Sirija

[Sirius]

Ja bih se zapitao zasto mi ranije nisu padale granate, koje mogu biti i PKK ili "prijateljske, i masovno stradaju vojnici. Posto si sigurno upoznat sa cinjenicom da Vojska Sirije ima problema da kontrolise granicu sa Turskom zbog Turske podrske suprotnoj strani. Sigurno ti je poznato da se Sirijska vojska povukla u dubinu teritorije, narocito prema Alepu, a da je granica, narocito prema istoku, ostala Kurdima. Ali Turska odmah zna cije su granate i koje ciljeve treba napasti. Zanimljivo da su gadjali Idlib. Malo je to cudno.Naravno, moguce je i da otvoris kampove uz samu granicu za placenike, da sponzorises iste, da saljes vojsku u drugu zemlju...Razne su mogucnosti, narocito ako se latis maca. Doduse, od maca se ponekad i strada.Uzgred, danas u Alepu tri automobila bombe odnele 40 zivota. Mogli bi se pitati odakle/preko koje teritorije je dosao eksploziv. Nisam primetio da se na zapadu po tom pitanju mnogo potresli. A, nije ni na forumu. To sto po Siriji idu samoubilacke akcije po ugledu na Irak nije problem. Nije problem sto u Iraku od samoubilackih napada u jednom danu strada po 100 ljudi. Koga je to briga? Amere sigurno nije, vise ni u vesti ne ide, oni su se povukli i druze sa finim i postenim noblesom iz S. Arabije i Katara.A, sto se Siti i Suniti medjusobom tamane, to je odlicno. Sto vise izdeljen Bliski i Srednji istok to bolje. Neka se Arapi, Persijanci, Kurdi i turkmenski narodi tamane ali samo najnizi slojevi.

[Аврам Гојић]

Izvanredna analiza, ni na Cvetkovoj pijaci ne bih cuo bolju.

Edited October 3, 2012 by Marko M. Dabovic

[Filipenko]

Ti bi uradio nešto drugo da ti minobacačka granata doleti preko granice i ubije petoro civila od čega troje dece?

Da, ne bih išao u rat. Da ne ulazim u to što je Turska direktno utočište pobunjenika sa sve bazama u njoj, čime narušava svaki mogući dobrosusedski i uopšte mirnosusedski odnos sa državom južno od nje...Ili još bolje - zarate Bugari među sobom, doleti neka minobacačka granata u predgrađe Negotina i ubije petoro civila, od čega troje dece. Pokrećeš Srbiju u rat, potencijalno ravnaš Vidin i Sofiju? Ili se zadovoljavaš time što ćeš ti zapucati malo iz haubica po nekoliko njihovih sela nadajući se da ćeš neke njihove civile pobiti i tako biti kvit?Preteruješ u posmatranju situacije očima Turske i njenog islamističko-populističkog režima. Kao da oni jadni nemaju izbora nego prosto moraju da peglaju susede i domaće stanovništvo u proxy ratovima, Sloba-style. Pa malo Irak, malo Sirija, usput malo šamara Kurdima i tako redom... Edited October 3, 2012 by Filipenko

[Muwan]

Da, ne bih išao u rat. Da ne ulazim u to što je Turska direktno utočište pobunjenika sa sve bazama u njoj, čime narušava svaki mogući dobrosusedski i uopšte mirnosusedski odnos sa državom južno od nje...Ili još bolje - zarate Bugari među sobom, doleti neka minobacačka granata u predgrađe Negotina i ubije petoro civila, od čega troje dece. Pokrećeš Srbiju u rat, potencijalno ravnaš Vidin i Sofiju? Ili se zadovoljavaš time što ćeš ti zapucati malo iz haubica po nekoliko njihovih sela nadajući se da ćeš neke njihove civile pobiti i tako biti kvit?Preteruješ u posmatranju situacije očima Turske i njenog islamističko-populističkog režima. Kao da oni jadni nemaju izbora nego prosto moraju da peglaju susede i domaće stanovništvo u proxy ratovima, Sloba-style. Pa malo Irak, malo Sirija, usput malo šamara Kurdima i tako redom...

Turska nije pokrenula nikakav rat i nije potencijalno poravnala Damask nego je nasumično ispalila jednu omanju artiljerijsku rundu. To je prvenstveno učinjeno zbog toga što su svi tamošnji mediji, do poslednjeg, čitavog dana izveštavali o pogibiji civila. U avgustu su takođe deca bila među poginulima u terorističkom napadu u Gaziantepu, pa je javnost postala malkice preosetljiva na ovakve stvari. To nema direktne veze sa umešanošću Turske u dešavanja u Siriji niti sa pričom o Kurdima, ozbiljne države naprosto čuvaju svoj kredibilitet u očima javnosti.

