Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Eraserhead]

Neka ostane tamo. To je iole cuva od ove diskusije ovde.

[dillinger]

Opet niz generalizacija, bez ikakve ilustracije.

 

Ono gde se cela ta ideja rusi (gde demokratija a gde diktatura) je - Egipat.

 

Dakle, zasto su, po tebi, Amerikanci zeleli da ruse Mubaraka?

Pa, potom, silentllu podrzali puc Sisija protiv MB-a?

 

Tu pada teza o geopolitici, "dobrim" diktatorima, dugorocnoj strategiji i sl.

 

 

Ovo je isto 1 jak detalj koji nas učvršćuje u uverenju da stvari na BI treba posmatrati sa aspekta humanizma i borbe za demokratiju, nikako geopolitike i interesa 

 

 

U.S. President Barack Obama on Saturday expressed his “deep condolences” in a phone call to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme UAE Armed Forces Commander Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan over the deaths of 45 UAE soldiers killed in Yemen the day before, the White House said in a statement.

 

“The thoughts and prayers of the American people are with the people of the UAE and with the families of the fallen,” the White House statement added.

 

The 45 soldiers were killed when Houthi militias fired a missile at arms depot at a military base in Yemen’s eastern province ofMarib, the UAE’s state news agency WAM reported. 10 Saudi soldiers, as well as 5 from Bahrain, were also killed in the attack.

 

Hours after the Houthi attack, UAE Air Force fighter jets launched strikes on militia targets.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain are three key members of the Arab-led coalition seeking to restore the internationally-recognized government of Yemeni President Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi to power.

 

In a statement issued on Friday, the UAE’s Ministry of Presidential Affairs said that President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan “mourns the death of the brave soldiers who martyred while performing their sacred duty as part of Arab coalition’s forces’ Operation Restoring Hope in order to defend justice and righteousness and to support those who suffer injustice.”

 

Early on Saturday, the bodies of the dead armed forces members were brought home onboard a military plane of the UAE air force and air defense.

 

The UAE’s ministry of presidential affairs declared a three-day period of mourning, starting from Saturday. Flags will be flown at half-mast for the duration of the mourning.

Edited September 6, 2015 by dillinger

[Gandalf]

Ovo je za mene novost. Izvor, detalji?

Sta su nudili Turci i emir?

Asad se prebacuje sa predsednika na premijera, mada zadrzava kontrolu nad vojskom i sluzbom. sirijski MB se vraca u zemlju, dopusta im se slobodan rad, i bivaju ukljuceni u vladu. nesto slicno su gurali Katar i UAE, pri cemu je Katar naravno imao veci uticaj na sirijski MB.

 

nista preterano revolucionarno.

 

 

od 59-e stranice.

 

kratko:

In April 2011, senior members of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) met in Ankara to discuss the unrest in Syria. The meeting focused on Syria and how the government should respond to Bashar al-Assad’s violent suppression of antigovernment demonstrations. For the AKP, the unrest posed a unique set of challenges. Since 2002, Turkey had prioritized good relations with Damascus, arguing that areas of northern Syria were part of what they called Turkey’s “natural hinterland.”

 

In the end, the meeting’s participants decided to cautiously support Assad, albeit while prodding him to make political concessions to allow the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to reenter Syrian politics. Unlike during the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, when Turkey called on President Hosni Mubarak to step down after only eight days of rallies, Ankara’s initial preference in Syria was for the regime to reform and remain in power. To this end, Recep Tayyip Erdogan—then prime minister and now president—dispatched two trusted advisers to try to convince Assad to make cosmetic democratic reforms to appease the protesters. In April 2011, he sent Intelligence Chief Hakan Fidan to try to convince Assad to deescalate the unfolding crisis. Thereafter, he dispatched Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister at the time and now prime minister, on numerous occasions. Despite these efforts, neither man was successful. In September 2011, Turkey severed ties with the regime and began to take active part in regional efforts to overthrow the Syrian dictator.

