Zašto se Jugoslavija/SFRJ zaista raspala

[Tribun_Populi]

Bold - ne, nego teritorija, a ne narodnost tj manjina. Drugo je pitanje zašto. Naravno da je prevashodno zbog etničke strukture. Ali svejedno - nije isto kao da su Albanci dobili autonomiju. To se potpuno poistovetilo znatno kasnije. Nije demografija bila ista 50-tih recimo kao što je bila 90-tih.

Opet je Albanaca bilo u apsolutnoj većini i opet je autonomija posledica dešavanja u WWII, post WWII i albanskih etnički motivisanih pobuna protiv svake srpske vlasti tamo. Doesnt make any difference.

 

TTjcem

[MancMellow]

Opet je Albanaca bilo u apsolutnoj većini i opet je autonomija posledica dešavanja u WWII, post WWII i albanskih etnički motivisanih pobuna protiv svake srpske vlasti tamo. Doesnt make any difference.

 

TTjcem

 

Bar od tebe kao pravnika™ očekujem 1 istančan sluh za formalne različitosti. 

 

Ali ne, suštinski nije isto. Albanci nemaju teritorijalnu autonomiju. Ima je Kosovo. Slažem se (uglavnom) oko motiva. 

[ObiW]

@ObiW

 

S tim sto je Macek hteo Hrvatsku u granicama Banovine (dakle veca nego danasnja Hrvatska, tj. svaka teritorija u ex-YU gde su Hrvati bili ne samo vecina vec i znacajna manjina), dakle njemu je cilj bio nebalansirana federalna Kraljevina gde bi Hrvatska bila dominantna.

Pa kako opisa, Macek ispade Pasic Jr.

 

Da podsetim, Pasic je 1912 i 1913 prikljucio teritorije u kojima su Srbi bili manjina (znacajna na KiM, beznacajna u Makedoniji), a onda je 1920 nastavio sa kalemljenjem teritorija u kojoj Srba nije bilo ni u tragovima (Backa) da bi na kraju stigao do unitrane Kraljevine gde je Srbija iz pre-1912 godine bila dominantna u politickom planu.

 

U tom smislu, ne znam sta bi Hrvatskoj 1945. falile neke takodje manje-vise "simbolicne" pokrajine (Krajina, Dalmacija, Dubrovnik) cisto da se malo "opali" po velikohrvatstvu.

Tek bi tad raspad YU bio zanimljiv...

[ObiW]

Srbi, tj. politicke elita Kraljevine Srbije, jesu posle prvog svetskog rata u novoj drzavi ispali jako glupi, i posejali su neke od semena propasti cele price odmah (nije da se nije moglo to ispraviti kasnije, no svejedno). 1918. je bila trenutak kada je Srbija mogla da crta granice manje vise kako je htela, tj. federalne jedinice su mogle tada da se izdele tako da maksimalno ispunjavaju srpske interese, a da Hrvati budu zadovoljni sto su dobili bilo sta. Kakva je prilika u tom smislu propustena videlo se kada su se 1939. crtale granice Hrvatske.

 

Sreca sto se to nije dogodilo.

 

Srbija je u I svetski rat usla sa 1/3 teritorije cije stanovnistvo nije zelelo da zivi u njoj.

 

Zamisli da su jos tome dodali Vojvodinu (sa pola miliona Nemaca i 400 hiljada Madjara), celu Bosnu gde polovina stanovnsitva (Bosnjaci i Hrvati) nije htelo sa Srbima, plus delove Dalmacije i Slavonije gde Srba inace ima jako malo. Zavrsili bi sa federalnom jedinicom u kojoj su jedva vecina a gde niko od Slovena (osim Crnogoraca), ne zeli da se bori za Srbiju, o manjinama i da ne pricamo. 

[ObiW]

 Drugo, mentalitetske razlike između krajnjeg zapada i istoka su ogromne (bile i ostale), to na okupu drži samo konstanta pretnja od spoljnjeg neprijatelja (i to se videlo). 

 

Te mentalitetske razlike su samo produbljene ukljucivanjem teritorija u kojima srpskohrvatski nije dominantan jezik.

 

YU bez Makedonije, Slovenije i KiM bi bila daleko laksa za pravljenje, odrzavanje i razdruzivanje.

[Kampokei]

 

 

YU bez Makedonije, Slovenije i KiM bi bila daleko laksa za pravljenje, odrzavanje i razdruzivanje.

