiju interesantnom. 

[Anonymous]

Bane5 je, za razliku od mnogih sa suprotne strane, uvek gledao stranu koju on favorizuje sa dozom kritike i činio je ovu diskusiju interesantnom. 

 

+1

 

Problematično je navijanje za bilo koga u jebenom ratu na maltene drugom kraju planete (ne mislim pri tom na Baneta uopšte).

[Budja]

naravno to bi tako bilo moguce kvalifikovati kada bi simplifikovali stvari ili cak banalizovali kako to neki rade ovde na forumu navijajuci za jednu stranu.

 

evo ga jedan od tekstova koji se bave time kako i koga iran regrutuje da gine u siriji za asada.

vredi procitati.

 

Bane, obavesten si sagovornik i dobar forumas. I ok je podrzavati sunitske pobunjenike, tj. navijati za iste, uz dosta razumne argumentacije koji si ponudio pisuci o Asadovim zlocinima.

 

Samo je bezveze pretvarati se da si neutralan u ovom sukobu.

[Muwan]

Erm, drugari, o kakvom navijanju pričate? Ne samo Sirija, nego čitav region pršti od sunitsko-šiitskog sukoba pri čemu obe strane imaju svoje oslonce i sponzore kao što su ih uvek imale. Ja nisam primetio da na ovom topiku neko blanko podržava jedne ili druge ali sam primetio da kad neko nazove stvar šiitsko-sunitskim sukobom rizikuje da popase etiketu navijača jer se, možeš misliti, drznuo da stvar posmatra malo drugačije od "narod protiv diktatora" postavke. Ovo u Siriji je pre otprilike četiri godine prestalo da se tiče tamošnjeg diktatora i preraslo je u proxy rat umišljenih sila iz kojeg se poradja sve jedno zlo veće od drugog kako vreme prolazi. Meni je žao ako nekima™ rušim sneška tom konstatacijom ali stvarno ne treba biti Slavoj Zizek pa to zaključiti.

 

Sirija će ostati zabeležena kao tužan primer zemlje koju je 7-8 drugih zemalja uzelo i pretvorilo u poligon za svoj proxy rat. I to rade tako brutalno da ne žele čak ni da rasparčaju nesrećnicu nego mora jako i do samog kraja tj potpunog poraza druge strane. Čak i kada se medjusobno sastaju da nešto šatro razgovaraju, na tim sastancima najčešće nema nikog živog iz Sirije. Ni režima, ni pobunjenika, ni umerenih, ni ekstremista, nikog. Samo medjunarodna ekipica koja intenzivno oslobadja Siriju od Sirije.

[Bane5]

Bane, obavesten si sagovornik i dobar forumas. I ok je podrzavati sunitske pobunjenike, tj. navijati za iste, uz dosta razumne argumentacije koji si ponudio pisuci o Asadovim zlocinima.

 

Samo je bezveze pretvarati se da si neutralan u ovom sukobu.

 

ako procitas tu recenicu koju si izdvojio vidis da sebe nisam izdvajao na bilo koji nacin (ako si to tako protumacio onda je to greska), ali sam vise potencirao da postoji navijanje koje ide van racionalnog - obicno i plitko.

onda tu nema ni komunikacije ni argumenata i zato nam topik o siriji cesto lici na puko vredjanje ili prepucavanje (skoro su me tako vredjali snow i kurijak pisuci da sam bagdadijev PR).

ako sam se oko necega trudio, to je da, bar kad mi neko zatrazi, govorim argumentima.

u takvim situacijama se vidi razlika, uglavnom moje postove vecina uzima zdravo za gotovo jer je to njihov nivo komuniciranja, niko da pita npr. 'a odakle ti podaci da se za asada bore siitski dzihadisti' (steta jer bi bilo lepo da vidimo ovde niz video snimaka svetih siitskih ratnika koji ginu po siriji za 'sekularizam') kada sam to bio pomenuo.

