Raspad SFRJ

[Topola]

Dossier SDG/JSO/RDB

Tanka svirka, sto bi se reklo... Ako je ovo bio materijal US predsednika za njegovo upoznavanje sa krizom, uf... Pa mi smo jos i dobro prosli, mogli su da omandale i Beogradjanku kao kinesku ambasadu.No, dobro, ima ovde toplih reci za patriote obe strane. Kljucna rec: agresija. Nego, kako mu to ovde dodje Fikret pobunjeni Musliman? Pod 2) ako kaze da je pocelo angazovanje RDB u Hrv. jos 1988, kako se to onda uklapa u sliku Milosevica kao pokretaca rata? 3) Sta su pripremali pripadnici RDB Srbije u BiH i Hrvatskoj jos 1988-e, ako su separatisticki impulsi dosli od vlasti tih republika izabranih DVE godine kasnije?Pitanja, pitanja.... Edited January 10, 2014 by Topola

[Roger Sanchez]

Nego, kako mu to ovde dodje Fikret pobunjeni Musliman? Pod 2) ako kaze da je pocelo angazovanje RDB u Hrv. jos 1988, kako se to onda uklapa u sliku Milosevica kao pokretaca rata?

Dude...

[mlatko]

Nije Milosevic pokretac, on je potpaljivac. jos 70ih Cia je kucala scenarije za raspad Yuge i znalo se sta nas ceka... Davane su male sanse za miran razlaz republika

[Topola]

Sad, Dude ili ne, ali nesto ovde ne pasuje bas do kraja u zvanicnu verziju... Ili je Klinton dobijao reciklirane materijale iz beogradskih kafana, a bar na dva mesta se vidi da jeste, ili je u Hrvatskoj krenulo da se kuva jos pre negoli je Balkanski Kasapin cvrsto dohvatio dizgine u svoje ruke...A, ostade i ovo: zasto je Fikret bio rebel a Alija nije? Kad gledamo onako, situaciono...

[Prospero]

Ne, ovo je najgrublje moguce, tako da su odstupanja vise nego moguca, ali ne ogromna, pretpostavljam.A ovo za Srbiju mi je jako tesko da poverujem (za visinu plata, ne za nezaposlenost, mada...pitanje je koja i čija nezaposlenost). A posebno mi je u to tesko da poverujem u slucaju da je Jugoslavija opstala i recimo 2004-te ili pre postala članicom EU.

Radna pretpostavka je da je sve isto, SFRJ prošla kao svaka druga commie federation, dakle rastur, samo birokratski™ a ne antibirokratrski™, nema rata/sankcija ali ima svega ostalog - kolapsa unutrašnje trgovine, kolapsa IE tržišta koji pogađa Srbiju više nego SLO i HR, visoke inflacije (ne baš hiper ali...)...edit: kad ste već kod USofA i raspada evo ga jedan tekstić koji objašnjava gde je američka politika zaštucala '91-2. Tekst je s kraja '93. pa nema naknadne pameti.Za one koje mrzi da čitaju sve evo par isečaka:

In assessing the role played by the United States in attempting to put an end to the war, attention must first be drawn to the way in which the American government interpreted the origins of the conflict, for this interpretation dictated in critical respects its diplomatic posture. The American government's explanation stressed that the war was caused above all by Serbian aggression. The indictment rested fundamentally not on the violations of the laws of war that the Serbs have undoubtedly committed on a lavish scale, but on the decision to use force in the first place. In the U.S. view, the war itself was a crime. Although the Serbs' violations of jus in bello have been seen to confirm and compound their violation of jus ad bellum, the presumed existence of the aggression itself has played a decisive role in shaping the policy of the U.S. government. The assumption, moreover, that the war has been one of Serbian aggression has been generally accepted in the United States; the debate over intervention has not fundamentally turned over the existence of aggression against an internationally recognized state, but over the potential costs of U.S. military action to reverse it.

