Velika igra

[hazard]

Nemojmo zaboraviti ni alave Bugare...ima tu jedna povratna sprega srpske i bugarske alavosti. Samo ni jedni ni drugi nisu znali kada je dosta i kada treba da stanu. Inace srpska elita nije videla da Crnogorcima "pripada" Skadar (uostalom kakve to veze ima sa izlaskom na more), vec da Crnogorci u taj Skadar ulaze (sto je bilo ako ne gresim po dogovoru). Sile su vrsile veliki pritisak nad Crnom Gorom da se iz Skadra povuce.Neizlazak Srbije na more ima veze sa tim da je Srbija cesto, a narocito nakon svrgavanja proaustrijskih Obrenovica, smatrana za rusku ispostavu na Balkanu. No sama cinjenica kako navodis da se Rusi nisu mnogo cimali da Srbiji obezbede izlaz na more dokazuje suprotno (Zapadnim silama medjutim taj dokaz u tom trenutku nije bio dovoljan). Jedina konstantno ruska ispostava na Balkanu je Crna Gora, a jedno vreme je to Bugarska. Srbija to u sustini nikada nije ni bila.

Edited January 10, 2013 by hazard

[dillinger]

Crnogorski cilj nije bio samo Skadar već i pomeranje granice na obali do Lješa, na čitav taj pojas sam mislio. Čisto da dočaram šta je našima preostalo od mogućnosti, a da se ne zamere nijednom balkanskom savezniku, pa smo eto odlučili zameriti se velikim silama i stvoriti trajno neprijateljstvo sa Albancima. Bugare nije bilo potrebe pominjati u kontekstu zbivanja na zapadnoj strani.Izlazak na more nije neka konstanta i primarni cilj moderne Srbije, pa da se eto velike sile u nekom dužem periodu postavljaju u odnosu na to. ( To je i suštinski problem na koji ukazujem: nekonzistentnost, gladne oči oće čas ovo čas ono, i naravno gomilaju se neprijatelji na svim stranama)To izbija u prvi plan sa otpočinjanjem tzv. Carinskog rata sa Bečom. Mi smo imali ruske i francuske garancije za Metohiju, i ništa više. Čak su postojali predlozi da se, mislim, Srbiji obezbedi i neka eksteritorijalna luka na albanskoj obali.Ali mi smo hteli nešto više. Da se prva armija dokopa Soluna. Ali pošto su tamo stigli neki drugi pre nas, idemo na plan B, uzimanje većeg dela albanske obale. Bez ičijeg znanja i konsultacija sa bilo kim. I eto sad je razlog što smo najebali i pokupili frustracije nekakva antisrpska i antiruska zavera a ne naši idiotski planovi koje, kao što vidimo, menjamo od danas do sutra.

Edited January 11, 2013 by dillinger

[Zaz_pi]

Možeš koju reč o Stolipinu, pliz?

Mogu o Stoljpinu ali on nije deo Velike igre. Barem ne ekspilicitno. On je unutrasnja ruska prica, prilicno tragicna. Doduse, ono sto je on radio unutar Rusije se prenosilo na neke odluke Cara na spoljnem planu.Ne znam sta te zanima: njegovi poceci u Zapadnim carskim provincijama, Ustanak 1905 i kako je on reagovao u problameticnom Saratovu(u kojeg je premesten kao obecavajuci kadar), ulazak u Goremikinov kabinet 1906, raspustanje Prve Dume i njegov uspon u vlasti, pokusaj ubistva od strane Maksimalista 1907(kada su mu decu zakacili), Druga i Treca Duma, reforma poljoprivrede, pokusaji reforme drugih delova sistema, politicki pad, ubistvo 1911?

[Zaz_pi]

Nemojmo zaboraviti ni alave Bugare...ima tu jedna povratna sprega srpske i bugarske alavosti. Samo ni jedni ni drugi nisu znali kada je dosta i kada treba da stanu. Inace srpska elita nije videla da Crnogorcima "pripada" Skadar (uostalom kakve to veze ima sa izlaskom na more), vec da Crnogorci u taj Skadar ulaze (sto je bilo ako ne gresim po dogovoru). Sile su vrsile veliki pritisak nad Crnom Gorom da se iz Skadra povuce.Neizlazak Srbije na more ima veze sa tim da je Srbija cesto, a narocito nakon svrgavanja proaustrijskih Obrenovica, smatrana za rusku ispostavu na Balkanu. No sama cinjenica kako navodis da se Rusi nisu mnogo cimali da Srbiji obezbede izlaz na more dokazuje suprotno (Zapadnim silama medjutim taj dokaz u tom trenutku nije bio dovoljan). Jedina konstantno ruska ispostava na Balkanu je Crna Gora, a jedno vreme je to Bugarska. Srbija to u sustini nikada nije ni bila.

