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Drugim recima, zasto su od tri vrste information intermediaries:- rejting agencije- revizori- brokeri i sell-side analystpreve dve regulisane a treca ne?
Jesu forex brokeri, najviše u SAD-u. Ili misliš na brokere generalno?
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Jesu forex brokeri, najviše u SAD-u. Ili misliš na brokere generalno?
Ne na brokere, na sell-side analysts.Jesu i oni, ima pravila sta smeju a sta ne smeju da rade, itd., ali ne postoji obaveza preduzeca da placa analyst report koji se onda slobodn distribuira zainteresovanima.
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E sad, ja se nadam da će Obama poslušati Krugića. Pa nek ide sve..

So President Obama has to make a decision, almost immediately, about how to deal with continuing Republican obstruction. How far should he go in accommodating the G.O.P.’s demands?My answer is, not far at all. Mr. Obama should hang tough, declaring himself willing, if necessary, to hold his ground even at the cost of letting his opponents inflict damage on a still-shaky economy. And this is definitely no time to negotiate a “grand bargain” on the budget that snatches defeat from the jaws of victory.In saying this, I don’t mean to minimize the very real economic dangers posed by the so-called fiscal cliff that is looming at the end of this year if the two parties can’t reach a deal. Both the Bush-era tax cuts and the Obama administration’s payroll tax cut are set to expire, even as automatic spending cuts in defense and elsewhere kick in thanks to the deal struck after the 2011 confrontation over the debt ceiling. And the looming combination of tax increases and spending cuts looks easily large enough to push America back into recession.Nobody wants to see that happen. Yet it may happen all the same, and Mr. Obama has to be willing to let it happen if necessary.Why? Because Republicans are trying, for the third time since he took office, to use economic blackmail to achieve a goal they lack the votes to achieve through the normal legislative process. In particular, they want to extend the Bush tax cuts for the wealthy, even though the nation can’t afford to make those tax cuts permanent and the public believes that taxes on the rich should go up — and they’re threatening to block any deal on anything else unless they get their way. So they are, in effect, threatening to tank the economy unless their demands are met.Mr. Obama essentially surrendered in the face of similar tactics at the end of 2010, extending low taxes on the rich for two more years. He made significant concessions again in 2011, when Republicans threatened to create financial chaos by refusing to raise the debt ceiling. And the current potential crisis is the legacy of those past concessions.Well, this has to stop — unless we want hostage-taking, the threat of making the nation ungovernable, to become a standard part of our political process.So what should he do? Just say no, and go over the cliff if necessary.It’s worth pointing out that the fiscal cliff isn’t really a cliff. It’s not like the debt-ceiling confrontation, where terrible things might well have happened right away if the deadline had been missed. This time, nothing very bad will happen to the economy if agreement isn’t reached until a few weeks or even a few months into 2013. So there’s time to bargain.More important, however, is the point that a stalemate would hurt Republican backers, corporate donors in particular, every bit as much as it hurt the rest of the country. As the risk of severe economic damage grew, Republicans would face intense pressure to cut a deal after all.Meanwhile, the president is in a far stronger position than in previous confrontations. I don’t place much stock in talk of “mandates,” but Mr. Obama did win re-election with a populist campaign, so he can plausibly claim that Republicans are defying the will of the American people. And he just won his big election and is, therefore, far better placed than before to weather any political blowback from economic troubles — especially when it would be so obvious that these troubles were being deliberately inflicted by the G.O.P. in a last-ditch attempt to defend the privileges of the 1 percent.Most of all, standing up to hostage-taking is the right thing to do for the health of America’s political system.So stand your ground, Mr. President, and don’t give in to threats. No deal is better than a bad deal.
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I dalje se prica o radu neka dva tipa iz MMFa o "Chicago Plan"-u. Naime to je plan iz 1936. koji je predlagao ukidanje fractional reserve banking-a. Rad ima 71 stranu tako da ga nisam citao celog (niti sam dovoljno strucan za to) ali u zakljucku i uvodu i tvrde da su putem raznoraznih simulacija itd. zakljucili da je plan dobar, i da bi zamenom "privatnog novca" (koji kreiraju banke na osnovu nivoa obaveznih rezervi kada neko deponuje kod njih novac) 100% drzavnim novcem (samo centralna banka ima pravo da kreira novac) bio resen veliki deo problema oko dugova (prezaduzenost razvijenih drzava ponajvise) i bili bi skoro "ispeglani" poslovni boom-bust ciklusi. Mojim usima to zvuci dobro, meni je FRB oduvek "smrdeo", no bilo bi lepo neko skolovan na tu temu nesto da kaze.Evo radaA evo sta se o time pise u medijima:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9623863/IMFs-epic-plan-to-conjure-away-debt-and-dethrone-bankers.html

