Trojni pakt i Aprilski rat

[PopeЧе]

Ok, ucinilo mi se cudno sto bez osnova tvrdis da nije bio narocito inteligentan.

Kao kada bi razgovarali o tome da li je Montgomeri voleo pecurke, ako razumes sta hocu da kazem.

 

Takodje, nisam nailazio na romansirane prikaze najebavanja na Istocnom frontu.

Doduse, govorim o zemlji, za vazduh si mozda u pravu.

[namenski]

22. jul 1941, mesec dana posle pocetka, nevidjena frka, trka i strka, sumnjam da bilo ko moze da zamisli kako je to izgledalo i na sta je licilo: Nemcima je izgledalo da se ponavljaju turisticke lepote prethodnih pohoda po Evropi, Skandinavija, Francuska, Balkan, samo sto to bas i nije bilo tako.

Sovjeti su se sa Nemcima od pocetka - tukli.

Vec negde prve nedelje jula, dakle kada je sve islo po planu, Halder, nacelnik OKH, u dnevniku pise da na jugu ima problema sa nekim novim sovjetskim tenkovima koji su teski citavih 100 tona. Nigde veze, ali kad sam nacelnik generalstaba tako nesto napise, djavo je odneo salu; radilo se samo o skrpljenom protivnapadu neke sovjetske vece tenkovske jedinice, sve to pise i pisalo je jos u literaturi iz sovjetskih vremena, ali jebi ga, lazu komunisti.

Ali da je tog leta 1941. Nemce krenulo - jeste.

I kako to vec biva, iskusenje je bilo preveliko pa su se pojavili i vikendasi, vikend piloti lovci, medju njima i SS-Obergruppenfuhrer, General der Polizei, Reinhard Heydrich, onaj Heydrich, glava RSHA, tipican tip iz srecnih vremena nacisticke Nemacke, onaj sa hladnim nemilosrdnim plavim - a i kakvim bi drugim - ocima.

Ovaj Heydrich:

 

 

Sa sve svojim mehanicarem i svojim Bf-109E:

 

 

Mesto dogadjanja je krkljanac oko mostova na Donjecu, reci koju Nemci dzumle prelaze sto posto poto treba spreciti, pa se na taj posao salju beznadezno nepodobni Su-2 laki bombarderi, nalazi im se i nesto pratnje, par MiG-3, opet kako se pokazalo nepodobnih za posao koji ih je zadesio i par legendi poznatih kao I-16, samo sto prvi pravi moderni lovac celog sveta nije vise legenda, ali sta je tu je.

Jednim od MIG-3 upravlja bivsi besprizorni, uzas od sovjetskih postrevolucionarnih godina, dete kome je sistem dao, omogucio sve, od zanata metalca do obuke u lokalnom avio klubu, da bi na kraju postalo svesaveznicki as broj 2: Aleksandar Pokriskin, ime od formata.

Sta bi samo Holivud dao da ima pricu koja sledi, a u kojoj bi se glavni junak zvao malo drugacije ili bio negde sa Srednjeg zapada...

Ovako, MiG-ovi su doleteli iznad prelaza, dojurili su i Mesersmiti da se umesaju, u jednom od njih je leteo glavni esesovac i - glavni esesovac je dobio svoje.

I to 'ladno, nista ovo-ono.

Rutinski, sto bi se reklo.

Uspeo je da iskoci, izvukli su ga sa takozvane nicije zemlje, ako je tog leta na Istocnom frontu nicije zemlje uopste bilo.

Tek  izvukao se.

 

Aleksandar Pokriskin, covek koji se nije dao i koji je oborio glavnog esesovca koji se, opet, nadao da ce moci da se podici i po kojim obaranjem.

Hajdrih posle Pokriskina vise nije ponavljao vikendasenje, valjda mu je preselo.

A Pokriskin - slika i prilika.

 

Za uspomenu i dugo secanje iz lokalnog avio kluba. Slika za zidne novine i slanje u komsomolskim pismima komsomolkama.

 

Ali i kao etablirani as, sa sve Zvezdama, negde u Nemackoj, kako i dolikuje.

Zasluzeno.

 

[PopeЧе]

Nije valjda Hajdrih posle lagao da se uhvatio u kostac sa sedam aviona, sve ih oborio ali je morao da sleti jer mu je nestalo goriva?

Bilo je tu i losih vremenskih prilika, sudara sa drugim avionima ali se vitez Rajha ipak nekako izvukao.

E to bi bila romansirana epopeja.

[PopeЧе]

Ostavimo sada ss-mornara Hajdriha i njegove vikend izlete.

Da se vratimo na temu i vidimo kako su hrabri piloti VVKJ dejstvovali za vreme Aprilskog rata, pazljvo iscitavajuci listu vazdusnih pobeda.

 

6.4.41. 5:20 112.E kap I k Konstantin Jermakov Režanovce Bf 110 II./ZG 26: oboren jedan Bf 110

6.4.41. 5:20 112.E por Milorad Tanasić Režanovačka Kosa Bf 109E I.(J.)/LG 2: 1 Bf 109E oboren, 1 teško oštećen

6.4.41. 5:20 112.E por Milorad Tanasić Režanovačka Kosa Bf 109E 

6.4.41. 6:30 III PŠ por Milan Marjanović Mostar MC.200 370a Squa: 2 C.200 oborena

6.4.41. 6:30 III PŠ por Milan Marjanović Mostar MC.200 

6.4.41. 6:50 102.E nv Vukadin Jelić područje Krušedola Do 17Z III./KG 3: 1 Do 17Z oboren ?

