Opšti topik o EU (ex kriza Evrozone)

[borris_]

Minimalne. Onje ioanko rekao da ga ti partijski izbori ne zanimaju. Nije ni uclanjen u PS.

 

Javjerujem da ce se Hollande povuci i da ce ga podrzati. 

 

Kada me muka prodje, otvaram temu iako nisam nesto vijest u otvaranju novih tema i pisanju carsafa.

[hazard]

http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21703263-problems-linger-italy-and-ireland-stress-tests-results-reveal-broadly

 

 

European banks

Stress tests results reveal a broadly healthier industry

 

Europe’s banks are in a better position than two years ago. But problems linger in Italy and Ireland

 

Jul 30th 2016 | Business and finance

 

ANY big announcement about banks that is made after the markets close, and with a weekend to come before they reopen, brings back dark memories of the 2007-08 financial crisis. The results of the latest European bank stress test, which were released on Friday night, lacked the drama of that period and contained much that was reassuring. But they did not dispel the doubts that linger around a handful of institutions, notably in Italy.

 

Aggregate numbers suggested that European banks were in a generally healthier position than at the time of the last stress test, in autumn 2014. This time the banks started off with an average “fully-loaded” capital ratio of 12.6% and ended up with one of 9.2% in the tests’ most adverse scenario; that compares with a fall from 11.1% to 7.6% last time. No country’s banking sector ended these tests with an average capital ratio below the 5.2% of Ireland; in 2014, the capital ratio for several countries was negative, implying systemic insolvency. And all banks, except for Monte dei Paschi of Italy and Allied Irish, had capital ratios in the adverse scenario that exceeded 5.5%—a threshold that has previously been seen as “failing” the tests (this time the European Banking Authority eschewed pass/fail benchmarks and insisted that the results should be treated only as guidance.)

 

That guidance is not as clear-cut as it might be, however. The adverse scenario was based on the effects of a spike in long-term yields—in a world of ultra-low interest rates, other shocks seem more likely. For some banks, results varied based on whether current “transitional” capital requirements were used, or the “fully-loaded” requirements of when the Basel III capital rules enter into force in 2019. Most significantly, this year’s tests only examined 51 banks from 14 EU member states and Norway, instead of the 123 banks from 22 countries scrutinised in 2014; so no banks from the still-struggling economies of Greece, Portugal or Cyprus were included, undoubtedly flattering the results. Banks complained that the tests were too harsh in some respects, for example in their assumption of static balance-sheets: they argue that in the event of a shock they would take action, such as asset sales, to shore up their finances.

 

The broadly encouraging aggregate results were overshadowed by the dismal performance of a few banks. Worst of the bunch was Monte dei Paschi (whose headquarters are pictured above). The Italian lender’s capital ratio was the only one to turn negative in the adverse scenario, at -2.4%, meaning, in plain English, that it would be bankrupt. The total fall in its capital ratio, of 14.5%, was also by far the largest of all the banks being tested, underlining the poor quality of the assets on its balance-sheet. Indeed, the bank moved before the stress-test announcement to quell fears of its demise, by announcing a plan to raise additional capital, and to move €9.2 billion worth of non-performing loans (€27.7 bn of gross loans, discounted to 33% of book value) off its balance-sheet into a special-purpose vehicle. The bad loans will be securitised, with the senior tranche benefiting from an Italian government guarantee, the mezzanine tranches being bought by Atlante, a private-sector bank-rescue fund, and the equity stake left with Monte dei Paschi shareholders. To offset its loss on these bad loans, the bank plans to raise €5 billion in equity, although it is unclear how easy it will be for the underwriters, who are led by J.P.Morgan and Mediobanca, to find any takers.

 

No other bank approached the travails of Monte dei Paschi. But several fared badly, nonetheless. Allied Irish Bank ended up with a predicted capital ratio of only 4.3% in the adverse scenario, a result that may delay the Irish government’s plans to float 25% of the bank in 2017. Other disappointments included Raiffeisen Bank of Austria, predicted to fall to a 6.1% capital ratio in an adverse scenario, making it the third-worst performer, and Royal Bank of Scotland, for which the test foresees a capital ratio deterioration of 7.45% (the fourth-largest fall). Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, two large German institutions, also turned in lacklustre performances. For banks such as these, the stress tests may not force action in the way they have with Monte dei Paschi, but they also offer little in the way of relief. 

[bigvlada]

Jean-Claude Juncker’s next big thing

 

No longer held back by the Brexit debate, the Commission president has plans to add a ‘social’ dimension to EU policymaking.