Edited September 6, 2015 by Gandalf

[Gandalf]

Meni deluje kao da su medjunarodni faktori ozbiljno i iskreno mislili da će to sve da prodje kao u Libiji, možda malo krvavije ali na kraju ipak isto.

mozda. u datom slucaju, ne menja na stvari.

 

rat nisu izabrali zli i pokvareni naftozedni faktori, vec rezim i pobunjenici. mozda su Asad & co racunali da ce ponavljanje Hame 1982 ugusiti pobunu, mozda su racunali na iransku i rusku podrsku, mozda su utripovali da nemaju izbora... pobunjenici su verovatno ocekivali nasilni odgovor koljaca, ali su racunali da ce ici znatno lakse nego sto je ispalo.

Edited September 6, 2015 by Gandalf

[Gandalf]

ja procitah sve ovo, i nikako da prokljuvim za sta ti u stvari optuzujes americke administracije.

 

jesu li destabilizovali region invazijom i okupacijom Iraka? jesu, to niko i ne spori. jesu li direktno odgovorni za stvaranje Al Kaide u Iraku, iz koje ce nastati ISIS? 100%.

 

kako bilo, tvrditi tako nesto je jedno. nesto sasvim drugo je tvrditi da su na bilo koji nacin svesno gurali revolucije u Tunisu, Egiptu, Libiji, Siriji, Jemenu, i Bahreinu - Tunis, Egipat, Bahrein i Jemen su bili prozapadni ili proamericki ili prosaudi rezimi. zasto bi pomagali rusenje rezima koji su po americke interese znatno bolji od alternativa?

Edited September 6, 2015 by Gandalf

[harper lee]

ja procitah sve ovo, i nikako da prokljuvim za sta ti u stvari optuzujes americke administracije.

 

jesu li destabilizovali region invazijom i okupacijom Iraka? jesu, to niko i ne spori. jesu li direktno odgovorni za stvaranje Al Kaide u Iraku, iz koje ce nastati ISIS? 100%.

 

kako bilo, tvrditi tako nesto je jedno. nesto sasvim drugo je tvrditi da su na bilo koji nacin svesno gurali revolucije u Tunisu, Egiptu, Libiji, Siriji, Jemenu, i Bahreinu - Tunis, Egipat, Bahrein i Jemen su bili prozapadni ili proamericki ili prosaudi rezimi. zasto bi pomagali rusenje rezima koji su po americke interese znatno bolji od alternativa?

 

[Eraserhead]

Kao sto rece McCabe:

 

Mantra "Amerikanci stoje iza svega" je novi religijski pokret. Dulističko verovanje u zlog ovozemaljskog materijalnog boga uz iščekivanje nekog pravednog pricipa izvan ovog sveta.

 

Ne mozes ti tu sad logikom da nista dokazes.

[harper lee]

Kao sto rece McCabe:

 

 

Ne mozes ti tu sad logikom da nista dokazes.

 

Ali, najbolje je sto si se ti kao jedan od najgorljivijih zagovornika rasturanja Iraka dok stvar nije toliko ocigledno otisla u majcinu, javio prvi. Obraz - djon.

[Eraserhead]

Ali, najbolje je sto si se ti kao jedan od najgorljivijih zagovornika rasturanja Iraka dok stvar nije toliko ocigledno otisla u majcinu, javio prvi. Obraz - djon.

 

 

Imas arhivu pa pogledaj postove od pre 7-8 godina.

[Budja]

 

Ne znam sta je smesno.

Procitah tvoj carsav koji je sve samo ne objasnjenje dogadjaja na bliskom istoku od 2010 do danas.

[Muwan]

Ne bavi se uzrocima ali dobro sumira suprotstavljene interese.

 

 

Što se tiče uzroka, onaj strip o klimatskim promenama deluje prilično smisleno. Okidač koji je pokrenuo lanac užasnih dešavanja počev od državnog terora, preko regionalnog mešanja, do hladnoratovskih obračuna SAD i Rusije.

