Hladni rat

[fikret selimbašić]

:Hail:

[Zaz_pi]

Da li znate da je prvi čovek u svemiru bio rus, Jurij Gagarin?btw.

-Koliko se secam iz Poznavanja prirode i drustva Juri Gagarin bese Rus.-Milj V-12 su eksperimentalni modeli koji se nalaze izmedju helikoptera i tiltrotora. Da je projekat nastavljen verovatno bi dobili nesto slicno V-22 Osprey. Posto je njihova konstrukcija avionska sa postavljenim horizontalnim rotorima na krajevima. To je odlika tiltrotora. Prvo prototip V-12 je pao, drugi je postigao rekord u kolicini podignutog tereta.Medjutim, Mi-26 je duza letelica od V-12. Razlog za veci teret kod V-12 je sto V-12 ima trup aviona dok je Mi-26 "tipicni" helikopter sa repom i rotorom i kada rotori rade on je duzi od V-12. Kada vec hoces da se nadgornjavas. Iako je smesno poredjenje. Ali, da, Sovjeti su napravili letelicu koja je najvise podigla.Ostali modeli koji se stavio, narocito Hughes XH-28, ne bih komentarisao. Jer su bili operativni manje i od V-12.- Mislio sam da je ovo ozbiljna prica gde se stavljaju slike i dogadjaji iz Hladnog rata a ne fikcija koja bi mogla da se pored sa Hulkom.Ozbiljna propaganda su dela Toma Klensija koja se cesto oslanjaju na stvarne dogadjaje poput Lova na Crveni Oktobar ili Crveni zec, pa se onda nadgradjuje prica. Primera rad, Red Storm rising je pisao uz pomoc mornarickog oficira, gde je opisao glavne NATO i SSSR baze u Evopi, sva oruzja obe strane, moguce nacine napada SSSR strategijski itd. Mogu da ti na knjizevnosti prepricam knjigu. Doduse, koliko je ovo ozbiljno mogao bih i ovde. Izgleda da je to neka vazna stavka u Hladnom ratu Uzgred, Klensi je neocon i ima veze u americkoj obavestajnoj zajednici i price su vrlo cesto povezane sa onim sto se stvarno desava u svetu. Da ne govorim o ekranizacijama njegovih knjiga.Ono sto sam ja hteo da uradim je da stavim detalje iz Mitrohinovog arhiva o raznim operacijam KGB poput Operacije Progres ili da pricam o Maksu.

While fulfilling his diplomatic duties in the second half of the year 1952,[MAKS] twice visited Yugoslavia, where he was well received. He had accessto the social group close to Tito’s staff and was given the promise of a personalaudience with Tito. The post held by MAKS at the present time makes it possibleto use his capabilities for active measures against Tito.

Hulk Hladni rat prica me je ipak malo pokolebala. -Koje si knjige o Hladnom ratu procitao ako nije tajna? Ne crtace, strip, dokumentarac na Discovery ili sajt Kalifornijskog vazdhuholovnog drustva.

[bigvlada]

-Koliko se secam iz Poznavanja prirode i drustva Juri Gagarin bese Rus.

To je problem sa umetnošću vređanja. Ne vredi zezati nekoga da iznosi očigledne stvari kada on ne shvata da ga zezaju.

-Milj V-12 su eksperimentalni modeli koji se nalaze izmedju helikoptera i tiltrotora. Da je projekat nastavljen verovatno bi dobili nesto slicno V-22 Osprey. Posto je njihova konstrukcija avionska sa postavljenim horizontalnim rotorima na krajevima. To je odlika tiltrotora. Prvo prototip V-12 je pao, drugi je postigao rekord u kolicini podignutog tereta.Medjutim, Mi-26 je duza letelica od V-12. Razlog za veci teret kod V-12 je sto V-12 ima trup aviona dok je Mi-26 "tipicni" helikopter sa repom i rotorom i kada rotori rade on je duzi od V-12. Kada vec hoces da se nadgornjavas. Iako je smesno poredjenje. Ali, da, Sovjeti su napravili letelicu koja je najvise podigla.Ostali modeli koji se stavio, narocito Hughes XH-28, ne bih komentarisao. Jer su bili operativni manje i od V-12.

Lepo si ti prepisao Vikipediju ali ostaje činjenica da si tvrdio da je MI 26 najveći. A nije. Verujem da tamo možeš i da nađeš definiciju kako tiltrotora tako i helikoptera. Pa se onda vrati i pročitaj ponovo šta si napisao u vezi v12 i v22.

Mislio sam da je ovo ozbiljna prica gde se stavljaju slike i dogadjaji iz Hladnog rata a ne fikcija koja bi mogla da se pored sa Hulkom.

Mislio sam i ja a onda sam naleteo na post o Tu 144 i Mi 26. Očekujem da nas prosvetliš činjenicom da su rusi prvi lansirali veštački satelit. Nemoj nas izneveriti.

Ozbiljna propaganda su dela Toma Klensija koja se cesto oslanjaju na stvarne dogadjaje poput Lova na Crveni Oktobar ili Crveni zec, pa se onda nadgradjuje prica.

Po čemu je on ozbiljnija propaganda od Džona Haketa ili Kolijersa? Broju prodatih knjiga?

Primera rad, Red Storm rising je pisao uz pomoc mornarickog oficira, gde je opisao glavne NATO i SSSR baze u Evopi, sva oruzja obe strane, moguce nacine napada SSSR strategijski itd. Mogu da ti na knjizevnosti prepricam knjigu. Doduse, koliko je ovo ozbiljno mogao bih i ovde. Izgleda da je to neka vazna stavka u Hladnom ratu Uzgred, Klensi je neocon i ima veze u americkoj obavestajnoj zajednici i price su vrlo cesto povezane sa onim sto se stvarno desava u svetu. Da ne govorim o ekranizacijama njegovih knjiga.

Jel' ti to prepričavaš reader's digest rainbow six-a? Da li treba da očekujem i kratki opis igre?

Ono sto sam ja hteo da uradim je da stavim detalje iz Mitrohinovog arhiva o raznim operacijam KGB poput Operacije Progres ili da pricam o Maksu.Hulk Hladni rat prica me je ipak malo pokolebala.

Procenio si to oštrim letimičnim pogledom ili si sačekao da ja postavim skenove kompletnih tekstova?

-Koje si knjige o Hladnom ratu procitao ako nije tajna? Ne crtace, strip, dokumentarac na Discovery ili sajt Kalifornijskog vazdhuholovnog drustva.

Knjigometrija ti je završni argument? Koliko ti imaš godina?Ako te tema zanima, onda čitaš originalne studije i ostalu deklasifikovanu dokumentaciju iz tog perioda i sam stvaraš mišljenje, ne kupuješ i čitaš nečije tuđe.

[Prospero]

[bigvlada]

