Superkapitalizam

[Eraserhead]

5x obično

Zavisi od dosta stvari. Industrije, zemlje, stvari vezanih za samu kompaniju kao sto je velicina kompanije itd.

[Sestre Bronte]

rekoh prosek, bio sam svedok preuzimanja firmi sa godišnjim prometima od 100 do 900 miliona chf grubo govoreći, pratio sam ceo postupak iznutra, same firme su se dosta razlikovale po profitabilnosti, doduše sve su bile proizvodnje, sve u svemu, uz male razlike, stvar se završavala na oko 5x

 

doduše, bio je i jedno preuzimanje u UK, cena je bila oko 3,3 milijarde CHF, što je bilo oko 15x, ali je bio problem pogrešne procene budućnosti, računali su da su sirovine za farmaciju dinamične kao i sama farmacija, vota mistejka to mejka, prodato posle za oko 300 miliona chf

 

sa druge strane, u poslednjih par godina su pokušali nekoliko puta da kupe firmu u kojoj sam, ali je 5x bilo preskupo, previše dobro radimo

 

bukvalno je bilo reči o tome da smanjimo doživljaj ili da daju 3,5x, to je valjda uticaj zemlje, jelte

[Eraserhead]

rekoh prosek, bio sam svedok preuzimanja firmi sa godišnjim prometima od 100 do 900 miliona chf grubo govoreći, pratio sam ceo postupak iznutra, same firme su se dosta razlikovale po profitabilnosti, doduše sve su bile proizvodnje, sve u svemu, uz male razlike, stvar se završavala na oko 5x

 

doduše, bio je i jedno preuzimanje u UK, cena je bila oko 3,3 milijarde CHF, što je bilo oko 15x, ali je bio problem pogrešne procene budućnosti, računali su da su sirovine za farmaciju dinamične kao i sama farmacija, vota mistejka to mejka, prodato posle za oko 300 miliona chf

 

sa druge strane, u poslednjih par godina su pokušali nekoliko puta da kupe firmu u kojoj sam, ali je 5x bilo preskupo, previše dobro radimo

 

bukvalno je bilo reči o tome da smanjimo doživljaj ili da daju 3,5x, to je valjda uticaj zemlje, jelte

 

5x EBITDA mi deluje realno za Srbiju recimo, ali ne i za razvijenija trzista.

 

Evo podaci za USA: NYU Stern

 

Dosta vise od 5x. Ja recimo radim za middle market investicionu banku i nase valuacije su oko 8-9x a u pitanju su manje kompanije.

[Budja]

Ujednacavanje obrazovanja je nerealno za razliku od poreza i kapitala.

Porez je porez, kapital je kapital a talenat nije uvek talenat. 

 

Prica da je nerealno oporezivanja kapitala jer ce uvek pobeci je bullshit - problem je vise u politickoj volji da se to sprovede.

Nekoliko kljucnih igraca bi resilo problem pojednostavljivanjem i povezivanjem prava/obaveze kapitala kao sto se to vec radi sa pravima/obavezama fizickih lica.

Recimo, ako Apple ili neki investitor ne zele da plate porez na profite u nekom regionu (SAD/EU) i da tako izmiruju obaveze, treba da im se uskrate i prava, tj. zabrana poslovanja.

 

Umesto njih ce uleteti neka druga firma ili investitor a trzista te velicine nema mnogo na planeti.

Mogu oni i da posluju samo na Kajmanskim ostrvima ali ce tesko tamo podati milione telefona ili naci dobru investiciju.

No, takva pravila bi trebalo da se uvedu na nivou WTO a za sada politicki pritisak u SAD i EU od strane gradjana i javnosti ocigledno nije ni priblizno dovoljan da se nesto uradi po ovim pitanjima.

 

Prosto ujednacavanje prava kapitala, korporacija i gradjana bi trebala da bude glavna ideoloska tema i pritisak progresivnih snaga u sledecih 50 godina.

U protivnom ce se stanje vratiti na nesto nalik feudalnim odnosima.

 

Empirijski papiri kazu da individualci ne beze iz jedne americke drzave u drugu kada jedna poveca porez na dohodak.

Da li to vazi i za kompanije, druga je prica.