Edited September 7, 2015 by beowl

[aram]

aman, ljudi...

mislim, nebitno da li se slazem sa ovim sto harper pise, ali dajte da raspravljamo o napisanom.

Ne mislim da je u SAD postojao neki master "kljuc u ruke" plan koji je identican za sve drzave u regionu, niti je takav plan i bio potreban. Bilo je potrebno (i desilo se) samo da se poremeti tesko odrzivi balans u regionu koji je ionako sam od sebe nestabilan, ostalo je uradio sistem spojenih sudova. A taj balans je, uz nekoliko izgovora koji vredjaju inteligenciju, poremecen intervencijom, gle cuda, u Avganistanu i Iraku.

[bradilko]

 

 

zasto bi pomagali rusenje rezima koji su po americke interese znatno bolji od alternativa?

U ovom pitanju je skupljena sva glupost skolskog sistema.

Ne bi bilo prvi put da se to radi,zrtvujes manje bitne i nepouzdane saveznike, stvaras privid da si na celu slobodarskih pokreta sveta.. i sto je najvaznije, u tom regionu ojacao si poziciju svojih najvaznijih,najvernijih saveznika koji btw nemaju alternativu osim da ti budu saveznici.normalno ne interesuje te koliko su korumpirani ili krvavi tj demokratski takvi rezimi.pobune su se prelile tamo gde treba.

Moze i ovako,zasto iskljucivati

[Muwan]

aman, ljudi...

mislim, nebitno da li se slazem sa ovim sto harper pise, ali dajte da raspravljamo o napisanom.

 

Harperova postavka je načelno dobra. Invazije na Avganistan i Irak su potpuno destibilizovale i onako kilav sistem, pri čemu je okupacija Iraka doslovce bila bacanje baklje u skladište baruta. Međutim, malo mi je teško da zaključim da se Mohamed Buazizi polio benzinom i zapalio zbog američkog intervencionizma. Taj momak je bio maltretiran od strane komunalaca i njegov čin je čista pobuna sirotinje. Rekao bih da je stvar funkcionisala slično i u Egiptu.

 

Sad, jednom kad je to krenulo raznorazni pokreti su ugledali šansu za sebe. U Libiji mi više miriše na neku politiku koju je vodila ekipa iz Bengazija. U Bahreinu je verovatno Iran dosolio. U Siriji ona suša skroz ima smisla kao objašnjenje, hiljadama godina narodi širom sveta dižu ustanke zbog takvih stvari mnogo pre nego zbog nekakvih sloboda i ideala.

 

Tek tada na scenu stupaju veliki igrači na čelu sa SAD. Kad već nisu potpalili požar probaće makar da ga usmere tamo gde im odgovara. Za Tunis ih boli uvo pa je prošlo koliko-toliko kontrolisano, već u Libiji su uhvatili priliku da naplate dugove onoj budali. U Egiptu su čekali razvoj događaja pa kad im se nije dopalo kako su Egipćani iskoristili svoje demokratsko pravo glasa elegantno su zažmurili na povratak diktature i odmah krenuli da sklapaju ugovore sa novim diktatorom. U Bahreinu su naravno podržali svoje pajtose iz Kuće Sauda a onda je došla Sirija gde su onako slepački i bezrezervno ponovili tu podršku i eto globalnog belaja.

 

Sve u svemu, nisu mastermindovi onoga što se dešava u poslednjih 4-5 godina ali da su lovili u mutnom - lovili su. Plus što su još ranije destabilizovali ceo region onim nečuvenim poduhvatom u Iraku.

Edited September 7, 2015 by beowl

[Lord Protector]

Opet niz generalizacija, bez ikakve ilustracije.

 

Ono gde se cela ta ideja rusi (gde demokratija a gde diktatura) je - Egipat.

 

Dakle, zasto su, po tebi, Amerikanci zeleli da ruse Mubaraka?

