Opšti topik o EU (ex kriza Evrozone)

[Anduril]

 

Mogao si reći i ГПУ ... или још болје ВЧК-а.

 

 

Sto ti smeta KGB? Pa Putin i prijatelji koji gazduju Rusijom kao svojom prcijom jesu bili KGB kadar a ne nesto drugo.

 

Eh da je samo EU, izjeda i Ameriku (Trump)

Civilizacija se mora obračunati sa Putin(izm)om, krajnje je vreme

  

 

Pa jeste i Trump samo sto sistem u US ima suvise checks and balances da bi erodirao tako brzo.

Kao sto pokazuje Orban a posebno Kacinski, Evropa je mnogo sklonija putinizmu i to ce na kraju razbiti EU ako se konacno ozbiljnije ideoloski ne obracuna sa tom pojavom.

Jedini nacin je verovatno kroz agresivnu federalisticku kampanju i ujedinjenje delova EU u pravu drzavu sa jasnim aspiracijama velike sile koja je u stanju mnogo brze resavati probleme.

Ta federalna Evropa bi trebala da se definise kao politicko-kulturno nadmocnija od raznih putinistickih, populistickih i blisko-istocnih mucaka koji izradjaju slabe drzave, slaba drustva i ratove.

[frn1782]

Super ideja.

Zameniti vise manjih totalitarnih rezima 1 velikim savezom evropskih socijalistickih republika

[Budja]

Eh, da je sve te pare sto trpa u Alternativu za Nemacku, FN, Trampa, UKIP... potrosio u ruskoj ekonomiji gde bi mu bio kraj.

[aram]

...pokusaji destabilizacije kontinenta iz Kremlja (i putem bombardovanja u Siriji) postaju sve ocigledniji.

[porucnik vasic]

 

 

Sto ti smeta KGB? Pa Putin i prijatelji koji gazduju Rusijom kao svojom prcijom jesu bili KGB kadar a ne nesto drugo.

 

  

 

Pa jeste i Trump samo sto sistem u US ima suvise checks and balances da bi erodirao tako brzo.

Kao sto pokazuje Orban a posebno Kacinski, Evropa je mnogo sklonija putinizmu i to ce na kraju razbiti EU ako se konacno ozbiljnije ideoloski ne obracuna sa tom pojavom.

Jedini nacin je verovatno kroz agresivnu federalisticku kampanju i ujedinjenje delova EU u pravu drzavu sa jasnim aspiracijama velike sile koja je u stanju mnogo brze resavati probleme.

Ta federalna Evropa bi trebala da se definise kao politicko-kulturno nadmocnija od raznih putinistickih, populistickih i blisko-istocnih mucaka koji izradjaju slabe drzave, slaba drustva i ratove.

Какав си ти расиста.

[Eraserhead]

 

 

Sto ti smeta KGB? Pa Putin i prijatelji koji gazduju Rusijom kao svojom prcijom jesu bili KGB kadar a ne nesto drugo.

 

  

 

Pa jeste i Trump samo sto sistem u US ima suvise checks and balances da bi erodirao tako brzo.

Kao sto pokazuje Orban a posebno Kacinski, Evropa je mnogo sklonija putinizmu i to ce na kraju razbiti EU ako se konacno ozbiljnije ideoloski ne obracuna sa tom pojavom.

Jedini nacin je verovatno kroz agresivnu federalisticku kampanju i ujedinjenje delova EU u pravu drzavu sa jasnim aspiracijama velike sile koja je u stanju mnogo brze resavati probleme.

Ta federalna Evropa bi trebala da se definise kao politicko-kulturno nadmocnija od raznih putinistickih, populistickih i blisko-istocnih mucaka koji izradjaju slabe drzave, slaba drustva i ratove.