6.4.41. 7:00 101.E kap II k Živica Mitrović Beograd Ju 87 2./KG 2: 2 Do 17Z manje oštećena

6.4.41. 7:10 101.E kap II k Živica Mitrović Krčedin Bf 109E II./StG 77: 2 Ju 87B oboren

6.4.41. 7:15 102.E nv Đorđe Stojanović Beograd Ju 87 III./StG 77: 2 Ju 87B oboren

6.4.41. 7:15 102.E kap I k Milan Žunjić Belegiš Ju 87 I./ZG 26: 4 Bf 110 oboren, 1 uništen, 1 oštećen

6.4.41. 7:15 104.E kap I k Borivoje Marković  Stara Pazova 1 Bf 110 I./KG 51: 3 Ju 88A oštećen, 1 uništen

6.4.41. 7:15 142.E kap I k Militin Grozdanović Beška Do 17Z 6./JG 77: 1 Bf 109E oboren

6.4.41. 7:20 103.E ppor Otmar Lajh Batajnica Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 7:20 102.E por Miodrag Bošković ušće Save Ju 87 

6.4.41. 7:30 161.E por Dušan Borčić Pančevo Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 7:30 162.E nvtč IV k Eduard Banfič Surčinsko polje Bf 110 

6.4.41. 7:30 103.E ppor Jovan Kapešić Stara Pazova Bf 110 

6.4.41. 7:30 104.E por Vasa Kolarov Stara Pazova Bf 110 

6.4.41. 7:30 103.E por Bojan Presečnik Stara Pazova Bf 110 

6.4.41. 7:35 104.E nar Zvonimir Halambek Stara Pazova Bf 110 

6.4.41. 7:40 161.E por Dušan Borčić Pančevo Bf 109E 

6.4.41. 7:40 104.E vod Tomislav Kauzlarić Krušedol Bf 110 

6.4.41. 10:00 101.E nv Nedeljko Pajić Paraćin Hs 126 2.(H.)/31: 1 HS 126 oborena

6.4.41. 11:00 51.LG kap I k Todor Gogić Beograd Ju 87 videti iznad: II./StG.77 i III./StG 77

6.4.41. 11:40 102.E nv Karlo Štrbenk Pančevo Bf 109E 7./JG 54: 1 Bf 109E manje oštećen

6.4.41. 12:00 III PŠ nv Blagoje Grujić Čapljina Z.1007 260a Squa: 1 Z.1007 oboren

6.4.41. 13:00 108.E kap I k Janko Dobnikar područje Maribora Bf 109E 2./JG 27: 1 Bf 109E oboren ?

6.4.41. 14:30 III PŠ kap I k Zlatko Stipčić Pelješac Ju 88 8./LG 1: 1 Ju 88A uništen

6.4.41. 16:00 6.LP ppuk Božidar Kostić Batajnica Do 17Z 8./KG 3. 1 Do 17Z oboren, 1 uništen

6.4.41. 16:00 103.E ppor Otmar Lajh Beograd Do 17Z 

7.4.41. 16:10 104.E nar Zvonimir Halambek Krušedol 1/5 Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 16:15 142.E ppor Đorđe Kešeljević Krušedol 1/5 Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 16:20 103.E ppor Jovan Kapešić Krušedol 1/5 Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 16:25 6.LP ppuk Božidar Kostić Krušedol 1/5 Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 16:30 103.E ppor Otmar Lajh Krušedol 1/5 Do 17Z 

6.4.41. 16:30 142.E ppor Miloš Aleksić Fruška Gora Ju 88 videti iznad : I./KG 51

6.4.41. 16:30 6.LP maj Stevan Krajinović Beograd Ju 87 videti iznad : II./StG.77 i III./StG 77

6.4.41. 17:00 III PŠ por Đorđe Vasojević ušće Neretve SM.79 RA: 1 SM.79 manje oštećen

7.4.41. 10:00 141.E rez por Pavle Crnjanski Donja Mutnica Hs 126 

7.4.41. 10:30 142.E kap I k Milutin Grozdanović Beška Ju 87 

7.4.41. 11:00 161.E nv Milisav Semiz Beograd Ju 88 KG 51: 3 Ju 88A oborena, 2 uništena, 1 oštećen

7.4.41. 13:30 108.E nar Živorad Tomić Rovine Bf 109E 7./JG 54: 1 Bf 109E oboren

7.4.41. 13:30 106.E kap I k Dragiša Milijević Rovine 1/2 Bf 109E 

7.4.41. 13:30 106.E nar Milan Mitić Rovine 1/2 Bf 109E 

7.4.41. 13:00 51.LG kap I k Todor Gogić Beograd  Ju 88 videti iznad: KG 51

7.4.41. 15:20 102.E nv Đorđe Stojanović područje Grocka - Kovin Ju 88 videti iznad: KG 51

7.4.41 15:40 161.E nar Dušan Vujičić Beograd Ju 88 videti iznad: KG 51

7.4.41. 16:15 102.E kap I k Milan Žunjić Beograd Ju 88 videti iznad: KG 51

7.4.41. 17:10 161.E nv Milisav Semiz Debeljača Ju 88 videti iznad: KG 51

7.4.41. 17:15 103.E ppor Jovan Kapešić Fruška Gora Bf 109E 

7.4.41. 17:15 142.E ppor Miloš Aleksić Ečka Bf 109E 

7.4.41. 17:20 103.E kap I k Miha Klavora Vrdnik Bf 109E 

7.4.41. 17:25 103.E kap I k Miha Klavora Vrdnik Bf 109E 

11.4.41. ? 108.E kap I k Janko Dobnikar Nova Gradiška Ju 88 II./KG 51: 1 Ju 88A oboren

11.4.41. 12:00 161.E nv Milisav Semiz Fruška Gora Bf 110 

11.4.41. 14:10 51.LG kap I k Todor Gogić Ruma Ju 87 

11.4.41. 14:10 161.E nar Dušan Vujičić Ruma Ju 87 

12.4.41. 13:00 108.E kap I k Vaso Grbić Banja Luka Bf 110 I./ZG 26: 1 Bf 110 oboren

13.4.41. 8:00 35.LG ? Nikšić C.200 

13.4.41. 8:00 35.LG ? Nikšić C.200 

Edited January 26, 2015 by PopeЧе

[namenski]

Ma vise sam imao na umu zapadni stav koji najbolje izrazava ona Klostermanova izjava da je Istocni front za Luftwaffe bio odmaraliste...