Pa, potom, silentllu podrzali puc Sisija protiv MB-a?

 

Tu pada teza o geopolitici, "dobrim" diktatorima, dugorocnoj strategiji i sl.

 

Morsi je napravio više kardinalnih grešaka...da ih nije napravio moguće je da bi još bio na vlasti (ili bi bila manja verovatnoća da sa nje bude ukonjen).

 

Egypt Two Years After Morsi, Eric Trager:

But perhaps more to the point, the Sisi government represents a major opportunity for Washington, because it is significantly more closely aligned with U.S. interests than the Brotherhood-dominated government that preceded it. Consider the following:

• Egypt is once again a strategic partner against Iran. Following former president Hosni Mubarak's ouster in February 2011, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reversed more than three decades of tense relations with Iran by permitting Iranian warships to transit the Suez Canal. Egypt-Iran relations warmed further under Morsi. His August 2012 visit to Tehran marked the first visit by an Egyptian leader since 1979, and Morsi hosted then Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo in February 2013. The Brotherhood viewed its engagement with Iran as a mechanism for moving away from Washington's orbit and having more "balanced" global relations. Under Sisi, however, Egypt has returned to its prior anti-Iran posture: it has deployed its navy to prevent the Iran-backed Houthis from disrupting maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. So as the Obama administration seeks a nuclear arrangement with Iran, strengthening the U.S.-Egypt relationship can help reassure Washington's Sunni Arab allies in the Persian Gulf that the United States isn't pivoting toward Tehran.
• Egypt is, for the first time in its history, aggressively battling jihadists in the Sinai. For many years, the Egyptian government rebuffed Washington's calls to confront jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian military did not want to be held responsible for operations that, in its view, were the purview of intelligence and the Ministry of Interior. And during his year in power, Morsi similarly refused to authorize an aggressive campaign against the jihadists, since the Brotherhood believed that its electoral success would convince the jihadists to lay down their arms and embrace the Brotherhood's approach of "implementing sharia" through the ballot box. As a result, the jihadist threat grew significantly, and exploded in the months that followed Morsi's ouster, during which hundreds of Egyptian security personnel were killed. Since September 2013, however, the Egyptian military has been actively fighting the Sinai jihadists, some of whom have declared their loyalty to ISIS. The Egyptian military has also aggressively targeted the tunnel network that links Sinai and Gaza, which the jihadists used for escaping Sinai to hide and receive medical treatment.
• Egypt's relationship with Israel has never been stronger. Despite being president of a country that signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Morsi refused to establish a communication channel between his presidential office and the Israeli government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly signaled that it intended to alter or end the peace treaty, such as by holding a popular referendum or parliamentary vote on it. By contrast, President Sisi communicates directly with Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu -- and openly acknowledges this fact. The Sisi era has also witnessed unprecedented coordination between Israel and Egypt on counterterrorism in the Sinai.
• Egypt is constraining, rather than aiding, Hamas. Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Morsi's victory in the June 2012 elections benefited it considerably. Morsi became the first Egyptian president to welcome Hamas officials to the presidential palace in Cairo, thereby affording Hamas the same diplomatic treatment as the Palestinian Authority receives. Morsi's ouster, however, reversed Hamas's fortunes: Hamas leaders' diplomatic access in Cairo diminished and its office in a Cairo suburb was shut down. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military has taken unprecedented measures to close the tunnels that are used to smuggle goods, weapons, and personnel from Sinai into Gaza.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Egypt Two Years After Morsi

Eric Trager

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

May 20, 2015

Although the Obama administration is right to be concerned about Egypt's domestic political trajectory, conditioning the bilateral strategic relationship on Cairo's progress toward democracy will only make matters worse under the current circumstances.

To read testimony from other participants, visit the House website.