 

Problem u tvome resenju je kako bi definisao sta je profit u multinacionalki? Vec postoje OECD uputstva za oporezivanje transfernih cena, ali to je prilicno jalovo.

A ako nije jasno sta je definicija profita, i ako se ostavi manevarski prostor drzavi da uskracuje prava/obaveze na necemu sto je klizav pravni teren, onda je Putini pobedio.

 

Nije mi jasno zasto pominjes WTO jer pitanje oporezivanja profita nije usko gledano pitanje trgovine.

 

Naravno da, kako su to i Tobin i Piketi govorili, taksa ima smisla samo ako je globalna, no ti u jednoj recenici pricas o lokalu a onda skreces na WTO tako da nije jasno o cemu zapravo govoris. 

[Budja]

 

 

 

 

Cena se u velikoj vecini slucajeva ne odredjuje na osnovu profita vec na osnovu novcanih tokova a izrazava se kao EBITDA x neki multiplikator (nekad se moze gledati revenue ukoliko se radi o mladoj kompaniji ili industriji koja jos ne pravi profit). Investitor kupuje buduce novcane tokove a ne neto profit koji je uglavnom racunovodstvena kategorija i cesto ne govori mnogo.

 

 

Slabo su te ucili teoriju vrednovanja preduzeca. (videti Penmana, Palepua, Sloan i Lundholma  a ne samo McKinsey prirucnik, mada verujem da su ti nesto od toga na Duku preneli) 

 

Profit, cash flow, residual income... sve to daje istu vrednost ako imas iste pretpostavke o projektovanom rastu prihoda, rentabilnosti i diskonstnoj stopi a to je tako jer su sve racunovodstvene kategorije medjusobno uvezane.

 

Multplikatori, kao PE (forward), se mogu izraziti kao funkcija diskonte stope i stope rasta rezidualnog dobitka iznad stope rasta koja je jednaka diskontnoj stopi.

 

Sto se oslanjanja samo na prihod tice, good luck with that. See you in 2001.

[Eraserhead]

Slabo su te ucili teoriju vrednovanja preduzeca. (videti Penmana, Palepua, Sloan i Lundholma  a ne samo McKinsey prirucnik, mada verujem da su ti nesto od toga na Duku preneli) 

 

Profit, cash flow, residual income... sve to daje istu vrednost ako imas iste pretpostavke o projektovanom rastu prihoda, rentabilnosti i diskonstnoj stopi a to je tako jer su sve racunovodstvene kategorije medjusobno uvezane.

 

Multplikatori, kao PE (forward), se mogu izraziti kao funkcija diskonte stope i stope rasta rezidualnog dobitka iznad stope rasta koja je jednaka diskontnoj stopi.

 

Sto se oslanjanja samo na prihod tice, good luck with that. See you in 2001.

 

 

Ajde profesore nisam mislio nista lose da ti kazem za racunovodstvo. Ja sam veliki fan. Sve si u pravu teorija zaista kaze da nema razlike. U realnom svetu pretpostavljam da Dagmar nije gledala strukturu profita i onda ga uporedjivala sa ponudjenom cenom vec da je pogledala i ucinilo joj se premnogo.Ucinilo joj se mnogo verovatno iz dva razloga. Prvi je taj sto ne zna kako valuacije funkcionisu, a drugi moze biti taj da se u tom net incomu nalazi nesto sto su verovatno adjustmenti (i u tom smislu moram da dodam da se gleda adjusted EBITDA a kod DCF analize se polazi od Adjusted EBIT). Neki od tih adjustmenta mogu biti veliki one-off eventi i bez znanja o onjima net income sam po sebi ne govori mnogo.

Edited March 29, 2016 by Eraserhead

[Budja]

Ajde profesore nisam mislio nista lose da ti kazem za racunovodstvo. Ja sam veliki fan. Sve si u pravu teorija zaista kaze da nema razlike. U realnom svetu pretpostavljam da Dagmar nije gledala strukturu profita i onda ga uporedjivala sa ponudjenom cenom vec da je pogledala i ucinilo joj se premnogo.Ucinilo joj se mnogo verovatno iz dva razloga. Prvi je taj sto ne zna kako valuacije funkcionisu, a drugi moze biti taj da se u tom net incomu nalazi nesto sto su verovatno adjustmenti (i u tom smislu moram da dodam da se gleda adjusted EBITDA a kod DCF analize se polazi od Adjusted EBIT). Neki od tih adjustmenta mogu biti veliki one-off eventi i bez znanja o onjima net income sam po sebi ne govori mnogo.