Ne bih ovde o Balkanskom ratu. Mislim da bi za to trebalo da se otvori posebna tema. Hteo sam da odgovorim na tvrdnju da Srbija nije ispostava Rusije na Balkanu. Pa, nije ispostava. Srbija je bila centar Ruske aktivnosti ka proboju ka centru Balkana i Grckoj. ;) U krajnjem, oslobadjanju pravoslavnih naroda Balkana, za sta se Rusija zalagala puno jer je to bilo u njenom interesu zbog napredovanja prema Dardanelima i izlazak na Mediteran. A, delom, manjim, i zbog iracionalnosti ruskih careva ka nekadasnjem Istocnom Rimu(Carigradu) plus Pan-slavizam.Srbi traze pomoc Rusije jos od 17. veka. Jos od vremena vladavine Bojara u Carevini. Prvi odgovor je stigao od Petra Velikog, parafraziram: Rusija prati desavanja u Srbiji i ucinice da se polozaj Srba popravi. Cak je pokusano da se vojno intervenise prema Otomanu ali je Rusija dozivela poraz plus je imala pretnju na severu od Svedske. Tako da kompletne snage i nije mogla da upotrebi. Treba reci da u tom trenutku Austrija osvaja danasnju Srbiju ali dozivljava poraz u Grockoj i povlaci se. Austrija ce doziveti jos jedan poraz protiv Turske krajem 18. veka u pokusaju osvajanja Srbije i od tada vise nece ulaziti u Srbiju do nezavisnosti Srbije. Sto je bilo prilicno razocaranje za Srbe. Plus su Srbi bili pritiskani od Austrije u samoj Austriji, sto je dovelo do iseljavanja Srba prema Rusiji.Suprotno Austirji, Rusija je bila mnogo uspesnija krajem 18. veka od Austrije prema Turskoj i tu krece ruska ekspanzija na Balkanu ali i klica problema koji ce se pojaviti u Grckoj. Sto ce masovno eksplatisati Britanci i delom Francuzi protiv Rusa u Grckoj, a time i dosta na Balkanu. I tu ce se moja prica kretati jer oko Srbije stvarno ne bih. Osim sto cu reci da je Prvi Ustanak bio u ogromnoj meri pomognut od strane Rusije, prvo novcano a zatim i vojno, da bi i pukao zbog Napoleonovog napada na Rusiju gde je Rusija morala da odstupi na kratko od Balkana. Medjutim, Drugi ustanak je imao isto podrsku Rusije, a sve ce zavrsiti Ruskim pritiskom, i kroz rat, na Portu sto ce rezultirati Hatiserifima, cime je Srbija prakticno dobila nezavisnost. I, tu bih se zaustavio i vratio na Grcku. Koja je vrlo zanimljiva prica i koja je deo Velike igre. Mada periferija.Treba reci da postoje dva perioda koja treba gledati na Balkanu i Aziji oko Velike igre.Prvi: od sredine 18. veka do Krimskog rata, gde je Rusija bila prilicno uspesna na Balkanu a prilicno neuspesna u Aziji;Drugi: od Kirmskog rata do 1905, gde je Rusija neverovatno napredovala u Aziji ali je na Balkanu imala velike probleme oko svojih interesa.

[Zaz_pi]