Projekat Horizont, američka vojna baza na Mesecu, kapaciteta 12 vojnika, početak rada 1965. godineProject HORIZON Volume I:Summary ans Supporting Considerations (PDF format – 17Mb)http://www.history.army.mil/faq/horizon/Horizon_V1.pdfProject HORIZON Volume II:Technical Considerations and Plans (PDF Format - 33Mb)http://www.history.army.mil/faq/horizon/Horizon_V2.pdfOvo je jako interesantan dokument, kako zbog sadržaja tako i zbog vremena u kome je napisan. Izradila ga je Future Projects Design Branch armijske ABMA agencije (Army Ballistic Missile Agency) u martu 1959 godine, dakle posle Sputnjika a pre Vastoka. Vidi se da su Amerikanci naučili lekciju o uticaju kosmičkih istraživanja na globalno javno mnjenje i prestiž zemlje. Glavna svrha baze na Mesecu je naučno istraživanje, nadzor Zemlje, komunikacioni relej i eventualne vojne operacije. Zaključeno je da je mnogo lakše braniti mesečevu bazu nego je napadati pa je i to jedan od razloga zašto SAD mora tamo biti prva, pre Rusa. Pogotovo što je 1957. napomenuto da će pedesetogodišnjicu Oktobarske revolucije neki sovjetski građani proslaviti na Mesecu. Ovde su Amerikanci i dalje mislili da će prvi poslati čoveka u kosmos. Oni i jesu bili bliži jer je Redstone raketa bila dovoljna za podorbtalni let. Ali su čekali Atlas i ispustili šansu. Mogli su i do Meseca ranije, da je korištena Gemini kapsula za dve osobe umesto potpuno nove Apolo. Projekcije ove vojne baze se zasnivaju na lansiranjima Saturn I i II raketa za koje se pretpostavljalo da će biti operativne 1963 odnosno 1964 godine i koje bi zajedno trebale da imaju 72 lansiranja do kraja 1964 godine. Gradnja baze bi zahtevala lansiranje 61 rakete Saturn I i 88 raketa Saturn II do Novembra 1966 godine, plus još 64 rakete u narednoj godini. Ukupno je trebalo preneti nešto malo manje od 350 tona opreme na Mesec.Koliko je ovo bilo nerealno govore činjenica da je ukupno lansirano 9 Saturna I dok Saturn II koji je trebao da popuni prazninu između Saturna I sa nosivošću od oko 20 tona i Saturna V sa 100 tona nikada nije sišao sa papira. Da nije bilo rata u Vijetnamu ovo bi se možda i ostvarilo. Cifre jesu ogromne (6 milijardi dolara, oko 700 miliona dolara godišnje) ali su one tada činile samo 2% tadašnjeg budžeta ministarstva odbrane. Interesantan je i izbor lansirnih lokacija, Brazil ili Božićno ostrvo, kako bi se do maksimuma iskoristio potencijal nosivosti rakete lansiranjem sa ekvatora. Ja zastupam stanovište da je ubedljivo najbolja geografska lokacija za glavnu svetsku kosmičku luku pustinja severno od Mogadiša, u Somaliji. Na ekvatoru je, jako slabo naseljena, ako nešto eksplodira pada u Indijski oekan, blizu je svetskih pomorskih puteva, moguć je transport komponenata putem, železnicom, kanalom ili morem. Da taj napaćeni narod izabere rukovodstvo koje je dovoljno mudro da ponudi koncesije Rusima i Kinezima (Amerikanci to nikada neće uraditi iz bezbednosnih razloga kako glede ljudstva tako i iznošenja klasifikovane tehnologije van SAD-a) za po dve univerzalne lansirne rampe za njihove rakete, plivali bi u lovi. I Rusi i Kinezi se trude da razviju koncept univerzalne lansirne rampe, tj. lansirnog kompleksa koji bi bio sposoban da opsluži ceo spektar raketa kojima zemlja raspolaže. Nakon tog prvog uspeha, vidim i Japan, Indiju i EU kako lansiraju svoje rakete iz Afrike.Dobar deo prvog dokumenta se odnosi na Kosmičko pravo i pravne odnose među državama van Zemljine orbite. Kako postupati u slučaju da druga strana pošalje sondu sa zastavom i položi pravo na Mesec? A kako ako pošalje ljude i izjavi istu stvar? Pretpostavljam da se Kosmičko pravo još uvek ne izučava na Pravnom Fakultetu? :DDrugi dokument je više tehnički orijentisan, i razmatra konkretne sisteme koji bi bili korišteni za prevoz ljudstva, snabdevanje, gradnju i održavanje baze kao i istraživanje Meseca.U maju 1961 godine, američka avijacija (tj. njen Air Force Space Systems Division )je predstavila svoj plan mesečeve baze, projekat Lunex ko ji predviđa mesečevu bazu do 1967 godine.www.astronautix.com/data/lunex.pdfOvaj projekat se naslanja na USAF studije iz 1958,1959 i 1960 godine (one nažalost još nisu objavljene – ili ja ne umem da ih nađem). U odnosu na armijski dokument, ovo je mnogo opštija studija, sa malo konkretnih detalja. Korišćenje Kejp Kanaverala je još jedan minus u odnosu na Horizont jer povlači manju nosivost istih raketa nosača.

[bigvlada]