ali me zato pitaju 'zasto si napisao da su siitske milicije bulumenta' i nije to pitanje tu zbog toga da mu objasnim da ih iran regrutuje ucenama, da ih regrutuje i sa 14, 16 godina starosti, da nemaju ni osnovnu vojnu obuku, da im govore da ce ginuti za 'siitske svetinje i biti sahidi' a ne da ce ginuti za interes politike itd itd... vec me pitaju samo zato sto to nisam u tom postu napisao i za sunitske pobunjenike.

dakle, dolazimo do paradoksa da se ne prica o sustini posta vec da se meri neka vrsta stepena opredeljenosti.

evo vam ceo topik od pocetka do danas, pisao sam svasta, ali stojim iza toga... i tada su sunitski pobunjenici bili takvi, naoruzane grupe bez glave i repa, na momente borci, na momenet razbojnici, na momente cinili zlocine.

mislim da se jos po necemu moze odvojiti racionaniji pristup od pukog navijackog - to je sloboda (pa i hrabrost) da se o necemu da procena/predvidjanje dogadjanja jer bas tu treba dati najvise racionalnog. na ovom topiku sam ih napisao vise desetina i dobar deo se u neku ruku obistinio (naravno, bilo je i onih koje se nisu ostvarile).

na kraju (mozda je trebalo na pocetku), mislim da je, podrzavanje nekog stava/principa koji je iznad samog rata sasvim legitiman, ako taj princip podrazumeva svrstavanje na jednu stranu u ratu onda je i to legitimno ma koja strana u sukobu to bila. uz uslov da se ne zastrani u puko navijanje.

jedino, za mene, nije legitimno i uopste nije normalno da se cuti o zlocinima (a cuti se cesto) svih strana, da se podrzavaju IS i dzihadisti svih strana.

Edited November 6, 2015 by Bane5

[Prospero]

The Not-So-Great Game in Syria

And How to End It

By Andrew J. Tabler

 

 

In the last few weeks, Russia has returned to the Middle East through a direct military intervention in Syria. In doing so, it has entered the Great Game for the heart of that country and the region. Early speculation that Russia intervened unilaterally to prop up the Bashar al-Assad regime has since been undermined by evidence that Russian air strikes are coordinated with an Iranian-supported regime offensive near Aleppo. In fact, it is likely that a June 2015 visit to Moscow by Qassem Suleimani, leader of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, was part of the planning for the eventual Iranian-Russian intervention.

 

Assad apparently invited the Russian strikes, which has given them some degree of legitimacy, as has Moscow’s concurrent promotion of negotiations, which started in Vienna last week. But by intervening on behalf of what Russian officials call a “mosaic” of Iranian-supported forces, Moscow has picked a fight with Syria’s majority Sunni rebels and their brethren in the region. It has also tripped into other regional players’ spheres of influence, including those of Turkey, the Gulf countries, the Kurds, Jordan, and Israel.

 

Before the Russian intervention, Syria seemed to be turning into Bosnia or Somalia. Now, it could well become another Afghanistan.

 

 

 

 

UNBALANCED

 

Russia’s intervention in Syria is the country’s first direct military engagement in the Middle East (in Egypt’s war of attrition, Soviet pilots flew Egyptian planes; in the 1973 war, the Soviets sent planes but didn't use them). The intervention has primarily consisted of air strikes in areas where the Assad regime had recently been losing ground: north Latakia, the Ghab plain north of Hama, the Rastan pocket north of Homs, and Aleppo. Meanwhile, according to multiple media reports, Iranian, Assad regime, and Hezbollah fighters have started a ground campaign to retake areas in the north lost earlier this year to the so-called Army of Conquest—a patchwork of moderate, Islamist, and al Qaeda–affiliated rebels.

 

Collectively, the strikes and ground campaign represent a concerted effort to secure three key sites. The first is the Ghab plain, Syria’s most fertile area and the boundary between minority populations on the coast and Syria’s majority Sunni population inland. The second is the M-5 roadway, the transportation spine linking Damascus to Homs, Hama, and the north. The third is the besieged city of Aleppo.

