Avijacija bez granica...

[bigvlada]

Za ljubitelje Tupoljeva, fotogalerija iz njihovog izložbenog prostora. 

 

http://saidpvo.livejournal.com/559565.html

[hazard]

Da li je F-35 najveci boondoggle u istoriji zapadne (americke) vojne industrije? Discuss. :D 

[hazard]

https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/222380-the-pentagons-official-f-35-bug-list-is-terrifying

 

 

The Pentagon’s official F-35 bug list is terrifying

 

The first contracts to design what became the F-35 were handed out 20 years ago. Lockheed’s X-35 won the contract in October, 2001. Fifteen years later, the aircraft is in terrible condition — a fact driven home by the DoD’s own official report on the state of the F-35 and the bugs that continue to plague it.

 

The first contracts to design what became the F-35 were handed out 20 years ago. Lockheed’s X-35 won the contract in October, 2001. Fifteen years later, the aircraft is in terrible condition — a fact driven home by the DoD’s own official report on the state of the F-35 and the bugs that continue to plague it.

 

There’s a line of thinking that argues criticizing the F-35 has become “fashionable,” and is based on a desire to drive Web traffic rather than an objective evaluation of the aircraft’s shortcomings. The government’s own report on the F-35B’s readiness refutes such arguments.

 

The state of the F-35

 

Before we dive into the report’s findings, we need to cover some of its terminology. The Air Force uses block numbers to denote differences in an aircraft’s capability. Sometimes these block numbers are specific to an entire aircraft (e.g., the F16A/B Block 20). In the F-35’s case, there are also block numbers for many of its subsystems.

 

The US Marine Corps declared the F-35B Block 2B had reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in July, 2015. As the DoD notes, however:

 

If used in combat, the Block 2B F-35 will need support from command and control elements to avoid threats, assist in target acquisition, and control weapons employment for the limited weapons carriage available (i.e., two bombs, two air-to-air missiles). Block 2B deficiencies in fusion, electronic warfare, and weapons employment result in ambiguous threat displays, limited ability to respond to threats, and a requirement for off-board sources to provide accurate coordinates for precision attack. Since Block 2B F-35 aircraft are limited to two air-to-air missiles, they will require other support if operations are contested by enemy fighter aircraft.

 

(prevod: avion koji je zamisljen da zameni vise tipova aviona je, kako stvari trenutno stoje, potpuno beskoristan samostalno, i ne moze bez podrske iz "centrale" da pogodi cilj na zemlji kako treba)

 

Block 2B’s limitations aren’t going to be solved at any point in the near future. One major problem with the F-35 is that solutions to existing software problems are being punted down the road into future blocks in order to meet development timetables. Block 3i development testing began for a third time in March 2015, after two previous starts in May and September 2014. Again, from the report:

 

Block 3i began with re-hosting immature Block 2B software and capabilities into avionics components with new processors. Though the program originally intended that Block 3i would not introduce new

capabilities and not inherit technical problems from earlier blocks, this is what occurred. The Air Force insisted on fixes for five of the most severe deficiencies inherited from Block 2B as a prerequisite to use the final Block 3i capability in the Air Force IOC aircraft… However, Block 3i struggled during developmental testing (DT), due to the inherited deficiencies and new avionics stability problems.

 

Block 3F also began development in March 2015, 11 months behind schedule. It’s far behind where it’s supposed to be; the DoD states that Block 3F developers spent most of 2015 squashing bugs in Block 3i.

 

Originally, the F-35 was expected to enter Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) by August 2017. The DoD declares this “unrealistic.” Block 3F development and flight-testing isn’t expected to be completed until January, 2018.

 

For want of a nail

 

The F-35’s buggy flight software is scarcely the only problem. The F-35 loads specific profiles for every mission it flies. These profiles are designed to “to drive sensor search parameters and to identify and correlate sensor detections, such as threat and friendly radar signals.”