Avione na nuklearni pogon sam pominjao par puta, u kontekstu kako strateške avijacije tako i vremenskog okvira (koliko je vremena trebalo da protekne od prvog reaktora do dovoljno malog reaktora koji se mogao ugraditi u avion u okviru priče o budućim fuzionim reakorima i kosmičkim brodovima sa fuzionim reaktorima). Članak daje malo više detalja o sovjetskim radovima na tom polju. Imao sam negde i američku studiju o mogućnostima za gradnju baze koja bi ospluživala takve avione, postaviću je ako uspem da je iskopam. Soviet Experimentation with Nuclear Powered Bombersby Raul ColonThe Tupolev Tu-95M was used as a flying test-bed to develop a nuclear powered bomber and was given the designation Tu-95LAL.In the late 1940s, as the Cold War began to heat-up, the Soviet Union began research into the development of nuclear reactors as power sources to drive warships. The work was performed at first by an academic Russian engineer, I.V. Kurchatov, which added aviation as a possible recipient of the new nuclear power plants. On August 12th, 1955 the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a mandate which ordered certain groups within the aviation industry to join forces in this research. As a direct result of the mandate, the design bureaus of Andrei Tupolev and Vladimir Myasishchev became the appointed chief design teams on a project to develop and produce several aircraft designs intended to be powered by nuclear propulsion while a bureau headed by N.D. Kuznetsov and A.M. Lyulka, were assigned to develop the engines for the aircraft.They promptly decided on an energy transfer method— Direct Cycle. This method would enable the engines to use energy supplied by a reactor, that would replace the combustion chamber of a jet engine. Several types of nuclear powered engines were tested: ramjet, turboprop and turbojet, with different transfer mechanisms for transmitting the nuclear generated thermal energy. After extensive experimentation with various engines and transfer systems, Soviet engineers concluded that the direct cycle turbojet engine offered the best alternative.In the direct cycle power transfer configuration, the incoming air enter through the compressor mechanism of the turbojet engine, then, passes through a plenum that direct the air to the reactor core. Then the air, by this time acting as the reactor coolant additive, is constantly heated as its move through the core. After exiting the core, the air goes back to another plenum and from there is directed to the turbine section of the engines for thrust production. New coolant systems were also tested, as it was the protective shielding for the crew cabin. This and the size of the initial nuclear power plants were the main problem facing engineers working on the project. Shielding the crew and reducing the size and weight of the reactors in order to fit one on an airframe became the main technical hurdle in the project.The Tupolev bureau, knowing the complexity of the task assigned to them, estimated that it would be two decades before the program could produce a working prototype. They assumed that the first operational nuclear-assisted airplane could take to the air in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The program was design to operate in development phases. The first phase was designing and testing a small nuclear reactor, which properly began in late 1955.On March 1956, the Tupolev bureau was assigned by the Council of Ministers of the USSR the task of producing a flying test-bed plane as soon as possible. The Tupolev engineers decided to take an existing Tu-95M bomber and use it as a nuclear flying laboratory, the plane eventual designation were to be Tu-95LAL.Tupolev Tu-95LAL nuclear test-bed airplane.By 1958, the ground phase of the program, the rig used to install the nuclear reactor on the aircraft, was ready for testing. Some time during the summer of 1958, the nuclear power plant was turned on and testing commenced. Immediately, the required level of reactor power was achieved, thus opening the path for the flight test phase.Between May and August 1961, the Tu-95LAL completed 34 research flights. Much of them made with the reactor shut down. The main purpose of the flight phase was examining the effectiveness of the radiation shielding which was one of the main concerns for the engineers. The massive amount of liquid sodium, beryllium oxide, cadmium, paraffin wax and steel plates; were the sole source of protection for the crew against the deadly radiation emerging from the core. The results were once again promising. Radiation levels were low on the crew cabin, paving the way for the bureau to design a new airframe.The next phase in the program was to produce a test aircraft designed from the beginning to use nuclear power as its main propulsion force. This was to be the Aircraft 119. This aircraft was based on the Tu-95 design. The major distinction was that two of its four engines, inboard, were to be the new NK14a turboprops with heat exchangers. The NK14a operates very similar to the direct cycle engines, the main difference is that the air, after passing through the compressor, does not go to the reactor, it goes directly to the heat exchange system. At the same time, the heat generated by the reactor, carried in the form of fluid; go to the heat exchange system. The combination of these two forces would enable the turbojet to produce the require amount of thrust. The other two outboard engines would remain NK12Ms.The nuclear engine was housed in the bomb bay.The NK Kuznetsov Design Bureau commenced work on the engines at the same time that the schematics of Aircraft 119 were drawn. As in the Tu-95LAL, the internal bomb bay would house the reactor. The connections leading from the reactor to the engines would run thru the main fuselage, up to the wings and then directly to the heat exchangers attached to the two inboard engines. Tupolev estimated that the first 119 were to be available for runway trials by late 1965. After trials, the 119 engines were to be replaced by a four NK14a engine configuration based on the Tu-114 commercial liner. However, the 119 never made it out of the drawing board. Budgetary constraints and the development of new conventional aircrafts designs were cited as the main reason for the cancellation of the program in August 1966.The cancellation of Aircraft 119 did not mean that the Soviet Union terminated its research into a nuclear powered aircraft. Several attempts were made in designing a nuclear-powered, supersonic bomber. Around the same time that Tupolev began working on the 119, there was a parallel program code named Aircraft 120. Vast amounts of research hours were invested on this project. Most of them on the design of a new turbojet engine and the layout of a new nuclear reactor system that would have been able to offer more protection to the crew and the aircraft sensitive avionics systems.Aircraft 120 was to be fitted with two turbojet engines on development by Kuznetsov. The reactor was to be installed near the rear part of the plane, as far from the cabin as possible. The crew consisted of the pilot, co-pilot, and navigator; enclosed in a heavy lead radiation shielding cabin. The 120 would have a conventional aerodynamics configuration with a high mounted 45 degrees swept wing, a swept empennage and a tricycle landing gear. Tupolev’s goal of reaching the testing phase for the 120 in the late 1970s never materialized, as with the 119, the 120 existence was only on the drawing board. Termination of the program was mainly for the same reasons as for the 119’s.Next for Tupolev was the Aircraft 132. Another attempt by the Soviets to produce a serviceable nuclear powered bomber. The 132 was conceived as a low-level strike aircraft. The design 132 would have housed the reactor in the front two turbojet engines, the entire package would be accommodated in the rear of the airframe. The engines were to be designed to operate with nuclear power or with conventional kerosene. The kerosene would be only used for take-off and landing operations and the fuel would be housed in a tank installed in front of the reactor. As with the 120, the 132 would have had a conventional configuration, with the cabin, again, heavily shielded.The main difference was the wings configuration. The 132 would have been a delta wing plane. The empennage was also to be swept and the horizontal stabilizer was to be located on top of the fin. As with the other projects, the 132 was cancelled in the mid 1960s for budgetary and, most importantly, technical difficulties.Initial M-60 with trapezoid wing. (Image courtesy of Avicopress ©)One last attempt was made by the Tupolev bureau to achieve a nuclear powered aircraft. This aircraft would have been supersonic, long ranged bomber designed to compete with Convair’s B-58 Hustler supersonic medium bomber. This time, the aircraft did not make it to the drawing board. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union decided to abandon further research into the feasibility of a nuclear powered aircraft. The main reason given to the bureaus involved in the project was that with the introduction of more accurate and less expensive Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles aboard nuclear powered Soviet submarines; the Soviet Union could achieve the same degree of nuclear capability at a fraction of the cost. Also, in consideration, but rarely mentioned by the Soviets, was the ecological impact of a crash during operations. Should one of these aircrafts were to crash in a populated area, the radiation fallout could have been disastrous.Another nuclear powered aircraft program was started by the Myasishchev Design Bureau in the summer of 1955. On May 19th, 1955; a resolution passed by SovMin ordering Myasishchev to commence development of a supersonic nuclear bomber. The bureau first design was code name M-60. The first draft of the project was finished on July 1956. At the same time, Lyulka’s new engine design that would comprise a nuclear/turbojet engine with the heat the reactor generates transferred through air to the jet, a power plant configuration known as an Open System; would give the M-60 49,600 lbs of thrust. The aircraft would take-off and land with a chemical mixture fuel as its propulsion. On reaching the desired operational altitude, the nuclear system would engage and provide the M-60 with its cruise speed. This engine configuration and thrust would have given the M-60 the ability to achieve Mach 2 speeds. Crew accommodations were to be housed in the center of the fuselage, again, in an all enclosed, lead shielding cabin. The cabin configuration would have curtailed visual observation. Consistent with other Soviet nuclear configurations, the reactor would be housed on the rear of the aircraft to offer further protection.The initial fuselage configuration called for a long, slim airplane with trapezoid wings and a trapezoid T-shaped tail. The nuclear/jet engines were to be placed side-by-side in the fuselage. The length of the M-60 was proposed at 169 ft, 3.5in; with a wing span of 86 ft, 11in. Sub sequential designs modifications of the M-60 had the aircraft fitted with four engines, mated as pairs at the rear of the airframe. As with the other nuclear programs, a tricycle undercarriage was selected for the M-60.M-50 Bounder.Later, a swept wing variant of the M-60 design was introduced in December 1957— it called for the M-60 to be a delta winged design with both engines placed on under wing pylons and in tip nacelles which resemble the configuration of the M-50 Bounder. After extensive research, the Myasishchev bureau determined that with the correct nuclear power plants, a strategic bomber with a 1,989 mph speed, an operational range of 15,500 miles, and a service ceiling of 65,600 ft was achievable.The M-60 also did not make it out of the planning stage. After the cancellation of the M-60 program in 1959, the Myasishchev bureau put much of its research assets on the M-30 program, which started back in 1953; but by this time, SovMin interest on a nuclear powered aircraft was waning. Several other attempts were made to design an operational nuclear aircraft, chiefly the M-30, but also the M-62 program, ran similar along the lines of the M-60 The final blow to the nuclear powered aircraft program came in early 1961, when the Soviet leadership called for the abandoning of all related programs, thus ending one of the their most expensive and technically challenging programs ever. The end of the M-60 and the M-30 was also the end of Myasishchev’s affiliation with the design and production of heavy bombers.At the time of the cancellation of the program, the overall state of available technology, atomic science and aerodynamic designs, had progressed to the point that if the program had run its service course, it is very plausible that the Soviet Union would have reached its goal of deploying a nuclear powered bomber platform by the late 1970s. Instead, the flow of new aerodynamic information and designs, the vast amount of economic resources needed in the program, not only to develop a nuclear powered bomber, but to maintain it were cited as the reason for the cancellation. Also the emergence of a new Soviet doctrine that would rely heavily on the new submarine launched ICBM; with improve targeting mechanism, coupled with the sheer number of Land Based ICBMs that the Soviets were rapidly deploying, doomed the Soviet nuclear power bomber program. At around the same time the Soviets commenced its nuclear powered aircraft program, the other Cold War warrior, the United States, was already working at a fast pace to field its own nuclear bomber, but that story is for another time@•The author Paul Colon is a freelance writer who resides in San Juan Puerto Rico. rcolonfrias@yahoo.comhttp://www.aviation-...uke-bombers.htmSources* Indigenous Bombers (1945-2000) Part I: SM Ganin, AV Karpenko, VV Kolnogorov; Bastion 2001* Soviet X-Planes: Alan Dawes; Key Publishing 2001* Yakolev Aircraft since 1924: Bill Gunston and Yefim Gordon; Putnam 1996* Supersonic Myasishchevs; Piotr Butowski; Air Enthusiast No.82 Jan/Feb 1998

Edited December 21, 2012 by bigvlada

[bigvlada]