 

I price, sve cesce, o umornim nemackim vojnicima koji su ipak i pre svega bili samo vojnici i koji zadnjim snagama zaustavljaju boljsevicke horde koje neumoljivo i neljudski nadiru da bi na kraju pobedile samo zahvaljujuci brojcanoj nadmocnosti i zapadnoj pomoci.

Romantizuje se koliko hoces, smira, a naprimer u memoarima nikog drugog nego Staljinovog ministra vazduhoplovstva, Sahurina, objavljenim jos za sovjetskog vakta imas neverovatno iskren i ilustrativan opis jedne situacije i to u vreme Staljingrada.

Sahurin pise kako je obisao polaznike jedne skole za pilote lovce i to uoci njihovog upucivanja pod Staljnigrad: niko od polaznika nije imao vise od 3 (tri) sata letenja na borbenom avionu, a od toga ni minut na tipu na kome ce da lete kad dodju u jedinicu...

[PopeЧе]

Ne znam u kom kontekstu je Klosterman to izjavio, nisam citao njegove knjige.

Pilot takvog kalibra sigurno nije zeleo da kaze kako je Zapadni vazdusni front na kome je on ucestvovao sa 30-tak pobeda bio mesto gde se kalio celik za razliku od mlakog Istocnog fronta.

[namenski]

Kad je vazduh u pitanju, upravo to je zeleo da kaze; sa sve drugarstvom ljudi u letecim masinama, njihovom apoliticnoscu, itd, itd...

Sa vecernjim cutanjem u kantini i ispijanjem pica u cast poginulom neprijatelju koga je, eto, zli usud doveo na suprotnu stranu.

[čekmeže]

Ovaj Srem ko Bermudski trougao, ko preleti ne sleti. Odmah sam se setio spiskova obaranja iz 1999.

[PopeЧе]

Daj da vidimo te spiskove.

Ili izbaci saldo, garantujem ludacku zabavu kada razni krenu da se prikljucuju diskusiji pa moderacija udari po splitu.

[x500]

Porucnik Bozidar Zugic

 

[MancMellow]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqZ0982j3hc

[Prospero]

Plava grobnica drugog rata

Dragan Vujičić | 24. maj 2015. 20:30

 

U Solunskom zalivu 27. maja 1941. potonuo brod sa jugoslovenskim oficirima. Na potonulom brodu život izgubilo 214 naših starešina, od generala i pukovnika do redova

 

Deo zarobljenika sa broda u logoru Osnabrik

 

 

DVE su Plave grobnice sa srpskim vojnicima u grčkim morima. Jedna je u Jonskom, nadomak ostrva Vido, gde počivaju oni koji nisu mogli da se oporave od prelaska preko Albanije 1915. Druga, zaboravljena Plava grobnica, nalazi se u Solunskom zalivu u Egejskom moru. Tu je 27. maja 1941. potonuo grčki brod "Helena Kanavarioti" na kome se nalazilo preko 500 zarobljenih srpskih oficira i podoficira. Oni su u Aprilskom ratu uspeli da se probiju preko Olimpa do grčkih luka, nadajući se da će Englezi pomoći i da će se ponovo uspostaviti Solunski front kao 1915.

 

 

Brod "Helena Kanavarioti" nosio je u nemačko zarobljeništvo 503 oficira, sužnja. Na njemu je bilo četiri generala (divizijski general Jovan M. Jovanović i brigadni generali Milan I. Radovanović, Ilija Dimitrijević i Veljko S. Šaponjić), 7 pukovnika, 45 potpukovnika, 93 kapetana prve klase, 18 kapetana druge klase, 82 poručnika, 124 potporučnika, 22 podoficira, 6 podnarednika, 17 kaplara i 80 redova.

Posle eksplozije mine na koju je brod naišao u zoru 27. maja, utopilo se 214 zarobljenika, a preživelo 289. Udavili su se i generali Jovanović i Radovanović. Svi su bili vojnici Vardarske, Bregalničke i Kosovske divizije.

Kako je docnije svedočio Božidar Dikić, posleratni novinar "Politike", "Helena Kanavarioti" podsećala je na brod avet. Nemački oficiri i vojnici koji su sprovodili zarobljenike, kada su u Pirejskoj luci videli kakvim brodom treba da plove "naježili su se".

 

Miroslav Lazanski pamti priču oca Vladimira

 

Najstariji zarobljeni srpski oficir, general Jovan Jovanović, podneo je pismeni raport nemačkom rezervnom oficiru Sefelsu Paulu, profesoru Univerziteta u Minhenu, kao komandantu transporta, tražeći da se cela grupa zarobljenika preveze suvim putem za Solun, vozom ili kamionima. Predloženo je da sami zarobljenici plate taj prevoz. Kada mu je sopšteno da to nije moguće, tražio je da se bar svakom obezbedi pojas za spasavanje, jer je more bilo puno mina.

 

Sve je bilo uzalud.

 

Brod je isplovio 24. maja za Solun. Danju je plovio, a noću je bio usidren zbog mina.

- U zoru 27. maja krenuli smo prema Solunu. Desno od nas nazirala se helespontska obala (oblast Halkidik, sa tri poluostrva - Kasandra, Sitonija i Atos - Sveta Gora), levo, visoko, dizao se gorostasni Olimp. Nije prošlo ni petnaest minuta plovidbe kad se prolomila strašna eksplozija. Veliki vodeni stub srušio se na brod - zapisao je Dikić.