Pre nego nastavim sa Grcima, treba da ispravim: prvi pokusaj ubistva Stoljpina se desio 1906.Kljucni dogadjaj za ruski uticaj na Balkanu se desio u Rusko-turskom ratu(1768-1774). Rusiju je u ratu predvodila carica Jekaterina Velika. Rusija je pobedila i osim sto je dobila deo Crnog mora dobila je i pravo da bude zastitnik pravoslavnih naroda na Balkanu tj. da se direktno mesa u unutrasnje stvari Turske.Medjutim rat je pratia velika ruska priprema za isti. U kojem su obavestajno i diplomatski dignuti narodi Balkana na noge. To je uradjeno sa Grcima, Rusi su sredinom 1760ih poslali svoje ljude da odrade pripremu u Grckoj. Kada je rat poceo Rusi su poslali iz Baltika svoju flotu koja je doplovila do Grcke 1770. Pocetkom jula 1770 se desila pomorska bitka kod Cesme, gde Rusi unistavaju Turke. Ubrzo izbija Ustanak na Peloponezu (Orlovov ustanak)gde Grci, uz pomoc Rusa, ostvaraju pocetne uspehe. Medjutim, ruska pomoc nije bila dovoljna i trebala je jos vec vojska jer su Turci poceli da dovlace velika pojacanja. Ustanak je na kraju slomljen a osim izgubljenih zivota mnogi Grci su mislili da su Rusi mogli vise da pomognu i da bi vec tada Turska bila izbacena iz Grcke. Iako je rezultat rata bio pobeda Rusije i uplitanje u unutrasnje Turske odnose, Orlovov ustanak ce se Rusima vratiti kao bumerang nekih 50 godina kasnije.Filiki Eteria, Heteria, ili Drustvo prijatelja je tajna organizacija osnovana u Odesi(tada Rusija) koja je okupljala Grke iz Rusije i sa Balkana, ali iz celog Sveta, plus i druge narode. Pred kraj svog zivota je i Karadjordje bio clan.Jedan od vodja je bio Aleksandar Ipsilanti, poreklom iz Male Azije, njegova porodica prelazi u Carevinu sa pocetkom Rusko-turskog rata 1805. Tu ce Ipsilanti steci obrazovanje u uci u elitne Ruske jedinice. Ucestovace u Rusko-Napoleonovim ratovima, gde ce steci visoke vojne titule u Ruskoj vojsci.Na celo Heterie dolazi 1820, posle odbijanja da se te pozicije lati Ioni Kapodistrias(o njemu ce tek biti reci). U medjuvremenu je organizacija iz Odese presla tajno u Carigrad. U maju 1820, u Bukurestu, sprema se velika pobuna na Balkanu, sto je i pocetak Rata za nezavisnost Grcke.Iako je car Aleksandar govorio da nije vreme da se krece u rat i da je potrbebno jos diplomatske i obavestjane pripreme Ipsilanti je krenuo i napravio je haos. Turci su saznali sta se sprema pa su poslali veliku vojsku u Vlasku, a u Bukurestu je doslo do sukoba Vlaskih i Grckih ustanika. Cak je ubijen i jedan od heroja Rumunije, Tudor Valimiresku, od strane Grka iz Heterie. Turci su presli Dunav i odigralo se nekoliko bitaka u kojima je Heteria porazena. Zbog svega ovoda, Ipsilatni potpuno degradiran u Rusiji. Pominjani Kapodistrias je kao ministr spoljnih poslova Rusije, i poreklom Grk, direktno degradirao Ipsilanta zbog odbijanja da se saslusa car i zbog haosa koji je napravio. Ispilanti je zavrsio u Austriji i umro je u bedi.Ovo je vazna prica koja ce se cesto ponavljati na Balkanu, ne samo kod Grka vec Srba i Bugara. Zaglavljeni u svoju znacajnost mnogi nece shvatiti pozicije velikih, najcesce Rusije, sto ce dovoditi do mnogi nesreca.

[pere urban x]

Samo da se i ovde ne zapostavi Naum Krnar, Moskopoljac, Cincarin, Karadjordjev momak, sekretar, pisar...kako ga sve nisu nazivali u retkim slucajevima kada je uopste spominjan.Clan Heterije, spona izmedju srpskih ustanika i prijatelja iz drugih balkanskih zemalja pod osmanlijskom vlascu, Karadjordjev politicki i diplomatski savetnik.Da je rec o coveku cija je uloga bila jako znacajna jer je kao poverenik Heterije na Karadjordja vrsio veliki politicki uticaj, govori cinjenica da su Turci trazili da i njegovu glavu, uz Vozdovu, donesu u Stambol.

[Zaz_pi]

Medjutim, Heteria jeste rasplamsala Grcku. Narocito Peloponez, odakle se preko mreze Heterie pobuna se prosilrila i stvorila se slobodna teritorija. Turci su bili neorganizovani i nisu uspevali da naprave znacajnije prodore. Medjutim, Grcima nisu bili potrebni Turci, oni su zaratili sami izmedju sebe. Veliku ulogu su imali stranci u tome. Britanija je jos 1822 zakljucila da je prevelik uticaj Rusije u Grckoj i podrzavale je one koji su hteli da marginalizuju Heteriju(pro-ruska strana) U tome su nasli saveznike i njih su pomagali sa dve kredita. Ne samo to, nego ce se stvoriti prakticno britanska partija u Grckoj, kasnije ruska i francuska. Ali je zato trajao Gradjanski rat u Grckoj. Koji ce se opet ponoviti nekih 100 godina kasnije, opet ce Rusi biti na jednoj strani a Amerikanci na drugoj.Uplaseni od Ruske intervencije u Grckoj, Britanci, kojima ce se prikljuciti i Francuzi, deluju vojno u Grckoj, formalno u savezu sa Rusima protiv Turaka. U stvari, to je bio blokiranje ruskog uticaja. Iako su Rusi bili glavni u forsiranju autonomije u Porti i davanja sto vecih prava, Britanci izlecu sa predlogom da se Grckoj da nezavisnost. I, ovo je bilo u cilju suzbijanja ruskog uticaja oko borbe za sto vecu Grcku nezavisnost koju je Rusija forsirala u Carigradu.Rusija ovo nije odobravala, narocito sto je planirano da se u Grckoj za vladara postavi covek sa zapada. Ali, Rusija nije mogla da se protivi Grckoj nezavisnosti te je prihvatila uslove jer je imala jos jednog asa u rukavu.