Flying on Nuclear, The American Effort to Built a Nuclear Powered Bomberby Raul Colon The NB-36H was a modified Convair B-36 Peacekeeper that was used as a testbed for an American nuclear powered bomber.Fascination about a potential nuclear power that might offer limitless energy led the United States Air Forces commenced in 1944 as an experimental program, designed to produce an operational nuclear powered bomber. The idea of nuclear propulsion energy to power an aircraft dates back to 1942 when Enrico Fermi, one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, discussed the idea with members of the Manhattan Project. For the first two years, engineers were immersed on the issue of how radiation would affect the performance of a flying platform, its avionics, materials, and more importantly, its crew. The program seemed lost in endless detailed fights and controversies, when in 1947, it received new life. The newly formed U.S. Air Forces decided to invest the necessary resources to make the program feasible. Allocation for ten million dollars was promptly made available to the program. From early 1948 to 1951, extensive research was made in reactor technologies and engine transfer systems; the backbone of the nuclear powered aircraft. Many configurations were proposed, Dual reactor, combination (chemical and nuclear) and single systems were tested. Eventually it was decided that a single reactor would provide the aircraft with the necessary flight reliability. Next came the debate about what type of transfer mechanism would be implemented. Transferring nuclear power to a conventional engine had long been seen by engineers as the main obstacle in the development of the program.In 1949, the program ran a series of tests, known as the Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment (HTRE), involving three types of reactors, with the purpose of determining the most efficient method of transferring energy from the reactor. After an extensive trial series, the HTRE-3 emerged as the selected transfer system. The HTRE-3 was a Direct-Cycle Configuration. In a direct cycle system, the air entered the engine through the compressor of the turbojet, it then moved to a plenum intake that directs the air to the core of the reactor.At this point the air, serving as the reactor coolant, is super-heated as it travels through the core. After that stage, it goes to another plenum intake; from there the air is directed to the turbine section of the engine and eventually to the tailpipe. This configuration allowed the aircraft engine to start on chemical power and then switch to nuclear heat as soon as the core reached optimized operational temperatures, thus providing the proposed aircraft the ability to take-off and land on conventional power.Another system considered was the Indirect-Cycle Configuration. In this configuration, the air did not go through the reactor core, air instead passed through a heat exchanger. The heat generated by the reactor is carried by liquid metal or highly pressurized water, to the heat exchanger where the air is, thus heating the air in its way to the turbine. Engineers preferred the direct-cycle approach due to the fact that was simpler to produce; program managers preferred the idea because its development time was relatively short compared to the indirect system.After establishing the parameters for the power plant and the transfer mechanism, engineers commenced work on the shielding for the crew and aircraft avionic systems. Initial plans called for the shielding of the reactor by massive layers of cadmium, paraffin wax, beryllium oxide, and steel. The idea behind this setting was that the more protection the reactor have, the less shielding the crew cabin would require. Technically, this was a sound approach, but in a rapidly functioning environment such as an aircraft setting, this shielding proved to be ineffective. For this reason it was decided to implement what is known as Shadow Shielding Concept. In shadow shielding, the layers of protection would be equally divided between the reactor and the crew cabin. Shadow Shielding would also provide a more robust protection for the aircraft’s avionics systems. An added plus from the implementation of this system was the reduction in the weight of the aircraft due to the distribution of the shield.Having tackled the reactor, transfer mechanism, and shielding problems, the program moved it to the aircraft design stage. By late 1951, the program was heavily involved in the acquisition of a test-bed type aircraft for the initial trials of the configuration. The only proven airframe large enough to carry the massive reactor and Heat Transfer system was the Convair’s B-36 Peacekeeper Bomber. The Peacemaker started to enter front line service with the U.S. Air Force in late 1948 and at the time of the nuclear powered program, was the Strategic Air Command (SAC) main nuclear deterrent platform. The B-36 was indeed massive. The dimensions are impressive even today. A wingspan of 230 ft, a length of 162 ft 1in, high of 46 ft 8in, and a wind area of 4,772sq ft. This bomber maximum take-off weight was an amazing 410,000 lbs—which is why the program managers selected the B-36. A service ceiling of 39,900 ft and a climb rate of 2,220 ft per minute were also pluses in the selection process. Once the testing aircraft had been identified, the next phase would commence at once—the conversion of the B-36 into an experimental aircraft. The main modification made to the original B-36 airframe was on the nose cone section. The original crew and avionics cabin was replaced by a massive 11 ton structure lined with lead, and rubber. Water tanks were also placed in the aft section of the frame to absorb any escaping radiation.A special shielded cockpit was installed in the NB-36HThe other section of the plane that underwent significant modifications was the rear-internal bomb bay. Internal cross sections were removed as well as many of the bomb carrying rafts in order to make space for the nuclear reactor power plant. These alterations made it possible for the aircraft to receive a new designation. It is from this moment on that this sole B-36 Peacemaker, number c/n 51-5712, sample would be called Nuclear Test Aircraft-36. An additional designation change was made when the nuclear powered plant was installed on the aircraft. Thus the NB-36 “Crusader” was born.Identifying the aircraft was the radioactivity symbol painted on the tailfin. The R-1, one standing for the energy it would generate, a one megawatt; reactor installed on the aircraft was a liquid-sodium cooled power plant winched up into the plane’s bomb bay at a dedicated pit on Convair’s Fort Worth plant every time the NB-36 was scheduled to take to the air. When the NB-36 landed, the R-1 was removed for research purposes.The original B-36 was powered by six Pratt & Whitney 3600 hp, R4360-53 radial piston engines, supplemented by four General Electric 13,500 lb thrust J47-19 turbojets. After conversion, the engines were removed and a new configuration was incorporated. The NB-36 now had four GE J47 nuclear converted piston engines generating 3,800 hp augmented by four 23.13 kn turbojets generating 5,200 lbs of thrust. Each of the engines utilized the Direct-Cycle Configuration for power conversion. The NB-36 was designed from the beginning, to be propelled to the air with a conventional chemical mixture, and then the crew would switch on the reactor after achieving the necessary heat requirements on its core. On landing approaches, the aircraft would switch back to chemical mixture. This procedure was implemented in order to minimize the possibility of a major radiation leak in case of a crash landing.The Heat Transfer System Being loaded into the bomb-bay of Convair NB-36H.The NB-36 made 47 recorded flights between the summer of 1955 and the fall of 1957. All these tests were made operating the NB-36 with conventional chemical power. The R-1 reactor was turned-on on many of these flights, not to actually power the aircraft, but to test and collect data on the feasibility of a sustained nuclear reaction on a moving platform. All the data collected by these tests showed the program managers that the possibility of using a nuclear power plant to provide an aircraft with unlimited operational range was indeed at their disposal at this time. Impressive as the taxi and flight testing were for the NB-36, the complete concept of a nuclear powered aircraft was made irrelevant by advances in conventional aircraft and engine design and the public concern about the dangers of flying a nuclear reactor over their homeland. In the end, after expending no less than $469,350,000 on the nuclear powered program and having a concept aircraft flying, the U.S. Air Force shelf the program in the late 1960s, thus ending any major attempt by the United States to utilizing nuclear propulsion to impulse an aircraft in combat.@The author Paul Colon is a freelance writer who resides in San Juan Puerto Rico. rcolonfrias@yahoo.comSources1. Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-Planes, and Experimental Aircraft; Edit Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press – 20052. Peacetime Use of Atomic Energy; Martin Mann, The Viking Press – 19613. The X Plane; Jay Miller, Aerofax – 19884. Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program; Metal Progress – 19595. The World Encyclopedia of Bombers; Francis Crosby, Anness Publishing - 2004http://www.aviation-history.com/articles/nuke-american.htm