By  HARRY COOPER  8/1/16, 5:32 AM CET

 

 

The European Commission is quietly preparing to unleash a flood of policy initiatives to boost workers’ rights across the EU, rebooting plans by Jean-Claude Juncker that were kept mostly out of sight during the Brexit debate.

 

With the U.K. preparing to leave, Juncker wants to give a new push to the “European pillar of social rights” — a proposal he first mentioned nearly a year ago. The measures, aimed primarily at the eurozone but with non-euro countries able to opt-in if they wish, include rules on the minimum wage and to protect gender equality — policies long considered out-of-bounds for Brussels.

 

As he fights for free trade deals and measures to boost economic growth and competitiveness, the Commission president also wants to add a “social” dimension to EU policy. Introducing the idea in his State of the Union address to the European Parliament last September, Juncker said he wanted to build a new EU social policy that “takes account of the changing realities of the world of work.”

 

Juncker backed Belgium’s Marianne Thyssen, the European commissioner in charge of employment, social affairs and labor mobility, to push the initiative, and she’s spent the past few months gauging support for the possible changes in EU countries with NGOs, business groups and trade unions.

 

One door closes, another opens

 

The idea of boosting social protections got a mention in a 2015 report from the “Five Presidents” of the EU institutions on the future of the eurozone, with the leaders calling for the Union to aim for a “social triple A” rating in parallel with efforts to boost economic growth. The largest center-left and center-right political groups in the European Parliament also back elements of the initiative. 

 

But apart from that, little has been done on the plan since Juncker first raised it. During the months-long debate ahead of the U.K. referendum on June 23, the idea was kept under wraps for fear it would be seen as EU regulatory meddling in Britain. Meanwhile, European trade unions grew increasingly frustrated at the lack of action. 

 

Oliver Roethig, regional secretary of the service workers’ union UNI Europa, said some have wondered “to what extent this is all just talk.” As for the idea that Europe could earn “a social triple A” rating, Roethig said that right now “it is probably junk status.” 

 

The U.K. has long led opposition to attempts to introduce new social rights or employment legislation, such as on remuneration, parental leave, anti-discrimination and pension reform.

Peter Scherrer, deputy secretary-general of the European Trade Union Confederation, said that while Juncker is “personally committed to a social Europe,” the Commission has “so far … not delivered.”

 

While some may dismiss Juncker and Thyssen’s plans as a pipe dream, others say Brexit offers proponents of more EU action on social policy a unique political opening. The U.K. has long led opposition to attempts by the Commission to introduce new social rights or employment legislation, such as on remuneration, parental leave, anti-discrimination and pension reform. British Conservatives in particular have argued that the EU is not allowed to dictate to its member countries how they should run their social welfare systems.

 

Thyssen persevered anyway. In March, the Commission released a “preliminary outline” of the plan, proposing initiatives that include the introduction of eurozone rules on the minimum wage, new rights on “quality education and training” and measures to ensure gender quality and protection from discrimination.

 

The outline argued that much of the legislation would be justified not only by provisions in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, but also in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although that charter has been anathema to British Conservatives, who say it would make U.K. judges subservient to a court in Strasbourg, other countries are less concerned.

 

With discussion of the topic taboo ahead of the referendum vote, the Commission did almost nothing to push it. But now Thyssen has seen her chance, telling a Cypriot newspaper in a July interview that she will put forward a “revision of the current rules on social security coordination in the coming months.”

 

Wage war

 

There’s a risk the Commission could push too far. It is seeking a role for itself on sensitive policy areas such as wages, pensions and unemployment benefits. Although the EU’s governing treaty expressly limits the ability of the Commission to act in these areas, it can “assist” governments should they wish to align social policy. Whether governments will take the Commission up on this offer remains to be seen. 

 

 

VINCE CHADWICK

A Commission spokesperson suggested that a key aim of Thyssen’s consultation process, which will close at the end of the year, is to identify the appropriate legal form for any EU action. The official pointed out that rules on the minimum wage, for example, could be introduced via a so-called Council decision, whereby governments agree on a policy action without the Commission taking the central role that it does on most other legislation. In some ways, such an agreement is easier to reach, given that it keeps the European Parliament out of the equation, but on controversial areas such as social security, the likelihood of finding consensus is in doubt.

 

Proponents of the social pillar saw a positive sign that the political climate may be shifting in their favor after an agreement was signed in the days immediately following the U.K. referendum by business organizations, trade unions and, crucially, governments themselves. The statement called for “the promotion of dialogue between management and labor,” as well as “a strengthened involvement of social partners in EU policy and lawmaking.”

 

Scherrer from the ETUC described the agreement as a “historic moment,” given that never before had governments recognized the role of “social dialogue” so clearly.