 

"Helena Kanavarioti" završila na dnu mora

 

Prema njegovom svedočenju, brod je počeo da tone prednjim delom, a na lađi nije bilo čamaca za spasavanje, ni pojaseva. Samo su nemački oficiri i vojnici imali pojaseve. Četiri naša oficira iz mornaričkog odreda u Ohridu sa nekoliko mornara preuzeli su komandu broda. Ljudi su skakali u more. Jedna manja grupa starijih oficira ostala je na zadnjem delu broda, čekajući tragičnu sudbinu.

Majori Svetislav Sretenović i kapetan Boško Bivolarević koji su preživeli potapanje grčkog broda, sredinom prošlog veka ostavili su pisano svedočenje o događanjima na palubi "Helene Kanavarioti":

- Divizijski general Jovan Jovanović i brigadni general Ilija Dimitrijević terali su ljude da skaču u more. Prestrašene neplivače su jurili po lađi i naređivali da odstupe sa broda rečima: "Ti ćeš još trebati otadžbini - ti imaš decu". Kada bi ih ovi pitali zašto oni ne skaču, odgovarali bi: "Mi komandujemo ovima u moru".

 

Rezervni oficir Slobodan Gegović je, kako su zapisali preživeli oficiri, od trenutka eksplozije, videvši šta se događa i da je smrt za vratom, počeo da peva himnu. Kao u transu je rukama odvaljivao daske sa broda, kupio razne predmete i bacao u more drugovima. Neki su ga pitali zašto se ne spasava, a on je kratko odgovorao: - Ja sam sve izgubio!

 

Grci iz Nea Mihaniona pritekli u pomoć

 

Dok su se na brodu mešali krici ranjenika sa zvukom vode koja guta lađu, pakao je vladao i u moru. Grčka posada je napustila brod u jednom čamcu, a u drugom su otišli Nemci. Potapanje su sa distance gledali grčki ribari na svojim brodićima, ali nisu prilazili dok nisu čuli preko Morzeove azbuke da se dave Srbi. Signale je davao srpski pomorski oficir koji se zatekao na brodu. Naime, brod je imao nemačku zastavu i Grci nisu hteli da pomažu.

 

Potporučnik Vladimir Lazanski preživeo je brodolom u Solunskom zalivu. On je poslednji koji se upokojio sa "Helene Kanavarioti" - 2005. godine. Njegov sin Miroslav Lazanski, naš ugledni novinar, baštini očevu strašnu priču.

- I oni koji su preživeli nesreću "poginuli" su gledajući nesreću onih koji nisu isplivali - veli Lazanski. - Moj otac je bio 66. klasa Vojne akademije u Beogradu. Poslednja klasa koja je pre Drugog svetskog rata proizvedena u potporučnike. Njegova četa je pripadala Struškom odredu Vardarske divizije, koja je utvrđivala granicu prema Albaniji. Nemci su zauzeli Skoplje već 7. aprila, a otac je sa ostalom vojskom u noći između 9. i 10. aprila prešao granicu napustivši Bitolj. Kasnije su se pridružili engleskoj vojsci, pa se tako oko 2.500 Jugoslovena sa oko 20.000 Engleza povlačilo ka Kalamati, na jugu Peloponeza. Tu je trebalo da se ukrcaju u brodove i otplove do Egipta, odakle bi nastavili otpor Nemcima. Međutim, usledio je desant nemačkih padobranaca, a u grčkim vodama pojavile su italijanske i nemačke podmornice i svi su zarobljeni.

 

Vladimir Lazanski je pričao da su davljenici bili u vodi preko jedan sat pre nego što su došle u pomoć grčke lađice. U Solunu su zarobljenici ostali desetak dana, a odatle su prebačeni u logor u Osnabriku. Miroslav Lazanski navodi:

- Moj otac, kao Slovenac, mogao je da traži otpust iz logora i da ide kući, ali nije hteo jer je položio zakletvu otadžbini. I ne samo to, ovi ljudi su i u logoru činili podvige.

 

General Jovan Jovanović potonuo sa brodom

 

Kako otkriva Lazanski, u Osnabriku je bilo preko 10.000 oficira i podoficira iz armija koje je prethodno razbio Vermaht, a među zarobljenicima je bilo i oko 700 oficira Jevreja. Kada su Nemci 1941. hteli da ih prebace u "Aušvic" i pobiju, usledila je pobuna u logoru koju su vodili srpski oficiri. Našim oficirima pridružili su se i oficiri drugih zemalja, a pobuna u kojoj je bilo i gušanja i bodenja bajonetima završena je odustajanjem Nemaca od ovog nauma.

- Otac je pričao da se naši oficiri Nemcima nisu dali - priča Lazanski. - Oni su se sa svojim životim oprostili još 27. maja u vodama Egeja. Priču iz Osnabrika, za koju sam prikupio i zvanična dokumenta i zapisnike, još nisam objavio.Dugujem to ocu.

 

 

PARASTOS U CRKVI SVETOG MARKA

Svake poslednje nedelje u maju u Crkvi Svetog Marka u Beogradu familije poginulih i preživelih daju parastos ovim ljudima. Više niko od njih nije živ, ali porodice pamte.

 

USUD GENERALOVE FAMILIJE

 

DOK je brod "Helena Kanavarioti" tonuo u Plavu grobnicu, evakuaciju sa palube nadgledao je divizijski general Jovan M. Jovanović. Bio je heroj na Solunskom frontu. U čin brigadnog generala unapređen je 21. oktobra 1923. godine, a divizijski general postao je 24. aprila 1926. godine. Penzionisan je 4. februara 1938, a aktiviran početkom aprila 1941. godine, uoči nemačkog napada.