 

Ovo mi je jedan od omiljenih scenarija alternativne istorije na ovim prostorima. Jezik je mocan kohezivni faktor, a to su najbolje znali Madjari, stoga i onako agresivna asimilaciona politika u Ugarskoj (koja im se obila o glavu Trijanonom, ali to je druga prica).

 

Nije bas da u Backoj Srba nije bilo ni u tragovima. U juznoj su bili mozda i pojedinacno najbrojniji, ili tik iza Madjara, a i na severu ih je bilo (Zombor). 

[Tribun_Populi]

Bar od tebe kao pravnika™ očekujem 1 istančan sluh za formalne različitosti.

A ja od tebe kao istoričara na istorijskoj temi da se okaneš formalnih™ razlika kojima se opravdavala malo drugačija suština.

 

Ali ne, suštinski nije isto. Albanci nemaju teritorijalnu autonomiju. Ima je Kosovo. Slažem se (uglavnom) oko motiva.

1 multi(č)etnička država, takoreći. :p

 

TTjcem

[MancMellow]

Te mentalitetske razlike su samo produbljene ukljucivanjem teritorija u kojima srpskohrvatski nije dominantan jezik.

 

YU bez Makedonije, Slovenije i KiM bi bila daleko laksa za pravljenje, odrzavanje i razdruzivanje.

 

Jedino što se to ne zove Jugoslavija, nego Srbohrvatska/Hrvatosrbija. Tj danas i kako-tako, ali u to vreme - definitivno. 

 

 

SHrvbija

 

Alternativno - Greater Herzegovina  ^_^

Edited May 18, 2015 by MancMellow

[Prospero]

pašićev spis iz, mnijem, 1893. se zove 'sloga srbo-hrvata'.

 

ja sam opet na liniji orjunaškog integralizma, batina je iz raja izašla :D

 

via TT

[ObiW]

Jedino što se to ne zove Jugoslavija, nego Srbohrvatska/Hrvatosrbija. Tj danas i kako-tako, ali u to vreme - definitivno. 

 

 

SHrvbija

 

Jezik - stokavski, kraljevina - Stokavija?

 

edit: da, da... znam kako bi to srpskom seljaku izgledalo 1921: prvo mu kazu da se dzabe tukao sa Turcima i Bugarima (ode KiM, ode Makedonija), a onda mu i jezik nazovu drugacije. Ukinuli bi kraljevinu u roku od odmah, a Pasic bi omastio konopac na sred Terazija. 

Edited May 18, 2015 by ObiW

[Cane Vukic Prebranac]

 a onda je 1920 nastavio sa kalemljenjem teritorija u kojoj Srba nije bilo ni u tragovima (Backa)

Откуд ти ово да Срба у Бачкој није било, wtf?

[MancMellow]

Откуд ти ово да Срба у Бачкој није било, wtf?

 

Preterao je. Ali je istina da su Srbi u Bačkoj postali većina tek 1990-tih. 

[Cane Vukic Prebranac]

Добро, Бачка јесте посрбљена колонистима и избјеглицама, али српски трагови су прилично дубоки, нека села постоје и по пет вјекова. Мало је велика разлика између "не постојати" и "не бити већински".

[Prospero]

JNA se pokazala kao najveci neprijatelj federacije a reforma iste je bio jedini put ka mirnom ocuvanju Jugoslavije.

 

slažem se za ovo ali takav predlog zaista nije bio na stolu. predlog o konfederaciji koji si pominjao svakako nije imao za cilj očuvanje jugoslavije već, između ostalog, odlaganje i fasadiranje potpune suverenosti, što naravno nije za tadašnju srpsku poziciju značilo ništa jer opet srbi postaju manjina van zajednčke države.

 

iz jovićevog teksta, pošto ne verujem da će forumaši čitati ceo pdf, čisto da bude jasno da to nije bila panacea:

   

Croatian scholar of international law Vladimir Djuro Degan was the main author of the draft of both the document titled Model of Yugoslav Confederation and the actual Confederal Treaty that accompanied it.1 He has noted that the documents were based upon the assumption of contractual mutual recognition of full state sovereignty and international subjectivity of all post-Yugoslav states. The confederation plan called for a “union of states,” not a “state union.” In a structural sense the proposed confederation was to be modelled almost as a copy of the European Community, only marginally adapted to specific post-Yugoslav circumstances. Although the proposal and the contract offered many alternative solutions for practical issues—such as, for example, three options regarding the monetary issues, two on the issue of transport, three on the structure of defence forces, three on coordination of foreign policy, and many more on the structure (and existence) of the institutions of confederation— it offered no alternative to the proposal for statehood. According to the draft confederal agreement, all Yugoslav republics would recognize each other’s right to unrestricted self-determination at any time. Some functions could still be delegated to joint institutions. However, each member-state would have the inalienable right to revoke any authority delegated to the confederation.