Nearly two years ago, on June 30, 2013, unprecedented millions of protestors descended on the central squares across Egypt to demand President Mohamed Morsi's ouster. While Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, had narrowly won the June 2012 presidential elections, he rapidly lost support. Morsi's assertion of total executive power through a November 2012 constitutional declaration alienated a substantial cross section of the Egyptian public, setting off frequent -- and often violent -- demonstrations that continued for months. Meanwhile, as the economy plummeted and the tide of popular opinion shifted further against Morsi, Egypt's state institutions mutinied: bureaucracies became unresponsive to Brotherhood ministers, police refused to guard Brotherhood properties, and in some cases uniformed officers even stood alongside anti-Morsi protestors in the streets. As a result, the Egyptian state was on the brink of collapse: by the time the massive June 30, 2013, demonstrations began, Morsi controlled practically nothing on the ground, and he was reduced to being a president in name only.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, utterly misinterpreted the depth of this crisis, and refused to negotiate a political solution, such as early elections or a referendum on Morsi's presidency. Instead, it mobilized thousands of its cadres to defend Morsi's "legitimacy," and indicated that it would use violence if necessary. At the Brotherhood's protest site in northern Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, I personally witnessed hundreds of Muslim Brothers marching in formation as a vigilante group, chanting threatening slogans. Meanwhile, clashes between Muslim Brothers and their opponents erupted throughout the country, in which dozens were killed.

This is the context in which Egypt's military, led by then defense minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, removed Morsi from power on July 3, 2013. Egypt was on the verge of severe civil strife, if not civil war, and many Egyptians feared that their country was headed the way of Syria or Libya. Indeed, from the perspective of the generals and many Egyptians, Sisi's decision to oust Morsi saved Egypt from outright chaos.

Yet the manner in which Morsi was removed from power had significant consequences for Egypt's democratic prospects. By toppling Morsi, the Egyptian military locked itself in a kill-or-be-killed struggle with the Brotherhood. The generals and their supporters believe that they must destroy the Brotherhood, or risk the Brotherhood remobilizing, returning to power, and seeking vengeance for Morsi's overthrow. And by the same token, the Brotherhood seeks to destroy the current government. In this vein, Brotherhood leaders openly call for Sisi's death, and the Brotherhood released a statement in January 2015 calling on its followers to embrace "jihad" and "martyrdom" in fighting the current regime. So after removing Morsi, Egypt's military-backed government launched a brutal crackdown on the Brotherhood, repressing its protests with deadly force while decapitating the Brotherhood's hierarchical command-chain through a massive arrest campaign. This past weekend's death sentences for dozens of Brotherhood figures, including Morsi, constitute merely the latest chapter in the brutal power struggle that has defined Egypt's domestic politics in the post-Morsi period.

The repression, however, has not stopped at the Brotherhood. Because the current regime sees most opposition activity as possibly enabling the Brotherhood's return, it has also cracked down on media criticism, non- Islamist opposition activism, and youth protests. And because many Egyptians are weary of political tumult and frightened by an upsurge of terrorist attacks within Egypt's major cities, they are largely supportive of this crackdown -- and, in many cases, encourage Egypt's police to deal with the Brotherhood and other oppositionists even more forcefully.

Of course, these dynamics are quite dispiriting for those who hoped that the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings represented the dawn of a more democratic era in the Arab world, with Egypt leading the way. And Washington should in no way downplay the current Egyptian government's repressiveness, such as by declaring that Cairo is "transitioning toward democracy," as Secretary of State John Kerry did in July 2014. But Washington should be realistic about its ability to influence Egypt in a more democratic direction so long as the government and the Muslim Brotherhood remain in a life-and-death struggle with each other.

To be sure, the Obama administration has tried. In October 2013, the administration withheld most of the $1.3 billion in annual military aid to Egypt "pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government." This was a lose-lose proposition: withholding military aid had no impact on Egypt's domestic politics, which remained quite autocratic, and at the same time it soured the strategic relationship between Washington and Cairo. In lieu of the U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets that are part of Egypt's military aid package, Egypt inked a $5.4 billion weapons deal with France. It also signed a preliminary $3.5 billion weapons deal with Russia, and granted Russian president Vladimir Putin a hero's welcome when he visited Cairo in February 2015. Meanwhile, Egypt reportedly partnered with the United Arab Emirates to attack jihadist sites in Libya without coordinating with Washington, and similarly rejected U.S. assistance in Sinai.

