Opšti topik o EU (ex kriza Evrozone)

[Lezilebovich]

Ovi moji u banci vratili drahmu na kursnu listu...

:D i koji je kurs ? Edited November 26, 2011 by Lezilebovich

[čekmeže]

Nešto tipa 30 dinara 100 drahmi al nije to bitno, i sad kad odeš na nbs ima kurs dma, pezete itd. a ovo je neka interna kursna lista gde su samo "žive" valute a međ njima i pokojna drahma.

[Sirius]

Hoces da kazes za socijalizam. Ovo sto sada vidimo je socijalizam bankarskog sistema, tj. kolektivizacija gubitaka banaka sto nikako nije odlika kapitalizma. Za razliku od drugih delova privrede gde kompanije mogu slobodno da bankrotiraju (sto je kapitalizam), to ne vazi za finansijske institucije jer one imaju monopolsku poziciju kao i svuda u socijalizmu.ECB stoji iza evropskih banaka za razliku od pojedinih drzava i zato banke nece bankrotirati ali drzave su u vecem problemu. Problem je sada politicki na vladama, novom EU ustavu, pravilima, kontroli budzetskih deficita i strukturnim reformama. Japan ima zombi banke vec eto 20 godina od njihove krize sa nekretninama pa prezivljavaju.

Ne, mislim na kapitalizam. Kriza je sastavni deo kapitalizma kada lose radis jer cisti sistem. Zato je kapitalizam odrziv sistem, sto je i drug Kondratijev shvatio pa platio glavom. Lose funkcionisanje kapitalizma u Evropi(ti to nazivas socijalizmom, ja ne bih isao tako daleko)je uzrok krize. Kao sto je i preterana pohlepa oterala Japan u 20 godina stagnacije. I to ce uvek tako biti jer je covek kao bice takav i to se nece promeniti. Odbijanje cinjenice da si u krizi i da moras kroz nju da prodjes jer si lose radio ce te jos vise kostati kao sto je to slucaj sa Japanom, sa SAD za razliku od J. Koreje, Rusije ili Argentine.A, sta ce nova EU integracija da resi po pitanju solventnosti u Evropi, cak i da prodje kroz nemacki Ustavni sud? To je trebalo da se uradi kada je formirana zona. Danas je problem naci novac za isplatu plata i penzija. A, to se resava stampanjem a posledice sam naveo u prethodnom odgovoru.

[Sirius]

Nešto tipa 30 dinara 100 drahmi al nije to bitno, i sad kad odeš na nbs ima kurs dma, pezete itd. a ovo je neka interna kursna lista gde su samo "žive" valute a međ njima i pokojna drahma.

Eto, dinar jaci od valute(za sada virtuelne) clanice EU :P Lepo su Tarabici rekli: Srbija ce biti nova Svajcarska kada nastupi kriza i rat u Evropi

[Budja]

Da, ocigledan je pritisak a razlog je mislim jednostavan - ukoliko nemacki plan uspe i na ovaj nacin nateraju brze izmene u EU pravilima, pre nego sto pocne brzopleto stampanje ili izdavanje Euro-bondsa, koje bi u suprotnosti potrajale godinama ili decenijama, onda bi se u roku od godina dana stvorio verovatno najvece i veoma brzo najstabilnije trziste obveznica na svetu. Nezavisna Bundesbanka je vec pokazala u proslosti da je mnogo bolji garant za stabilnost novca od FED-a ili BoE a ako se cela Evro-zona uspostavi na tim principima i ustavnim garancijama oko zaduzivanja onda je prvo funta a onda i dolar (kao i njihove obveznice) srednjorocno u ogromnim problemima jer su deficiti SAD i Britanije mnogo veci cak i od sadasnjeg EU proseka a prospekti za rast su slicni. Ukoliko Spanija i Italija uvedu pod pritiskom i protiv unutrasnjeg otpora brzo reforme na trzistu rada poput nemackih od pre 6-7 godina + dodatne strukturne reforme smanjenja birokratije (u cemu je nova spanska ali i italijanska vlada na punoj nemackoj liniji) i limit na zaduzivanje do recimo samo 60% drzavnog garantovanog duga (o cemu se prica u nemackim modelima) u evro obveznicama, to ce ujedno postati najveca i najbolja sigurnosna investicija na planeti u sadasnjoj situaciji stampanja dolara i funti bez ikakvog ogranicenja. EU samit je 9. decembra cini mi se i tu ce biti reci upravo o brzoj promeni EU/EZ pravila sto ce ujedno biti i izuzetno vazan politicki signal. Onog trenutka kad Merkel stane pred publiku i objavi da je dil postignut i road-map potpisana, da je rok implementacije recimo godinu dana a da ce do tada ECB uciniti sve da stabilizuje sistem dok sve ne prodje kroz parlamente i referendume, kamate ce poceti da padaju i politicko-duznicka kriza ce biti zavrsena skoro preko noci. No, do tada ne cudi tvrda linija ni Nemacke a ni ECB da prakticno koriste pritisak trzista na Spaniju, Italiju i pre svega Francusku jer pravila koja ce se dogovoriti sada treba da vaze sledecih 50 godina i imace veliki uticaj na buducnost kontinenta.