[Bane5]

Pre toga Asadaove snage su oborile turski vojni avion (piloti su poginuli) koji sve i da jeste povredio vazdusni prostor nije bio na vojnom zadatku.Ovo je samo odusak javnosti, Turska vecinski nije za rat, pogotovo ne za siri sukob kakav bi mogao da izbije intervencijom u Siriji.ps. Na tom delu granice Asadove snage su na daljini artiljerijske vatre pa je itekako moguce da su odgovorne za ovaj artiljerijski napad koji se zavrsio na turskoj teritoriji.

[Eraserhead]

Ako pogine troje dece stvar nece popraviti da pogine jos troje. Asada treba precrtati u svakom slucaju.

Edited October 4, 2012 by Eraserhead

[Muwan]

To je tačno ali cilj nije bio "oko za oko" već naprosto da se pokaže spremnost na reakciju. Gađali su neke vojne položaje i nema potvrde da je neko nastradao. Jučerašnje odobrenje turskog parlamenta vojsci da "koristi trupe protiv Sirije ukoliko situacija bude zahtevala" je deo tog paketa pokazivanja spremnosti da se reaguje. To je kombinacija unutrašnjeg populizma i odigravanja poteza u spoljnopolitičkoj partiji šaha. Vojsci nije dat nikakav konkretan zadatak, ali naravno svi svetski teoretičari zavere su odmah krenuli da arlauču kako sada, eto, imaju ključni dokaz false flag operacije u kojoj su se NATO diverzanti u dogovoru sa Turskom infiltrirali preko granice i sa sirijske teritorije izveli black op koji će poslužiti za kopnenu invaziju na Siriju preko Turske. To su neopevane budalaštine. Turska vlada ne želi takav rat i vrlo dobro zna da turska javnost ne želi takav rat i vrlo dobro zna kakav karambol bi takav rat izazvao (juče stanovništvo u Akçakaleu maršira pred gradsku kuću da traži bezbednost dok stanovništvo u Ankari maršira pred vladinu zgradu da im poruči da ne žele rat) i vrlo dobro zna da bi takav rat propisno osakatio ekonomiju na kojoj počiva Erdoganov populizam i vrlo dobro zna da je narodu pun kufer već i od toga što svakog dana nekoliko vojnika pogine u kurdskim zasedama na jugoistoku i da nema tog populizma koji će ih motivisati da progutaju pedeset puta veće žrtve koje ih čekaju po sirijskim nedođijama. Ali sve to ne znači da će tek tako iskulirati svaku svinjariju koju napravi dileja koja već godinama podržava PKK i koja je prošle godine na kratko prihvatila ruku koju joj je u ime turske vlade pružio Ahmet Davutoglu da bi ubrzo vratila sve na staro i pride svojim ponašanjem primorala više od 100 hiljada civila da pobegnu preko granice u Tursku.

[nautilus]

Mensecini da je ovo vise usmjereno protiv Kurda i da je u pitanju davanje slobode vojsci da intervenise u Siriji onako kako su svojevremeno protiv PKKa intervenisali u Iraku, nego sto je nesto spektakularno usmjereno protiv Asada. Nerealno mi se cini da ce Turci iznenada uletiti u ulične borbe u Alepu ili jurnuti tenkovima do Damaska, ali mi je sasvim realno da ce napadati kurdske baze za obuku, nekakve artiljerijske položaje ili PVO baterije.

[yolo]

kakve se sve genijalnosti ovde citaju, vazno da je turska "ozbiljna" zemlja. ocekujem da u nekoj skorijoj iteraciji dogadjaja podrzite napad turske na izrael, zato sto je toliko "ozbiljna".

[Sirius]