 

Currently, the US Reprogramming Lab is plagued by “significant deficiencies that preclude efficient development and adequate testing of effective mission data loads for Block 3F.” Despite being given a $45 million budget in fiscal year 2013, the USRL has not engaged in the necessary upgrades. The estimated time to finish the upgrades is two years. Without them, the DoD estimates the F-35 faces “significant limitations” to its combat capability against existing threats.

 

Weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) tests have been pushed back to the point that they can no longer be completed by the original mid-2017 Initial Operational Capability target date. Of the 15 tests scheduled for the Block 2B F-35, three were pushed back into Block 3i / 3F testing. Here’s another fun quote:

 

Eleven of the 12 events required intervention by the developmental test control team to overcome system deficiencies and ensure a successful event (i.e., acquire and identify the target and engage it with a weapon). The program altered the event scenario for three of these events, as well as the twelfth event, specifically to work around F-35 system deficiencies (e.g., changing target spacing or restricting target maneuvers and countermeasures).

 

(prevod: bez aktivne tehnicke podrske od proizvodjaca, avion nije uspeo da ispali projektil na metu ni u probnim scenarijima, i na kraju morali same scenarije da promene kako bi avion uspeo da ih "polozi" - drugim recima, avion je maltene beskoristan)

 

The laundry list of problems continues. There’s no Verification Simulation in place for the F-35, despite eight years of work and $250 million in funding. The average availability of the F-35 for operations was 51% in 2015, well below the 60% availability goal. (This metric has, at least, improved in recent years.) The F-35 spent 21% more time down for maintenance and waited 51% longer for parts than anticipated. Between 10-20% of the fleet was grounded at any given time, due to the need to rework the aircraft to install upgrades or for repairs.

 

The F-35’s logistics and maintenance needs are supposed to be governed by a next-generation system, codenamed ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System). The report notes that “many critical deficiencies remain which require maintenance personnel to implement workarounds to address the unresolved problems.”

 

Ejecting might kill you

 

Ejection tests on the F-35 are troubling, to say the least. The third-generation helmet display system for the F-35 is heavier than its predecessors, which may be causing issues for the aircraft. Pilots weighing less than 136 lbs are prohibited from flying the F-35, because the ejection seat tests show stresses that’ll snap the neck of regular human beings.

 

Pilots between 136 and 165 lbs are cleared to fly the F-35, despite a formal “serious” risk rating. Again, here’s the DoD: “The level of risk was labeled ‘serious’ by the Program Office based on the probability of death being 23 percent, and the probability of neck extension (which will result in some level of injury) being 100 percent. Currently, the Program Office and the Services have decided to accept this level of risk to pilots in this weight range, although the basis for the decision to accept these risks is unknown.”

 

DefenseOne has a list of additional errors and flaws with the aircraft worth perusing. ALIS doesn’t track new versus used parts correctly. Its integrated system for measuring whether or not the aircraft exceeded design limits during flight doesn’t work. It can’t load mission profiles without direct support from Lockheed-Martin.

 

The failure of concurrency

 

The F-35’s problems are at least partially the result of allowing Lockheed Martin to pursue concurrent flight design and active deployment. The idea behind concurrency was that Lockheed Martin could begin building an aircraft while still fine-tuning various aspects of its design. In theory, applied to much simpler vehicles, it might have worked, especially if the F-35 had been a modest evolution of an existing aircraft.

 

Applied to the F-35, concurrency has been a disaster. Right now, every single F-35 already built will need to be extensively overhauled to meet its minimum performance targets. It’s one thing to overhaul a ship or aircraft to improve its baseline capabilities, and something else entirely when the aircraft as delivered can’t execute its mission.

 

The report argues strongly against the use of a so-called “block buy” strategy in which up to 270 aircraft would be purchased in bulk to achieve theoretical savings. If F-35 production continues at its current rate, more than 500 aircraft will have been built by the time the design is finalized — and all of them will need to be refitted to one degree or another to “provide full Block 3F combat capability.”