 

Nema od toga nista. Evropa je do sada bila nesposobna da se promeni. Uz to nije Putin kriv sto u Evropi prolazi populizam i sto Evropa nije izgradila institucije koje bi tako necemu stale na put nego je uzivala uljuljkana u blagodetima ekonomskog uspeha bez ikakve vizije za sutrasnjost pa sada kada je dosla ekonomska i politicka kriza hvata se za glavu i pokusava da nadoknadi propusteno. Ipak opasnost od nekakavog potpadanja Evrope pod uticaj drzave gangsterije nije izgledan jer se i Putinova drzava raspada na svoj nacin.

Edited January 31, 2016 by Eraserhead

[porucnik vasic]

jer se i Putinova drzava raspada na svoj nacin.

Колико им ти као стручњак дајеш? Шест месеци, осамнаест...две године...

[Budja]

Nema od toga nista. Evropa je do sada bila nesposobna da se promeni. Uz to nije Putin kriv sto u Evropi prolazi populizam i sto Evropa nije izgradila institucije koje bi tako necemu stale na put nego je uzivala uljuljkana u bleagodetima ekonomskog uspeha bez ikakve vizije za sutrasnjost pa sada kada je dosla ekonomska i politicka kriza hvata se za glavu i pokusava da nadoknadi propusteno. Ipak opasnost od nekakavog potpadanja Evrope pod uticaj drzave gangsterije nije izgledan jer se i Putinova drzava raspada na svoj nacin.

 

Sad, Rusija je manje-vise uvek bila raspadnuta, te je sa te strane Putinovih prvih osam godina pre izuzetak nego pravilo.

[dillinger]

Nema od toga nista. Evropa je do sada bila nesposobna da se promeni. Uz to nije Putin kriv sto u Evropi prolazi populizam i sto Evropa nije izgradila institucije koje bi tako necemu stale na put nego je uzivala uljuljkana u blagodetima ekonomskog uspeha bez ikakve vizije za sutrasnjost pa sada kada je dosla ekonomska i politicka kriza hvata se za glavu i pokusava da nadoknadi propusteno. Ipak opasnost od nekakavog potpadanja Evrope pod uticaj drzave gangsterije nije izgledan jer se i Putinova drzava raspada na svoj nacin.

 

Zna to i Anduril ali Putin-neman potreban je baš kao izgovor za prinudno ujedinjenje Evrope, formiranje jedinstvene vojske itd...sad stvari su malo izmakle kontroli pa zapravo se desnica ujedinjuje i formira Fortress Europe ali pred imigrantskom invazijom a ne Putinom.  

Edited January 31, 2016 by dillinger

[porucnik vasic]

Zna to i Anduril ali Putin-neman potreban je baš kao izgovor za prinudno ujedinjenje Evrope, formiranje jedinstvene vojske itd...sad stvari su malo izmakle kontroli pa zapravo se desnica ujedinjuje i formira Fortress Europe ali pred imigrantskom invazijom a ne Putinom.  

Није то исто.

[Anduril]

Какав си ти расиста.

 

Prvo, od kada tebi smeta rasizam - sto puta si vec banovan zbog sovinizma.

 

Drugo, reportovan si a ako ne bude reakcije nazvacu te fasistickim stokerom u svakom sledecem postu.

[Lord Protector]

Kremlju ocigledno nije dovoljno sto su u ekonomski nezavidnoj situaciji koja relativno brzo moze dovesti do situacije kao 1998. pa dalje doliva vatru. Ako EU uopste zeli da prezivi morace mnogo agresivnije da se obracuna sa putinizmom koji je izjeda iznutra.

 

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

 

Merkel’s Bavarian Critic Meets Putin to Discuss Migrants, Sanctions Horst Seehofer kicks off two days of talks with Russian leader as Angela Merkel’s allies decry his ‘provocation’

 

ENLARGE

Bavarian Premier Horst Seehofer (l) and Russia's President Vladimir Putin shake hands as they meet at the Novo-Ogaryovo residence. PHOTO: ZUMA PRESS

By 

RUTH BENDER

Feb. 3, 2016 12:20 p.m. ET

8 COMMENTS

BERLIN—One of Angela Merkel’s sharpest critics met Russian President Vladimir Putin Wednesday, a move German politicians called a provocation of the German chancellor.