The Obama administration effectively recognized its blunder seventeen months later, in March 2015, when it announced that it would resume the $1.3 billion in aid to Egypt. But to signal its ongoing displeasure with Egypt's domestic political trajectory, it announced the end of cash-flow financing of aid to Egypt after 2017. As a result, the U.S.-Egypt relationship will likely remain tense: if Cairo cannot depend on the reliable flow of aid that cash-flow financing entails, it will likely continue turning to other partners for weapons, including partners that do not necessarily share U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Fueling this tension isn't in Washington's interests, given Egypt's role as an important U.S. strategic partner. Egypt has maintained a peace treaty with Israel since 1979, and coordinates with Washington on a wide range of regional activities, including counterterrorism and diplomacy. Washington further relies on Egypt to grant preferred access in the Suez Canal and overflight rights to equip U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf, and to support the current efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

But perhaps more to the point, the Sisi government represents a major opportunity for Washington, because it is significantly more closely aligned with U.S. interests than the Brotherhood-dominated government that preceded it. Consider the following:

• Egypt is once again a strategic partner against Iran. Following former president Hosni Mubarak's ouster in February 2011, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reversed more than three decades of tense relations with Iran by permitting Iranian warships to transit the Suez Canal. Egypt-Iran relations warmed further under Morsi. His August 2012 visit to Tehran marked the first visit by an Egyptian leader since 1979, and Morsi hosted then Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo in February 2013. The Brotherhood viewed its engagement with Iran as a mechanism for moving away from Washington's orbit and having more "balanced" global relations. Under Sisi, however, Egypt has returned to its prior anti-Iran posture: it has deployed its navy to prevent the Iran-backed Houthis from disrupting maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. So as the Obama administration seeks a nuclear arrangement with Iran, strengthening the U.S.-Egypt relationship can help reassure Washington's Sunni Arab allies in the Persian Gulf that the United States isn't pivoting toward Tehran.
• Egypt is, for the first time in its history, aggressively battling jihadists in the Sinai. For many years, the Egyptian government rebuffed Washington's calls to confront jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian military did not want to be held responsible for operations that, in its view, were the purview of intelligence and the Ministry of Interior. And during his year in power, Morsi similarly refused to authorize an aggressive campaign against the jihadists, since the Brotherhood believed that its electoral success would convince the jihadists to lay down their arms and embrace the Brotherhood's approach of "implementing sharia" through the ballot box. As a result, the jihadist threat grew significantly, and exploded in the months that followed Morsi's ouster, during which hundreds of Egyptian security personnel were killed. Since September 2013, however, the Egyptian military has been actively fighting the Sinai jihadists, some of whom have declared their loyalty to ISIS. The Egyptian military has also aggressively targeted the tunnel network that links Sinai and Gaza, which the jihadists used for escaping Sinai to hide and receive medical treatment.
• Egypt's relationship with Israel has never been stronger. Despite being president of a country that signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Morsi refused to establish a communication channel between his presidential office and the Israeli government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly signaled that it intended to alter or end the peace treaty, such as by holding a popular referendum or parliamentary vote on it. By contrast, President Sisi communicates directly with Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu -- and openly acknowledges this fact. The Sisi era has also witnessed unprecedented coordination between Israel and Egypt on counterterrorism in the Sinai.
• Egypt is constraining, rather than aiding, Hamas. Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Morsi's victory in the June 2012 elections benefited it considerably. Morsi became the first Egyptian president to welcome Hamas officials to the presidential palace in Cairo, thereby affording Hamas the same diplomatic treatment as the Palestinian Authority receives. Morsi's ouster, however, reversed Hamas's fortunes: Hamas leaders' diplomatic access in Cairo diminished and its office in a Cairo suburb was shut down. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military has taken unprecedented measures to close the tunnels that are used to smuggle goods, weapons, and personnel from Sinai into Gaza.