 

The F-35 isn’t just the most expensive fighter plane ever built, with total program cost estimates over the lifetime of the aircraft now between $320 – $400 billion, depending on how you count. It’s also expected to spend the longest in development.

 

Just for fun, I pulled data on a number of other high-profile US aircraft over the last forty years. The F-16 and F/A-18 took six and eight years to go from first flight to combat-certified. The B-2 Spirit stealth bomber first flew in 1989 and was fully certified only in 2003, some 14 years later. The F/A-18E (Super Hornet) had a quick bring-up time of just five years, while the F-22 Raptor took a decade between first flight and full certification. Clearly the trend has been towards longer development times; the F/A-18E is an outlier in that regard.

 

With that said, the F-35 is in a class of its own. First flight took place in 2006. According to the DoD, full WDA testing on the Block 3F software won’t be complete until 2021. By that point, the Block 4 software should be in the field. It’s not clear from this report which milestones must be passed to certify the aircraft as fully operational. But if the WDA tests are part of that process, it’ll be another five years before the F-35 is “done” — a full 50% longer than any aircraft has taken before.

 

Anybody else thinking unmanned drones are looking really useful — and inexpensive — right about now?

[wall]

Kupiće™ Katar, Bahrein, S. Arabija po 50 kom pa će se barem troškovi smanjiti.

Edited December 13, 2016 by wall

[hazard]

Vec je kupilo ili planira da kupi nekoliko zemalja (Italija, Danska, UK, Turska, Izrael, J. Koreja, Holandija, Norveska, Australija), pa dzabe...neki su i odustali: Kanada je investirala u program (JSF) od samog pocetka, ali je na kraju odustala (kupice Super Hornet). Mislim ako ne odustanu i ovi drugi skroz, ovo ce biti najepskije uvaljivanje vruceg krompira jos otkad su Ameri svojim saveznicima uvalili F-104 Starfighter, zvani "leteci sanduk" (flying coffin). To je, gle cuda, takodje bio Lokidov proizvod. :D

[wall]

Te sam već računao. :D

Meni gadan avion, nadam se da će propasti. -_-

[Shan Jan]

Koji su racku i usli u ovaj projekat pored zivot raptora to samo oni znaju... ima se moze se. 

[Radoye]

 Kanada je investirala u program (JSF) od samog pocetka, ali je na kraju odustala (kupice Super Hornet).

 

Nisam ispratio, ali koliko sam razumeo Super Horneti su uzeti samo kao privremeno resenje dok se ne doceka F-35, jerbo su sadasnji CF-18 na izdisaju a F-35 je po originalnom planu vec trebao biti isporucen i uveden u naoruzanje ali iz poznatih razloga jos nije...

[hazard]

Ja sam shvatio da su Liberali u kampanji pricali da F-35 nece kupiti, tacka.

 

Sada kazu da Super Horneti jesu "privremeno" resenje, a da ce kasnije biti tender za "trajnu" zamenu CF-18, na kojim je moguce da ce F-35 biti jedan od kandidata, ali da nigde nije uklesano u kamen da ce F-35 biti kupljen.

 

Vojska izgleda i dalje hoce F-35 i tvrdi da on moze da se saceka jer kao CF-18ice mogu da lete do 2025., mada je vlada nedavno pokazala da je spremna da ide protiv vojnih zelja: za novi SAR avion je izabran Airbus C-295W, posle tendera koji je trajao 12 godina, jer je ponisten vise puta zbog toga sto je vojska optuzena da ja namerno "nastimovala" originalne uslove da samo C-27J moze da prodje, a nije bila neka tajna da su oni hteli bas C-27J. Tako da videcemo, mozda i F-35 ode trajno "u kantu".

[hazard]

Nisam ispratio, ali koliko sam razumeo Super Horneti su uzeti samo kao privremeno resenje dok se ne doceka F-35, jerbo su sadasnji CF-18 na izdisaju a F-35 je po originalnom planu vec trebao biti isporucen i uveden u naoruzanje ali iz poznatih razloga jos nije...