 

Rec je o tome da i u praksi ne bi trebalo da bude razlike ako se pretpostavke pravilno primenjuju.

 

Sto se druge stvari tice, naravno da se special items/extraordinary items/exceptional items, kako se vec zovu ne racunaju bilo koji imenilac da uzmes u multiplikatoru, upravo zato sto imenilac treba da reflektuje buduci profit za koji ti one-off items nisu relevantni.

 

Sta, zapravo, hocu da kazem?

Hocu da kazem da nije stvar u tehnici, formuli ili brojci koji se napamet uce, pa onda bude daj "5 x EBITDA", "DCF mi je dao tu vrednost", "multplikator i DCF ponderisem 50-50" i slicno divljenje tehnikama bez razumevanje sta zapravo stvara vrednost. Ako se generatori vrednosti razumeju, primenjuj sta hoces, neces pogresiti. 

Slepo pridrzavanje prirucnika slicno kopulama i Black-Scholes i VaR koji su tako lepo primenjivani do 2008. 

[Anduril]

Empirijski papiri kazu da individualci ne beze iz jedne americke drzave u drugu kada jedna poveca porez na dohodak.

Da li to vazi i za kompanije, druga je prica.

 

Problem u tvome resenju je kako bi definisao sta je profit u multinacionalki? Vec postoje OECD uputstva za oporezivanje transfernih cena, ali to je prilicno jalovo.

A ako nije jasno sta je definicija profita, i ako se ostavi manevarski prostor drzavi da uskracuje prava/obaveze na necemu sto je klizav pravni teren, onda je Putini pobedio.

 

Nije mi jasno zasto pominjes WTO jer pitanje oporezivanja profita nije usko gledano pitanje trgovine.

 

Naravno da, kako su to i Tobin i Piketi govorili, taksa ima smisla samo ako je globalna, no ti u jednoj recenici pricas o lokalu a onda skreces na WTO tako da nije jasno o cemu zapravo govoris.

 

Ne ulazim u to kako se definise profit nego da pojedince i kompanije treba tretirati na isti nacin.

Spominjem WTO jer bi recimo lokalne sankcije kontra neke kompanije koja ne placa porez dovele do sukoba sa WTO a time i do politickih posledica.

[Indy]

[Indy]

[bigvlada]

The Great Debate
The real reason for spikes in food prices
By Yaneer Bar-Yam and Greg Lindsay    October 25, 2012
 

Spikes in grain prices are regularly blamed on oil shocks, droughts and emerging markets’ hunger for meat. The real culprit in the three bubbles-and-busts of the last five years, however, isn’t the weather. It’s financial speculation.

The Midwest drought this summer, the worst in a half-century, produced a bumper crop of profits for derivatives traders like Chris Mahoney, the director of agricultural products for Glencore, the world’s largest commodities trading firm. Mahoney noted during one August conference call that tight grain supplies and the resulting arbitrage opportunities “should be good for Glencore.”

They’ve been a disaster, however, for the world’s poor.

More than 40 percent of grain futures can now be traced to financial institutions, which nearly doubled their commodity bets over the last five years — from $65 billion to $126 billion.

During that time, food prices have bubbled and burst twice — leaving millions of people to go hungry and stoking global unrest — before climbing to new heights this summer. Corn prices soared 65 percent between June and July alone, the same month the World Bank’s food price index recorded its highest rise ever, breaking the previous record set in February 2011.

What’s fueling this stunning price fluctuation is financial speculation. Our research team at the New England Complex Systems Institute built mathematical models to test possible explanations for the price spikes of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 — including all the above, in addition to the rise of ethanol production. We could replicate a rise in prices but couldn’t explain the bubbles and crashes. When we added speculation, the model fit precisely.

When it comes to food, our faith in markets is contingent on their ability to match supply and demand at prices that benefit farmers, while ensuring the greatest number of people can afford to eat. Speculation in grain futures knocks these prices out of equilibrium. During past bubbles, for example, bountiful harvests piled up in silos because grain was too expensive for consumers to buy. This grain accumulation eventually bursts the bubbles after a year or more — the time elapsed between harvests.