Bavaria’s governor Horst Seehofer Wednesday kicked off two days of talks in Moscow that will cover two topics over which he has clashed with Ms. Merkel: Migrants and sanctions against Russia.

Shortly before leaving for Russia, Mr. Seehofer openly questioned the wisdom of maintaining sanctions against Moscow, contradicting Ms. Merkel’s insistence this week that the issue shouldn’t be discussed until the cease-fire agreed between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian troops is respected.

Nominally an ally of Ms. Merkel’s conservatives and a backer of her ruling coalition, Mr. Seehofer, who heads Bavaria’s regional government and chairs the region’s Christian Social Union party, has grown into a major irritant for the chancellor since he spearheaded a charge against her liberal refugee policy last year.

“The [Russia] sanctions are having massive negative implications in Bavaria,” Mr. Seehofer said Wednesday, echoing a sentiment often voiced in private by business people in the wealthy south-German state. “I think it is in the interest of all to achieve a change here in the foreseeable future.”

Mr. Putin praised Mr. Seehofer’s efforts toward the “normalization of Russian-European and Russia-German relations,” state-run news agency RIA quoted the president as saying as he welcomed the German politician at his residence outside Moscow Wednesday evening. “We are indeed grateful for this,” Mr. Putin was reported to have said.

Mr. Seehofer’s latest act underlines Ms. Merkel’s increased political vulnerability since she opened her country’s doors to hundreds of thousands of migrants stranded in Eastern Europe last autumn, a move that has proven deeply controversial within her conservative camp.

Mr. Seehofer’s trip also comes amid mounting tensions between Moscow and Berlin over a range of domestic and international issues.

A diplomatic row between Germany and Russia erupted last week after reports in Russian-speaking media about an alleged rape of a German-Russian teenage girl by migrants in Berlin sparked anti-migrant protests by the Russian-speaking community in Berlin.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused German authorities of “sweeping problems under the rug,” prompting German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to warn Moscow in return not to exploit the case ”for political propaganda”. Berlin police later said the girl had been neither raped nor abducted.

Edited February 3, 2016 by slow

[Sludge Factory]

A New Deal for Europe

Thomas Piketty

 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 ISSUE

 

The far right has surged in just a few years from 15 percent to 30 percent of the vote in France, and now has the support of up to 40 percent in a number of districts. Many factors conspired to produce this result: rising unemployment and xenophobia, a deep disappointment over the left’s record in running the government, the feeling that we’ve tried everything and it’s time to experiment with something new. These are the consequences of the disastrous handling of the financial meltdown that began in the United States in 2008, a meltdown that we in Europe transformed by our own actions into a lasting European crisis. The blame for that belongs to institutions and policies that proved wholly inadequate, particularly in the eurozone, consisting of nineteen countries. We have a single currency with nineteen different public debts, nineteen interest rates upon which the financial markets are completely free to speculate, nineteen corporate tax rates in unbridled competition with one another, without a common social safety net or shared educational standards—this cannot possibly work, and never will.

 

Only a genuine social and democratic refounding of the eurozone, designed to encourage growth and employment, arrayed around a small core of countries willing to lead by example and develop their own new political institutions, will be sufficient to counter the hateful nationalistic impulses that now threaten all Europe. Last summer, in the aftermath of the Greek fiasco, French President François Hollande had begun to revive on his own initiative the idea of a new parliament for the eurozone. Now France must present a specific proposal for such a parliament to its leading partners and reach a compromise. Otherwise the agenda is going to be monopolized by the countries that have opted for national isolationism—the United Kingdom and Poland among them.