 

btw, naleteh na ovaj blog: http://bestfighter4canada.blogspot.ca/

 

ne znam ko stoji iza njega ali ima dosta informacija

 

iznenadilo me je npr. sledece, koliko se sporo proizvode neki modeli borbenih aviona:

 

 

Unlike the F-35 and the Gripen E, the Super Hornet is ready now.  Boeing can easily produce the requested eighteen aircraft within three years or less.  At its current production rate of two aircraft per month, Boeing's St. Louis assembly plant can fulfill both Canada's (18) and Kuwait's (40) orders in under 30 months.  

 

Australia's acquisition of 24 Super Hornets took less than five years from initial decision to final delivery.  Canada could very well have its entire stock of Super Hornets by 2020.  Possibly sooner.  

 

The Eurofighter Typhoon, with its current production rate of 35/year, could match this delivery schedule.  Dassault, producing a mere eleven Rafales a year, would likely have difficulty given its current commitments.  While production rates could be increased, this would be unlikely on such a small order.  

 

Znaci da se napravi jedan Rafal, potrebno je vise od mesec dana. Brate. Inace nije navedeno nista za Gripen (koji se pojavljuje dosta na blogu). Ti borbeni avioni su kao serijska proizvodnja, a ispada da ih rucno srafe jedan po jedan.

[hazard]

sa gornjeg bloga:

 

 

With over 185 F-35 Lightning II's built, none are yet ready to go to war.  The USMC and USAF may have declared "IOC" but this is little more than window dressing to keep the program alive now that politicians are demanding results.  The timing of the USAF declaring IOC during an election year is more than a little suspect.  

 

Make no mistake, the JSF program is still woefully behind on its promise to deliver a combat-capable aircraft.  A recent "successful" weapon test involving the AIM-120 AMRAAM launched from an F-35 omitted the fact that ground controllers told the pilot when to fire because the F-35's radar failed to display any targeting data.  

 

More worrisome still is the F-35's tendency to self-immolate.  Out of 185 F-35's built, THREE have now caught on fire.  The first was caused by "engine rubbing" and was hopefully fixed.  The second was likely caused by a stiff breeze (maybe not).  The third is still under investigation.  Statistically speaking, if the RCAF already had its full complement of F-35s, one of them would have been lost to a fire already.  

 

185 aviona skupih ko sv. petra kajgana "u upotrebi", ali nijedan ne moze da...ispali raketu potpuno beskorisni za ratovanje bilo kakvog tipa. Ovo kao da je americko vojno-industrijski kompleks izgubio kompas nakon toliko godina manjka konkurencije i pritiska.

[hazard]

Inace ima svasta na tom blogu, evo npr. o novom kineskom lovcu J-20:

 

 

Not one, but two J-20 "Mighty Dragons" made its public debut the other day, after years of being a poorly kept secret.  While its performance and equipment specifications are still relatively unknown, China has made it very clear that it is now making 5th generation stealth fighters. 

 

 

 

From a design standpoint, the J-20 is clearly aimed at the F-22 and the Russian PAK FA.  Unlike the F-35, this is a big twin-engined fighter.  Also similar to the F-22 and PAK FA, the J-20 utilizes four (not two) internal weapon bays.  Its forward weapon bays, likely dedicated to IR-guided A2A missiles, utilized a innovative design that allows for the missile to be deployed on a rail with the door closed.  As seen in this video:

 

http://youtu.be/5sAdN_Jzrn8

 

While the F-22 and PAK FA are larger than the F-35, the J-20 is even larger still.  Measuring in slightly larger than the F-14 Tomcat, the J-20 appears to be designed with a similar role of long range interceptor in mind.  The idea of a "stealthy Tomcat" in the hands of a potential enemy is sure to have military planners worried. 

 

More worrisome is the release of images with the J-20 landing on an aircraft carrier (although these are likely photoshopped). 