 

Russian air strikes and the associated Iranian-backed offensive have already collided head-on with Turkish and Arab Gulf spheres of influence in northern Syria. Russia has indicated to Turkey via multiple incursions into Turkish airspace that it regards northern Syria as being in play. Turkey, as Russia has made clear, must rein in its support for rebel groups at the Bab al-Salam border crossing in the north and the Bab al-Hawa crossing to the west. Although Russian strikes have hit a number of groups, the most significant have been against moderate groups backed by the United States, the Saudi-backed Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham, and al Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra. Rebels in the area have tried to stop or slow the regime’s ground offensive using U.S.-made TOW antitank missiles, a weapon rumored to be paid for by Riyadh but that requires Washington’s approval of end users.

 

The Russian strikes have also altered the balance between Turkey and the Kurds. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the political heavyweight behind the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), is attempting to form a contiguous Kurdish belt along Syria’s northern border. Russia is reportedly keen to support this effort in order to block Russian and Chechen fighters in Syria from returning home via the Caucasus. The PYD, sensing Washington’s weak hand, has openly asked for U.S. backing to connect the western Kurdish canton of Afrin to Kobani by seizing the area west of the Euphrates River (which, not incidentally, is where Turkey has said it intends to create a safe zone).

 

Washington has encouraged the PYD to focus on working with Arab tribes, Assyrians, and Syriac Christian units under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS). If the PYD does not receive U.S. support for its unification efforts, though, it could turn to Russia and Iran to close off the belt from the south and cut ISIS off from Turkey. This area is home to a mix of Turkmen, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs, which means that however the situation develops, it is likely to be extremely bloody. The Kurds are strong but likely not strong enough to hold the whole area. ISIS, meanwhile, has long had the region in its cross hairs; ISIS-linked ideologues point to prophecies that in the village of Dabiq, a great battle will take place between an invading “infidel” army that will be turned back by defending Muslims, marking the beginning of the end of the world.

 

In this conflagration, Russia has been relatively hands-off in southern Syria, with only a few strikes near Tel Harra and Daraa, despite rebel gains there over the last year that have brought them close to Damascus. Southern Syria is split among the Jordanian, Israeli, and Hezbollah spheres of influence, but Israel holds air supremacy in the area. The lack of Russian action there, at least so far, could be the product of a September meeting in Moscow between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Russians have said they have created a joint antiterror “mechanism” in Amman that might keep Russian planes out of the area, at least for now.

 

What is still unclear is Russia’s plans for ISIS. That Russia is serious about combating the terrorist group is doubtful, given that 80 percent of Russian air strikes so far have targeted groups other than ISIS. Unless Russia is willing to commit tens of thousands of ground troops, it is unlikely that it (or Assad) will be able to retake and hold Raqqa and the Euphrates valley. In other words, Moscow is in for a long slog in the Syrian quagmire, a point U.S. President Barack Obama has repeated on multiple occasions.

 

DIPLOMATIC GAME

 

The Russian intervention, nominally meant to fight terrorism, is designed to strengthen Assad’s and Iran’s hands in the diplomatic game over a political settlement in Syria. The ongoing talks in Vienna are just the latest move in untying what is often referred to as the “Assad knot”—the fraught question of the Syrian president’s role in a transition that was outlined in the Geneva Communiqué of 2012, which Russia and the United States negotiated.

 

At that time, the regime's fall seemed likely, so Western representatives watered down the communiqué’s language over Assad's fate to overcome a Russian veto at the United Nations. Instead of demanding that Assad “step aside” as part of a transition, the United States agreed that a “Transitional Governing Body” with “full executive powers” would be formed by “mutual consent.” American negotiators argued that the mutual consent clause would give the opposition a veto over Assad's participation in the transitional government. But by not explicitly ruling Assad out of the scheme, and by failing to define which opposition groups had to be consulted, the agreement allowed Assad to stall for time and gave Russia the upper hand.