[Zaz_pi]

Ionis Kapodistrias, veliki heroj Grcke, ali i izuzetno znacajan covek za istoriju Evrope, i to zapadne.Kapodistrias dolazi u kontakt sa Rusima tokom osnivanja prve moderne nezavisne grcke drzave, ciji su sponzor bili Rusi. U pitanju je Republika Sedam ostrva u Jonskom moru. Ta Ostrva je od Mletacke republike uzeo Napoleon 1797. Medjutim, Francuzi su ponasali rdjavo na Ostrvima i pored ogromne vojne sile, smatralo se da na tim ostrvima nalazi najjace vojna baza na Svetu, Rusi, uz koje su prikljucili i Turci, tj. general Usakov izbacuje Francuze sa Ostrva. I tako se uspostavlja Republika Sedam ostrva koja je formalno vezana za Turke ali je u sustini pod kontrolom Rusa.U periodu od 1809 do 1822 sluzio kao izaslanik i Ministar Petrograda. Napustio je sluzbu zbog spletki na Dvoru, koje su forsirali stranci. Videcete u posebnom delu koliko je on bio vazan u svojoj sluzbi u istoriji Evrope.Kada se vratio u Grcku 1828, stanje je bilo katastrofalno. Osim jos nezavrsenih borbi sa Turcima, trajali su unutrasnji grcki sukobi. Drzava je bila bankrotirala. Poceo je da otvara skole, udario temelje Univerzitetu, poceo da emncipuje zene, ujedinio vojsku, zavrsio gradjanski rat, stvorio prvu grcku valutu, poceo razvoj poljoprivrede, organizovao lokalnu administraciju.Medjutim, u pokusaju da suzbije srednjevekovne klanovske borbe koji su se prenosili na vojsku, desila mu se pobuna. Da bi je sprecio pozvao je u pomoc Britance i Francuze, ovi su odbili da to ucine. Verovatno sto su Kapodistriasa smatrali za ruskog coveka. Ali su mu Rusi pritekli u pomoc. Medjutima, rusko slamanje dela grcke mornarice je potkopalo ugled Kapodistriasa.U 1831 Kapodistrias naredjuje da se uhapsi Patros Mavromikalis, kao vodja dela zemlje koja se protivi zakonu i drzavi. Porodica Mavromikalis je bila pro-zapadno orjentisana jos od vremena Orlovog ustanka. Kada je Patros uhapsen pokusao je da pregovara preko psima sa Kapodistriasom ali je odbijen. E, onda je usledilo tradicionalno klanovsko resenje.9.10.1831. Kapodistrias je ubijen od stran brata Patrasovog i sina Jorgosa. Obojica ubica se uhvaceni i jedan od njih je rastrgnut od besne mase.Grcka ulazi u proce bezvlasca a onda zapadne sile(Britanija i Francuska) koriste sansu i na grcki tron dovode Bavarskog princa Ota iz kuce Vitelsbah. Britanija je bila prilicno srecna ovim izborom, Grcka se i nije usrecila. Oto ce na kraju morati abdicirati i otici britanskim brodom kuci.Kljucni momenat za Grke i njega je bio Krimski rat, kada je formalno podrzo Ruse, ali sustniski nista nije ucinio. Poznat je po tome sto je uveo vece poreze u Grckoj nego za vreme Turaka. Doduse, on se tu nije mnogo pitao posto su mu to naredili Britanci. Britanci, koji su davale zajmove Grckoj, su trazili da se oni vrate zato su naredili Otu da uspostavi mere stednje. Ko kaze da se vreme ne ponavlja? :)Kada se doda da je doveo Bavarsku birokratiju i vojsku, koji su sebe smatrali za visi rod naspram Grka, i jos pri tome je bio katolik. Nije bas bilo dobro. Doduse, on je proglasio Atinu za prestonicu i osnovao nekoliko fakulteta. Doduse, kada je usao u Atinu, mislim da je rekao: gde su ovde Grci?Uglavnom, vlast mu je bila pod stalnim pritiskom jer i nije bila dobra. Osim za mali broj privilegovanih. Mozete pretpostaviti ko su bili: porodica Mavromikalis je bila medju njima.Posle njega su dosli drugi zapadni vladari na presto u Grckoj.