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Sada sam se setio da sam u subotu na PTC jutarnjem video na tračici za vesti sledeći tekst: "Od kako je uvedena RUBLJA na kursne liste u Srbiji smanjila se potražnja za evrima i dolarima"U neverici sam sačekao da pročitam još jednom i stvarno su tako napisali.Ja rublju još ne videh na kursnim listama banaka i menjačnicama, a pogotovo ne primećujem potencijalno ostvarene efekte.

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to mi nije palo na pamet, a trik može da bude u kupovini rubalja ovde, a posle zameni u USD tamoproverljivo je koga ne mrzi, a mene mrzi obzirom da mi trenutno ta šema ništa ne znači, fale mi pare za nju

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Google avoided about US$2B in taxes last year by stashing US$10B in Bermuda haven
“The tax strategy of Google and other multinationals is a deep embarrassment to governments around Europe,” said Richard Murphy, an accountant and director of Tax Research LLP in Norfolk, England. “The political awareness now being created in the U.K., and to a lesser degree elsewhere in Europe, is: It’s us or them. People understand that if Google doesn’t pay, somebody else has to pay or services get cut.”
Google Chairman Eric Schmidt Defends Tax Dodge: 'It's Called Capitalism'
Google's chairman says he is "proud" of the way his company avoids paying taxes."It's called capitalism," Eric Schmidt told Bloomberg in a Wednesday article. "We are proudly capitalistic. I'm not confused about this.""We pay lots of taxes; we pay them in the legally prescribed ways," he said. "I am very proud of the structure that we set up. We did it based on the incentives that the governments offered us to operate."
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najbolji je naziv. double irish dutch sandwich. kapitalizam my ass ako stvarno placaju patent royalities fiktivnoj irskoj kompaniji. Double%20Irishi.jpg

Edited by paculla
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Mr. Mau Dau ;)