BEFORE CONSIDERING the consequences this American interpretation of the origins of the war had on the course of events in Bosnia, attention may first be drawn to the extremely awkward, and yet almost entirely unremarked, position in which it placed U.S. diplomacy. By the spring of 1992, our diplomacy was clearly directed toward the breakup of Yugoslavian territorial integrity on the basis of plebiscitary majorities in each of its constituent republics. Having previously taken the position, as James Baker did in Belgrade in the summer of 1991, that the United States favored the preservation of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, American diplomacy did a sharp turn and pronounced itself in favor of Yugoslavia's partition. Once this partition had taken place, however, we once again insisted that the territorial integrity of the new states was something sacred and inviolable. Having defiled the principle of territorial integrity, the American government immediately rediscovered it in all its purity. Thereafter, any suggestion that these new boundaries be changed was subsequently met by the insistence, in the exasperated voice of outraged virtue, that to do so challenged the very basis of world order.The reasons for this last attitude are clear. The shift in American policy toward Yugoslavia took place immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Concerned primarily as they were with the potential for violence that this breakup might bring, and thinking of Russia as they considered Yugoslavia, American diplomatists searched for the means by which that potential might be mitigated. The parallels between the two situations, indeed, were eerily exact. Russia had her "famous twenty nine millions" outside the mother country; Serbia had a comparable percentage outside its borders. It seemed a sound approach to adopt the same policy toward both. Whatever the merits of this approach as applied to Russia, however, it was an unmitigated disaster as applied to Yugoslavia.

Once fighting started, the understanding of the war that attributed it fundamentally to Serbian aggression had an equally bad effect on the diplomatic posture the United States adopted towards settling it. The passions and hatreds unleashed by the war were such that territorial partition almost immediately became the only basis on which a compromise settlement might be reached. Yet the United States consistently opposed all such proposals. A compromise settlement was ruled out by the terms of the UN resolution passed in late May 1992, under American prompting, which called for the disarmament of all irregular forces and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav federal army (JNA) from Bosnian territory. Only one reading of these resolutions was possible, and this was that they required as a condition for lifting the sanctions imposed on Serbia the establishment of the police power by the Sarajevo government over the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.(5) Thereafter, the Bush administration opposed the interest expressed by London and Paris in a territorial partition before the August 1992 London conference. The incoming Clinton administration's opposition to the Vance-Owen plan was of a piece with this policy. The American interpretation of the war as one of Serbian aggression has made any compromise settlement vulnerable to the charge of rewarding aggression. As such, it precluded a negotiated settlement, and made it inevitable that the war would be decided by sheer military power.

Perhaps the most paradoxical effect that this understanding of the origins of the war had was on the prospect that the United States or the international community might use force to limit Serb territorial claims. For one thing, it made it much more difficult to reach a consensus either at the United Nations or within the Western alliance on the possible limited use of force. Given the objectives that flowed directly from the definition of the conflict as unadulterated Serbian aggression, it was evident that any limited use of force would leave unsatisfied the larger objective of "restoring" Bosnian territorial integrity, and that after the first drink, to paraphrase John F. Kennedy, it would be necessary to take another. If the objective were the disarmament of Serbian militias throughout Bosnia, it was a moral certainty that the Serbs would resist this through force, and that the objective could only be achieved through a major war. Just as the Americans were capable of vetoing diplomatic measures that pointed toward partition, the Europeans (and Russia) were capable of vetoing steps that pointed toward such a war. The end result, of course, was a stalemate at the UN and within the Alliance in which fervid denunciations of the war were paired with measures that held out no prospect of ending it on terms conformable to those laid out in UN resolutions.

[MancMellow]