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Ovo je prevod sa arapskog (na koji je preveden sa nemačkog a original je engleski, ipak dovoljno je razumljivo), originalni članak je iz 1958. godine, sa informacijama koje su onda bile javno dostupne.http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=de&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=ar&ie=UTF-8&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.castor.de%2Ftechnik%2Fatomkraft%2F08_1958%2F72.htmlOdličan serijal članaka na francuskom (link je google prevod) o istorijatu razvoja aviona na nuklearni pogon u SAD i SSSR-u. Dosta slika i bibliografija. Možda najzanimljiviji je projekat Pluton, interkontinentalna balistička raketa kojoj je izvor energije nuklearni reaktor. Praktično, nuklearni ramjet motor. Kod klasičnog ramjet motora, vazduh se usisa, doda se gorivo, zapali i izbaci. Ovde je to jednostavnije jer nema goriva, reaktor se koristi da zagreje vazduh koji se izbacuje i stvara potisak. Želeli su projektil koji bi stalno bio u vazduhu, mesecima (godinama kada tehnologija to bude dozvolila), spreman da za par minuta raznese protivnički cilj. Pravi SF Doomsday device.http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fjpcolliat.free.fr%2Fx6%2Fx6-1.htmOvaj tekst govori o jednom od tih istraživačkih centara. Obratite pažnju na oklopnu lokomotivu, oklopni hangar i oklopljene tunele za posadu. http://www.inl.gov/proving-the-principle/chapter_13.pdf

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Da sve ne bude istraživanje i razvoj namenjen isključivo efikasnijem genocidu, pobrinula se NASA. LARGE NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBSONIC AIRCRAFT FOR TRANSOCEANIC COMMERCEhttp://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19710028801_1971028801.pdfRaspravlja se o floti od 500-1000 aviona sa vertikalnim poletanjem i sletanjem koji bi pokrili oko 8% interkontinentalnog transporta projektovanog za 1980. godinu, odnosno 4% transporta iz 1995 godine. Jačina zaštitnog oklopa zavisi od snage reaktora a rešenje podrazumeva zračenje koje je manje od kosmičkog zračenja na oko 10km visine. Važna stvar je što se akcenat stavlja na konkretne brojke koštanja da se kontejner sa robom preveze sa tačke a do tačke b i koliki procent korisnka bi platio cenu višu od brodskog transporta za razliku u brzini dostave. Studija je iz 1971. godine.DESIGN ANALYSIS OF A SUBSONIC NUCLEAR-POWERED LOGISTICAIRPLANE WITH HELIUM -COOLED REACTORhttp://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19630010644_1963010644.pdfMnogo starija studija, iz 1959. godine, koja se takođe bavi transportnim avionom.Ljudi su potrošili decenije svog života (neki su i stradali pri tome) i brdo novca da bi učinili avion na nuklearni pogon realnim. I SAD i SSSR su imali realne planove i tehnologiju koja bi im omogućila da konstruišu takve avione. Taj trud nije bio uzaludan jer bi nuklearni avioni tek mogli da dožive svoju revoluciju. Danas, kada je nauka o materijalima kilometrima dalje od stanja iz polovine pedesetih i kada se obraća pažnja na drugu vrstu reaktora, nuklearni avion može biti sagrađen. Da ne bi mnogo gnjavio oko toga, pročitajte članak o Torijumu kao gorivu za reaktorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium_fuel_cycleOvaj članak lepo sumira trenutno stanje stvari, tj. ko se najviše protivi takvim reaktorima a ko ih oberučke prihvata. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/7970619/Obama-could-kill-fossil-fuels-overnight-with-a-nuclear-dash-for-thorium.htmlDanašnji klasični reaktori od 100MW teže 500 tona i mogu da stanu na prikolicu kamiona. Torijumski su lakši jer ne rade pod pritiskom. Posebno interesantna podkategorija su podkritični reaktori kod kojih se nuklearne reakcije dešavaju samo ako imaju spoljni podsticaj (tj. ako nestane struje reaktor se gasi). To može biti uranijum ili plutonijum, ali su mnogo interesantniji oni koji umesto goriva koriste akcelerator čestica. Ovakav demonstrator je dovoljno mali da se utovari u avion, napretkom tehnologije može samo da bude još manjihttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2001548/Electron-Model-Many-Applications-Technology-save-world.htmlVeliki transportni avioni (čitaj ekranoplani) sa nosivošću od 4000 tona (da, bilo je projekata takvih letelica na hemijski pogon) sa ili bez posade koji bi mogli da sleću na vodu ili kopno bi mogli da ispune neke od zadataka koji su nuklearnim avionima namenjeni u onoj studiji gore.

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U drugoj polovini pedesetih godina 20. veka, Amerikanci i Kanađani su utrošili dosta vremena i novca kako bi napravili letelicu sa vertikalnim poletanjem i sletanjem koja bi mogla da razvije brzinu do tri maha. Iako se u dokumentaciji koristi naziv aircraft, reč je o letećem tanjiru. To je bio niz sve sofisticiranijih projekata kanadske kompanije Avro, koju je finansirala američka vojska. 2001 godine je deklasifikovana dokumentacija o jednoj fazi razvoja, koja je krštena kao Projekat 1794 (može se naći i kao Avro silver bug i projekat sa prototipom p.v. 704). Od prošle godine je dokumentacija dostupna javnosti. Jako interesantan princip, ali na kraju se ispostavilo da kombinacija mlaznog motora i hemijskog goriva ne može da izvrši poveren zadatak. To je trebao da bude izviđač, presretač pa čak i lovac-bombarder. Ostaje pitanje da li je sam koncept pogrešan ili mu jednostavno treba nova pogonska grupa i izvor energije. Sličice iz dokumentacije

i skenovi dokumenataProject Planning Report Project 1794http://www.secretsdeclassified.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-121113-017.pdfProject Planning Report Project 1794 Final Development Reporthttp://www.secretsdeclassified.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-121113-019.pdfSpecial Projects Group Technical Report No. 112http://www.secretsdeclassified.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-121113-024.pdfUntitled Project 1794 Reporthttp://www.secretsdeclassified.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-121113-026.pdfKada se vidi koliko je truda uloženo u dizajn opreme koja bi testirala pojedine podsisteme, svaka priča o nemačkim letećim tanjirima (a na Internetu ih ima mnoštvo) pada u vodu. Oni nisu mogli imati ni znanja i tehnologiju da to izvedu.

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pretrčao sam ga na brzaka, ali da ga okačim:

The Real Cuban Missile CrisisEverything you think you know about those 13 days is wrong. By BENJAMIN SCHWARZCustomers in the electronics section of a department store watch as JFK addresses the nation, October 22, 1962. (Ralph Crane/Time-Life Pictures/Getty)On october 16, 1962, John F. Kennedy and his advisers were stunned to learn that the Soviet Union was, without provocation, installing nuclear-armed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. With these offensive weapons, which represented a new and existential threat to America, Moscow significantly raised the ante in the nuclear rivalry between the superpowers—a gambit that forced the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. On October 22, the president, with no other recourse, proclaimed in a televised address that his administration knew of the illegal missiles, and delivered an ultimatum insisting on their removal, announcing an American “quarantine” of Cuba to force compliance with his demands. While carefully avoiding provocative action and coolly calibrating each Soviet countermeasure, Kennedy and his lieutenants brooked no compromise; they held firm, despite Moscow’s efforts to link a resolution to extrinsic issues and despite predictable Soviet blustering about American aggression and violation of international law. In the tense 13‑day crisis, the Americans and Soviets went eyeball-to-eyeball. Thanks to the Kennedy administration’s placid resolve and prudent crisis management—thanks to what Kennedy’s special assistant Arthur Schlesinger Jr. characterized as the president’s “combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve, and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated, that [it] dazzled the world”—the Soviet leadership blinked: Moscow dismantled the missiles, and a cataclysm was averted.