 

The political basis for an Assad-led transition (or a transition led by any other member of the Assad regime) seems far from clear. During the last talks in Moscow between the Assad regime and representatives of the opposition, in April, the Russians failed to gain agreement on an antiterrorism platform—mainly because the regime insists on labeling anyone in the opposition as a terrorist. Russia’s subsequent air strikes against moderate elements of the Syrian opposition indicate that Moscow might see the situation in a similar way. Otherwise, it could indicate that when pressed to choose Assad or ISIS, the opposition will opt for the former. The notion of getting the regime and the opposition to bury the hatchet and unite against terrorism is thus a real long shot.  

 

YOUR MOVE

 

The ultimate result of Russia’s intervention in Syria will depend on what domestic actors and their regional supporters do next. The mothballing, but not cancellation, of the U.S. train-and-equip program shortly after Moscow started bombing Syria was just the latest example of Washington’s horrible timing in the Syrian war; the optics are likely to benefit jihadists above all. Washington’s sending of 50 Special Forces to back the PYD-supported Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS is unlikely to help the rebels fighting Assad in western Syria and it could create considerable tension between the United States and Turkey. Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, a group of 55 clerics and prominent Islamists signed a statement that called for everything just short of jihad to confront the Russian intervention.

 

In other words, Islamist factions such as Ahrar al-Sham could soon be getting much more support. If Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS starts spreading its influence in southern Syria, it could trigger Jordan and Israel to seriously consider the creation of a formal safe or buffer zone in southern Syria. Until now, the two have maintained the status quo with a de facto safe area stretching about 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) into Syria from the Jordanian border. Something deeper would require a more formal arrangement and, likely, a Security Council resolution.

 

Turkey and the Gulf states have already facilitated the transfer of TOW missiles into Syria, but the real dilemma remains whether and under what circumstances they will provide their allies with antiaircraft capabilities. For years, the Syrian opposition has demanded shoulder-fired man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to counter the regime aircraft and now Russian jets. But the lack of clear lines of separation among opposition forces and the prevalence of terrorist groups in the opposition have kept MANPADS out of Syria. Meanwhile, direct air support for the opposition from Turkey or Jordan could set the stage for a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia. If Russia continues to pound opposition positions in the north or expand operations to the south in support of the Assad regime, tens of thousands of refugees could go pouring across the border, dramatically accelerating plans for the creation of safe areas.

 

With the victory of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) on November 1, Ankara is likely to viciously fight any PYD attempt to unite the Afrin and Kobani cantons. Turkey would likely combat such a move by supporting Syrian groups in the area along the Marea line, the main supply route from Turkey’s Bab al-Salam crossing south to Aleppo. Although it is unlikely, a PYD move en masse could even trigger a direct Turkish military intervention to fight both the YPG and ISIS.

 

What remains to be seen is how Tehran will react, not so much to Russia’s military campaign (from which it has already benefited) but to Russia’s attempts to cobble together a broad-based multisectarian transition in Syria. Up to this point, Tehran’s support in Syria has been narrowly focused on building up the minority-dominated National Defense Forces and importing Hezbollah fighters as well as Shiite Iraqi and Afghan militias to fight rebels. Iranians say their approach is based on the assumption that the Assad regime is an inverted pyramid—that is, that the whole system would crumble without Assad. Russian officials quietly voice an interest in a transition in which the regime is perserved but Assad at some point exits the scene.

 

Even if Moscow is able to pull a rabbit out of its diplomatic hat and get a process started, it remains far from clear that Tehran would break ranks with the Assad family. For now, deployment of more Iranian forces to the gates of Aleppo indicate that Tehran is doubling down on Assad yet again, even as its nuclear agreement with Washington brings it in from the cold. Such a development would likely ensure Syria’s partition indefinitely, and with it, the Great Game of Syria.

 

[borris_]

Procitah interesantan intervju u vezi Sirije i gradjanskog rata.

