Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[Prospero]

malo sam čačkao po jstoru pa naletim na ovo, gde bohemi pljuju po kuk-u:

THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM 1CHARLES PERGLERVice-President, Bohemian National Alliance of AmericaThe ruthless Hapsburg policy of extermination of the best element in Bohemian national life is best illustrated by the fact that when the Peace of Westphalia was concluded, Bohemia was little better than a desert with about eight hundred thousand impoverished inhabitants, while prior to the war she was a prosperous country with more than three million inhabitants. At one time, in the middle of the eighteenthcentury, it seemed that Czech national life had come to an end. The policy of Germanization seemed to be successful....Austria-Hungary not only always opposed the legitimate ambitions of her own nationalities, but probably because of this very home policy, her foreign policy was ever dictated by a desire to smother elsewhere tendencies aiming at the liberation of subject nationalities and their unity in national states. Whoever fought for the right of any nationality to develop freely became an enemy of the Austrian state.When, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, the Greeks rose against the Turks, they found one of their worst enemies in the Austrian government. Greek independence was recognized only as a result of the insistence of the Allies of today-Russia, France and England. It is an interesting fact that President Monroe, in his message formulating the doctrine which now bears his name, also advocated the recognition of Greek independence, so that when we speak of the Allies of today we can properly add the United States of America.When, in the thirties, the Belgians rose against the domination of the Dutch, it was again Austria assisted by Prussia which was ready to put down their movement with the sword; and the freedom of Belgium then, as now, was defended by the Allies of today-England and France. The whole history of the movement for the liberation and unity of Italy is a history of wars against Austria. Italy owes its liberation not only to the heroism of its own sons, but to the armed support of France and the diplomatic assistance of England. For a longtime Austria was the enemy of German unity, which was made possible only after the defeat of Austria by Prussia in I866.But the continuous opposition of Austria to the principle of nationality may perhaps best be seen in her attitude toward the Balkan nationalities, and especially the Serbs. The Hapsburgs, when the Turks were forced to give up their conquests, did not liberate the Rumanians and Serbs, but simply annexed to the empire a large part of the lands inhabited by them in the hope of extending their dominion as far as Saloniki and the IEgean Sea. The erection of new independent national states in the Balkans was not in accord with imperialistic aspirations, and Austria-Hungary developed into as dangerous an enemy of freedom for the Balkan nations as Turkey ever was. The main reason why Austria was unsuccessful in her policy of penetration in the Balkan peninsula is to be sought in the rivalry of Russia, which, related to the Balkan nations both by blood and religion, pursued a policy directly opposed to that of Austria. While Austria was the enemy of independence for the Balkan nations, Russia favored the erection of independent states in the peninsula, and as a matter of fact every Russian victory over the Turks was followed by the creation of such an independent state. It would, of course, be naive to claim that Russia did not have in mind the extension of her own influence, but it cannot be gainsaid that Russian understandingof Russian interests was consistent with freedom for oppressed Slav nations, while Austria saw her interests only in opposition to their liberation. The crimes of Austria against the principle of nationality culminated in the infamous attack upon Serbia. This little country, strengthened by two victorious Balkan wars, formed a strong barrier against the Austro-German Drang nach Osten. The rise of the Serbian state of course created a desire on the part of Austrian Southern Slavs for national unity; Austria feared Serbia would become the Piedmont of the Balkans. For this reason Austria sought to destroy independent Serbia....The federal formula has become wholly inapplicable to Austria-Hungary. The rise of the spirit of nationality is equivalent to a death-warrant for Austria. The longer the execution is delayed, the longer we shall have a condition which the President described as the ferment of whole populations fighting subtly and constantly against a rule not founded upon the affections or convictions of mankind.It is gratifying that official circles in this country seem to have recognized the necessity of dismembering Austria-Hungary if German imperialistic aims are to be thwarted, if Middle Europe, with its consequent enslavement of whole populations, is not to remain a fact, if permanent peace is to prevail. A dispatch from Washington, dated May 26, indicates that an agreement was reached with the British and French war missions insuring harmonious action of the United States with the Allies for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, this including the constitution of an independent Bohemia and the restoration of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, with Transylvaniato be given to Rumania, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, and the Trentino and Trieste to Italy. This is a program which means freedom for the suppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and which will completely satisfy the American principle denying the right of existence to governments lacking the consent of the governed; for Czechs and Slovaks, by a solemn manifesto issued in Paris in November1915, call for the erection of an independent Bohemian state; the Italians are hoping for the day when Italia Irredenta will be redeemed; the Rumanians expect the war to bring freedom to their brethren still suffering under Magyar oppression, and the South Slavs of Austria pray for a united Jugoslavia. This is not a policy of annexations, but simply a policy of justice. In this program the administration deserves the support of all people who think clearly and are not in the grip of obsolete formulas. It is an American program.1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of theUnited States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science,at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917.