 To be sure, the Obama administration is right to be concerned about Egypt's domestic political trajectory, and it should use its diplomatic engagement with the Sisi government to encourage greater tolerance and political pluralism. But if Washington conditions its strategic relationship with Cairo on Egypt's progress toward democracy, it won't achieve democracy in Egypt given the current circumstances, and will hurt the bilateral strategic relationship in the process.

The current regional environment makes it particularly urgent for Washington to restore its relationship with Egypt on the basis of shared strategic interests. Specifically, Congress should encourage the Obama administration to proceed with the "strategic dialogue" that Cairo has requested since early 2014. This is an important opportunity to review the military aid relationship in a bilateral setting, and to coordinate both countries' strategies on a wide range of regional challenges.

Eric Trager is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute.

 

 

 

Foreign Affairs

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Why Israel Will Miss Morsi

As Egypt's Military Cracks Down, Sinai Descends Into Chaos

Zack Gold

ZACK GOLD is a Washington-based Middle East analyst conducting research on Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation in the Sinai Peninsula. Follow him on Twitter @ZLGold [1].

Even as Egypt’s generals continue their violent crackdown on supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsi, Israel has been lobbying the international community [2] to give the military its full backing. Israeli policymakers are understandably nervous about the Muslim Brotherhood, and they take as a given that Islamist group wants to see the Jewish state’s destruction. But security and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt actually thrived during Morsi’s presidency [3]. And particularly in the wake of Monday's massacre of 25 Egyptian policemen in Rafah, a city on the border of the Gaza Strip in North Sinai, Israel might find that it was better off with Morsi in power.

For Israel, the worst possible result of the political upheaval in Cairo is chaos along its southern border. The Sinai Peninsula stayed relatively calm for decades after Israel returned it to Egypt in 1982, following the countries’ 1979 peace treaty. Terrorism, smuggling, and cross-border provocations did not begin with the collapse of the Mubarak regime, but Sinai began to descend into total lawlessness as the police state apparatus melted away around the time of the February 2011 revolution. And the security situation there has dramatically worsened since the military’s removal of Morsi on July 3, after which there has been a marked uptick [4] in deadly attacks against Egyptian soldiers and police in Sinai.

The violence in Sinai could soon spill over into Israel. Israel remains an obvious target for jihadis, who see it as an occupier of Muslim land. This is especially true for Gaza-based terrorist groups that operate in Sinai, such as the Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. Moreover, some jihadi groups in Sinai, such as Ansar Jerusalem, view cross-border attacks as holding a second beneficial purpose: showing the Egyptian military’s weakness and inability to protect its borders. Indeed, jihadi action over the past two years has purposefully attempted to embarrass the Egyptian military, expose Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, and draw Israel into a cross-border response. As with the increased jihadi activity in Sinai since the military full took control, Sinai terrorist groups may opt to double down on this strategy of drawing Israel into their fight.

In raids against Israel in 2011 and 2012, attackers wore replica Egyptian military uniforms [5] and drove Egyptian military vehicles [6] both to confuse Israeli responders and to create the perception that the Egyptian military was involved in such incidents and that the Israelis were shooting at Egyptian soldiers. An airstrike in July against an Ansar Jerusalem rocket squad in Sinai may or may not have been carried out by Israel [7], but Sinai’s jihadis had every reason to make this claim [8] as a way of pushing back against the military and driving a wedge between the generals and the people.

Israel’s main fear is that Sinai-based jihadists will target civilian planes bound for Israel’s southern tourist city of Eilat. In fact, on August 8, such a plan was in the works [9], forcing Israel to shut the airport for several hours. Less than a week later, an Israeli Iron Dome battery intercepted a rocket fired from Sinai [10] at Eilat for the first time. Although Israel should be glad that it foiled the attack and that Egypt made little noise about the use of Iron Dome so close to its border, Israel should be even more worried that it had to deploy the system in the first place.