Usput, Britanije odlucila da je smanjenje deficitia suvise riskantno u sadasnjem trenutku i vratile se na laburisticke pozicije. Dve mere:1. garancija i vladino ucesce za first-time buyers nekretnina koji su kreditno sposobni ali nemaju dovoljni depozit (sub-prime zove...)2. danasnja vest: credit easing"The credit easing scheme will see the government providing a guarantee for banks to borrow on the financial markets, with those institutions then obliged to pass on the cheap lending rates to small and medium-sized companies. "http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15907249Dakle, umesto da rasformiraju 4 banke koje drze celu Britaniju (Lloyds, RBS-NatWest, HSBC i Santander-Abbey) oni guraju banke da se dalje zaduzuju. Fantasticno.

[Budja]

Kako se cini, tesko je identifikovati ko je kriv, SPD ili CDU. Ono sto je primetno je skok zaduzivanja posle ujedinjenja, bez obzira ko je bio na vlasti, kao i skok posle krize, tj. 2009 i 2010 (aktuelna vlada CDU/FDP).Edit: ono sto je mnogo zanimljivije na ovom grafikonu je sto pokazuje koliko je sistem neodrziv. Jedina godina kada nisu imali porast duga, tj kada su od poreza uspeli sve da finansiraju je bila 2000 -- kada su namakli silne pare prodajom UMTS licenci Vodafonu i ekipi.

Cini mi se da je bolji pokazatelj odrzivosti duga onaj relativan, %GDP, nego ovaj apsolutni.Ovde imaju podaci za sve zemlje, a i knjiga je vrlo dobra sa istorijskim pregledom.http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/9/Najpoucnije i najrelevantnije stivo.Za Nemacku je dug centralne vlade oko 44%, sanajvecim skokom izmedju 1998 i 1999 - sa 24% na 35%.Ukupan javni dug (sa dugovima republika) je 78%.

[Gandalf]

Yep, ali gde će kapital? U zlato? U nekretnine? U kineski juan?

u dolar, a onda ce americka ekonomija naprasno da procveta. sve ce biti lepo i krasno, a USA ce ponovo postati jedina svetska geopoliticka supersila. opis'o Katic.samo sto ce happily ever after trajati kratko.

[burekdzija]