[Zaz_pi]

A, sto se tice Kapodistriasa i Zapadne Evrope: kada bi vam rekao da je Svajcarska postala neutralna i kantonalno uredjena zbog Rusa da li bi mi verovali? Verovatno ne li ona jeste to postala zbog Rusa, tacnije zbog Kapodistriasa. Moderna Svajcarska koja je model mnogima je u stvari zamisao ruskog poslanika u Svajcarskoj. :lol:Svajcarska je dugo vazila za problematicnu zemlju zbog svojih placenika koji su ratovali za one koji im vise plati :P plus je cesto bila meta mocnih lokalnih drzava. Posle poraza Napoleona, Kapodistrias, kao izaslanik Rusije, je dao predlog da se Svajcarska kantonalno uredi i proglasi neutralnost i da joj se prizna nezavisnost od svih kao takvoj.Ovo su mu i Svajcari priznali, a 2009, kada je u Lozani podignuta njegova bista uz prisustvo spoljnih ministara Rusije i Svajcarske.Zbog svojih izuzetnih diplomatskih vestina je i postao Ministar spoljnih dela u Carskoj Rusiji.

Edited January 11, 2013 by Zaz_pi

[Prospero]

kad već mixujete srbiju u veliku igru, evo jednog teksta o tome:Vladimir Stojančević, Srbija u vreme Krimskog rata 1853-1856.

[Prospero]

prikaz knjige "Playing the Great Game: Britain, War and Politics in Afghanistan since 1839" Edmunda Yorke-a, iz 2012.