inače, meni je super zamena teza po kojoj se priča o tragediji istočne i centralne evrope u xx veku (u "bloodlands"-u, npr, pa i u ovom tekstu u slejtu) i kao rešenje i nova nada potura neko novo uvezivanje pod germanskim vođstvom a zaboravlja da su ogroman procenat, gotovo 100% te tragedije doneli germani, bilo iz berlina bilo iz beča. valjda logika nalaže "što manje germanstva" ako se želi mir i prosperitet "krvave zemlje".

[MancMellow]

malo sam čačkao po jstoru pa naletim na ovo, gde bohemi pljuju po kuk-u:inače, meni je super zamena teza po kojoj se priča o tragediji istočne i centralne evrope u xx veku (u "bloodlands"-u, npr, pa i u ovom tekstu u slejtu) i kao rešenje i nova nada potura neko novo uvezivanje pod germanskim vođstvom a zaboravlja da su ogroman procenat, gotovo 100% te tragedije doneli germani, bilo iz berlina bilo iz beča. valjda logika nalaže "što manje germanstva" ako se želi mir i prosperitet "krvave zemlje".

Pa da, samo to je jako prosto. Za prvi sv. rat krivi su svi, a najviše Rusija i Srbija, a za drugi krivi su Versaj, strah od komunizma, tradicionalna svađa među antisemitima, and what not. I sve bi zapravo bilo puno lakše da nije bilo tih nekih naroda što nešto hoće, budala Wilsona i Lloyd-George-a i svetske ekonomske krize za koju su svi krivi, etc. I to uopšte nije zajebancija, naslušaćemo se tek toga u narednih 5 godina. Naravno, ni mi nećemo sedeti skrštenih ruku. Prilećićemo.

[Prospero]

manče, ja bar okačim na topic ono što je za čitanje :Pevo još nešto, čini mi se izbalansirano a ja bih ga mogao +1-irati:

After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank CheckFRANK C. ZAGARE...We begin with what we know, starting in 1879. As Bismarck saw thingsat the time, Germany’s strategic situation looked dire. Although Germanyand Austria-Hungary were in loose alignment, this relationship was lessthan solid. Making matters worse, in the middle of the year Austria’s pro-German Foreign Minister, Count Julius Andrássy, announced that heplanned to resign. Bismarck’s very real fear was that Andrássy’s replacement inthe Foreign Office would be open to an overture from Russia. Bismarck alsowas worried that Russia might attempt to achieve a realignment by aggressivelychallenging Austrian interests in the Balkans. If so, there were no good outcomesfor Germany. One possibility was that Germany would be drawn into anunwanted war with Russia. The other was an Austrian and Russia rapprochementthat would clearly pose a strategic threat to Germany.Given the facts on the ground in 1879, that is, a highly motivated Challengerand a likely disloyal Protégé, Bismarck’s decision to enter into a formalalliance with Austria was entirely consistent with both the prescriptions andthe empirical expectations of the Tripartite Crisis Game model. What is importantto note is that under all other strategic environments considered by themodel, a move toward closer alignment with Austria would have been, at leastin theory, counterproductive (Zagare and Kilgour, 2003). Thus, the TripartiteCrisis Game model correctly anticipated Bismarck’s decision to enter intowhat was considered to be an unlikely strategic arrangement with Austria(Massie, 1991, p. 79).Behavioral patterns changed in 1908–1909, but so did the underlyingconditions. During the Bosnian crisis, the Russian threat to Austria was realized,moving actual play away from the status quo into the Protégé-Defender subgame.But in a template that was to be repeated in June 1914, the challengewas anything but premeditated. The botched implementation of a deal betweenthe Austrian and Russian foreign ministers led to the formal annexation ofBosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrian government in October 1908. TheRussian Foreign Minister, Alexander Izvolsky, had secretly agreed to supportthe annexation in return for Austrian support of Russia’s right of freepassage through the Bosporus Straits and the Dardanelles. But the Russiangovernment repudiated both the deal, when it became public, and Izvolsky.An unintended crisis emerged, therefore, when subsequently Russia refusedto recognize the Austrian fait accompli. It was at this point that the dynamics ofthe Protégé-Defender subgame took over. As in 1879 and again in 1914,“there was some fear in Germany that Austria might defect to France andRussia if not supported” (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 540). Thus it is notsurprising at all that Germany backed Austria to the hilt. Forcing the issue inMarch 1909, Germany issued what amounted to an ultimatum. Unlike 1914,however, war was averted. Without firm support from France, Russia hadlittle choice but to back down.Still other behavioral patterns emerged in the years immediately precedingthe Great War. For example, when Serbian troops occupied theAlbanian port of Durazzo during the First Balkan War, some members ofthe Austrian leadership group pressed for a military response. For this, theygot little encouragement in Berlin. The reason, according to Wilhelm, wasthat there was “absolutely no risk for Austria’s existence or even prestige ina Serbian port on the Adriatic Sea” (Cowles, 1963, pp. 301–302). In October1913, however, the German leadership group strongly backed an Austrianultimatum to Serbia demanding that its troops vacate disputed territory inAlbania. And the Serbs complied. At the time, according to Williamson(1991, p. 153), Wilhelm “was at his bellicose worst.” Nonetheless, a fewmonths later, in mid-June 1914 to be precise, the Kaiser once again refusedan Austrian request for unconditional support for an aggressive Balkan policy(Fromkin, 2004, pp. 98–99). Thus, throughout the prewar period, Germansupport of Austria blew hot and cold, depending on how German policymakersaccessed the threat to Austrian integrity and, not incidentally, thelikely involvement of Russia.It is in the context of these other plays of the Tripartite Crisis Game thatwe can consider the causal significance of the double murders in Sarajevo.First, can the assassination be considered a necessary condition for the outbreakof World War I? The answer depends on whether the assassination isthought of as a “perfect storm” or as the “last straw.” Lebow (2000–2001)sees it as the former, Thompson (2003) and Schroeder (2007) as the latter.For Lebow, the assassination represented a clear challenge to the survival ofthe Austrian Empire, inflamed opinion in both Berlin and Vienna, and eliminatedthe most potent advocate of peace within the Hapsburg oligarchy. Inthis regard, Lebow is undoubtedly correct. But the question remains: hadthe assassination not occurred, could these same or equivalent conditionshave come to pass at some later time?To deny that they could have, as does Lebow, one must overlook thereality that similar conditions in fact existed in the past, that the actual playof the Tripartite Crisis Game had indeed taken place within the theoreticalconfines of the Protégé-Defender subgame, and with a similar outcome. IfGerman support of Austria was necessary for a great power war in 1914,there is no good reason to believe that it could not have materialized again,as it had on several prior occasions. And if an Austrian determination toconfront Serbia and/or Russia was a necessary condition for a Europeanconflict, there is also no reason to believe that it would not have surfacedonce more, as it had previously. Thus, it is difficult to agree with Lebow thatthere was no other provocation that could have brought the war about. Theassassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28 was simply not a necessarycondition for a World War at the beginning of the 20th century.But was it sufficient? Here it is difficult to agree with Thompson (2003)and others who see World War I as inevitable, or at least highly likely. ForThompson, the necessary structural conditions for war clearly existed in 1914.Great power rivalry density was at a maximum, alliance polarity was veryhigh, and a power transition was in the works. In his view, then, Europe in1914 was a powder keg, Sarajevo was but one of many potential sparks, anall but sufficient but entirely unnecessary condition for major power war.As anyone who has struggled to light a fire can attest, however, not allsparks land. Many fail to ignite, even in an actual tinderbox. An equilibriumanalysis of the Protégé-Defender subgame suggests that in 1914 there wereseveral rational strategic possibilities, not all of which were associated withunconditional German support of Austria. Many of these other possibilitiesare reflected in the historical record briefly surveyed above. To argue thatthe existence of necessary structural conditions made war highly likely, ifnot inevitable, after Sarajevo is to ignore these theoretical and actualizedpossibilities. Maybe it was an amazing stroke of luck that a European wardid not occur in, say 1913, when Austria, with strong German support, wasprepared to evict Serbia from Albania. But the requisite structural conditionswere no different immediately after the Second Balkan War than in July1914 (Thompson, 2003, p. 469). Why didn’t the powder keg ignite then? Tosay that luck prevailed is to offer no explanation at all.All of which is to say that the spark was not necessary (other sparks couldhave come along, as they had in the past) and the powder keg was not sufficientto bring about the Great War (the presence of a spark did not alwayscause this particular powder keg to combust). It is a mistake, therefore, toimbue the assassination of Franz Ferdinand with either too much or too littlecausal importance. Perhaps it is best to think of the Archduke’s murder as butone of several important steps on the road to war. For “the great seminal catastrophe”to have occurred, other steps had to be taken as well. To be sure, ithelped—if that is the right word—that the blank check was issued, and cashed.Still, the local war in the Balkans also had to escalate to the level of a continentalconflict, and then expand to the level of a worldwide conflagration. Anyexplanation of the Great War that excludes both the escalatory endgame thatwas brought about by the Russian partial mobilization decision and theconcomitant failure of the British to deter a German invasion of Belgium, therefore,is anything but complete. True, the first steps toward a world war in 1914were taken in Sarajevo, but they could just as well have been taken elsewhere.Nor did the journey have to end the way that it did. Lebow (2000–2001, p. 592)is both half right and half wrong. But so is Thompson (2003). While the warwas most certainly highly contingent, it was also not overdetermined. Therewere so many points at which things could have easily gone the other way(Zagare and Kilgour, 2006; Zagare, 2009). Sadly, they did not.