 

 

Just for starters, it would be important for European leaders—the French and Germans in particular—to acknowledge their errors. We can debate endlessly all sorts of reforms, both small and large, that ought to be carried out in various eurozone countries: changed opening hours for shops, more effective labor markets, different standards for retirement, and so on. Some of these are useful, others less so. Whatever the case, however, the failures to make such reforms are not enough to explain the sudden plunge in GDP in the eurozone from 2011 to 2013, even as the US economy was in recovery. There can be no question now that the recovery in Europe was throttled by the attempt to cut deficits too quickly between 2011 and 2013—and particularly by tax hikes that were far too sharp in France. Such application of tight budgetary rules ensured that the eurozone’s GDP still, in 2015, hasn’t recovered to its 2007 levels.

 

Important changes did take place as a result of the belated interventions of the European Central Bank and the agreement on the new budget treaty of 2012—the European Fiscal Compact, which created the European Stability Mechanism with a budget of 700 billion euros. These developments made it possible to move ahead toward debt mutualization, by which the debts of all eurozone countries would be jointly guaranteed. Such policies have finally managed to stop the decline, but without solving the underlying problems. The recovery remains timid at best; the crisis of confidence in the eurozone persists.

 

What is to be done now? We should put together a conference of eurozone nations on debt—just like those that were held in the postwar years, to the notable benefit of Germany. The objective would be to reduce public debt as a whole, starting with a system of allocation of payments based on the increases in debt that have occurred since the crisis began. In an early phase, we could place all public debts greater than 60 percent of GDP in a common fund, with a moratorium on repayment until each country has regained a trajectory of robust growth in comparison with 2007. All historical experience points in this direction: above a certain threshold, it makes no sense to repay debts for decades. It’s more advisable to openly reduce debts in order to invest in growth, even from the creditors’ point of view.

 

Such a process demands a new form of democratic governance, one that can assure that such disasters are not allowed to recur. In concrete terms, the interests of taxpayers and national budgets demand the establishment of a eurozone parliament composed of members drawn from the national parliaments, proportionate to each country’s population. (Such a parliament, of course, would be different from the current parliament of the EU, which includes EU members that are not part of the eurozone and is relatively powerless.)

 

We should also entrust each national parliament of eurozone members with a vote on a common eurozone corporate tax, otherwise the outcome will still—inevitably—be fiscal dumping and scandals like that of LuxLeaks, in which leaked documents revealed the use of Luxembourg in tax-avoidance schemes. Such a common corporate tax would make it possible to finance investments in infrastructure and in universities. To take one emblematic example, the Erasmus education program—which provides opportunities for students and teachers to study and train abroad—is ridiculously underfunded. It has a budget of two billion euros annually, against the 200 billion euros set aside every year for interest on eurozone debt. We ought to be investing heavily in innovation and young people. Europe has every right and every capacity to be able to offer the finest model of social welfare on earth: we must stop squandering our opportunities!

 

In the future, the choice of what level of public deficit the eurozone nations should carry will also need to be made in this new setting of joint action. There are many in Germany who would fear being placed in a minority in such a new parliament, and they would prefer to stick to the logic of automatic budgetary criteria. But it was the hindrance of eurozone-wide democracy by a set of rigid rules that led us to the brink of the abyss in the first place, and it’s time to be done with that approach.

 

If France, Italy, and Spain (roughly 50 percent of the eurozone’s population and GDP, as against Germany, with scarcely more than 25 percent) were to put forth a specific proposal for a new and effective parliament, some compromise would have to be found. And if Germany stubbornly continues to refuse, which seems unlikely, then the argument against the euro as a common currency becomes very difficult to counter. Currently, a Plan B involving the abandonment of the euro is being touted by the far right, a policy that is increasingly tempting to the far left. Why don’t we start by actually giving a chance to genuine reforms that would make the eurozone work for the common good?

 

—Translated from the French by Anthony Shugaar

 

[Prospero]

Jezgro i satelitirajući elektroni:
 

Ministers of ‘core’ Europe plan EU’s future
Foreign ministers from founding EU nations to hold talks in Rome.