To je tačno ali cilj nije bio "oko za oko" već naprosto da se pokaže spremnost na reakciju. Gađali su neke vojne položaje i nema potvrde da je neko nastradao. Jučerašnje odobrenje turskog parlamenta vojsci da "koristi trupe protiv Sirije ukoliko situacija bude zahtevala" je deo tog paketa pokazivanja spremnosti da se reaguje. To je kombinacija unutrašnjeg populizma i odigravanja poteza u spoljnopolitičkoj partiji šaha. Vojsci nije dat nikakav konkretan zadatak, ali naravno svi svetski teoretičari zavere su odmah krenuli da arlauču kako sada, eto, imaju ključni dokaz false flag operacije u kojoj su se NATO diverzanti u dogovoru sa Turskom infiltrirali preko granice i sa sirijske teritorije izveli black op koji će poslužiti za kopnenu invaziju na Siriju preko Turske. To su neopevane budalaštine. Turska vlada ne želi takav rat i vrlo dobro zna da turska javnost ne želi takav rat i vrlo dobro zna kakav karambol bi takav rat izazvao (juče stanovništvo u Akçakaleu maršira pred gradsku kuću da traži bezbednost dok stanovništvo u Ankari maršira pred vladinu zgradu da im poruči da ne žele rat) i vrlo dobro zna da bi takav rat propisno osakatio ekonomiju na kojoj počiva Erdoganov populizam i vrlo dobro zna da je narodu pun kufer već i od toga što svakog dana nekoliko vojnika pogine u kurdskim zasedama na jugoistoku i da nema tog populizma koji će ih motivisati da progutaju pedeset puta veće žrtve koje ih čekaju po sirijskim nedođijama. Ali sve to ne znači da će tek tako iskulirati svaku svinjariju koju napravi dileja koja već godinama podržava PKK i koja je prošle godine na kratko prihvatila ruku koju joj je u ime turske vlade pružio Ahmet Davutoglu da bi ubrzo vratila sve na staro i pride svojim ponašanjem primorala više od 100 hiljada civila da pobegnu preko granice u Tursku.

Basar je postao prvi put predsednik Sirije 2000te. PKK je isteran iz Sirije 1998 i tokom vremena vlasti Basara pripadnici PKK su hapseni. Odnosi sa Turskom su stalno napredovali dok Erdogan nije dozvolio baze FSA uz granicu sa Sirijom. Ako ne verujes, mozes sam naci podatke plus jucerasnja vest kaze da je 1 200 pripadnika PKK pusteno iz sirijiskih zatvora. Sto znaci da su bili ranije hapseni. Turci se bune zbog toga a Sirija odgovara da kada Turska prestane da pomaze FSA tada ce Sirija prestati da pomaze PKK.

[Budja]

Izvanredna analiza, ni na Cvetkovoj pijaci ne bih cuo bolju.

Ja sam vec na ovom topiku rekao da me cudi kako Bujosevic ili Djodridjie nisu prepoznali talenat i najurili Lazanskog. Sveza krv. In Sirius, out Lazanski.

[Prospero]

Asad, vojska i zima u Siriji: The Syrian Army and the Coming Winter WarBy Glen Segell on October 11, 2012

The outcome of the ongoing Syrian civil war remains uncertain. What is certain is that the Army has not fragmented as in Libya and Yemen leading to the downfall of their leaders. The Army elite are closely associated with President Assad’s regime, and perceive that their best option is to support the armed crackdown. The Syrian Army is committed to Assad’s plan to wear out the rebels in a fierce summer battle and then blockade them in their villages through the winter. By next summer, the rebels will be weak, dead or defeated through exhaustion, battle or hunger.[1]