[MancMellow]

Dobar je tekst. Mislim čak prevashodno zato što u potrazi za uzrocima ide malo dublje u XIX vek.

Edited July 1, 2013 by MancMellow

[Prospero]

Pa da, samo to je jako prosto. Za prvi sv. rat krivi su svi, a najviše Rusija i Srbija, a za drugi krivi su Versaj, strah od komunizma, tradicionalna svađa među antisemitima, and what not. I sve bi zapravo bilo puno lakše da nije bilo tih nekih naroda što nešto hoće, budala Wilsona i Lloyd-George-a i svetske ekonomske krize za koju su svi krivi, etc. I to uopšte nije zajebancija, naslušaćemo se tek toga u narednih 5 godina. Naravno, ni mi nećemo sedeti skrštenih ruku. Prilećićemo.

na jednom partikularnom primeru je to lelujanje shvatanja uzroka rata lepo opisao mark trahtenberg (fokusirao se na shvatanje da je bio u pitanju udes, nesporazum):

The idea that the First World War came about because statesmen wereoverwhelmed by military imperatives and thus "lost control" of the situationcame to be accepted for essentially political reasons, and not because it wasthe product of careful and disinterested historical analysis. It was hardly anaccident that the first to propagate this idea were the statesmen whosepolicies in 1914 had led directly to the conflict-that is, the very people whohad the greatest interest in avoiding responsibility for the catastrophe. Onthe very eve of the disaster - on July 31, 1914 - Bethmann was already arguingalong these lines.After the war, it became apparent in Western Europe generally, and inAmerica as well, that the Germans would never accept a peace settlementbased on the notion that they had been responsible for the conflict. If a truepeace of reconciliation were to take shape, it required a new theory of theorigins of the war, and the easiest thing was to assume that no one hadreally been responsible for it. The conflict could be readily blamed on greatimpersonal forces-on the alliance system, on the arms race and on themilitary system that had evolved before 1914. On their uncomplaining shouldersthe burden of guilt could be safely placed.In the 1930s the idea that the military system was to blame for World WarI became even more attractive. With the resurgence of German power in thelatter part of the decade, the great war itself came to be widely regarded inthe West as a terrible mistake which could only be explained if it was assumedthat the political leaders had stumbled into it blindly, pulled along by theirmilitary advisers, or trapped by military arrangements whose implicationsthey had never really understood.By the 1950s and 1960s, these ideas had taken on a life of their own. Duringthis period, American stategists developed a way of thinking about issues ofwar and peace that placed an extraordinary emphasis on military factors,especially on preemption and the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack." In suchan environment, the notion that the First World War had come about becauseof the working of the military system of the day had an obvious appeal. Thisinterpretation seemed to provide an important degree of empirical supportfor conclusions reached through an essentially abstract process of analysis.Thomas Schelling's work is perhaps the best example.In the 1970s and 1980s, the environment again shifted, but the theory,which by now had been around long enough to become part of the conventionalwisdom, was once more able to find a new niche. In the aftermath ofthe Vietnam War, and even more with the fading of the Cold War in the1980s, the "Munich analogy" was discredited as a basic paradigm for foreignpolicy. The "Sarajevo analogy" was drawn into the vacuum. It might be hardto believe that general war could result from deliberate aggression. But forthis very reason, it was important-the argument now ran-to rememberwhat had happened in 1914. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example,pointed out in 1976 that the lesson of the July Crisis was that one could havea war "without any conscious decision to overturn the international structure."War could come about because "a crisis much like any other went outof control. Nation after nation slid into a war whose causes they did notunderstand but from which they could not extricate themselves.It was in fact commonly assumed that even in the nuclear age there wasa real danger that the world might slip into war in this way. Today, in aworld where all of the major powers obviously want very much to avoid anew world war, the only real fear is that the great nations might somehowstumble into one more or less inadvertently. The "inadvertent war" interpretationof the events of 1914 gives focus and substance to this fear and thusappeals particularly to those in the defense and arms control communitieswho have a professional interest in taking the risk of great-power war seriously.During this whole process, the inadvertent war interpretation was acceptedbecause it was what people wanted to believe. It is important, however, thatour basic thinking about issues of war and peace not be allowed to rest onwhat are in the final analysis simply myths about the past. The conventionalwisdom does not have to be accepted on faith alone: claims about the pastcan always be translated into historically testable propositions. In this case,when one actually tests these propositions against the empirical evidence,which for the July Crisis is both abundant and accessible, one is struck byhow weak most of the arguments turn out to be. The remarkable thing aboutthe claims that events moved "out of control" in 1914 is how little basis infact they actually have.