By
TARA PALMERI
2/8/16, 8:22 PM CET

The foreign ministers of the six founding member countries of the European Union are meeting for a discreet dinner on Tuesday in Rome to discuss setting up a very informal group of “core” countries prepared to push the EU forward, POLITICO has learned.

The informal dinner has been dubbed “Reflection on Europe,” and is symbolic as it’s being held one year before the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.
 
Foreign ministers from the original European Economic Community — Belgium’s Didier Reynders, France’s Laurent Fabius, Germany’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Italy’s Paolo Gentiloni, Luxembourg’s Jean Asselborn and the Netherlands’ Bert Koenders — will discuss the state of Europe in the city where their bloc was established in 1957.

“The Italians want to already prepare a little bit by just thinking on a political level what shape the Union is in before we celebrate,” an EU diplomat said. “Do we still celebrate all of the same values and interests?”

With growing Euroskepticism across Europe fueled by British demands for reform, there’s been much discussion of Europe à la carte.“The aim is to think about the future of Europe,” another diplomatic source told POLITICO of the meeting, which has not been promoted in the media, who added that their “Plan A” is to push Europe forward on the same track, not a two-track.
 
In December, Gentiloni and British Foreign Minister Philip Hammond called for a “two-speed” Europe in a joint op-ed in the Telegraph.

“Italy and the United Kingdom have two very different ideas of Europe, but this does not prevent them from working together for a better EU that can also be a two-speed one, however avoiding the risk of Brexit,” they wrote.

All 28 members will meet at the European Council on February 18 to try to hash out a deal on the U.K.’s demands for reform.

 

 

 

Plan B je "Kerneuropa"

[Budja]

 

A New Deal for Europe

Thomas Piketty

 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 ISSUE

 

The far right has surged in just a few years from 15 percent to 30 percent of the vote in France, and now has the support of up to 40 percent in a number of districts. Many factors conspired to produce this result: rising unemployment and xenophobia, a deep disappointment over the left’s record in running the government, the feeling that we’ve tried everything and it’s time to experiment with something new. These are the consequences of the disastrous handling of the financial meltdown that began in the United States in 2008, a meltdown that we in Europe transformed by our own actions into a lasting European crisis. The blame for that belongs to institutions and policies that proved wholly inadequate, particularly in the eurozone, consisting of nineteen countries. We have a single currency with nineteen different public debts, nineteen interest rates upon which the financial markets are completely free to speculate, nineteen corporate tax rates in unbridled competition with one another, without a common social safety net or shared educational standards—this cannot possibly work, and never will.

 

Only a genuine social and democratic refounding of the eurozone, designed to encourage growth and employment, arrayed around a small core of countries willing to lead by example and develop their own new political institutions, will be sufficient to counter the hateful nationalistic impulses that now threaten all Europe. Last summer, in the aftermath of the Greek fiasco, French President François Hollande had begun to revive on his own initiative the idea of a new parliament for the eurozone. Now France must present a specific proposal for such a parliament to its leading partners and reach a compromise. Otherwise the agenda is going to be monopolized by the countries that have opted for national isolationism—the United Kingdom and Poland among them.

 

 

Just for starters, it would be important for European leaders—the French and Germans in particular—to acknowledge their errors. We can debate endlessly all sorts of reforms, both small and large, that ought to be carried out in various eurozone countries: changed opening hours for shops, more effective labor markets, different standards for retirement, and so on. Some of these are useful, others less so. Whatever the case, however, the failures to make such reforms are not enough to explain the sudden plunge in GDP in the eurozone from 2011 to 2013, even as the US economy was in recovery. There can be no question now that the recovery in Europe was throttled by the attempt to cut deficits too quickly between 2011 and 2013—and particularly by tax hikes that were far too sharp in France. Such application of tight budgetary rules ensured that the eurozone’s GDP still, in 2015, hasn’t recovered to its 2007 levels.