• The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory By Sheldon M. SternStanford

Every sentence in the above paragraph describing the Cuban missile crisis is misleading or erroneous. But this was the rendition of events that the Kennedy administration fed to a credulous press; this was the history that the participants in Washington promulgated in their memoirs; and this is the story that has insinuated itself into the national memory—as the pundits’ commentaries and media coverage marking the 50th anniversary of the crisis attested.Scholars, however, have long known a very different story: since 1997, they have had access to recordings that Kennedy secretly made of meetings with his top advisers, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (the “ExComm”). Sheldon M. Stern—who was the historian at the John F. Kennedy Library for 23 years and the first scholar to evaluate the ExComm tapes—is among the numerous historians who have tried to set the record straight. His new book marshals irrefutable evidence to succinctly demolish the mythic version of the crisis. Although there’s little reason to believe his effort will be to any avail, it should nevertheless be applauded.Reached through sober analysis, Stern’s conclusion that “John F. Kennedy and his administration, without question, bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the onset of the Cuban missile crisis” would have shocked the American people in 1962, for the simple reason that Kennedy’s administration had misled them about the military imbalance between the superpowers and had concealed its campaign of threats, assassination plots, and sabotage designed to overthrow the government in Cuba—an effort well known to Soviet and Cuban officials.In the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy had cynically attacked Richard Nixon from the right, claiming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had allowed a dangerous “missile gap” to grow in the U.S.S.R.’s favor. But in fact, just as Eisenhower and Nixon had suggested—and just as the classified briefings that Kennedy received as a presidential candidate indicated—the missile gap, and the nuclear balance generally, was overwhelmingly to America’s advantage. At the time of the missile crisis, the Soviets had 36 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 138 long-range bombers with 392 nuclear warheads, and 72 submarine-launched ballistic-missile warheads (SLBMs). These forces were arrayed against a vastly more powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal of 203 ICBMs, 1,306 long-range bombers with 3,104 nuclear warheads, and 144 SLBMs—all told, about nine times as many nuclear weapons as the U.S.S.R. Nikita Khrushchev was acutely aware of America’s huge advantage not just in the number of weapons but in their quality and deployment as well. Kennedy and his civilian advisers understood that the missiles in Cuba did not alter the strategic nuclear balance.Moreover, despite America’s overwhelming nuclear preponderance, JFK, in keeping with his avowed aim to pursue a foreign policy characterized by “vigor,” had ordered the largest peacetime expansion of America’s military power, and specifically the colossal growth of its strategic nuclear forces. This included deploying, beginning in 1961, intermediate-range “Jupiter” nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey—adjacent to the Soviet Union. From there, the missiles could reach all of the western U.S.S.R., including Moscow and Leningrad (and that doesn’t count the nuclear-armed “Thor” missiles that the U.S. already had aimed at the Soviet Union from bases in Britain).The Jupiter missiles were an exceptionally vexing component of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Because they sat aboveground, were immobile, and required a long time to prepare for launch, they were extremely vulnerable. Of no value as a deterrent, they appeared to be weapons meant for a disarming first strike—and thus greatly undermined deterrence, because they encouraged a preemptive Soviet strike against them. The Jupiters’ destabilizing effect was widely recognized among defense experts within and outside the U.S. government and even by congressional leaders. For instance, Senator Albert Gore Sr., an ally of the administration, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that they were a “provocation” in a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1961 (more than a year and a half before the missile crisis), adding, “I wonder what our attitude would be” if the Soviets deployed nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Senator Claiborne Pell raised an identical argument in a memo passed on to Kennedy in May 1961.Given America’s powerful nuclear superiority, as well as the deployment of the Jupiter missiles, Moscow suspected that Washington viewed a nuclear first strike as an attractive option. They were right to be suspicious. The archives reveal that in fact the Kennedy administration had strongly considered this option during the Berlin crisis in 1961.It’s little wonder, then, that, as Stern asserts—drawing on a plethora of scholarship including, most convincingly, the historian Philip Nash’s elegant 1997 study, The Other Missiles of October—Kennedy’s deployment of the Jupiter missiles “was a key reason for Khrushchev’s decision to send nuclear missiles to Cuba.” Khrushchev reportedly made that decision in May 1962, declaring to a confidant that the Americans “have surrounded us with bases on all sides” and that missiles in Cuba would help to counter an “intolerable provocation.” Keeping the deployment secret in order to present the U.S. with a fait accompli, Khrushchev may very well have assumed America’s response would be similar to his reaction to the Jupiter missiles—rhetorical denouncement but no threat or action to thwart the deployment with a military attack, nuclear or otherwise. (In retirement, Khrushchev explained his reasoning to the American journalist Strobe Talbott: Americans “would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine.”)Khrushchev was also motivated by his entirely justifiable belief that the Kennedy administration wanted to destroy the Castro regime. After all, the administration had launched an invasion of Cuba; had followed that with sabotage, paramilitary assaults, and assassination attempts—the largest clandestine operation in the history of the CIA—and had organized large-scale military exercises in the Caribbean clearly meant to rattle the Soviets and their Cuban client. Those actions, as Stern and other scholars have demonstrated, helped compel the Soviets to install the missiles so as to deter “covert or overt US attacks”—in much the same way that the United States had shielded its allies under a nuclear umbrella to deter Soviet subversion or aggression against them.Remarkably, given the alarmed and confrontational posture that Washington adopted during the missile crisis, the tapes of the ExComm deliberations, which Stern has minutely assessed, reveal that Kennedy and his advisers understood the nuclear situation in much the same way Khrushchev did. On the first day of the crisis, October 16, when pondering Khrushchev’s motives for sending the missiles to Cuba, Kennedy made what must be one of the most staggeringly absentminded (or sarcastic) observations in the annals of American national-security policy: “Why does he put these in there, though? … It’s just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] in Turkey. Now that’d be goddamned dangerous, I would think.” McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, immediately pointed out: “Well we did it, Mr. President.”Once that was straightened out, Kennedy himself declared repeatedly that the Jupiter missiles were “the same” as the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Rusk, in discussing the Soviet motivation for sending missiles to Cuba, cited CIA Director John McCone’s view that Khrushchev “knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority … He also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours. Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, had already acknowledged that the Soviets’ primary purpose in installing missiles in Cuba was “to supplement their rather defective ICBM system.The Soviets were entirely justified in their belief that Kennedy wanted to destroy the Castro regime.Kennedy and his civilian advisers understood that the missiles in Cuba did not alter the strategic nuclear balance. Although Kennedy asserted in his October 22 televised address that the missiles were “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas,” he in fact appreciated, as he told the ExComm on the first day of the crisis, that “it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was 90 miles away. Geography doesn’t mean that much.” America’s European allies, Kennedy continued, “will argue thattaken at its worst the presence of these missiles really doesn’t change” the nuclear balance.That the missiles were close to the United States was, as the president conceded, immaterial: the negligible difference in flight times between Soviet Union–based ICBMs and Cuba-based missiles wouldn’t change the consequences when the missiles hit their targets, and in any event, the flight times of Soviet SLBMs were already as short as or shorter than the flight times of the missiles in Cuba would be, because those weapons already lurked in submarines off the American coast (as of course did American SLBMs off the Soviet coast). Moreover, unlike Soviet ICBMs, the missiles in Cuba required several hours to be prepared for launch. Given the effectiveness of America’s aerial and satellite reconnaissance (amply demonstrated by the images of missiles in the U.S.S.R. and Cuba that they yielded), the U.S. almost certainly would have had far more time to detect and respond to an imminent Soviet missile strike from Cuba than to attacks from Soviet bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs.“A missile is a missile,” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asserted. “It makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or Cuba.” On that first day of the ExComm meetings, Bundy asked directly, “What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?” McNamara answered, “Not at all”—a verdict that Bundy then said he fully supported. The following day, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen summarized the views of the ExComm in a memorandum to Kennedy. “It is generally agreed,” he noted, “that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of power—i.e., they do not significantly increase the potential megatonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil, even after a surprise American nuclear strike.”Sorensen’s comment about a surprise attack reminds us that while the missiles in Cuba did not add appreciably to the nuclear menace, they could have somewhat complicated America’s planning for a successful first strike—which may well have been part of Khrushchev’s rationale for deploying them. If so, the missiles paradoxically could have enhanced deterrence between the superpowers, and thereby reduced the risk of nuclear war.Yet, although the missiles’ military significance was negligible, the Kennedy administration advanced on a perilous course to force their removal. The president issued an ultimatum to a nuclear power—an astonishingly provocative move, which immediately created a crisis that could have led to catastrophe. He ordered a blockade on Cuba, an act of war that we now know brought the superpowers within a hair’s breadth of nuclear confrontation. The beleaguered Cubans willingly accepted their ally’s weapons, so the Soviet’s deployment of the missiles was fully in accord with international law. But the blockade, even if the administration euphemistically called it a “quarantine,” was, the ExComm members acknowledged, illegal. As the State Department’s legal adviser recalled, “Our legal problem was that their action wasn’t illegal.” Kennedy and his lieutenants intently contemplated an invasion of Cuba and an aerial assault on the Soviet missiles there—acts extremely likely to have provoked a nuclear war. In light of the extreme measures they executed or earnestly entertained to resolve a crisis they had largely created, the American reaction to the missiles requires, in retrospect, as much explanation as the Soviet decision to deploy them—or more.The Soviets suspected that the U.S. viewed a nuclear first strike as an attractive option. They were right to be suspicious.On that very first day of the ExComm meetings, McNamara provided a wider perspective on the missiles’ significance: “I’ll be quite frank. I don’t think there is a military problem here … This is a domestic, political problem.” In a 1987 interview, McNamara explained: “You have to remember that, right from the beginning, it was President Kennedy who said that it was politically unacceptable for us to leave those missile sites alone. He didn’t say militarily, he saidpolitically.” What largely made the missiles politically unacceptable was Kennedy’s conspicuous and fervent hostility toward the Castro regime—a stance, Kennedy admitted at an ExComm meeting, that America’s European allies thought was “a fixation” and “slightly demented.”In his presidential bid, Kennedy had red-baited the Eisenhower-Nixon administration, charging that its policies had “helped make Communism’s first Caribbean base.” Given that he had defined a tough stance toward Cuba as an important election issue, and given the humiliation he had suffered with the Bay of Pigs debacle, the missiles posed a great political hazard to Kennedy. As the State Department’s director of intelligence and research, Roger Hilsman, later put it, “The United States might not be in mortal danger, but … the administration most certainly was.” Kennedy’s friend John Kenneth Galbraith, the ambassador to India, later said: “Once [the missiles] were there, the political needs of the Kennedy administration urged it to take almost any risk to get them out.”But even weightier than the domestic political catastrophe likely to befall the administration if it appeared to be soft on Cuba was what Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin called “the psychological factor” that we “sat back and let ’em do it to us.” He asserted that this was “more important than the direct threat,” and Kennedy and his other advisers energetically concurred. Even as Sorensen, in his memorandum to the president, noted the ExComm’s consensus that the Cuban missiles didn’t alter the nuclear balance, he also observed that the ExComm nevertheless believed that “the United States cannot tolerate the known presence” of missiles in Cuba “if our courage and commitments are ever to be believed by either allies or adversaries” (emphasis added). America’s European allies (not to mention the Soviets) insisted that Washington should ignore these intangible concerns, but Sorensen was dismissive. Appealing to psychology rather than to the hard calculations of statecraft, he asserted that such arguments “carried some logic but little weight.”Indeed, Washington’s self-regard for its credibility was almost certainly the main reason it risked nuclear war over a negligible threat to national security. At the same meeting in which Kennedy and his aides were contemplating military action against Cuba and the U.S.S.R.