 

More importantly, it was seen as a departure for the Commission and for many European governments, whose dominant narrative for years had focused on boosting growth and competitiveness of EU businesses — what Scherrer calls “dangerous austerity.”

 

Coupled with a Continent-wide decline in the fortunes of left-wing parties, the time for centralized wage bargaining, stronger protections for workers and guarantees for access to public services seemed to many to have passed.

 

But this fails to take into account broader political trends in Europe. Populist parties across the Continent (on the Left and Right) are adopting economic and social policies that seem more at home in mainstream social democratic parties. 

 

Supporters say that with the U.K. no longer able to block it, the EU is about to start legislating far more extensively in social policy than ever before.

One example is wages. In July, Thyssen batted away criticism from East European parliaments that her reform of EU rules on cross-border workers interfered too much with national wage policy. Her proposals seek to limit “social dumping” — the shipping of temporary, cheap East European labor westwards — on the grounds that this undercuts wage levels in the host country.

 

But the same countries who reacted so angrily to the proposal, such as Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic, are simultaneously demanding that Germany change its new minimum wage law, which they argue is destroying their trucking businesses.

 

That’s why the Commission is optimistic about its broader social agenda, with a spokesperson confirming that governments both in and outside the eurozone have signaled their support for the initiative. Supporters say that with the U.K. no longer able to block it, and a renewed commitment to the “social dialogue” between employers and trade unions, the EU is about to start legislating far more extensively in social policy than ever before.

 

Saim Saeed contributed to this article. 

 

This story was corrected to reflect that the EU is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights rather than the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

 

http://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-junckers-social-agenda-europe-commission-president/

[Aleksija]

zanimljivo

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/28/imf-admits-disastrous-love-affair-with-euro-apologises-for-the-i/

[Budja]

zanimljivo

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/28/imf-admits-disastrous-love-affair-with-euro-apologises-for-the-i/

 

By

 

 

• •  Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 
  •  
  •  
  •  
  • Dezurni contrarian.
  •  

[Aleksija]

ah, naravno, ja nemam pojma ko je to. ali bih bas volela da saznam da li u clanku zaista ima mesa, da li je stvarno to nezavisno evaluaciono telo pronaslo toliko katastrofalnih propusta i gresaka u IMF aktivnostima. 

[hazard]

Pa ne verujem da bi Pritchard izmisljao, citira iz izvestaja. Sad pitanje je sta je izvestaje precutao i koji je stvarno ukupan ton tog izvestaja

[bigvlada]

Corleone local government dissolved due to mafia infiltration

 

Sicilian town the latest of more than 2oo Italian municipalities to be shut down for this reason since 1991

 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/corleone-local-government-dissolved-mafia-infiltration

[Prospero]

The silent death of eurozone governance

Friday, 19 August 2016

 

 

Sometimes the most important thing that happens is what doesn’t happen – or, to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, it’s the dog that doesn’t bark in the night. The lack of response to the European Commission’s non-enforcement in Spain and Portugal of the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is one of those times.

According to SGP rules, the Commission should have proposed a fine to be levied on Spain and Portugal for overshooting their fiscal deficit targets by a wide margin. The fine would have been largely symbolic, but the Commission seems to have decided that the symbolism wasn’t worth it.

And it was not only the Commission that chose not to bark; the rest of Europe remained silent as well. Not even Germany, the European Union’s leading austerity watchdog, perked up. In fact, there have been reports that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble lobbied several Commissioners not to impose a fine on Spain or Portugal. The German financial press, which often criticises the European Commission for being too lax, barely registered the decision.

What explains the silence?

There is a precedent for fiscal leniency in the EU. In 2003, all three large eurozone countries (France, Germany and Italy) were running deficits in excess of 3% of GDP, the upper limit established by the SGP. Towards the end of that year, it was clear that France and Germany (then with record-high unemployment) were not fulfilling their commitment to reduce their deficits.

But, unlike today, the Commission seemed ready to bark (if not bite). It proposed ratcheting up the SGP’s so-called excessive deficit procedure. The proposal did not entail any fines; rather, it focused on the stage before fines would be considered. Nonetheless, EU finance ministers strenuously opposed it, largely for political reasons.

The clash occupied the front pages of newspapers all over Europe, especially in Germany, where the press, like the political opposition, was eager to chastise Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government for its failure to uphold fiscal rectitude. There were heated debates on the fiscal rules, and the Commission’s role in enforcing them. In short, everyone was howling.

Despite the resistance, the Commission decided to plough ahead and censure Germany and France. With that decision, it sent a clear message that it took seriously its responsibility to administer the EU treaties – so seriously, in fact, that it would enforce rules with which it did not necessarily agree. Indeed, the Commission’s then-president, Romano Prodi, had already harshly criticised the SGP’s rigidity. Ultimately, however, political interests won the day, and the EU finance ministers voted down the proposal.