@Anduril, BudjaBez zelje da se pretvori u pissing contest, slazem se sa svim sto ste napisali, ali pitanje je bilo da li postoji neka posebna vlada koja se prezaduzila, na to pitanje jednako odgovara i obican grafik apsolutne zaduzenosti (inflacija se u jednoj izbornoj periodi moze zanemariti).Odrzivost duga je drugo pitanje, kao sto neko rece gore kapitalizam je odrziv ako se procisti. Od 70tih na ovamo vise i nije, i to pokazuje grafik apsolutnog duga. Mozes ti meriti kako hoces, %BPD je ispod x posto odrziv jer postoji dobra sansa da ce dug biti servisiran, ima pokrice u privredi itd. (tih famoznih x% je cisto psiholosko sacovanje) -- sto je najgore, kako pokazuje ta uobicajena metrika Nemci su i tamo zagazili u 80%. Takodje je zaista dobar onaj Andurilov podatak da procentualno u odnosu na aktivu dug ostaje konstantan (pri cemu bih rekao da dosta novca ostaje i narodu). Medjutim to donekle maskira jednu istinu: dug se uvecava za nekolio redova velicine (prilagodi inflaciju i rast privrede tj BDP i nista se nece promeniti), i nema se nameru ni mogucnost vratiti. Nemacka je jos i dosta dobro kontrolisan primer ovoga, suoceni smo sa mnogo gorim. Ovde je dobar Budjin podatak o saveznom i drzavnom zaduzenju. Tu je Nemacka suocena sa svojim jedinstvenim problemima, npr. Berlinom i gradonacelnikom koji izjavi da je Berlin siromasan ali seksi i bude izabran cetvrti put zaredom, ali to je neka druga tema.Prosto receno, narod i drzava zivi bolje nego sto im vrednost koju stvaraju omogucava, saberi/oduzmi sve ekonomske igracke i metrike. To nije odrzivo u zatvorenom sistemu. Za to je potrebno jedno od sledecih prociscavanja: 1. neverovatno tehnolosko otkrice koje ce podici ekonomiju za red velicine i otvoriti novo trziste (tipa teleport, hladna fuzija, ftl motor -- dakle zaboravi); 2. socijalizam/komunizam; 3. rat; 4. novi, meni dosad nepoznati drustveno/ekonomski sistem koji ce zameniti ovaj, najgori osim svih ostalih.

[Tribun_Populi]

samo sto ce happily ever after trajati kratko.

Slažemo se, ali je alternativa tome da se lipše odmah & sada. Ergo, izbor je jasan.

[hazard]

O evroobveznicama:http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/11/euro-bonds