   The Yugoslav confederation would, therefore, have discontinued the existence of Yugoslavia as sovereign state. A commonwealth of six internationally recognized sovereign states willing to cooperate with each other would have been established in its place.

...

Two weeks following the formal joint proposal, the Yugoslav state presidency rejected the plan. The representatives of the other four republics, as well as both autonomous provinces of Serbia, were also against. This left Slovenia and Croatia with no official support from any of the federal units. While Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia later accepted some elements of this proposal (but not before May 1991), Serbia (and to some degree Montenegro) remained hostile to the very end.

...

In this chapter I argue that the confederalist proposal was a genuine attempt to achieve first a de facto and then a de jure independence without violence. The ultimate objective was not a confederation but the international recognition of sovereignty and thus, ultimately, the full state independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The confederation was seen as a vehicle for this objective and as a good initial compromise that might prevent the violence that would inevitably characterize any open conflict with Serbia and/or the Yugoslav federal institutions (primarily, the Yugoslav People’s Army, JNA).

...

The most explicit is perhaps Mario Nobilo, who in the early 1990s was the chief foreign policy advisor to Croatian President Tudjman. In his political memoirs published in 2000, Nobilo concludes that the “Croatian-Slovenian confederation project was little more than an attempt to buy time until our government was consolidated, until the issue of state-making was internationalized, thus ultimately—[it was] only an intermediate phase toward the full independence.”4 According to Nobilo, the main strategy of the Croatian and Slovenian leaderships in the final months of Yugoslavia was “to paralyse federal institutions as much as we could, so that their reaction to the ever widening independence of certain parts of Yugoslavia was weaker and more confused.”5 In addition, the confederation proposal was an attempt to convince international factors, that is, other states and international institutions involved in the Yugoslav crisis, that Croatia and Slovenia wanted a peaceful solution and a compromise. It served as an alibi to Slovenian and Croatian elites, who needed to demonstrate clearly that it was Serbia, not they, who destroyed Yugoslavia beyond possible repair.

...

The failure of the confederal proposal, however, cannot be fully attributed to its tactical character, that is, to the fact that neither the Slovenes nor the Croats seemed to be fully committed to their own concept. There were at least four other equally important factors at work.

 

Firstly, no other republic in Yugoslavia supported the confederal proposal at the time it was presented. In fact, they became supportive of it only once it was too late, namely after the first serious military conflict had come to a close (the one in Slovenia, June 26–July 7, 1991), and when Croatia faced an all-out attack by the joint forces of Krajina Serbs, the Serbian “volunteers,” and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in Summer 1991. Back in October 1990, when discussed by the Yugoslav state presidency, the confederalist proposal was rejected by a majority of 6 votes to 2.

 

Secondly, although Slovenia and Croatia appeared to be united behind their joint confederalist proposal, there were still significant (and often visible) differences between them, both in terms of tactics (such as the dynamics of political change) and to some extent in terms of the desirable outcome, too. By the time of the first democratic elections in the two republics (in April and May 1990), Slovenia was already much more advanced on its road to full independence. While it cooperated with Croatia in their joint attempt to prevent the recentralisation of Yugoslavia, it also viewed Croatia as an anchor that was slowing down its own progress toward full independence. This was especially the case after August 17, 1990, when Croatia faced a rebellion by the Krajina Serbs within its own borders. Ethnically homogenous and with no major territorial disputes with its only Yugoslav neighbor, Slovenia was much more impatient to get on with its project of full independence. In order to achieve independence as soon as possible, the Slovenian government (even more than President Kučan) kept all options open, including one of direct negotiations with the Serbs. A permanent threat of a Slovenian unilateral secession by separate agreement with Serbia made Croatia suspicious of Slovenia’s real intentions. At one moment, the Croatian strategic interest was to slow down Slovenia in its road to independence. This was because Slovenia’s early achievement of independence would almost certainly leave Croatia in a more unfavorable and isolated position, in an ever more Serb-dominated “rump Yugoslavia.” At the same time, Croatian president Tudjman’s bilateral meetings with Serbian president Milošević in the last months of 1990 made the Slovenes equally suspicious of Croatia’s real intentions, primarily over Bosnia. Although publicly they continued to cooperate, both republics left the doors open for bilateral negotiations with Serbia. The Slovenian-Croatian alliance appeared, in this light, to be a marriage of convenience, where both partners were aware of the existence of a third partner—always present as an alternative, and potentially harmful. This impacted negatively upon the further joint promotion of the confederal agreement.