The ministers subsequently moved to reform the SGP, shifting the focus from headline deficits to a measure of the fiscal position that takes into account the state of the economy. The Commission accepted the reform, and has since made several additional changes, each time proudly declaring that the SGP is more “flexible” and “intelligent” than ever.

Today, Spain and Portugal are not adhering even to the new flexible rules. Yet the current Commission, led by President Jean-Claude Juncker, was divided on whether to enforce them, with some commissioners favouring leniency. Schäuble’s intervention, it seems, settled the matter. Clearly, when it comes to allowing political considerations to affect enforcement of the rules, not much has changed.

And, in fact, this time around, the Commission had more power to override resistance from finance ministers. After the 2008 economic crisis, Europe introduced a “reverse majority rule”, under which any Commission proposal to impose a fine is final, unless EU finance ministers can muster a two-thirds majority against it. And herein lies a key difference between today and 2003: the Commission’s commitment to enforce SGP rules has waned.

The relative silence of the public and the media drive the point home. Support for the fiscal rules has faded. Perhaps, with a surge in terrorist attacks, particularly in Germany and France, citizens and leaders are too preoccupied with security issues. The United Kingdom’s impending “Brexit” from the EU is also consuming much attention. And continuing high employment in many countries may seem to be a more urgent economic issue than reducing deficits.

But the decline in support for European fiscal rules carries serious risks. If the most concrete elements of the eurozone’s governance framework are not rigorously applied, what will compel member states to undertake reforms and stabilise their debt levels? Vague exhortations will not work. It seems that the crisis, and the untenably large risk premia for highly indebted governments that followed, has already been forgotten.

Officially, the Commission is still working to realise the blueprint for a “genuine” Economic and Monetary Union. But in the wake of the Commission’s decision not to enforce the SGP, this effort has become meaningless. It is now clearer than ever that EU member states prioritise domestic political imperatives over common rules – and Europe’s common good.

 

[MancMellow]

 

 

 It is now clearer than ever that EU member states prioritise domestic political imperatives over common rules – and Europe’s common good.

 

mozda je upravo obrnuto. tj, veca steta po evropu bi bila nacinjena drzanjem ko "pijan plota"

[Prospero]

Pa možda, s tim da ostaje pitanje upravljanja, odnosno kako će izgledati upravljanje jedinstvenom valutom bez seta zajedničkih pravila koja se u praksi poštuju.

 

S druge strane možda je ovo partikularno nepoštovanje uvod u guranje drugačijeg seta novih pravila za sve, ne znam.

[Tribun_Populi]

mozda je upravo obrnuto. tj, veca steta po evropu bi bila nacinjena drzanjem ko "pijan plota"

 

Separatisto! :P

[MancMellow]

Pa možda, s tim da ostaje pitanje upravljanja, odnosno kako će izgledati upravljanje jedinstvenom valutom bez seta zajedničkih pravila koja se u praksi poštuju.

 

S druge strane možda je ovo partikularno nepoštovanje uvod u guranje drugačijeg seta novih pravila za sve, ne znam.

 

Na to sam i ja mislio, tj nadam se

[hazard]

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37196802

 

 

Czechs and Hungarians call for EU army amid security worries

 

The leaders of the Czech Republic and Hungary say a "joint European army" is needed to bolster security in the

 

They were speaking ahead of talks in Warsaw with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. They dislike her welcome for Muslim migrants from outside the EU.

 

Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban said "we must give priority to security, so let's start setting up a joint European army".

 

The UK government has strongly opposed any such moves outside Nato's scope.

 

The Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak leaders are coordinating their foreign policy as the "Visegrad Group".

 

Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka said building a joint European army would not be easy, but he called for discussion to start on it.

 

The EU has joint defence capabilities in the form of 1,500-strong battle groups, but they have not been tested in combat yet.

 

Last year European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for a European army to give the EU muscle in confronting threats from Russia or elsewhere.

 

Post-Brexit planning

 

Slovakia will host an informal EU summit on 16 September to consider the EU's future without the UK.

 

No UK minister will attend, as the Conservative government is preparing the ground for Brexit, in line with the 23 June vote to leave the 28-nation bloc.

 

"Brexit is not just an event like any other - it's a turning-point in the EU's history, so we have to frame a careful response," Mrs Merkel said.

 

Interesantno da poziv dolazi iz zemalja tzv. ,,Nove Evrope" koja je inace vrlo NATO-entuzijasticna. A i jednom Orban da kaze nesto pametno.

[Prospero]

Sad sam hteo da okačim, da obradujem Tribuna :D