While Americans will likely only feel a pinch of drought-fueled speculation this year — the Department of Agriculture projects a 3 percent-4 percent rise in food prices next year — the situation is more dire in the developing world. Those living on less than a dollar per day already spend most of their income on food.

The price bubble of 2007-2008 led to food riots in more than 30 countries, including Mexico’s “tortilla riots” and the overthrow of Haiti’s government, before prices peaked again in February 2011, during the Arab Spring.

The current bubble is behind the fresh protests in Haiti, where food prices have gone up 40 percent since the election of President Michel Martelly last year. In eastern India, mobs robbed government granaries.

Hunger and revolutions have always gone hand-in-hand, of course — the latter is what happens when you let them eat cake but the people have no bread. But at which point do prices pass the point of no return?

Our research has found that food riots are most likely to occur when the Food Price Index, compiled by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, rises above 210.  It’s currently 216.

Recognizing the dangers of food speculation, six European banks — including Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest — this summer removed agricultural products from their commodity funds altogether. Wall Street, however,  has not been so accommodating.

Last month a federal judge vacated tough new rules designed to rein in commodity speculation that would have taken effect Oct. 12. The rules would have closed loopholes and instituted new position limits that would cap the number of derivative contracts a commodities trader could hold, in the hopes this would dampen volatility and prices.

But Judge Robert L. Wilkins channeled Wall Street’s objections when he questioned whether these rules were appropriate or necessary. In his decision he quoted Michael V. Dunn, a former commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who had doubted whether “excessive speculation is affecting the market.” Dunn once declared, “at best position limits are a cure for a disease that does not exist, or at worst it’s a placebo for one that does.”

CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has vowed to push ahead with the rule — including the possibility of appealing. Commissioner Bart Chilton meanwhile has proposed drafting an “interim final rule” that would appease Wilkins’ objections and could be instituted quickly. “Position limits are simply too important,” Chilton said earlier this month in a speech at the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization headquarters in Rome.

They are. But if the rule that’s eventually passed is to be more than the placebo Dunn fears, it will be necessary to close the loopholes added to the bill to appease derivatives traders — who instead sued to have it overturned.

The proof will be in seeing if speculation actually decreases. Current volumes are three to five times higher than what’s necessary for the smooth functioning of the markets, according to our research. At a time when the U.S. corn harvest is expected to be less than annual consumption, we can’t afford to gamble with our food.

PHOTO: Corn fields in Lexington, Kentucky. REUTERS/John Sommers II

 

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/25/the-real-reason-for-spikes-in-food-prices/

[Anduril]

On 20/09/2017 at 12:50 AM, Indy said:

 

 

Nije to mature nego je to crony kapitalizam. Kapitalizam je samo onoliko dobar kao sto su institucije pod kojima deluje. Sada imamo globalni kapitalizam bez globalnih i nezavisnih institucija koje bi ga regulisale. Masivno izbegavanje poreza je samo jedan od primera. Oligopoli su drugi.

[eumeswil]

Šta bi tačno bio kroni a šta pravi kapitalizam, ako je veza biznisa i političke moći mnogo starija od upotrebe tog termina i u stvari predstavlja uobičajeni oblik interakcije kapitalista-država koji postoji od njegovih početaka ? Ako su, prema autoru kao što je Fernand Brodel, kapitalisti prijatelji prinčeva, monopolisti čije monopole štiti država.

[namenski]

To ti je da se Vlasi ne dosete: gomila, zatrpavanje novokomponovanim terminima, pametovanje zarad pametovanja, ali i idealan nacin da se prikrije, zatrpa sustina problema koja se nije promenila od kako je kapitalizma i svih njegovih pratecih pojava, od prvobitne akumulacije do liberalizma.

[palikaris]

On 1/26/2018 at 9:28 PM, bigvlada said:

The Great Debate
The real reason for spikes in food prices
By Yaneer Bar-Yam and Greg Lindsay    October 25, 2012
 

Spikes in grain prices are regularly blamed on oil shocks, droughts and emerging markets’ hunger for meat. The real culprit in the three bubbles-and-busts of the last five years, however, isn’t the weather. It’s financial speculation.