elem, ne verujem da bi srpska privreda bez rata i sankcija prošla kao bugarska, recimo, koliko kapiram to je neka osnovna ideja. Struktura srpske privrede je uvek bila loša, to nije sporno. ALI - kolaps je prejaka reč. Mislim da se po toj strukturi Srbija može pre porediti sa Mađarskom ili još bolje Slovačkom nego sa Bugarskom, a kretala bi iz inicijalno (inicijalno) bolje pozicije od nje. Nekakva carinska unija ili bar debele olakšice bi odgovarale i Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, možda čak i više nego Srbiji. Drugo, prosto ne možemo da znamo da li bi bez ratnog ludila Milošević i do koje tačno godine sprovodio nekakvu socijalističku tranziciju. Možda bi posle određenog vremena na vlast došao neki naš Dzurinda. Mislim, nacionalno pitanje bi opterećivalo neminovno, ali to ne mora puno da znači u odnosu na to kakva bi se ekonomska politika vodila. Elem, pošto smo sa svim ratovima, sankcijama i svim ostalim dan danas negde na nivou Bugarske po primanjima, nema racionalnog razloga da pomislimo da bi bez svega toga situacija bila faktički ista. Investicije, opšti svetski prosperitet bar prve polovine 2000-tih ako ničeg drugog bi sigurno ostavio mnogo boljeg traga na jednoj takvoj Srbiji nego na ovakvoj. Mnogo bi zavisilo i od spoljne politike.Mislim da je nemoguće znati, ali da prosto nije logično pomisliti da bi bilo skoro isto. Okvirne procene su da je Srbija tokom 90-tih pretrpela desetine i desetine, odnosno možda i preko 100 milijardi dolara štete, da ne pričam o odlasku stručnih i veoma radno (i potrošački i reproduktivno sposobnih). Tako da...trebalo bi baš dosta da me ubeđuje :D

[MancMellow]

Pročitao sam ovo. Još uvek nisam pročitao ništa što bi me uverilo u to da je BiH rešiv problem na bilo koji način osim određenim i što čvršćim regionalnim integracijama. Da citiram P.Markovića iz onog intervjua u "Nedeljniku" kada je opisao situaciju na jugoistoku posle sloma Kr.Jugoslavije ' - na jugoistoku je dobijen 1 "antiporedak" i mislim da to ponovo imamo tj postoji i sada u jednom blažem obliku, naravno, but still.

Edited January 11, 2014 by MancMellow

[Roger Sanchez]

@bbPa na kraju je Clintonova ekipa upravo primjenila propisani recept..

an insistence on limited ends with a determination to employ forcible means. An armed mediation conducted on the basis of a territorial partition would have had several advantages over the course which was followed. By tying the threatened use of force against the Serbs to limited territorial objectives, it would have offered the Serbs terms that, though falling well short of their maximal territorial aims, would nevertheless have respected their vital interests and provided them with a strong incentive toward reaching a compromise settlement.

..s tom modifikacijom da je za izvršioce upotrebe sile prašinarskog tipa iskoristila eager local junkyard dogs, te s time postigla i dodatne bonuse - da je teritorijalna podjela ograničena na unutrašnji plan, pa se srbskim prisilnim dodatnim kompromisiranjem primjena Helsinkija na Avnoj i dalje održala. U principu. I junkyard dogsi nagrađeni dopuštanjem radikalnog rješenja svog unutrašnjeg problema olabavili su s apetitima na bosanskom planu. Pluses all over.

[MancMellow]

Ne bi to uopšte sa tog realpolitičkog stanovišta bilo sporno (sa humanitarnog dakako jeste) da je Zapad bio spreman ljudski da zalegne u BiH i stvarno stavi tu zemlju na noge. Oni su sada skoro ponovili ono što su uradili 6-7 godina posle WW1 na Balkanu i u Centralnoj Evropi, iako na prvi pogled to nije tako pošto imamo razne visoke predstavnike i ostale slične. rekli su suštinski ljudima - najbolje bi bilo da se dogovorite, vidite, u interesu vam je da se dogovorite. A to se neće desiti u uslovima opšteg siromaštva, kao što vidimo da se ne dešava. To je očevidno jedna zemlja u stalnoj političkoj krizi niskog, na momente srednjeg, intenziteta. I ne samo BiH.

Edited January 11, 2014 by MancMellow

[Roger Sanchez]

Pa mogu oni staviti tu zemlju na noge, samo ne znam koliko bi to bilo popularno na ovom forumu, a i šire. Ako su rezultati popisa točni, nema posebnog razloga zašto Bosna ne bi mogla biti i dalje defektna, ali u jednom blažem obliku. Nešto kao srednji slučaj između Makedonije i Crne Gore, kojima (p)ostaje vrlo slična ovim razbrojavanjem.Što se tiče ekonomije, tu im se nema što zamjeriti. Hrvatska ima na raspolaganju svu potrebnu pomoć, i 14 godina joj se lijepo govori što da radi, ali ona samouvjereno, s punom podrškom naroda, zaranja dublje u čabar... Nema tu quick fixa.