 

Po ovom covjeku, rat u Siriji je vise gradjanski rat nego rat religija. Kaze da na teritorijama koje kontrolise Asad, vecinu cine suniti, oko 60% (izvor je ovaj covjek  Fabrice Balanche est maître de conférences à l’Université Lyon 2 et directeur du Groupe de Recherches et d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient à la Maison de l’Orient). Vecina sunita je i u vladajucoj stranci (Baas). Po njemu je ovaj rat vise geografski nego religijski. Vecina pobunjenika je porijeklom iz manjih gradova i predgradja, sredina koje su najvise izgubile u "liberalnim reformama" (ovo on pise) koje je sproveo rezim i od kojih su profitirali veliki gradovi (Damas i Alepo). Drzava se povukla iz manjih gradova i ruralnih sredina i nije bila u stanju da umanji krizu socijalnim mjerama. Ne izbacuje ni religioznu komponentu ali po njemu to nije glavni okidac rata.

 

Atlantico : La Syrie est un pays historiquement composé de plusieurs groupes ethno-religieux - Sunnites, Alaouites, Chrétiens et Druzes. Après quatre ans de guerre, comment a évolué cette composition de la société syrienne et comment se répartie-t-elle sur le territoire ?

 

Frédéric Pichon : La guerre a amené à des transferts de population très importants. La Syrie est le pays qui compte le plus de déplacés dans le monde : environ la moitié de sa population, aussi bien à l'intérieur des frontières du pays qu'à l'extérieur.

 

L'essentiel des gens qui ont été déplacés sont des sunnites. Une partie d'entre eux a rejoint les zones gouvernementales : selon les estimations de Fabrice Balanche, sur les 60% de la population vivant dans les zones gouvernementales il y a une majorité de sunnites. Y compris dans les zones dites "alaouites" comme la province de Lattaquié qui compte plus d'un million de sunnites en raison de ces déplacements de population.

 

Pour ce qui est des quelques villages alaouites ou chrétiens qui se trouvent dans les zones tenues par l’État islamique ou le Front Al-Nosra, ces territoires ont été vidés de leurs populations minoritaires et seuls restent les sunnites.

 

Côté Kurde la situation est assez similaire, mais dans le sens inverse. Les sunnites ont en effet été chassés par les Kurdes, comme ces derniers l'ont fait en Irak, parfois sans ménagement.

 

Les Druzes sont au sud de la Syrie. Ils restent loyaux à Bachar Al-Assad - malgré quelques passages à vide - et ont repoussé toutes les attaques du Front Al-Nosra sur leur territoire. 

 

 

Les membres de ces groupes ethno-religieux sont-ils généralement unis dans leurs positions dans la guerre civile syrienne ? Où trouve-t-on les supporteurs et les opposants les plus fervents à Bachar Al-Assad ?

 

L'attitude générale des communautés minoritaires a été d'afficher un loyalisme bon teint envers Bachar Al-Assad, bien évidemment parce qu'elles n'ont pas d'autre possibilité. De leur côté, les Alaouites (dont sont issus les Bachar Al-Assad ndlr) font également front commun, ne provoquant pas le coup d’État contre Bachar Al-Assad que tout le monde attendait.

 

Par ailleurs, on voit se profiler la future fédéralisation de la Syrie d'après car ces communautés,  à part les Chrétiens, se sont organisés pour assurer leur propre défense, avec le soutien du gouvernement qui leur a distribué des armes. Les Druzes et Kurdes n'hésiteront donc pas à faire valoir ces arguments une fois la paix revenue pour obtenir plus d'autonomie, plus de fédéralisme. Dans le cas des Kurdes c'est une affaire déjà entendue. Ils auront à coup sûr une zone où ils s'administreront eux-mêmes avec un rapport un peu lâche au gouvernement central.

 

Concernant les sunnites, il faut se garder de les essentialiser en les pensant comme un bloc. Le Parti Baas par exemple est actuellement majoritairement composé de sunnites, notamment dans ses dirigeants. Les sunnites syriens sont extrêmement divisés.