Interesantno je da je Jovanovićev tast bio general Ilija Gojković, ministar vojni, koji je u ratu 1915. godine bio komandant Užičke vojske. Nakon dolaska na Krf, zbog bolesti, Gojković je otišao na lečenje u Francusku, a kada se vraćao na Krf brod na kome se nalazio torpedovan je od nemačke podmornice. Nemci su isplovili i tražili su od potopljenih koji su se spasli u čamcima da se predaju. Gojković je izvadio pištolj i pucao na podmornicu. Uzvratili su mu mitraljezom i on je završio na dnu mora.

[Prospero]

Naleteo sasm na ovaj, IMHO odličan (iako star 10ak godina), pregled britanske politike prema Jugoslaviji pred rat:

 

 

 

The aim of this article is to refine the existing historiographical debate, by placing the coup in the broader context of the formulation, execution and evolution of British policy towards Yugoslavia between the outbreak of the Second World War and the coup d’état on 27 March 1941. The events in Belgrade were seen as, and presented as, a remarkable propaganda victory for the British cause. The coup proved a tremendous, if ephemeral, boost to British morale, coming rapidly upon the victories against Italian forces in North Africa and The Sudan. Even provincial British papers printed the news from Belgrade as their banner headline.5 Prime Minister Churchill, above all, understood the value of gesture, and the coup was perceived as giving Nazism a bloody nose. Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare, in London, certainly basked in the reflected glory of his department’s perceived contribution.6 It was a much-needed fillip to the ‘upstart’ service Special Operations Executive [sOE] created by Dalton, and precisely the sort of spectacular ‘window dressing’ that he craved.

...

Even though the events in Belgrade were not just the product of British intrigue, the enduring myth is that the coup was a triumph for Britain. Certainly, it

appears that Britain provided important encouragement and support. However, examination of the files at The National Archives at Kew, private papers and memoir literature points to the reality of the inconsistencies and paradoxes of British policy towards Yugoslavia before March 1941, and underlines the fact that the British endorsement of the coup was born of the failure of Britain’s attempts to construct a Balkan front to withstand Axis encroachment. Therefore, the coup was indeed a crucial propaganda victory for the Allied cause – and Britain thereby succeeded in Churchill’s aim of ‘drawing Yugoslavia into the war anyhow’. However, for Britain the road to the coup was much bumpier than has been appreciated hitherto; indeed, British policy towards Yugoslavia between 1939 and 1941 can best be summed up as following the law of unintended consequences.

 

This article points to three main aspects of British policy towards, and activity in, Yugoslavia. Firstly, the severe constraints imposed on UK aims in Yugoslavia by British overall policy, its formulation and management. It was not simply that Britain operated at a fundamental strategic, economic and political disadvantage in the country, given German economic domination, political influence and infiltration by the Axis, and Yugoslavia’s increasing encirclement. In addition, there was, of course, also the reality of the UK’s severely limited military resources which hampered attempts to bolster the Yugoslav General Staff’s resolve. It appears that the inherent contradictions of the sum of British overall policy conspired to limit even further British influence in that country between 1939 and 1941: that is, to a degree, these disadvantages were also self-inflicted. British policy towards Yugoslavia can best be characterised as fragmented, inconsistent, indeed paradoxical.

Secondly, Section D/Special Operations Executive developed wider contacts within Yugoslav society than has been credited in the current historiography. But, although these contacts were more extensive than has been appreciated, they did not comprise greater leverage in Yugoslav politics. Not only was the UK one of several great powers seeking to extend its influence in Yugoslavia, SOE activities also exacerbated tensions with the British Legation in Belgrade and the Minister, Ronald I. Campbell.

Thirdly, Yugoslavia became crucial to British planning only by accident and oversight. The documents pointed to British efforts to bring all possible diplomatic means and political pressure to bear on Yugoslavia in February and March 1941. But this constituted an increasingly desperate attempt to salvage something from the wreckage of Anthony Eden’s pursuit and London’s vested hopes of a Balkan front. Thus, the British decision to support a coup at the

end of March should be seen as a product of the paradoxes in British policy and the failure of her political ambitions in the region, together with the power-political gamble of her decision to intervene in Greece.

 

There is a further paradox. From the available material it appears that Britain’s encouragement, from the Legation, SIS (Special Intelligence Service) and SOE, was an important psychological prop to the putsch. But, by the same token, British activity in support of certain factions within Yugoslav politics and society inadvertently contributed to the destruction of London’s hopes post-coup – namely, of Yugoslavia abandoning the policy of self-defence and attacking Italian forces in Albania. SOE operatives in Zagreb had recognised British political failings in Yugoslavia and the dangers of the choice of focussing on Belgrade and the Serbs, particularly the Serbian Peasant Party [sPP]. The coup ‘misfired’ in terms of British expectations and British policy had contributed to this outcome. In one sense only was British policy successful: the coup was seen as defiance of the Axis and did indeed precipitate a German invasion of the country, as Britain had foreseen – but this German attack took place before Britain had had the opportunity of fortifying her position in Greece.

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British policy towards Yugoslavia, particularly between June 1940 and March 1941, was profoundly confused in practice. ... the pressures of war, manpower shortages, and the variety of government agencies involved are partial explanations. More cogent reasons include personal antipathies, political coteries, bureaucratic squabbles within departments, competing Government departments, each with its individual agenda, together with the overriding goal of defeating Germany at all costs. This meant that the variety of departments and actors involved in Yugoslavia worked at cross-purposes, and unwittingly conspired to limit further British material influence in Yugoslavia. This was on top of the disadvantages of Yugoslavia’s strategic isolation, and economic dependence upon the Reich, and Britain’s own inability to provide the armaments Yugoslavia desperately craved.

...