The Midwest drought this summer, the worst in a half-century, produced a bumper crop of profits for derivatives traders like Chris Mahoney, the director of agricultural products for Glencore, the world’s largest commodities trading firm. Mahoney noted during one August conference call that tight grain supplies and the resulting arbitrage opportunities “should be good for Glencore.”

They’ve been a disaster, however, for the world’s poor.

More than 40 percent of grain futures can now be traced to financial institutions, which nearly doubled their commodity bets over the last five years — from $65 billion to $126 billion.

During that time, food prices have bubbled and burst twice — leaving millions of people to go hungry and stoking global unrest — before climbing to new heights this summer. Corn prices soared 65 percent between June and July alone, the same month the World Bank’s food price index recorded its highest rise ever, breaking the previous record set in February 2011.

What’s fueling this stunning price fluctuation is financial speculation. Our research team at the New England Complex Systems Institute built mathematical models to test possible explanations for the price spikes of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 — including all the above, in addition to the rise of ethanol production. We could replicate a rise in prices but couldn’t explain the bubbles and crashes. When we added speculation, the model fit precisely.

When it comes to food, our faith in markets is contingent on their ability to match supply and demand at prices that benefit farmers, while ensuring the greatest number of people can afford to eat. Speculation in grain futures knocks these prices out of equilibrium. During past bubbles, for example, bountiful harvests piled up in silos because grain was too expensive for consumers to buy. This grain accumulation eventually bursts the bubbles after a year or more — the time elapsed between harvests.

While Americans will likely only feel a pinch of drought-fueled speculation this year — the Department of Agriculture projects a 3 percent-4 percent rise in food prices next year — the situation is more dire in the developing world. Those living on less than a dollar per day already spend most of their income on food.

The price bubble of 2007-2008 led to food riots in more than 30 countries, including Mexico’s “tortilla riots” and the overthrow of Haiti’s government, before prices peaked again in February 2011, during the Arab Spring.

The current bubble is behind the fresh protests in Haiti, where food prices have gone up 40 percent since the election of President Michel Martelly last year. In eastern India, mobs robbed government granaries.

Hunger and revolutions have always gone hand-in-hand, of course — the latter is what happens when you let them eat cake but the people have no bread. But at which point do prices pass the point of no return?

Our research has found that food riots are most likely to occur when the Food Price Index, compiled by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, rises above 210.  It’s currently 216.

Recognizing the dangers of food speculation, six European banks — including Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest — this summer removed agricultural products from their commodity funds altogether. Wall Street, however,  has not been so accommodating.

Last month a federal judge vacated tough new rules designed to rein in commodity speculation that would have taken effect Oct. 12. The rules would have closed loopholes and instituted new position limits that would cap the number of derivative contracts a commodities trader could hold, in the hopes this would dampen volatility and prices.

But Judge Robert L. Wilkins channeled Wall Street’s objections when he questioned whether these rules were appropriate or necessary. In his decision he quoted Michael V. Dunn, a former commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who had doubted whether “excessive speculation is affecting the market.” Dunn once declared, “at best position limits are a cure for a disease that does not exist, or at worst it’s a placebo for one that does.”

CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has vowed to push ahead with the rule — including the possibility of appealing. Commissioner Bart Chilton meanwhile has proposed drafting an “interim final rule” that would appease Wilkins’ objections and could be instituted quickly. “Position limits are simply too important,” Chilton said earlier this month in a speech at the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization headquarters in Rome.

They are. But if the rule that’s eventually passed is to be more than the placebo Dunn fears, it will be necessary to close the loopholes added to the bill to appease derivatives traders — who instead sued to have it overturned.

The proof will be in seeing if speculation actually decreases. Current volumes are three to five times higher than what’s necessary for the smooth functioning of the markets, according to our research. At a time when the U.S. corn harvest is expected to be less than annual consumption, we can’t afford to gamble with our food.

PHOTO: Corn fields in Lexington, Kentucky. REUTERS/John Sommers II

 

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/25/the-real-reason-for-spikes-in-food-prices/

gde je sad onaj Vujović^tm da što nam je pre jedno šest meseci na drugom topiku objašnjavao kako je nedostatak hrane u Africi posledica isključivo toga što koriste zastarele tehnologije, nisu efikasni, i neće da dozvole GMO