Beginning in the late 1990’s, there has reemerged with a vengeance popular and indeed even scholarly interest in the subject of what was known in times past as the ‘great game’, AKA the competition, both real and imagined for power and influence between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire in Central Asia and the upper reaches of the Indian sub-continent. Unfortunately, a good deal of this writing and indeed even ‘scholarship’ leaves much to be desired(1). With anachronistic premises and ahistorical arguments, the concept of the ‘great game’ is one which, it may be argued, obscures more than it enlightens. Reflecting an understandable, but none the less not historically based, instinct to ground the past (19th-century Anglo-Russian diplomatic interaction and competition) in the concerns of the present and recent past. Given this rather less than impressive background, one opens the pages to Edmund Yorke’s book, entitled Playing the Great Game : Britain, War and Politics in Afghanistan since 1839, with some amount of trepidation. Thankfully, in that respect at least, Dr. Yorke eschews most of the substructure of the aforementioned topic except in the most nominal sense, choosing instead to concentrate upon Britain’s ‘four’ Afghan Wars, the last being Britain’s military involvement since 2001 as a junior partner of the United States.Currently a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at Sandhurst, Dr. Yorke understands his study as an analysis of the ‘political-military interface within the specific framework of Britain’s four Afghan conflicts’ [10]. With a focus on what is characterized as “the friction or tension generated by all of these wars between the ‘politicals’…and the military establishments”. Lest anyone misunderstand the underlying premises to this study, there is a foreword to Dr. Yorke’s book by no less a personage than Brigadier ‘Ed’ Butler, former SAS officer and circa 2006, one-time Commander in Chief of British forces in Afghanistan. According to Brigadier Butler, the value of Dr. Yorke’s study is that it “highlights the tensions” between the generals on the ground and the politicians in either London or British India. The sub-text being that just as the latest round of British military involvement in Afghanistan has been fraught with tensions between the army and its political leaders, with the former claiming that the policies by the latter have consistently undermined British forces in the field, so we see, as per Dr. Yorke, the same pattern of failures by the politicians in the past, thereby explaining the lack of success of British forces in the three previous Anglo-Afghan Wars. Given this rather topical background to his study, how does Dr. Yorke’s make sense of British military involvement in Afghanistan per se? Unfortunately, the book makes for an odd read, even given the premises outlined above. At times one is not entirely sure if one is not reading a contemporary journalistic exercise rather than a scholarly study of events occurring almost two hundred years ago. Anachronistic terms and expressions such as “military overstretch was matched by political overstretch” [78] and “it was a campaign and occupation already seriously under-resourced in both men and materials…. It was a classic situation of mission creep”, are ever-present throughout the text [80-81 & passim]. Oddly, at the same time, the study is also replete with language which almost comes straight out of the Boy’s Own: “An officer of the Queen’s Regiment, stationed amongst the first echelon, recalled the moment of the great assault as the thin red lines of 1,500 British troops and their Indian allies began their relentless advance” [53], as well as “it was a great British triumph, but both sides fought heroically” [55]. Also worthy of note are the limitations on source materials that Dr. Yorke has chosen to labor under (almost all of the primary source material for the chapters dealing with the 19th century is memoir literature by various British participants)—there being virtually no archival sources cited by the author except for his discussion of the Third Anglo-Afghan War.In dealing with the First, Second & Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, Dr. Yorke's chapters are in many ways quite rewarding insofar as one is prepared to read and enjoy a studiously old-fashioned version of military history. Indeed, it would appear from the text that Dr. Yorke is almost completely ignorant of the “New Military History”. Regardless, for the first-time reader of these military conflicts, Dr. Yorke does provide a solid introduction to the subject; in particular, explaining in depth the failures of military decision-making, which ensured that the British occupation of Kabul in 1840-1841 would end in dismal failure. Also rewarding and insightful, is his recounting of the lengthy aftermath of the disastrous British retreat from Kabul in 1841, in which in a revenge campaign, Kabul was reoccupied and sacked by British forces. The author is bringing to light a portion of the First Anglo-Afghan War which has been studiously ignored in most discussions of this conflict. Similarly, his telling of the (for this reader) exciting campaigns of the future Field-Marshal, Lord Roberts, in the Second Anglo-Afghan War almost justifies the book on its own. I also found the author’s recounting of the relatively ignored Third Anglo-Afghan War to be quite interesting and enlightening. Unfortunately, a complete understanding of the text, which the clear narrative provided by Dr. Yorke allows, is considerably reduced by the decision (one assumes by the publisher) to re-use 19th-century maps, which I for one found completely unreadable and indeed useless.Concerning Dr. Yorke’s thesis itself, the issue which undermines it considerably is illustrated by the absence from the text of the name and writings of Karl von Clausewitz. Meaning of course, that the concept that ‘war is politics by other means’, seems to have escaped the author completely. The fact of the matter is that the guiding supposition which Dr. Yorke operates under—that there was at anytime something akin to a hermetically sealed opposition between ‘the politicals’ and the ‘military’—is reductionist and completely ahistorical. Statements such as “many politicals had again exceeded their brief and directly interfered with military operations at great cost”, are undermined by the author’s own narrative of events [318]. Indeed, British forces in the Indian sub-continent, either under the East India Company or under the Raj, were never understood, nor did they understand themselves, as being autonomous actors, a sort of ‘state within a state’, à la Hans von Seekt’s idea of the Reichswehr in the 1920’s Weimar Republic. Nor did they ever assume the oppositional mindset between the ‘frocks’ and the ‘brass hats’ that dominated British civilian-military relations during the Great War. That fact is that per se ‘British forces’ (something of a misnomer insofar as most of the troops fighting for the East India Company or the Raj were in fact natives of the Indian sub-continent), were always throughout the entirety of the time period under discussion undermanned and under supplied. For the simple reason that for London, the military requirements of its forces in India always had to be subordinated to its larger geo-political strategy and goals. The first one being that the Indian Army as much as possible had to be a financially self-supporting enterprise. The concept that the British tax-payer had to remit a portion of his taxes to support the military establishment in the Indian sub-continent was one that was fundamentally at variance with British domestic politics and grand strategy up to the end of the Raj in 1947. It is not for nothing that all three Anglo-Afghan Wars merit barely a mention in the five-volume Oxford History of the British Empire(2). Au fond, from the larger London-centric perspective, the first three Anglo-Afghan Wars were nothing more than sideshows. In and of themselves they had no intrinsic importance. Hence the fact that the debacle that British forces suffered in 1841 did nothing to mar the future political careers of either its architect (Auckland) or its principal supporter in the Cabinet (Palmerston)(3). Indeed, it would be true to say that Dr. Yorke almost completely ignores the larger geopolitical context in which the key decisions by policy-makers either in India or London were made.Finally, in the case of the ‘fourth’ Anglo-Afghan war (surely another misnomer), that being British military operations in Afghanistan since circa 2005, Dr. Yorke seems to follow what one may characterize as the current British military establishment’s own ‘party line’, concerning the failure of the British military’s campaign in Helmond Province. As per Dr. Yorke, British forces were placed in “an impossible political dilemma in which the British were the military ‘fall guys’ ” [379]. An assertion backed by copious quotes from not only Brigadier Butler, but also Generals Richards (C in C NATO Forces in Afghanistan), and Dannatt (Chief of the Defence Staff), all of whom used the argument that British forces in Afghanistan were ‘under-resourced’ to try to escape from their own heavy responsibility for the failures of British military strategy in Helmand. Failures which Frank Ledwidge, among others, has recently shown were the result more than anything else of deficiencies in Britain’s own military culture and leadership(4). It is clear in retrospect that it is only when the campaign in Helmand ran into serious difficulties that the military hierarchy in London commenced using the ‘politicals’ as scapegoats. In that respect, the reader who is looking for the standard treatment of this still somewhat controversial subject will do well to read Ledwidge’s book. Otherwise for the First, Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, the lay reader, if not necessarily the academic specialist, would do well to read with some caution but read none the less, and indeed enjoy this old-fashioned exercise in military history by Dr. Yorke.______________(1) Karl Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac. Tournament of Shadows (1999); Peter Hopkirk. The Great Game : On Secret Service in High Asia (2001). (2) On the role of the Raj in 19th-century British ‘grand strategy’, see John Darwin. The British Empire Project : The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970. (2009) : 10, 35, 52-53 and passim. See also: D.A. Washbrook, “India, 1818-1860”. In The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century. Edited by Andrew Porter (1999) : 323-328 and passim.(3) For this point as it relates to Palmerston, see David Brown, Palmerston (2010).(4) On the failures in the Helmand campaign being primarily failures of military strategy and leadership, see Frank Ledwidge. Losing Small Wars : British Military Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011) : 60-82, 110-168. See also Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign : British military operations in Afghanistan”. International Affairs (March 2010) : 312-331.