[Prospero]

Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013

 

 

July 20, 1995

 

MEMORANDUM FOR MADELEINE ALBRIGHT

STROBE TALBOTT .

JOHN WHITE

ADM WILLIAM OWENS .

LEON FUERTH

GEORGE TENET

 

FROM: SANDY BERGER

SUBJECT: Bosnia Strategy

At their informal meeting on Wednesday, Principals asked the Deputies to review our medium- and long-term strategy for Bosnia on the basis of the attached NSC paper, with a view toward formulating recommendations or options for the President. The paper is extremely sensitive and should be held closely, I have scheduled a Deputies' meeting for Saturday, July 22 at 3:00-4:00. Attendance will be Principals plus one.

Attachment

Tab A  July 17 NSC paper: Bosnia Endgame Strategy

 

BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

 

Summarry: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa we need to make an all-out effort in the comlng weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and Gorazde (see separate paper), and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should let UNPROFOR collapse this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field·. This would be underpinned during a one year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

 

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have little time to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR' s collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will  represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies and make it impossible to sustain a Presidential veto.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support efforts to deter a Serb attack on Gorazde, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR,s efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to protect Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a polltical settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some ofthe leverage we have lost over the past year vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

 

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal (including how to mitigate the risks of OPLAN 40104 and secure Congressional support) and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

• Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we would, at a minimum, need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro), and we might also need to accept substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade as well.

• [-blank-]

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now thart when we first pushed lift-and·strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state.

 

Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

• Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD); as a fallback, we would enforce the NFZ through a coalition of.the willing.

• Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks. This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR through a U.S.-led coalitton of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below), since we would want to avoid assigning this function to the Bosnian Government. We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.

 

• Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation- controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries (except states like Iran-- the Bosnians would have to agree to rule that out). If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (end of 1996) ·an the NFZ and air strike commitments, making clear to the Bosnians that once the, playing field is leveled, they are on their own. The mandate of the successor force could extend beyond a year if the coalition members were willing In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce the Bosnians' ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Serb air when the NFZ lapsed.

 

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, fully seal the border, and accept a much larger international monitoring force. We could also encourage Milosevic by brokering a mutually favorable deal withTudjman over the Krajina and Sector East (see below)., We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bo~nia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

• Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;

• Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);

• Possibly going even further to broker a Belgrade-Zagreb deal whereby Milosevic would abandon the Krajina (Sectors North and South) to Tudjman in return for a piece of Sector East and assurances regarding Bosnian Serb confederation with the FRY following a settlement; and

• Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

 

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation .. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

 

 

Annex 1: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

 

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

• We would begin with a heart-to-heart talk with the:Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they must think more realistically about the shape of a settlement (map, constitutional arrangements, even 51 :49). They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the CG plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory. CG contacts or proximity talks with Pale.

• In talks with Pale, we would float possible modifications to the Contact Group map. At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive teritory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa --and possibly Gorazde --plus a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional tenitory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppe, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.

• Ultimately, we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51% if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible Federation frontiers in Central Bosnia.

• We would, similarly, develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.

• If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 Invincible package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the peaceful separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.

• We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans, including the prospect of EU association agreements, designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

• We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);

• Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large~scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.

• At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for noncompliance, we would increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps, such as suspending all non-strategic trade sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia and/or really seals the border, and perhaps lifting vice suspending a few of the phase-one sanctions .

 

 

https://www.sendspace.com/file/kscy7e

[cedo]

 

[pasha]

 

[nautilus]

jedina iznenadjujuca stvar je ta sto je ovo radio samo jedan covek. naravno da su znali cime se bavi i naravno da su mu davali delove informacija kao sredstvo pritiska na one koji donose odluke. poprilicno je naivno pretpostaviti da ga neko od stotina kontakata nije prijavio i da ga nisu pratili. mislim, jugoslovenski diplomata se u natou raspituje o vojnim planovima.

[namenski]

36 minutes ago, nautilus said:

jugoslovenski diplomata se u natou raspituje o vojnim planovima.

Jel' Srbin? 

Ako je k'o onaj Djems Bond, Dusko Popov, kako se zvase, onaj sto bez koga bi WW2 bio izgubljen, onda je to druga stvar, da vidi NATO cija majka crnu vunu....