 

Comment se fait le clivage entre les Syriens qui soutiennent le régime, ceux qui soutiennent l'Etat islamique, et ceux qui soutiennent la rébellion modérée ? Se fait-il en fonction du milieu social, de la religion, de la géographie, du lieu de vie (ville ou campagne) ?

 

Je pense que le clivage essentiel est celui qui a été à l'origine du conflit : c'est un clivage géographique. C'est la Syrie périphérique, des petits bourgs ruraux, de la campagne, qui s'est révoltée et qui reste la plus farouche opposante à Damas.

 

Cette partie de la Syrie est celle qui a le plus perdu des réformes plutôt libérales engagées dès les années 2000 qui ont survalorisé les grandes villes comme Damas ou Alep et qui ont conduit à un désengagement de l’État syrien dans les zones périphériques. C'est de là que sont parties les manifestations et la rébellion. Ce sont donc les territoires géographiques qui ont le plus perdu et qui n'ont plus rien à perdre qui restent les plus combatifs contre le pouvoir de Bachar Al-Assad. Parmi ces territoires, on trouve le nord de la Syrie, y compris les campagnes qui entourent Alep. Cependant il faut comprendre que la population sur laquelle règne l’État islamique ne représente qu'entre 2 ou 2,5 millions d'habitants, soit environ 10% de la population syrienne d'avant-guerre.

 

Par ailleurs, les clivages confessionnels existent également. La majorité des populations qui vivent dans les zones rebelles sont des populations sunnites. Cependant je crois que ce n'est pas le clivage essentiel dans la mesure où les populations qui vivent dans la zone gouvernementale sont également majoritairement sunnites. Pour moi le principal clivage est donc bel et bien le clivage géographique. Il faut recourir à ce qu'il y a de bon dans l'analyse marxiste pour comprendre cela.

 

La bourgeoisie sunnite commerçante a toujours été loyaliste. Cela explique pourquoi les grandes villes commerçantes qui avaient largement profité des ouvertures libérales du régime – y compris même depuis Bachar El Assad- sont tenues par la bourgeoisie commerçante sunnite. Il s’agit d’une des raisons pour lesquelles ces villes n’ont pas bougé. Elles ont tout à perdre. Pour le moment, les hommes d’affaires syriens sunnites restent loyaux.

 

Quelles sont les options politiques qui s'offrent aux Syriens pour l'avenir de leur pays ?

 

A vrai dire, il n’y a pas vraiment d’alternative. A ce propos, la répression de la rébellion par le pouvoir central a fait clairement comprendre qu’il n’y avait pas d’autre issue possible entre Bachar Al-Assad et le chaos.

 

 

Il est question d’organiser des élections législatives au printemps. D’après mes informations, les Russes - et même Bachar Al-Assad ! - seraient d’accord pour le faire sous supervision internationale. Cependant, il est bien évident que même avec des élections transparentes sans triche, le résultat sera le même. A partir du moment où des élections sont organisées dans les zones gouvernementales, les syriens voteront pour Bachar Al-Assad. C’est d’ailleurs ce qu’il s’est passé lors des élections présidentielles de 2014. Un diplomate français sous couvert d’anonymat m’avait confié à ce sujet que de toute façon, même si les élections avaient été organisées de manière transparentes Bachar Al-Assad aurait remporté haut la main les élections. C’est exactement ce qu’espèrent les Russes derrière leur volonté d’avoir des élections transparentes.

 

Seulement, il n’y a jamais eu de réelle opposition. En réalité, les syriens n’ont pas le choix. Il y a certes quelques candidats qui se présentent, mais pour le moment ils n’ont pas de poids.

 

Quelle est celle qui semble remporter le plus de suffrages dans l'opinion ? 

 

Lorsque nous sommes dans un conflit en guerre, il est assez difficile de connaitre et de comprendre l’adhésion véritable de la société civile. Certains vous diront qu’ils sont des fervents supporter de Bachar Al-Assad. Qu’en est-il de la sincérité ? C’est assez compliqué à déterminer