[porucnik vasic]

Мене занима г. Бафало колико је објективан баја који предаје на Војној Академији? са колико зрнаца соли узимамо то писаније...

[Prospero]

Sa dobrim pinchom, po obicaju :)Послато са HTC ChaCha A810e користећи Тапаток 2

[porucnik vasic]

Претпоставио сам, може казан пасуља да се засоли.

[Zaz_pi]

Prvi ruski igraciLeta gospodnjeg 1819, kapetan Nikolaj Muravijev se molio u crkvi. Trebace mu pomoc svih nebesa za njegovu planiranu misiju iz Tiflisa, danas poznat kao Tbilisi i u to vreme centralnog staba ruske vojske na Kavkazu, prema Hivi. Put dugacak oko 1 200 km preko jednog od najgorih predela na planeti zemlji-pustinje Karakum.Horezm, to je u stvari Hiva kaganat, danasnji Uzbekistan. Kao sto vidite, okruzen je pustinjama.Ali, nije samo problem klima, jos veci problem su ratnicka turkmenska plemena koja naseljavaju ovaj prostor. Rusi se dobro secaju katastrofe iz 1717. Od tada su turkmenska plemena upadala na ruske teritorije oko severnog dela Kaspijskog mora, administrativna oblast Orenburga, zbog kradji. Cesto su na prepade hvatali ribolovce i odvodili ih u ropstvo.Elem, general Jermolov(komandant ruskih trupa na Kavkazu) je izabarao maldog Muravijeva(24) za ovaj tezak zadatak jer je Muravijev znao tatarski a i sa 17 godina se iskazao u borbi protiv Napoleona. Plus je Muravijev imao ranije iskustva sa islamskim svetom posto je vec radio iza neprijateljskih linija, u Persiji, i to kao muslimanski hodocasnik.Muravijev je imao zadatak da uspostavi trgovinu, prodaju ruske robe i tehnologije, sa Hivom i ustanovi sta je sa ljudima otetim od strane turkmanskih plemena. Istina je, pak, bila da je glavni cilj misije bio izvidnica za moguce osvajanje. Trebao je da ispita teren, odbranu Hive, izvrsi analizu uredjenja i vladara. A, krajnji cilj je bilo preusmeravanje trgovine iz Azije, ukljucujuci i Indiju, preko Evrope preko centralne Azije, Kaspijskog mora, Volge do Evrope. Cime bi Britanija dosta izgubila.Od Bakua do istocne obale Kaspijskog mora, Muravijeva je prevezla ruska mornarica a onda je uz pomoc velike kolicine zlata iznajmio karavan kamila sa domiclnim, turkmanskim, stanovnistvom na koje je nosio darove Kanu, pre svega razlicita tehnoloska roba koja nije bila poznata u Hivi.Misija je krenula prema Hivi 21. septembra 1819. Ovako Muravijev opisuje put:

‘The desert presented . . . a very picture of death. Not an object betrayed signs of life . . . only here and there a stunted patch of bush struggled for existence in the sand.’

Iako je bio uplasen od mogucih napada lokalnih bandi to se nije desilo. Kada se priblizio Hivi, usao je u oazu, ovako je opisuje Muravijev:

‘The fields, covered with the richest crops,’ he wrote, ‘presented a very different aspect to the sandy wastes of yesterday.’ Even in Europe, he added, he had not seen such well-cultivated land. ‘Our course lay through lonely meadows covered with fruit trees in which the birds sang sweetly.’ All this he recorded discreetly in his notebook.