 

The irony is that the UK did not suffer from lack of information about Yugoslavia: she possessed sound intelligence and good links with ruling circles and the Yugoslav service departments. The Section D/SOE and SIS networks were more extensive than historians have charted. Certainly, the Foreign Office’s and Legation’s reliance on the Yugoslav small governing elite was symptomatic of Britain’s own governing elite - this was still ‘the world of the magic circle’ in England. It was also a function of Britain’s imperial outlook and practice. But knowledge of Yugoslav economic, political and military limitations did not lead to any modification or fine tuning of British overall policy: this was naturally dictated by the exigencies of fighting Germany and, from June 1940, Italy. Britain viewed Yugoslavia as part of the Balkan jigsaw, through the lens of British regional strategic imperatives. This imposed important constraints on British policy formulation towards Yugoslavia. Preoccupations in the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Planning Committee, the upper echelons of the Foreign Office and the Southern Department, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the War Office and Air Ministry, the Ministry of Information, and even the Colonial Office meant all departments demonstrated institutional resistance to cool consideration of Yugoslav factors and interests. Despite structures of co-ordination through key committees, with hindsight there appears to be fragmentation and lack of cohesion of British policy, combined with personal prejudice at critical junctures.

 

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Firstly, within the Foreign Office in London: despite the upsurge in interest in Yugoslavia since 1939, there remained a hangover of the implicit assumption of the inter-war period that Yugoslavia was a Balkan backwater. This only began to change after the capitulation of France in June 1940, and particularly with the Italian attack on Greece in October 1940, paralleled by growing German pressure on Romania and Bulgaria. In part this view was a function of geographic distance and isolation from London. The Foreign Office’s interest in Yugoslavia before June 1940 was as part of a neutral Balkan front (to deter any rash French projects of launching a Salonika front, as had been done in 1918). Thereafter, despite talk of ‘setting Europe ablaze’, or entangling Russia and Germany in the Balkans, the official approach was to avoid any premature explosion in the region, and to nurture the existing regime’s pursuit of neutrality. This began to shift from November 1940 given the growing British concern at German pressure on Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact. From this point, neutrality was no longer enough.

 

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The files demonstrate a sharp differentiation between the War Office’s and the Foreign Office’s assessment of Yugoslav capabilities, and their enduring faith in Serbian resolve. London possessed detailed knowledge of the shortcomings of the Yugoslav Army in terms of military personnel, armaments and strategic plans, etc. The extensive survey carried out by Shea’s MI® mission of December 1939 was supplemented by a further report from the Belgrade Military Attaché, forwarded by Campbell to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, in November 1940. This report pointed to the preferable strategic plan of retreating to defend Old Serbia, but recognised that this would not be accepted because of its political ramifications. After the dismissal of General Nedic as Chief of Staff, Clarke reported to London that there was no change in Yugoslav strategic planning: it remained focussed on total peripheral defence. Campbell accepted that there was only very limited pressure Britain could bring to bear on the Yugoslav Government for change, and he was very reluctant to advise the Regent on this. This point was totally overlooked in the War Cabinet and Foreign Office in March 1941. These Departments appear to have fallen prey to their propaganda that the Yugoslav Army was the best in the Balkans – this was not a competitive field – and the enduring faith in ‘gallant little Serbia’.

...

Therefore, despite the reports of equipment deficiencies, the knowledge of Yugoslav strategic planning, London’s awareness of the strain of mobilisation on the Yugoslav economy, in March 1941 the British demanded a Yugoslav volte-face to an offensive strategy. The political preoccupations of London civil servants and politicians meant that they lost sight of logistical realities.

 

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Above all, London’s hopes resided in the anglophile, Oxford-educated Regent, Prince Paul, friend and relation of the British establishment, confidant of the British Ambassador, ‘Our Friend’ in the telegraphic correspondence from Belgrade. The belief endured up to mid-March 1941 (20 March for the Minister and Legation; 24 March for Eden) that Prince Paul represented Britain’s trump card. With the continued suspension of parliamentary democracy dating back to 1929, Yugoslavia was under a quasi-dictatorship. London expected Paul to behave like an autocrat, and to think like an Englishman – despite the overwhelming body of evidence that Paul took his custodial tasks as Regent as his guiding principles, not adherence to British interests. The importance attached to Prince Paul was shown in the Ambassador’s and Southern Department’s requests for King George VI to write bracing letters to bolster the Regent’s resolve: ‘regal evangelism’33 and monarchical solidarity were offered as political and psychological substitutes for military hardware.

 

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The lack of detailed co-ordination and outlook between Section D/SOE and the British Legation in Belgrade further conspired to limit British influence. Indeed, the tensions between Section D/SOE and the British Legation, particularly, the Minister, Campbell, point again to the inconsistencies and paradoxes of UK policy in Yugoslavia. ... The combination of SOE sabotage activity, contacts with opponents of Prince Paul’s regime, the advocacy of funding and arming paramilitary organisations, and the proposal to fund a minority political party drove the tensions between SOE and the Legation into the open. ... Campbell barely tolerated SOE activities; and at various points in the files there appear flares of irritation and dislike towards the ‘amateur assassins’ and their political naivety. ... The conflict between SOE and the Legation came to a head in August 1940. SOE schemes of blocking the Danube to German-bound freight had fizzled out in that summer, as they conflicted with the aims of other British Departments. It was argued in Belgrade that any attempt to block the Danube would have a ‘somewhat bad effect on Yugoslav military opinion, since they would feel that their last connection to the seas controlled by the Allies was gone’. Such schemes raised issues of major strategy: ‘the potential value of Yugoslavia as an ally against the possibility, the chance daily becoming more remote, of making an effective block in the Danube for the purpose of stopping the oil’.