"angažovana istorija" u jednoj od svojih iteracija :)

[MancMellow]

Pa da, samo tu stvarno ima i onoga - ja moram nešto da napišem, a šta a da bude, da bar zvuči, nešto "novo". Samo poneko zaboravi, a i lakše je, obzirom koliko ih ima, da je način a od postojećih izvora dobiješ nešto novo tako što ćeš im (svima) postaviti nova pitanja, umesto da čisto neke zaobiđeš, ako ti ne odgovaraju. A videli smo da takvih primera ima i kod nas i to na samom, da tako kažem, vrhu. Može taj zaborav skupo da košta. Ne mora, ali može.

[Prospero]

Pa da, samo tu stvarno ima i onoga - ja moram nešto da napišem, a šta a da bude, da bar zvuči, nešto "novo". Samo poneko zaboravi, a i lakše je, obzirom koliko ih ima, da je način a od postojećih izvora dobiješ nešto novo tako što ćeš im (svima) postaviti nova pitanja, umesto da čisto neke zaobiđeš, ako ti ne odgovaraju. A videli smo da takvih primera ima i kod nas i to na samom, da tako kažem, vrhu. Može taj zaborav skupo da košta. Ne mora, ali može.

ihaj...

[Anduril]

---inače, meni je super zamena teza po kojoj se priča o tragediji istočne i centralne evrope u xx veku (u "bloodlands"-u, npr, pa i u ovom tekstu u slejtu) i kao rešenje i nova nada potura neko novo uvezivanje pod germanskim vođstvom a zaboravlja da su ogroman procenat, gotovo 100% te tragedije doneli germani, bilo iz berlina bilo iz beča. valjda logika nalaže "što manje germanstva" ako se želi mir i prosperitet "krvave zemlje".

Sada jos i Germani.Moj point je da ako Evropa zeli imati bolju buducnost, vidjenje istorije kroz nekakve imaginarne nacije ili cak homogena politicka vodjstva jeste pogresno a to je upravo taj stari pogled na istoriju koji se ovde brani.Mislim, sam taj termin "oslobodjenje" od Turaka ili AU i stvaranje nacionalnih drzava se oznacava kao nesto dobro a svi znamo koliko je zrtava zapravo odnelo i do cega je kasnije odvelo.Jeste AU bila autoritarna ali ni nacionalisticka Srbija, Jugoslavija ili SFRJ nisu bile ni priblizno demokratske ili liberalne da bi se moglo govoriti o nekakvim oslobodjenjima i o dobrom ishodu.Jednostavno, ni autoritarna imperija ni autoritarna nacionalna drzava nisu dobri ishodi za prosecnog pojedinca i demokratsko drustvo.