Ali u Hivu nije mogao uci odmah vec je morao cekati odobrenje Kana, sto ej bio problem jer se nije znalo da li Kan ima zelju da ga ubije ili baci u rosptvo, kao sto se desilo misiji 1717. Medjutim, bogovi su bili na strani Muravijeva i on je usao u Hivu.U Hivi je bio pod sumnjom i nije bas lako primljen kod Kana ali na posletku, ovako je isla konverzacija:

‘The Governor of the Russian possessions lying between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, under whose rule are Tiflis, Ganja, Grusia, Karabagh, Shusha, Nakha, Shekin, Shirvan, Baku, Kubin, Daghestan, Astrakhan, Lenkoran, Saljan and all the fortresses and provinces taken by force from the Persians, has sent me to express his deep respect, and to deliver you a letter.’The Khan: ‘I have perused this letter.’Muraviev: ‘I am also commanded to make certain verbal representations to thee, and only await thy order to discharge myself of the message now, or at any time that may be suitable.’The Khan: ‘Speak now.’Muraviev explained that the Tsar of all the Russias wished to see a prosperous commerce grow up between their two kingdoms for their mutual profit and well-being. At present there was little trade because all caravans had to march for thirty days across a bandit-infested and waterless desert. But there was a shorter route which could be used. This lay between Khiva and the new harbour which the Russians were planning to build on the eastern shore of the Caspian at Krasnovodsk. There, Muraviev told the Khan, his merchants would always find vessels waiting, laden with all the Russian luxuries and goods that he and his subjects most desired. Moreover, theroute between Khiva and Krasnovodsk would only take seventeen days, little more than half the present journey. But the Khan shook his head. While it was true that this was a far shorter route, the Turcoman tribes inhabiting that region were subject to Persian rule. ‘My caravans would thus run the risk of being plundered,’ he added, which effectively ruled it out. This was the opening the Russian had been hoping for. ‘Sire,’ he declared, ‘if thou wilt but ally thyself to us, thy enemies shall also be our enemies.’ Why not therefore allow a Khivan official to visit Tiflis as a guest of the Tsar so that important matters of mutual interest, such as this, could be discussed with General Yermolov, who was eager for the Khan’s friendship? The suggestion clearly fell into line with the Khan’s own thinking, for he told Muraviev that he would send trusted officials back with him, adding: ‘I myself desire that firm and sincere friendship may grow between our two countries.’ With that he gave a sign that the audience was at an end. Muraviev, relieved that it had gone so well and that his life no longer appeared to be at stake, bowed and withdrew from the royal presence.

Kada se Muravijev povukao, poslao je pismo u centralnu komandu na Kavkazu, gde je objasnio da je postigao sporazum ali i otkrio da u Hivu ima dosta ruskih zarobljenika, mada daleko manje od persijskih ili iz avganistana. Upravo saznanje da na tom prostoru zarobljeni Rusi ce biti ono sto ce Rusija iskoristiti u narednom periodu za osvajanje.13. decembra 1819. Muravijev je dosao do istocnih obala Kaspijskog mora, odakle ga je korveta prevezla do Bakua gde je saznao da general Jermolov pada u nemilost Cara. Muravijev, kada je dosao u stab u Tiflisu, je ovako opisao Kana:

of execution (impalement being a favourite). Muraviev also described the Khan’s ‘monstrous cruelty’ and his penchant for devising new methods of torture and punishment. Those caught drinking alcohol or smoking, which were forbidden after he himself had decided to give them up, had their mouths slit open to the ears. The permanent grin which resulted was intended as a macabre warning to others.

Muravijev je postao komandant Carske vojske na Kavkazu.A, dugorocni cilje Rusa je bio, kao sto sam napisao, da se oslabi britanska kontrola trgovackih puteva. To je video Vilijam Murkroft, predstavnik East India Company, koji je bio ubedjen da ce Rusi osvojiti centralnu Aziju a onda krenuti prema Indiji. U jednom je bio u pravu, Rusi ce stvarno uzeti centralnu Aziju ali u Peterburgu nikada nije stvarno odluceno da se ide na Indiju. Iako su rusofobi u Londonu, koji su po pravilu bili vojni "jastrebovi", uvek nalazili "dokaze". Ne, Rusija nikada ozbiljno nije to razmatrala, sto su Britancima potvrdjivali i obavestajni izvori iz Rusije ali mediji su drugacije pisali. Rusija je zelela da srusi britansku kontrolu trgovine i da prosiri trziste. Zato su i forsiirali Trans-Sibirsku i Trans-Kaspijsku zeleznicu. Sto je Britance vise uplasilo nego sve najave o mogucem napadu na Indiju.