 

Important changes did take place as a result of the belated interventions of the European Central Bank and the agreement on the new budget treaty of 2012—the European Fiscal Compact, which created the European Stability Mechanism with a budget of 700 billion euros. These developments made it possible to move ahead toward debt mutualization, by which the debts of all eurozone countries would be jointly guaranteed. Such policies have finally managed to stop the decline, but without solving the underlying problems. The recovery remains timid at best; the crisis of confidence in the eurozone persists.

 

What is to be done now? We should put together a conference of eurozone nations on debt—just like those that were held in the postwar years, to the notable benefit of Germany. The objective would be to reduce public debt as a whole, starting with a system of allocation of payments based on the increases in debt that have occurred since the crisis began. In an early phase, we could place all public debts greater than 60 percent of GDP in a common fund, with a moratorium on repayment until each country has regained a trajectory of robust growth in comparison with 2007. All historical experience points in this direction: above a certain threshold, it makes no sense to repay debts for decades. It’s more advisable to openly reduce debts in order to invest in growth, even from the creditors’ point of view.

 

Such a process demands a new form of democratic governance, one that can assure that such disasters are not allowed to recur. In concrete terms, the interests of taxpayers and national budgets demand the establishment of a eurozone parliament composed of members drawn from the national parliaments, proportionate to each country’s population. (Such a parliament, of course, would be different from the current parliament of the EU, which includes EU members that are not part of the eurozone and is relatively powerless.)

 

We should also entrust each national parliament of eurozone members with a vote on a common eurozone corporate tax, otherwise the outcome will still—inevitably—be fiscal dumping and scandals like that of LuxLeaks, in which leaked documents revealed the use of Luxembourg in tax-avoidance schemes. Such a common corporate tax would make it possible to finance investments in infrastructure and in universities. To take one emblematic example, the Erasmus education program—which provides opportunities for students and teachers to study and train abroad—is ridiculously underfunded. It has a budget of two billion euros annually, against the 200 billion euros set aside every year for interest on eurozone debt. We ought to be investing heavily in innovation and young people. Europe has every right and every capacity to be able to offer the finest model of social welfare on earth: we must stop squandering our opportunities!

 

In the future, the choice of what level of public deficit the eurozone nations should carry will also need to be made in this new setting of joint action. There are many in Germany who would fear being placed in a minority in such a new parliament, and they would prefer to stick to the logic of automatic budgetary criteria. But it was the hindrance of eurozone-wide democracy by a set of rigid rules that led us to the brink of the abyss in the first place, and it’s time to be done with that approach.

 

If France, Italy, and Spain (roughly 50 percent of the eurozone’s population and GDP, as against Germany, with scarcely more than 25 percent) were to put forth a specific proposal for a new and effective parliament, some compromise would have to be found. And if Germany stubbornly continues to refuse, which seems unlikely, then the argument against the euro as a common currency becomes very difficult to counter. Currently, a Plan B involving the abandonment of the euro is being touted by the far right, a policy that is increasingly tempting to the far left. Why don’t we start by actually giving a chance to genuine reforms that would make the eurozone work for the common good?

 

—Translated from the French by Anthony Shugaar

 

 

 

Prilicno nedorecen clanak:

- Nema nista o mehanizmima monitoringa nacionalnih budzeta tog zajednickog parlamenta.

- Veza izmedju zajednickog poreza na profit i investicija u obrazovanje nije objasnjena.

- Nije objasnjeno sta bi radio taj eurozona parlament a sta Savet EU. Nece bas moci da se sve prebaci na Parlament gde bi FRA i GER komotno nadglasavale manje zemlje, ako ove nemaju neki drugi mehanizam garancija.

- Ideja o vezivanju otplate duga za rast je Varufakisova ideja. No, ako se usvoji ne kaze se kakva bi mogla biti reakcija kreditora? Meni se cini da bi to vodilo poskupljenju duga za sve clanice, ako je dug zajednicki grantovan.