—action they knew could bring about an apocalyptic war—the president stated, “Last month I said we weren’t going to [permit Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba] and last month I should have said … we don’t care. But when we said we’re not going to, and [the Soviets] go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then … I would think that our … risks increase.”The risks of such a cave-in, Kennedy and his advisers held, were distinct but related. The first was that America’s foes would see Washington as pusillanimous; the known presence of the missiles, Kennedy said, “makes them look like they’re coequal with us and that”—here Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon interrupted: “We’re scared of the Cubans.” The second risk was that America’s friends would suddenly doubt that a country given to appeasement could be relied on to fulfill its obligations.In fact, America’s allies, as Bundy acknowledged, were aghast that the U.S. was threatening nuclear war over a strategically insignificant condition—the presence of intermediate-range missiles in a neighboring country—that those allies (and, for that matter, the Soviets) had been living with for years. In the tense days of October 1962, being allied with the United States potentially amounted to, as Charles de Gaulle had warned, “annihilation without representation.” It seems never to have occurred to Kennedy and the ExComm that whatever Washington gained by demonstrating the steadfastness of its commitments, it lost in an erosion of confidence in its judgment.This approach to foreign policy was guided—and remains guided—by an elaborate theorizing rooted in a school-playground view of world politics rather than the cool appraisal of strategic realities. It put—and still puts—America in the curious position of having to go to war to uphold the very credibility that is supposed to obviate war in the first place.If the administration’s domestic political priorities alone dictated the removal of the Cuban missiles, a solution to Kennedy’s problem would have seemed pretty obvious: instead of a public ultimatum demanding that the Soviets withdraw their missiles from Cuba, a private agreement between the superpowers to remove both Moscow’s missiles in Cuba and Washington’s missiles in Turkey. (Recall that the Kennedy administration discovered the missiles on October 16, but only announced its discovery to the American public and the Soviets and issued its ultimatum on the 22nd.)The administration, however, did not make such an overture to the Soviets. Instead, by publicly demanding a unilateral Soviet withdrawal and imposing a blockade on Cuba, it precipitated what remains to this day the most dangerous nuclear crisis in history. In the midst of that crisis, the sanest and most sensible observers—among them diplomats at the United Nations and in Europe, the editorial writers for the Manchester Guardian, Walter Lippmann, and Adlai Stevenson—saw a missile trade as a fairly simple solution. In an effort to resolve the impasse, Khrushchev himself openly made this proposal on October 27. According to the version of events propagated by the Kennedy administration (and long accepted as historical fact), Washington unequivocally rebuffed Moscow’s offer and instead, thanks to Kennedy’s resolve, forced a unilateral Soviet withdrawal.Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the opening of previously classified archives and the decision by a number of participants to finally tell the truth revealed that the crisis was indeed resolved by an explicit but concealed deal to remove both the Jupiter and the Cuban missiles. Kennedy in fact threatened to abrogate if the Soviets disclosed it. He did so for the same reasons that had largely engendered the crisis in the first place—domestic politics and the maintenance of America’s image as the indispensable nation. A declassified Soviet cable reveals that Robert Kennedy—whom the president assigned to work out the secret swap with the U.S.S.R.’s ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin—insisted on returning to Dobrynin the formal Soviet letter affirming the agreement, explaining that the letter “could cause irreparable harm to my political career in the future.”Only a handful of administration officials knew about the trade; most members of the ExComm, including Vice President Lyndon Johnson, did not. And in their effort to maintain the cover-up, a number of those who did, including McNamara and Rusk, lied to Congress. JFK and others tacitly encouraged the character assassination of Stevenson, allowing him to be portrayed as an appeaser who “wanted a Munich” for suggesting the trade—a deal that they vociferously maintained the administration would never have permitted.Arthur Schlesinger Jr. “repeatedly manipulated and obscured the facts.”The patient spadework of Stern and other scholars has since led to further revelations. Stern demonstrates that Robert Kennedy hardly inhabited the conciliatory and statesmanlike role during the crisis that his allies described in their hagiographic chronicles and memoirs and that he himself advanced in his posthumously published book, Thirteen Days. In fact, he was among the most consistently and recklessly hawkish of the president’s advisers, pushing not for a blockade or even air strikes against Cuba but for a full-scale invasion as “the last chance we will have to destroy Castro.” Stern authoritatively concludes that “if RFK had been president, and the views he expressed during the ExComm meetings had prevailed, nuclear war would have been the nearly certain outcome.” He justifiably excoriates the sycophantic courtier Schlesinger, whose histories “repeatedly manipulated and obscured the facts” and whose accounts—“profoundly misleading if not out-and-out deceptive”—were written to serve not scholarship but the Kennedys.Although Stern and other scholars have upended the panegyrical version of events advanced by Schlesinger and other Kennedy acolytes, the revised chronicle shows that JFK’s actions in resolving the crisis—again, a crisis he had largely created—were reasonable, responsible, and courageous. Plainly shaken by the apocalyptic potentialities of the situation, Kennedy advocated, in the face of the bellicose and near-unanimous opposition of his pseudo-tough-guy advisers, accepting the missile swap that Khrushchev had proposed. “To any man at the United Nations, or any otherrational man, it will look like a very fair trade,” he levelheadedly told the ExComm. “Most people think that if you’re allowed an even trade you ought to take advantage of it.” He clearly understood that history and world opinion would condemn him and his country for going to war—a war almost certain to escalate to a nuclear exchange—after the U.S.S.R. had publicly offered such a reasonable quid pro quo. Khrushchev’s proposal, the historian Ronald Steel has noted, “filled the White House advisors with consternation—not least of all because it appeared perfectly fair.”Although Kennedy in fact agreed to the missile swap and, with Khrushchev, helped settle the confrontation maturely, the legacy of that confrontation was nonetheless pernicious. By successfully hiding the deal from the vice president, from a generation of foreign-policy makers and strategists, and from the American public, Kennedy and his team reinforced the dangerous notion that firmness in the face of what the United States construes as aggression, and the graduated escalation of military threats and action in countering that aggression, makes for a successful national-security strategy—really, all but defines it.The president and his advisers also reinforced the concomitant view that America should define a threat not merely as circumstances and forces that directly jeopardize the safety of the country, but as circumstances and forces that might indirectly compel potential allies or enemies to question America’s resolve. This recondite calculation led to the American disaster in Vietnam: in attempting to explain how the loss of the strategically inconsequential country of South Vietnam might weaken American credibility and thereby threaten the country’s security, one of McNamara’s closest aides, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, allowed that “it takes some sophistication to see how Vietnam automatically involves” our vital interests. Kennedy said in his address to the nation during the missile crisis that “aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war.” He explained that “if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe,” then the United States could not tolerate such conduct by the Soviets—even though, again, he had privately acknowledged that the deployment of the missiles did not change the nuclear balance.This notion that standing up to aggression (however loosely and broadly defined) will deter future aggression (however loosely and broadly defined) fails to weather historical scrutiny. After all, America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq didn’t deter Muammar Qaddafi; America’s war against Yugoslavia didn’t deter Saddam Hussein in 2003; America’s liberation of Kuwait did not deter Slobodan Milošević; America’s intervention in Panama did not deter Saddam Hussein in 1991; America’s intervention in Grenada did not deter Manuel Noriega; America’s war against North Vietnam did not deter Grenada’s strongman, Hudson Austin; and JFK’s confrontation with Khrushchev over missiles in Cuba certainly did not deter Ho Chi Minh.Moreover, the idea that a foreign power’s effort to counter the overwhelming strategic supremacy of the United States—a country that spends nearly as much on defense as does the rest of the world combined—ipso facto imperils America’s security is profoundly misguided. Just as Kennedy and his advisers perceived a threat in Soviet efforts to offset what was in fact a destabilizing U.S. nuclear hegemony, so today, both liberals and conservatives oxymoronically assert that the safety of the United States demands that the country must “balance” China by maintaining its strategically dominant position in East Asia and the eastern Pacific—that is, in China’s backyard. This means that Washington views as a hazard Beijing’s attempts to remedy the weakness of its own position, even though policy makers acknowledge that the U.S. has a crushing superiority right up to the edge of the Asian mainland. America’s posture, however, reveals more about its own ambitions than it does about China’s. Imagine that the situation were reversed, and China’s air and naval forces were a dominant and potentially menacing presence on the coastal shelf of North America. Surely the U.S. would want to counteract that preponderance. In a vast part of the globe, stretching from the Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and from Greenland to Guam, the U.S. will not tolerate another great power’s interference. Certainly America’s security wouldn’t be jeopardized if other great powers enjoy their own (and for that matter, smaller) spheres of influence.This esoteric strategizing—this misplaced obsession with credibility, this dangerously expansive concept of what constitutes security—which has afflicted both Democratic and Republican administrations, and both liberals and conservatives, is the antithesis of statecraft, which requires discernment based on power, interest, and circumstance. It is a stance toward the world that can easily doom the United States to military commitments and interventions in strategically insignificant places over intrinsically trivial issues. It is a stance that can engender a foreign policy approximating paranoia in an obdurately chaotic world abounding in states, personalities, and ideologies that are unsavory and uncongenial—but not necessarily mortally hazardous. Benjamin Schwarz is The Atlantic’s literary editor and national editor.