Euro bondsThe tricky path toward greater fiscal integration, take twoNov 23rd 2011, 18:00 by H.G. | LondonA FEW weeks ago I blogged on a proposal by Oxford University’s John Muellbauer for euro bonds (to which he kindly replied with interesting comments, see here). Now seems a good time to return to the subject: the European Commission has just released a Green Paper on euro bonds.For your reading pleasure, here are some key quotes: The more extensively credit risk would be (sic) pooled among sovereigns, the lower would be market volatility but also market discipline on any individual sovereign. Thus fiscal stability would have to rely more strongly on discipline provided by political processes. Stability bonds would provide all participating Member states with more secure risk access to refinancing, preventing a sudden loss of market access due to unwarranted risk aversion and/or herd behaviour among investors. Any type of stability bond would have to be accompanied by substantially reinforced fiscal surveillance and policy coordination as an essential counterpart, so as to avoid moral hazard and ensure sustainable public finances. This would necessarily have implication for fiscal sovereignty, which calls for a substantive debate in euro area member states.The first thing to note is the fantastically aspirational name these euro bonds are given: "stability bonds". The Commission has three proposals ranging along the continuum of moral hazard.Proposal 1, the mother solution, would convert all national bonds into euro bonds with, in the jargon, "joint and several guarantees". This essentially means that "hard" Europe is completely on the hook for the debts of their brethren. It would quickly sort out Europe’s sovereign debt and banking crisis, but most likely end in disaster, even in the Commission's opinion: "member states could effectively free ride on the discipline of other member states, without any implications on their financing costs". This solution needs, again in the words of the Commission, a "very robust framework for delivering budgetary discipline and economic competitiveness." But would it actually work? I’m not optimistic. For one, the necessary treaty changes would take years to negotiate and ratify. And then a huge bureaucracy would have to be built to monitor compliance.Proposal 2, which is in the vein of the blue bond/red bond that I mentioned in my previous post, would convert national bonds into euro bonds up to a threshold (say 60% of GDP). What the dynamics of the "red" national bonds would look like is unclear. The larger the coverage of the "blue" bonds, the more risk would presumably be concentrated in the residual national ones. The cost of new borrowing (assuming the country is above the ceiling) would be dependent on national bond yields and so market discipline is retained. The paper discusses whether the ceiling should be flexible and linked to policy compliance. This brings in a sort of conditionality similar to that found in Mr. Muellbauer’s proposal: if a country does what it is told then more of its (presumably) high coupon national debt would be refinanced as low coupon euro debt.But the important part is how to deal with non-compliance. When considering any of these proposals, it is necessary to consider extreme circumstances. The proposal says that the flexible ceiling would act as an automatic stabiliser of the credit quality of the euro bonds: the respective share of wayward countries would be reduced as their ceilings were reduced. But this is hard to believe. If a country faced an extraordinary situation with widening budget deficits, rising debts, spiralling payments and so on—might the European Commission not be inclined to raise rather than reduce its ceiling on a temporary basis? The paper admits that if the ceiling was in any way perceived as being soft or liable to political pressure, the disciplining effect of the blue/red approach disappears.Proposal 3 is the weakest and is a simple "several" guarantee of euro bonds and (as with proposal 2) only up to a threshold. Countries would be on the hook "pro-rata", meaning that if one country defaults, all bonds take a proportional right down. In the absence of any "enhancement", such as directly collateralising respective shares with national assets, the credit quality of this euro bond would be at best a weighted average of the credit qualities of the euro-area members. The benefit of this proposal is that it would not require any treaty changes, but I’m not all that enthusiastic. In order to have any hope of keeping yields low, these bonds would have to enjoy credible seniority over the residual national debt. If they didn't, the yield on this bond could be much higher than the stronger euro states would ever be prepared to pay. Even with seniority it is very uncertain how these bonds would trade.n my last post I complained that Mr. Muellbauer’s proposal put too much faith in the ability of a European debt agency to impose his "side payments" on euro-zone countries in the manner he proposes. But these concerns will likely have to be brushed under the carpet. If Europe is going to whether the storm, it will have to trust in such new institutions.A side note—I also worried about the consequences of only backing 85% of national debts. Mr Muellbauer makes the interesting point that if struggling countries managed to reduce unit labour costs by X%, "then its existing sovereign debt could be written down X% up to the maximum of 15%. This would roughly mimic what happens in successful currency depreciation". He writes:Far from causing panic in the sovereign bond markets, this would result in a sharp fall in yields. For example, Italian 20-year government bonds are currently yielding around 8% vs Germany’s 2.6%. This discounts far, far more than a maximum 15% write down on existing Italian debt.

[Gandalf]

Najpoucnije i najrelevantnije stivo.

[Budja]

?Edit:Iz predgovora:We hope that the weight of evidence in this book will give future policy makers and investors a bit more pause before next they declare, “This time is different.” It almost never is. Edited November 27, 2011 by Budja

[Gandalf]

?

sitovacija ocajna, ostaje samo nada u nekakvo cudo. pa su molitva i tihovanje relevantniji od svega drugog. :P salu na stranu, odlicna knjiga. a podaci na sajtu su jako interesantni. Edited November 28, 2011 by Gandalf

[ultra plasticni]

Да ли ће Италија и Грчка избећи банкрот? Да ли ће нове владе успети да спроведу драстичне мере штедње? Докле ће порески обвезници земаља Европске Уније бити спремни да спашавају посрнуле економије "ПИГС" земаља? Да ли ће француски банкари бити расположени за даљи отпис дугова? Под којим условима је остатак света вољан да помаже Европској Унији која се, очигледно, тешко носи са дужничком кризом? Гост емисије У средишту пажње Радио Београда 1 у петак 11.11.2011. године био је економиста Љубомир Маџар.

Poslusaj...

[burekdzija]

Najnovija glasina (nesto kasnije vec demantovana iz Berlina):Nemacka predlaze Elite-Bonds ili Triple-A-Bonds koje bi zajednicki izdavali Nemacka, Francuska, Finska, Holandija, Luksemburg i Austrija.