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The Ambassador’s outrage at the activities of SOE’s agents boiled over with the discovery of Amery’s unilateral mission to sound out leaders of the Bulgarian Peasant Party as to whether there would be the chance of co-ordinated coup d’états in Sofia and Belgrade, followed by the establishment of a Balkan Front with the aim of setting up a pan-Slav federation and overt opposition to Germany.

Galvanised by the possibility of being inadvertently but actively involved in the overthrow of what he deemed to be the legitimate government – if necessary by violence – Campbell was stung into declaring that, while he would support a subsidy of up to £5,000 per month [to the SPP], he could not condone a coup d’état. In a flurry of telegrams, Campbell begged London to put an end to such behaviour: ‘the whole thing [is] clumsy and amateurish’, and described Section D operatives as a collection of ‘bomb happy parvenus’, compromising official diplomatic channels with Prince Paul and the UK Government’s express policy of preserving ‘peaceful conditions’ in Yugoslavia. This reflected Campbell’s fears that any action by Britain ‘might definitely provoke Germany to overrun Yugoslavia’.

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Although London poured cold water on the notion of supporting a coup d’état in the summer, and again in the autumn of 1940 when the idea was mooted again by Serb dissidents, it was agreed that SOE’s aim of setting up and equipping resistance to the anticipated German occupation should be implemented. Campbell reluctantly agreed.

 

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It has to be said that coup plots appear to have been endemic in Yugoslavia. General Simovic ‘had for some time been considered by elements hostile to the Government of the Prince Regent as a possible “sword” to further its ambitions.’ He had been involved in two coup attempts in early 1938 (prompted by the question of the Concordat with the Vatican) and again in December 1938 after the General Election. In May 1940 three retired Serbian Generals, who represented one of the Army clubs, concocted a scheme in Zagreb to assassinate Prince Paul the following month. (SOE soon learned when members of the opposition made another approach to the General in October 1940, asking him to lead a coup d’état. The General’s answer was non-committal.) It was certainly evidence of the Minister’s and the Foreign Office’s caution; but given Britain’s diplomatic isolation and the threat of imminent invasion of Great Britain in 1940, it was seen, not unnaturally, as an unacceptably reckless gamble. Eden, both as Secretary of State for War, and from December 1940, Foreign Secretary, set little store by SOE projects and proposals, and only turned to them in desperation in March 1941.

Thus, the sum of British policy towards Yugoslavia appears to be fragmented and inconsistent, reflecting a lack of overall supervision and a failure of co-ordination and cohesion – ultimately, a failure of leadership.

 

... 

the evolution of British policy towards Yugoslavia between early November 1940 and March 1941 was driven by her concerns for her ally, Greece, and by the deteriorating situation in the Balkans. With the fall of France in June 1940, Britain had nominally adopted the attitude of seeking to entangle Germany and the Soviet Union in the region, but in reality supported Prince Paul’s pursuit of neutrality to keep the Balkans quiet. Enigma decrypts from November 1940 onwards revealed that this was no longer a viable policy. Hence Britain changed tack from late 1940 to pressing Belgrade not to adhere to the Tripartite Pact; pursuit of neutrality was no longer enough. Therefore, UK policy towards Yugoslavia and ultimate support for the coup was defined by British strategic and power-political aims in the spring of 1941, and determination to resist the anticipated German attack on her ally, Greece – either through Bulgaria, or Yugoslavia.

 

The fragmentation and inconsistencies of British policy and activity in Yugoslavia, the inherent flaws versus the political expectations of British policy, came to repose in the new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who had his own particular agenda. In his critical biography of Eden, David Carlton attributes the resulting military fiasco in Greece to Eden’s own lack of critical judgement. Eden has been heavily criticised, both in the House of Commons on his return in April 1941, and by subsequent writers, for his role in the disastrous Greek campaign.

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Overall, Eden’s ultimate decision to authorise UK involvement in a coup d’état against Prince Paul’s regime was to save Britain’s Greek venture, to bolster Turkey’s resolve against the German advance into the Balkans, and because of the associated perceived benefits in the United States, Vichy France, Spain and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was thus part of a complex pattern of elements that Britain was attempting to forge into a bulwark against German advance. ‘The best way of ensuring that Turkey would fight would be to give effective help to the Greeks. If we failed in this, we should lose all hope of facing Germany with the Balkan front, we should probably lose our safe communications with Turkey, and we should lose Yugoslavia.'

At the outset of his tour of the Near East, Eden was instructed by Churchill ‘to deal directly with the Yugoslav and Turkish Governments, with the object of making both countries fight at the same time or do the best they could.

...

In Eden’s tour of the Near East from 22 February to 6 April 1941, the Foreign Secretary attempted to bring the wider world to bear upon Yugoslavia. In this, Eden adopted a four-fold approach. Initially the War Cabinet’s idea was to boost Yugoslavia’s resolve by aiding Greece. Failure to help Athens would mean ‘there is no hope of action by Yugoslavia’. This was Churchill’s view too. However, under Eden, this policy was turned on its head, and Yugoslavia and Turkey were to save Greece. Secondly, Eden sought to use Turkey as the means to draw Yugoslavia into regional military planning and diplomatic defiance. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, conceived Turkey as being more important strategically than Greece. ‘Yugoslavia will not fight unless Turkey fights and the converse is very likely true.’ Thirdly, Eden attempted to use American, Greek and Soviet channels to bolster Yugoslav resistance. And, fourthly, Britain was to exert pressure on Prince Paul’s Government to resist German pressure, and Italian enticement to join the Axis, using British diplomatic contacts, and SOE’s illicit network.

...

Prince Paul had already made abundantly clear his opposition to the idea of reinforcing Greece. Yet Eden was convinced that he could pull it off: ‘that Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia would all eventually come into the fight, but there would be would be a lot of slipping and slipping before that happens'.