 

 

The J-20's similarities to the F-22 go beyond the surface.  Beijing has gone on record stating that it will not be available for export sales.  Those nations who wish to purchase a Chinese stealth fighter will instead be directed towards the J-31, an aircraft with an uncomfortable resemblance to the F-35 Lightning II.

 

Despite all the fuss, higher-ups in the Pentagon do not seem to be concerned about the J-20. While it may be equipped with "fifth generation" features like a phased-array radar, electro-optical sensors, and a stealth body; it lacks the "sensor fusion" of the F-35.

 

This is likely hogwash.

 

While it sounds impressive in theory, sensor fusion is more difficult than it sounds and getting it right has been one of the F-35's bigger stumbling blocks.  In keeping things simpler, the Chinese have likely avoided some of the JSF's thornier issues. 

 

There is also a likely possibility that the J-20 was never meant to completely outdo the F-22 and F-35.  China already has a substantial presence in the South Pacific theatre.  In a now-infamous simulated air war, China emerged victorious.  This was not through any technological advantage, but sheer numbers and logistics.  The Chinese strategy was simple:  Knock out Taiwanese airbases first, followed by American AWACs and aerial tankers.  With these assets gone, even the "superior" American fighters are limited in what they can do thanks to concerns about range.  (It should be noted that this test was done with Su-35s).

 

Combine this with the development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or "carrier killer" and Chinese strategy becomes clear.  Simple area denial.  Chinese forces would not have to engage American fighters directly, simply knock out their support structure (AEW&C, aerial tankers, etc.)  A stealthy J-20 could even evade detection long enough to guide an ASBM to its target. 

 

 

Even if the J-20 is not a modern-day Firefox, it is still a sign that Chinese aviation technology is no longer a subject to be laughed at.  Chinese fighter design has come a LONG WAY since reverse engineering and redesigning a MiG-21.  Building a stealthy long-range interceptor is an accomplishment in and of itself, whether or not it compares favorably to the F-22. 

 

If Chinese aeronautical design has gone this far in twenty years, what will the next twenty look like?

[vathra]

The Chinese strategy was simple:  Knock out Taiwanese airbases first, followed by American AWACs and aerial tankers.  With these assets gone, even the "superior" American fighters are limited in what they can do thanks to concerns about range.

 

 

Ово је ахилова пета америчкој војној премоћи у ваздуху.

Иако су им ловачки авиони врхунски, велику потпору им дају Авакси и летећи танкери, који су у ствари обични путнички авиони, врло видљиви из далека и врло рањиви. Са ракетама дугог домета (нпр са МиГ-31), Авакси и танкер би морали да се помере знатно даље, а то им драматично смањује употребну вредност.

[bigvlada]

Ceo program bi po trenutnim procenama trebao da košta malo preko 1,5 biliona dolara. Projekat habitata (koji bi podrazumevao da NASA ima duplo veći budžet nego u najboljim danima Apolo ere u periodu od 20 godina) je koštao 180 milijardi dolara po kursu iz 1975. godine (za poređenje, Apolo je koštao 35 milijardi) ili $820,317,919,075.14 po današnjem kursu. 

[hazard]

Ово је ахилова пета америчкој војној премоћи у ваздуху.

Иако су им ловачки авиони врхунски, велику потпору им дају Авакси и летећи танкери, који су у ствари обични путнички авиони, врло видљиви из далека и врло рањиви. Са ракетама дугог домета (нпр са МиГ-31), Авакси и танкер би морали да се помере знатно даље, а то им драматично смањује употребну вредност.

 

Vidim da mnogi americki vojni analiticari kukaju o rastucem kineskom kapacitetu za "area denial". Kao, ne mogu da projektuju svoju moc preko pola planete kao Ameri, tome nisu ni blizu, ali kao da ih za to zabole, njihov cilj je da ako treba isteraju svakoga iz svog dvorista i ne daju mu da pridje. I ta "carrier killer" raketa ih bas "boli". Sada da li je to realno, ili se samo kuka kako bi drzava skrcala jos koji bilion na nove vojne projekte, nemam pojma.