 

Thirdly, there were very significant differences on strategic and tactical issues between the major political forces within both republics. In Croatia these differences were confined to fractional struggles between radical secessionists and moderate confederalists within the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). In Slovenia they took a more open form of a political conflict between the government (the proindependence Demos coalition) and the opposition (the reformed communists, who favored confederation). These differences were also manifest in occasional disputes between the government, led by Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle, and the more proconfederationist Slovenian state presidency, led by Milan Kučan, the former leader of the Slovenian League of Communists. As will be explained later in this chapter, some crucial decisions—including, for example, the hasty organization of a plebiscite in December 1990—were the direct result of internal party competition in Slovenia. The confederalist proposal was never unanimously supported by all major forces, either in Slovenia or in Croatia. Divisions between those who argued for full independence and those who were prepared to compromise through a confederalist proposal disappeared only after national unity in favor of independence had been forged as a result of the wars.

 

Finally, failure of the confederalist proposal in October 1990 could also be attributed, at least to some extent, to the lack of support from influential international factors. All key international factors that had had a lengthy involvement in the Yugoslav crisis favored the preservation of a democratised Yugoslav state. This policy was best articulated according to the formula of “a democratic and united Yugoslavia” promoted by the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann,10 and shared by others. When it appeared, the confederalist proposal was an outright challenge to this policy. To international observers it was clear that its authors saw it as only an interim arrangement for Yugoslavia that would eventually serve to facilitate the full independence of its republics. As such the confederalist proposal was in a sharp contrast with the international support for a united and democratic Yugoslav state. A good example of the difference between the dominant views of the key international factors and those of Slovenian President Kučan is offered in Warren Zimmermann’s description of Kučan’s meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on June 21, 1990, in Belgrade: [For Kučan] the question of secession is not whether, but how. . . . Kučan said it would be prepared to seek a future community of sovereign Yugoslav nations, along the lines of the European Community. I was struck by this reference to the EC; it showed that by “confederation,” a term Kučan had used with me just the week before, the Slovenes were thinking about themselves as a fully independent country rather than as part of a Balkan Switzerland.11

 

The position of the key international players in the Yugoslav crisis altered only in the aftermath of the Slovenian war with the JNA—and only after the Yugoslav state presidency (on July 18, 1991) decided to withdraw the JNA troops from Slovenia. Thus, the international policy with regard to Yugoslav unity changed largely in response to the concept of a united and democratic Yugoslavia’s being de facto abandoned by the informal agreement between the Slovenes and Serbs, making a unilateral secession of Slovenia possible. The final attempt to reintroduce the concept of confederation was initiated by Croatia through a “five-point plan” conceptualised by the Croatian minister of foreign affairs, Davorin Rudolf, in direct response to what seemed to be a Slovene-Serb agreement on unilateral secession of Slovenia.12 But at this moment, it seemed that the international factors were much more interested in the proposal than both Slovenia and (especially) Serbia. In September 1991, a confederation a la carte was proposed officially by the International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (via its chairman, Lord Carrington)—but was refused by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.13 As memoirs of the main participants from the Slovenian and Croatian sides now confirm, Slovenia only reluctantly agreed—perhaps also because it was convinced that Serbia never would. In conclusion, the international community supported the confederal proposal only when it became unrealistic to expect the various Yugoslav participants to agree to it.

 

Edited May 18, 2015 by Prospero

[bradilko]

izvinjavam se al maspok je imao brata blizanca u tzv srpskim liberalima.nije to samo po sebi bilo tako lose.spoljne manifestacije verovatno. i nesto me strasno nervira na forumu;ono sto je osudjeno od strane vec odavna debelguzog i tromoga komiteja tog vremena ovde se ne dovodi u sumnju.bar vecina sagovornika prelazi preko toga kao preko neke konacne istine

Edited May 18, 2015 by bradilko