Amid today’s turmoil, it is worth remembering that, while Morsi was president, political relations between Israel and Egypt were, if not friendly, certainly stable. The Brotherhood leader wanted nothing to do with his Zionist counterparts, so he left the relationship entirely to his military and intelligence branches. Effectively, Morsi sat atop a cooperative partnership over which he had no input. This dynamic helped tamp down on any Brotherhood or Islamist criticism of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

Indeed, the most difficult point in Egyptian-Israeli relations following Hosni Mubarak's ouster was not, as many would have guessed, when war broke out between Hamas and Israel in November 2012, a time when Morsi was in control. Despite the Brotherhood’s affinity for Hamas, the Morsi government worked with both sides to mediate and to guarantee a cease-fire. At the time, observers [11] noted little difference between the Morsi government’s approach and that of the Mubarak regime during the 2008­–09 Israeli operation in Gaza.

Rather, the closest [12] Israel and Egypt came to a break in relations was in the autumn of 2011, when Egypt's military was calling all the shots. In August 2011, terrorists tunneled from Gaza into Sinai and then on to Eilat, where they began attacking [13] Israeli civilians and soldiers. Israeli military forces responded, accidentally killing several Egyptian border guards. Egypt’s military-appointed prime minister initially called for a change in Egyptian-Israeli relations, saying that the Camp David accords between the two countries were “not sacred.” The following month, a violent mob breached the Israeli embassy in Cairo [14].

Since Morsi’s ouster, the Brotherhood has returned to blaming Israel [15] for Egypt’s domestic troubles. It has also specifically criticized Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation in the Sinai [16] -- cooperation that had been ongoing throughout Morsi’s term. Now that it no longer has to worry about governing the country, and without its man overseeing bilateral cooperation, the Brotherhood is free to harp on its favorite foes across the border.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood is hardly alone in its antagonism. After their successful petition campaign against Morsi, the anti-Islamist protesters that make up Egypt’s Tamarod (Rebellion) movement have set their sights [17] on throwing out the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Both Egyptian Islamists and secular nationalists generally oppose aspects, if not the entirety, of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. Islamists, however, already have significant credibility with the public on the issue; it is the secular nationalist camp that tends to be more vocal in its opposition.

Israel’s concern over the growing threat in Sinai has led to its unprecedented approval [18] of Egyptian troop and equipment deployments east of the Suez Canal, in excess of the limitations of the peace treaty. But even with Israel’s support, the military will have trouble calming the peninsula. Since the coup, Egypt’s military has had to put out fires, often literally, all over the country. And although Israel may have looked favorably on Egypt’s efforts to crush the Brotherhood protesters, the high death tolls brought on by the crackdown will not only increase violent opposition but also likely spread it to other cities and towns.

Israel’s strategic imperative since the fall of Mubarak has been to maintain its relationship with Egypt as best it can. For this reason, Israel will continue to urge the United States to keep up its military aid to Egypt, even as hundreds are killed in the streets. This strategic outlook, however, resulted in the same request [19] being made during the political turmoil in January, even as videos surfaced of Morsi, then president, ranting against Israel and Jews more broadly [20].

 

The connection between Israeli strategy and U.S. aid was addressed directly by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 14, when he stated that such aid is a cornerstone of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty [21]. Not only is this wrong [22], but such mistaken conventional wisdom belies the fact that Egyptian-Israeli cooperation benefits Egypt as well as the United States and Israel. Given the broad opposition to Israel in Egyptian society, it is fair to presume that many soldiers and officers share these views personally. But Egypt works with Israel because security cooperation in Sinai protects Egyptian lives, property, and territory. This will remain true whether or not the Americans cut the generals loose.

 

 

Edited September 7, 2015 by slow