[Otto Katz]

Kinže, pročitaj topik.

Pa pročitao sam, možda ne najpažljivije. Textovi koje je okačio buffalo bill uglavnom potvrđuju školsko znanje što se tiče Austrije. Onaj popljuvani text je problematizirao percepciju Srbije i to mi se čini zanimljivim. Je li Srbija bila prijetnja za K&K i da li ta činjenica implicira i dio odgovornosti za rat.

malo sam čačkao po jstoru pa naletim na ovo, gde bohemi pljuju po kuk-u:

Po kuku je bar lako pljuvati. Meni je zanimljivije istraživati poražene i neostvarene tokove događaja. Ne znam recimo koliko je u historiografiji prisutna činjenica da je lojalistička struja među Česima bila daleko od zanemarljive.

I to uopšte nije zajebancija, naslušaćemo se tek toga u narednih 5 godina. Naravno, ni mi nećemo sedeti skrštenih ruku. Prilećićemo.

Može taj zaborav skupo da košta. Ne mora, ali može.

Ako dobro razumijem, ovdje impliciraš da je interpretacija događaja od prije 100 godina politički bitna danas? Ko su "mi" koje pominješ i kako bi "vas" izvjesne interpretacije istorije mogle skupo koštati? O čemu se radi?

[Anduril]

For a longtime Austria was the enemy of German unity, which was made possible only after the defeat of Austria by Prussia in I866

Da, a posle toga je carovalo drugarstvo...Kao da je ujedinjenje Nemacke na taj nacin bilo nuzno zapravo nesto dobro iako znamo da se od tog momenta postavlja pozornica za najvece klanice u istoriji.Kakav miki maus tekst o herojima, oslobodjenju nacija, itd.

[Prospero]

Sada jos i Germani.Moj point je da ako Evropa zeli imati bolju buducnost, vidjenje istorije kroz nekakve imaginarne nacije ili cak homogena politicka vodjstva jeste pogresno a to je upravo taj stari pogled na istoriju koji se ovde brani.Mislim, sam taj termin "oslobodjenje" od Turaka ili AU i stvaranje nacionalnih drzava se oznacava kao nesto dobro a svi znamo koliko je zrtava zapravo odnelo i do cega je kasnije odvelo.Jeste AU bila autoritarna ali ni nacionalisticka Srbija, Jugoslavija ili SFRJ nisu bile ni priblizno demokratske ili liberalne da bi se moglo govoriti o nekakvim oslobodjenjima i o dobrom ishodu.Jednostavno, ni autoritarna imperija ni autoritarna nacionalna drzava nisu dobri ishodi za prosecnog pojedinca i demokratsko drustvo.

moj point je da će učitavanjem sadašnjih sadržaja u istorijske čitanke iz xyz perioda evropa (ili bilo koji drugi autoritet) sama sebi seći granu na kojoj sedi. to se prosto zove "politički angažovana istorija" i ona je nužno lažna, ma kako bila "plemenita" politika kojoj služi.

Pa pročitao sam, možda ne najpažljivije. Textovi koje je okačio buffalo bill uglavnom potvrđuju školsko znanje što se tiče Austrije. Onaj popljuvani text je problematizirao percepciju Srbije i to mi se čini zanimljivim. Je li Srbija bila prijetnja za K&K i da li ta činjenica implicira i dio odgovornosti za rat.Po kuku je bar lako pljuvati. Meni je zanimljivije istraživati poražene i neostvarene tokove događaja. Ne znam recimo koliko je u historiografiji prisutna činjenica da je lojalistička struja među Česima bila daleko od zanemarljive.

ja ću ponoviti da je jedan radoš ljušić često govorio da je neprihvatanje ultimatuma u celosti bila ludost i da je cena koja je plaćena bila prosto sumanuta, plus imaš naročito mlađe istoričare koji su generalno kritični prema celom tom predratnom periodu i naročito kontekstu odnosa prema albaniji, makedoniji, bosni, itd. ne ulazim u pozadinu svega toga, mnogo je linija podele u struci, problem je u suštini što jedan mali deo svega toga dođe u žižu interesovanja javnosti.drugo, kada imaš dve tako nejednake zemlje po snazi kao što su srbija a-u teško je izbeći shvatanje u kome je onaj veći činilac inherentno odgovoran (ne nužno i kriv) za stanje odnosa u celini pošto su njegove moći da utiče na manjeg činioca nemerljivo veće. mishendlovanje tog odnosa je već klasika političke istorije, primera je bezbroj (sssr - finska, sssr - čssr, sssr - mađarska, sad - kuba i brojne latinoameričke zemlje itd).nemam pojma o češkoj istoriji da bih sa bilo kakvim autoritetom pisao o tome.problem sa alternativnom istorijom je što ona ne daje checks and balances podlogu koja bi doprinela razumevanju; o takvim, ne-dogođenim stvarima se praktično može samo tvrditi, i te tvrdnje ne mogu biti podložne bilo kakvoj proveri dok su mogućnosti tvrđenja praktično beskonačne.