Raghuram RajanDid the Bankers Do It?NEW DELHI – Few areas of economic activity in the United States are more politicized than housing finance. Yet the intellectual left has gone to great lengths to absolve regulators, government lending mandates, and agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of any responsibility for the housing boom and the subsequent bust.The rationale is clear: if these officials, institutions, and policies were held accountable, the reform agenda would necessarily shift from regulating greedy bankers and their bonuses to asking broader questions. Might government mandates contribute to bad behavior by private players? Can regulators be trusted to make appropriate trade-offs between financial stability and mandates that have wide political support? Indeed, can central bankers be truly independent? Unquestioning acceptance of a greater government role in taming markets would, in short, give way to asking whether that role can sometimes be part of the problem.The left has had an easy task in dominating the debate, partly because the intellectual right’s attempt to place all the blame for the crisis on government is thoroughly implausible. It is far more defensible and correct to argue that everyone – bankers, households, regulators, and politicians – contributed to (and took credit for) the boom while it lasted, only to point fingers at one another when it collapsed.But bankers’ political tin ear in the aftermath of the crisis – first taking public bailouts and then paying themselves huge bonuses as if nothing had changed – ensured that they got the lion’s share of the blame, with everyone else willing to pose as their unwitting victims. As a result, the public-policy response has been dominated by “the bankers did it” narrative. The risk is that this approach is incomplete – and thus unlikely to be effective.It is therefore refreshing to see a careful econometric study take on an assertion by Paul Krugman, perhaps the most influential left-leaning US economist, that “the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was irrelevant to the subprime boom.” The CRA instructs federal financial supervisory agencies to encourage the institutions that they regulate to help the communities in which they are chartered to meet their credit needs, while also conforming to “safe and sound” standards. In practice, regulators measure the volume of lending to CRA target tracts – poor areas with median income less than 80% of the median income of the local community – as well as to low-income and minority borrowers in non-CRA tracts to verify compliance with the Act.The left has dismissed any claim that the CRA played a role in the housing boom by pointing out that it was enacted in 1977, while the subprime boom played out in the early 2000’s. But this ignores the possibility that regulators may have started to enforce the CRA rigorously only later.To enforce the statute, regulators periodically examine banks for CRA compliance. To hone in on the “regulatory enforcement” effect, the recent study compares the behavior of banks that are undergoing examination (which takes place over several quarters) to that of banks that are not undergoing examination in a particular tract in a particular month.The findings are clear. Compared to banks that are not undergoing examination, the volume of loans by banks in the six quarters surrounding a CRA examination is 5% higher, and these loans are 15% more likely to be delinquent one year after origination. In other words, banks undergoing examination lend more and make riskier loans – and these findings are even more pronounced in CRA-eligible tracts.Good econometric studies examine secondary effects to persuade readers that the main effect is what it is. Regulators’ primary tool to enforce compliance was their authority to reject non-CRA-compliant banks’ requests for new branches or mergers. During the subprime boom, large banks were more likely to want to expand, and thus had greater incentive to comply. The study finds that CRA lending by larger banks does indeed respond more to a CRA examination.At the height of the lending frenzy (2004-2006), the study finds that banks loaned even more in response to an examination, and that the outcomes were even worse. The authors speculate that easier loan securitization may have made risky CRA-compliant loans seem less costly. Finally, like all good studies, this one explains why the authors more careful analysis produces results that differ from those in previous studies.Because of the way it is structured, the study only suggests a lower bound on the effects of CRA compliance. It focuses on the differential impact of the CRA on banks undergoing examination and those not undergoing examination. In fact, all banks are likely to have upped their CRA-compliant lending. The study cannot measure this increase.There is room in economics for grand speculation – some part intuition, some part common sense, and some part ideology. If economists were to wait for careful studies before offering opinions about policy, we would never have anything timely to say. And it is certainly better to have some economic intuition guiding policy than none at all.But there is a danger that the public mistakes speculation for truth, only because of the speculator’s credentials and assertiveness. Studies like this one are useful in setting the record straight.More broadly, the study suggests that we should move beyond blaming the bankers. We must recognize that in the desire to broaden home ownership, essential checks and balances broke down. Households, politicians, and regulators were also complicit. As we go about the process of reform, we should bear in mind that the only thing worse than fighting the last war is fighting the wrong last war.
Edited by buffalo bill
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IMF admits Austerity Mistake05/01/2013 BY HENNING MEYER 32 COMMENTS

blanchard-120x166.jpgOlivier Blanchard

This is significant (and thanks to Gustav Horn for sharing this on Facebook)! On Social Europe Journal we have been analysing the failure of austerity from all kinds of angles for years. And towards the end of 2012, some of the traditionally austerity supporting institutions seemed to get doubts and reviewed their approach. And guess what, it looks like the Washington based IMF has issued a pretty clear ‘we were wrong’ note. The Washington Post called the document an ‘amazing mea culpa’:

Consider it a mea culpa submerged in a deep pool of calculus and regression analysis: The International Monetary Fund’s top economist [Olivier Blanchard] today acknowledged that the fund blew its forecasts for Greece and other European economies because it did not fully understand how government austerity efforts would undermine economic growth.

The technical paper’s own summary reads as follows:

This paper investigates the relation between growth forecast errors and planned fiscal consolidation during the crisis. We find that, in advanced economies, stronger planned fiscal consolidation has been associated with lower growth than expected, with the relation being particularly strong, both statistically and economically, early in the crisis. A natural interpretation is that fiscal multipliers were substantially higher than implicitly assumed by forecasters. The weaker relation in more recent years may reflect in part learning by forecasters and in part smaller multipliers than in the early years of the crisis.

We have recently published an article by Robert Skidelsky examining the merits of economic forecasting and there will be more on this subject next week. The IMF’s admission again shows that economic forecasts should not be treated as reliable predictions of the future. They are useful indicators but are always based on build-in assumptions and theories that might be helpful in some situations but much less so in others.The big question here is what this means politically. It is nice to talk about the merits of economic forecasting in academic terms but the policies that were (mis-)guided by these forecasts have done real harm. They have destroyed the lives of real people!The intellectual case for austerity has been disintegrating before our eyes but the politics needs to change too. And given that austerity is the backbone of so many governments’ politics, this will not be easy. It might get really messy this year!About Henning MeyerHenning Meyer is Editor of Social Europe Journal and a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Government Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has also written opinion editorials for newspapers such as The Guardian, Handelsblatt and DIE ZEIT and comments regularly on TV news channels.

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