It is proffered that the domestic battle will not be determined by the Army. Despite reports of defections by soldiers and some junior officers, very few mid-level Army officers have turned against the regime and almost none of the heavily Alawi-dominated Special Forces have done so. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, a key turning point was the relationship between the President and his generals where the generals were not willing to support the continuance of the Presidential rule.[2] From June 2011 to August 2012, which was the last defection, the number of high level defections in Syria stands at 46, constituting 27 senior military and security officials, 3 cabinet members, 4 members of parliament and 12 diplomats. None of these defections were from key members of the inner decision-making elite and the outcome of the conflict has not been affected.[3] The main Army units are composed of around 200,000 soldiers, however they are not trusted to do most of the work because 175,000 of these soldiers are conscripts.[4]There are several distinct arms of the Syrian military. Security forces compose the “first line of defense”; the intelligence services are another chief actor, and finally the regular army. The strategy of deployment of the military is to use regular army units establishing an outer cordon, while Special Forces and military intelligence raid houses, employ snipers, and arrest opposition leaders. These have been further assisted by the involvement of an armed militia group, the “Shabiha”, who are Alawi and do most of the “dirty work”. These tactics are not new; the same were used successfully against the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s.[5]Far from the most powerful institution, the Army is checked by four security directorates: Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, State Security, and Political Security – all under Assad’s Alawite control.[6] Despite a growing death toll since the uprising began, and in the face of widespread castigation by the international community including the Arab League, the Army elites believe that in order to maintain a position of influence, their best option is to side with the regime. There is limited potential for the Army to act independently in order to influence Assad.[7]In addition to the effective restraints imposed by the regime, the Army also has few interests in seeing a dramatic change to the status quo. The Army occupies a peculiar position in Syrian society that does not clearly indicate an overwhelming interest in overturning the current arrangement. It is accorded respect as an institution that has protected the state against Israel and fought bravely in Lebanon.[8] The Army still enjoys popular support in Syrian society, with the national anthem, sung by many protesters, celebrating the military as “defenders of our home … [and] the lion-abode of Arabism.”Even though proximity to Assad trumps any other measure of influence, Army elites have also maintain a relatively high social standing in Syrian society. Officers see the Army as a social safety net. The salaries of junior and middle-ranking officers who come from lower- or middle-class families is supplemented by subsidized food, housing, and social clubs, coupled with “graft” on the side to guarantee a decent quality of life. Further, army elites have little reason to expect that supporting protesters would lead to any measurable improvement in their position in society.[9]Even though the Army has little autonomy under Assad’s regime, it has not displayed a desire to gain more freedom of maneuver under a new regime. There is no evidence that they want to have more control over the economy, its decision-making abilities, or influence over promotions. There is no guarantee that supporting “the street” would result in any more autonomy or political influence. Further, soldiers have supported Assad’s regime “because they are scared to death of what might happen to them if Alawite control ends in Syria”.[10] For those units who have been involved in the eradication of protesters, there is little chance that they will be spared retribution from the populace if the regime falls. Reports of attacks on Army units in Banyas and Homs have substantiated this.[11]President Assad has restricted his own freedom of maneuver by his continual use of armed force against civilian population and in recalcitrant rejection of international attempts to ameliorate the conflict. The Army elites and the rank and file who have obeyed his orders for many months can not claim innocence from the consequences of their actions. The President and the military are bound together in their fate. Assad may be calculating that forcing the Army into this dilemma will make it even more committed to his preservation. The Army remains on the outer lines while the security forces, the intelligence services and the “Shabiha” fight a hot summer and prepare the rebels for a cold winter. The Army elite hope this will keep Assad in power and themselves in safe employment. A new and democratic regime could scarcely offer the same lifestyle.The exchange of fire with neighboring Turkey has provided both Assad and the Army elites with a new breath of life. The regular Army has welcomed it as a justifiable role to defend the nation’s borders, turning attention away from barracks gossip of civil war. Assad has found the external scapegoat he has desperately sought to unify the Army against the fragmentation that occurred in the domestic strife in Yemen and Libya leading to the demise of their leaders. Since the exchange of fire began, defections have been reduced to zero. This is a safe option because all-out war with Turkey is not probable, although low level skirmishes are likely to continue, despite the call for de-escalation by both sides.The Middle East winter storm clouds have gathered on the horizon, the first rains of the season have fallen, the nights are becoming chilly, the Syrian rebels are moving back to their hill-top villages while the region is focused on Iranian nuclear developments and the world on American elections, and their own economic woes. No longer are the casualties of Homs and Damascus a daily focus of the world media, so President Assad and the Alawi look destined to a cozy winter in their Palaces, bar NATO intervention to support Turkey or a successful assassination attempt.

—

Dr. Glen Segell is a Researcher at

The Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv and Lecturer at Bar-Ilan University.

Edited October 12, 2012 by buffalo bill

[Gandalf]

http://www.cbsnews.c...or-pious-rural/

Most of the rebels fighting government forces in the city of Aleppo fit a specific mold: They’re poor, religiously conservative and usually come from the underdeveloped countryside nearby.They bring to the battle their fury over years of economic marginalization, fired by a pious fervor, and they say their fight in the civil war is not only against President Bashar Assad but also the elite merchants and industrialists who dominate the city and have stuck by the regime. The rebels regard this support for the government to be an act of betrayal.

Edited October 19, 2012 by Gandalf

[Indy]

Syrian troops' execution video may be 'war crime'A video posted on the internet appearing to show Syrian rebels executing captured government troops may be evidence of a "war crime", the United Nations human rights body says

For months activists have reported similar summary executions by regime forces virtually every day, but there has been mounting evidence of similar tactics being used by rebel groups too, although many have signed a code of practice banning such abuses.

Edited November 2, 2012 by Indy

[Bane5]

snimak je retko vidjen.postoji brutalna nonsalancija u tom masakru.uopste im nije bilo bitno cak ni da ih ponize niti da se izvljavaju na bilo kakav nacin.nesto uvreda, par udaraca i onda rafali.ni radosti, ni zluradosti, verovatno ni olaksanje nakon ubistva.