Da, a posle toga je carovalo drugarstvo...Kao da je ujedinjenje Nemacke na taj nacin bilo nuzno zapravo nesto dobro iako znamo da se od tog momenta postavlja pozornica za najvece klanice u istoriji.Kakav miki maus tekst o herojima, oslobodjenju nacija, itd.

primeti da je to praktično propagandni tekst, češki nacionalisti se obraćaju američkoj političko-naučnoj eliti sa ciljem podrške onim što doživljavaju kao svoju nacionalnu emancipaciju.ironija je da ti upravo zastupaš tezu da tako treba tumačiti istoriju, samo sa posebnim vrednosnim kategorijama koje odgovaraju tvojim ideološkim stavovima i sadašnjim političkim potrebama ("ako evropa želi imati bolju budućnost...").oni su pričali o češkoj naciji, ti danas pričaš o liberalizmu, sutra će doći neki ekstrem da od naučnika naučenih da služe političkom trenutku dobije amin za svoje stavove.tale as old as time history.

[Anduril]

moj point je da će učitavanjem sadašnjih sadržaja u istorijske čitanke iz xyz perioda evropa (ili bilo koji drugi autoritet) sama sebi seći granu na kojoj sedi. to se prosto zove "politički angažovana istorija" i ona je nužno lažna, ma kako bila "plemenita" politika kojoj služi....

Cekaj, a ovaj dosadasnji mejnstrim mislis da nije politicki i da je zapravo naucan?

[MancMellow]

Pa pročitao sam, možda ne najpažljivije. Textovi koje je okačio buffalo bill uglavnom potvrđuju školsko znanje što se tiče Austrije. Onaj popljuvani text je problematizirao percepciju Srbije i to mi se čini zanimljivim. Je li Srbija bila prijetnja za K&K i da li ta činjenica implicira i dio odgovornosti za rat.

Misliš da li je bila percepirana kao pretnja? Da. Kakva je to pre svega pretnja bila - ideološka, idejna po uticaju koje te ideje mogu da izvrše na stanovništvo A-U. Da li je Srbija mogla da bude realna vojna pretnja za KuK? Nije, nije nikako.

Ako dobro razumijem, ovdje impliciraš da je interpretacija događaja od prije 100 godina politički bitna danas? Ko su "mi" koje pominješ i kako bi "vas" izvjesne interpretacije istorije mogle skupo koštati? O čemu se radi?

Ako bolje pogledaš, videćeš da sam tu pričao o srpskoj istoriografiji. Može skupo da košta, kao što su određena tumačenja događaja i određeni zaboravi mogla i jesu skupo koštala 1991/2. To "školsko znanje" nije palo s neba. Ono je rezultat decenijskog istraživanja po celoj evropi i svetu posle pretočenog u jednostavnije forme za širu publiku. Ništa nije od boga dato i sve se može dovesti u pitanje. Ali "mišljenje je slobodno, fakti su sveti". Priroda Julske krize je takva da su dani, pa i sati bitni i tu se ono, baš mora uroniti u dokumenta. Ovaj bloger je nebitan, ali Chris Clark zna o čemu priča i vraća težište pažnje na Balkan (što je "u modi" već neko vreme). Ono što mi se nije svidelo na prvi pogled je da je odgovor na ultimatum bio jedna vrsta dela krivice za rat. Srpska vlada je bila "found not guilty" za atentat. No to nije pomoglo.

[Otto Katz]

moj point je da će učitavanjem sadašnjih sadržaja u istorijske čitanke iz xyz perioda evropa (ili bilo koji drugi autoritet) sama sebi seći granu na kojoj sedi. to se prosto zove "politički angažovana istorija" i ona je nužno lažna, ma kako bila "plemenita" politika kojoj služi.problem sa alternativnom istorijom je što ona ne daje checks and balances podlogu koja bi doprinela razumevanju; o takvim, ne-dogođenim stvarima se praktično može samo tvrditi, i te tvrdnje ne mogu biti podložne bilo kakvoj proveri dok su mogućnosti tvrđenja praktično beskonačne.