Edited January 11, 2013 by buffalo bill

[bigvlada]

In the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy had cynically attacked Richard Nixon from the right, claiming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had allowed a dangerous “missile gap” to grow in the U.S.S.R.’s favor. But in fact, just as Eisenhower and Nixon had suggested—and just as the classified briefings that Kennedy received as a presidential candidate indicated—the missile gap, and the nuclear balance generally, was overwhelmingly to America’s advantage. At the time of the missile crisis, the Soviets had 36 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 138 long-range bombers with 392 nuclear warheads, and 72 submarine-launched ballistic-missile warheads (SLBMs). These forces were arrayed against a vastly more powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal of 203 ICBMs, 1,306 long-range bombers with 3,104 nuclear warheads, and 144 SLBMs—all told, about nine times as many nuclear weapons as the U.S.S.R. Nikita Khrushchev was acutely aware of America’s huge advantage not just in the number of weapons but in their quality and deployment as well.

U maju 2012 je deklasifikovana obimna višetomna istorija razvoja američkih špijunskih satelita u periodu od 1946 do 1965 godine, tj. sistema Korona, Gambit i Heksagon. Taj rad je napisan 1974 godine a u prvom tomu se ovo pominje, kao i činjenica da je Nikson znao da je missile gap šarena laža ali da to nije smeo da upotrebi u kampanji. Evidentno je i da je Kenedi o'ladio sa tom idejom u drugom delu kampanje kada je saznao da to nije tačno. Pitanje je da li bi pobedio da je Nikson smeo da to iznese u javnost.

Moreover, despite America’s overwhelming nuclear preponderance, JFK, in keeping with his avowed aim to pursue a foreign policy characterized by “vigor,” had ordered the largest peacetime expansion of America’s military power, and specifically the colossal growth of its strategic nuclear forces.

Ovo je direktna posledica fotografija dobijenih iz dve uspešne misije satelita Korona. Snimljeno je nešto preko 14.000.000 kvadratnih kilometara SSSR-a a najmanji objekat koji se mogao razaznati je imao nešto manje od deset metara u prečniku. Mogli su da broje avione na stajankama aerodroma. Od ICBM-ova ni korova.

[Indy]

Da li je jos neko ovde misljenja da su atomske bombe na Hiroshimu i Nagasaki u stvari pocetak hladnog rata, a ne (samo) kraj II svetskog?PS. Izvinjavam se ako je neko ovo vec kacio.http://youtu.be/I9lquok4Pdk

[čekmeže]

Možda malčice ranije, kad je umro Ruzvelt. Za Čerčila je počeo još ranije.

[Prospero]

to je tekuća debata.recimo, ova dva autora kažu da je počeo između prvog i drugog bacanja atomske bombe, gde je hirošima bila akt čisto usmeren protiv japana a nagasaki je imao i svojevrsnu poruku moskvi.dobili su šarene kritike, čisto kao ilustracija nemanja jedinstvenog stava u nauci^tm.meni se čini da ogromni upliv dokumentarne građe od kraja HR "krivicu" za početak i eskalaciju sukoba prebacuje na ameriku, jer je sve više pokazatelja da su američki političari delom svesno a delom nesvesno pogrešno pročitali ponašanje moskve u periodu 1945-48. ima kod krejga i lodževala lepo opisan deo oko sovjetskog odbijanja da efektivno učestvuju u breton vudsu, tj. odbijanja da učestvuju u globalnoj podeli u kojoj bi amerika imala od moskve priznatu implicitnu vodeću ulogu. sovjeti su se interesovali za svoj "sanitarni kordon" prema zapadu, bili su devastirani ratom i nisu imali a-bombu. drugim rečima, sovjetski strah od zapada je bio opravdaniji nego zapadni strah od sovjeta.