Ono što me zanima je zapravo negdje između alternativne istorije i "učitavanja sadašnjih sadržaja". Zapravo dok ovo pišem i sebi razjašnjavam šta me kopka. Zanima me pitanje reinterpretacije, kontinuiranog lanca reinterpretacija, koji je zasnovan na obogaćivanju povijesnog iskustva i njime određenog smisla i značenja istorijskih događaja. Kako naslućujem pojam reinterpretacije čini mi se da ga je moguće odijeliti od revizionizma. Za razliku od revizionizma reinterpretacija ne dovodi u pitanje utvrđene činjenice fizičkih akata niti već analizirane subjektivne motive i samorazumijevanje aktera. Reinterpretacija se tiče prosuđivanja i vrednovanja. Pod vrednovanjem ne mislim na prvenstveno na moralne iskaze, nego prvenstveno kontextualno, uslovljeno vrednovanje - u smislu da, ako je motiv aktera ovakav, onda njegovo djelanje ocjenjujemo tako i tako. Naravno tiče se i moralnog vrednovanja - šta je cilj poželjni cilj istorijskog razvoja. Odgovori ovise o tome, odaberemo li nacionalnu emancipaciju. andurilovska libertarijansku slobodu pojedinca ili besklasno društvo, ili mir u stvoritelju.Primijenjeno na temu problematiziram vizuru u kojoj su akteri Austrija i Srbija, tj. Austrijanci i Srbi. Ako uzmemo da to jesu exkluzivni akteri, onda bih doveo u pitanje vrednovanje, po kojem je Srbija abolirana od odgovornosti za rat iz već pomenutih razloga:Srbija je objektivno bila prijetnja za Austriju iz pijemonteških razloga koje u ondašnjoj Srbiju lako nalazimo;Srbijanski faktori su bili upleteni u atentat;Srbija nije učinila ništa da spriječi nastanak povoda za rat;Srbija je profitirala iz sukoba. Ovo je zapravo upućeno onome "mi" MancMellowa. Lično mi je takvo razumijevanje istorije strano. Kao aktere vidim pojedince, društvene grupe povezane zajedničkim interesima i subjektivnom identifikacijom, socijalne klase, ok i narode, pa i druge abstraktne entitete poput religija, ali otprilike tim redom. Svakom od njih je istorijska lutrija donijela nešto drugo.

drugo, kada imaš dve tako nejednake zemlje po snazi kao što su srbija a-u teško je izbeći shvatanje u kome je onaj veći činilac inherentno odgovoran (ne nužno i kriv) za stanje odnosa u celini pošto su njegove moći da utiče na manjeg činioca nemerljivo veće. mishendlovanje tog odnosa je već klasika političke istorije, primera je bezbroj (sssr - finska, sssr - čssr, sssr - mađarska, sad - kuba i brojne latinoameričke zemlje itd).

Naravno. Još i više kad na jednoj strani imaš organiziranu državu, a na drugoj plemena, razne spontano okupljene grupe i slično.

[Prospero]

Cekaj, a ovaj dosadasnji mejnstrim mislis da nije politicki i da je zapravo naucan?

pa nemaš 1 mejnstrim koji je neprekinut od 1914. do danas, eno trahtenbergov tekst koji upravo pokazuje na jednom malom pitanju.čak ni u domaćoj istoriografiji nije tako, do 2sr je svakako dominirao etos herojstva, malog naroda koji se junački... itd, posle 2sr je tema gurnuta u stranu pošto smo imali tzv novi početak a na svetlo dana su stupile istorija socijaldemokratskih pokreta u srbiji i u južnoslovenskim društvima iz tog perioda, rat je posmatran delom kao imperijalistički, delom kroz prizmu agrarnih i širih socijalnih odnosa itd, 80ih dolazi nekakav srpski nacionalni revival, javno se otvaraju teme "da li je trebalo stvarati jugoslaviju" i sa srpske ali i sa hrvatske strane ("guske u magli"); posle ratova ovde se počelo detaljnije i kritički pisati o odnosu srpske elite prema nesrpskim elementima, itd.