 

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Bulgaria’s accession to the Tripartite Pact on 1 March, and the awful realisation on 5 March 1941 that the Greeks had not withdrawn to the Aliakmon line as Eden and Dill had anticipated. Thereafter, British policy became a desperate race prevent Yugoslavia’s signature of the Tripartite Pact to protect Britain’s exposed flank in Greece, comprising Commonwealth troops (from Australia and New Zealand, which was politically very sensitive in itself, given the theatre of war.

...

Eden stressed repeatedly – in his memoirs, in correspondence with Churchill, and in telegrams to London – that Turkey was the key to the whole Balkan situation, and did his best to promote a Balkan bloc to withstand Germany’s advance. At the UK’s instigation – through the Southern Department, the Ankara Legation, and then the Foreign Secretary – in mid-January and early-February there had ensued an elaborate dance between Yugoslavia and Turkey, as British diplomats and the military painstakingly attempted to nudge Turkey and Yugoslavia closer together. The bait offered to each side was that a German threat to Salonika would constitute a casus belli for the other: but neither Belgrade nor Ankara responded.

...

The Legation and military staff in Angora were profoundly dubious about Eden’s policy, and their Government’s attempts ‘to hustle the Turks faster than their temperamental and technological situations would justify’. On 18 March Eden tried again at a meeting with Cyprus with Sarajoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and Greek representatives. He finally managed to extract the statement that an attack on Salonika would constitute a ‘mortal danger’ (but not the desired ‘casus belli’) for Turkey; as he telegraphed Campbell in Belgrade, this was the best he could do.134 To the immense frustration of the Foreign Secretary, the Turkish Government subsequently refused to send new instructions to their Belgrade minister because of the Cabinet crisis in

Yugoslavia – precipitated by the resignation of three Serb politicians on 20 March. (It is ironic that this was the work of SOE in close co-ordination with Tupanjanin.).

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Eden and London had much more success co-ordinating their Balkan policy, and consequent pressure on Prince Paul’s regime, with the Roosevelt Administration. Historians have pointed in general terms to the ‘common law marriage’ that developed between the United States and Britain following the offer of Lend Lease in December 1940. Yugoslavia was one of the first manifestations of the evolving partnership.

 

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Churchill similarly pressed Roosevelt, when informing him of Britain’s decision to aid Greece:

At this juncture the action of Yugoslavia is cardinal. No country ever had such a military chance. If they will fall on the Italian rear in Albania there is no measuring what might happen in a few weeks. The whole situation might be transformed, and the action of Turkey also decided in our favour. One has the feeling that Russia, though actuated mainly by fear, might at least give some reassurance to Turkey about not pressing her in the Caucasus or turning against her in the Black Sea. I need scarcely say that the concerted influence of your Ambassadors in Turkey, Russia, and above all Yugoslavia, would be of enormous value at the moment, and indeed might possibly turn the scales.145

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This marked (if not total) British success in co-ordinating policy and diplomatic pressure in the Balkans, and on Yugoslavia in particular, with the Americans was in direct contrast to UK’s efforts to recruit the Soviet Union. It was initially hoped that ‘the best way of gaining Russia is a good throw in the Balkans’. As well as trying to cajole the Soviets into a stout declaration of support for Yugoslavia (Sir Stafford Cripps and Gavrilovic co-ordinated their activity in Moscow), London was also pressing the Soviet Union to give a formal assurance that it would not attack Turkey in the event of a German attack. The Soviet Union finally announced this formally on 19 March. However, British hopes that the USSR could make good Yugoslavia’s armaments deficiencies came to nothing. The Soviets refused to be drawn into a commitment to support the neutrality and independence of the Balkan states.

 

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Finally, there is the bilateral relationship and the pressure that Britain sought to exert on Prince Paul, and Prime Minister Cvetkovic between January and March 1941. Wheeler, Stafford and Barker have all reviewed this, pointing to the established method of monarchical missives, and visits from trusted British friends (such as Henry ‘Chips’ Channon).156 As Yugoslavia’s decision seemed to hang in the balance, there were repeated requests for audiences and increasingly frenetic messages from Eden; the despatch of Terence Shone, the former First Secretary at the Belgrade Legation and a close friend of the Prince Regent; Churchill’s personal appeal to the President of the Council, Cvetkovic; exhortations from the Minister, Campbell; offers to consider Yugoslavia’s ethnographic claim to the Istrian Isthmus and islands in Adriatic in the post-war peace settlement. (Britain did not think it necessary to tell the Americans that this had been proposed.) Official diplomatic channels were backed by SOE efforts to orchestrate particularly Serbian dissatisfaction with the pro-German drift of the Regent’s Government, through nationalist petitions, co-ordinating the resignation of three Serb ministers with Tupanjanin; and increased broadcasts by the BBC designed to bring ‘all possible pressure’ to bear in the Serb-Croat programmes.

...

None of this co-ordinated diplomatic activity and pressure succeeded in preventing the Yugoslav Government’s signature of the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941. The Foreign Secretary’s decision to agree to a coup in March therefore marked the failure in the Foreign Office’s and the British Legation’s preferred approach of reliance upon Prince Paul to ‘do the right thing’. This had been perceived as Britain’s trump card in Yugoslavia since 1939. It is clear that Tupanjanin had believed that the resignation of three political allies, and the ensuing Cabinet crisis, would either precipitate the fall of the government, or a radical change of foreign policy. This did not happen, and the Turkish Government, much to Eden’s frustration, used the political crisis in Belgrade as the excuse not to make a new approach to Yugoslavia: the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade was instructed to act only ‘if he finds the occasion suitable.

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The earnest hope was that a new Yugoslav government, either a civilian one (which was expected to be overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, Serb), dominated by the military, or – preferably – an authoritarian regime, would reject Prince Paul and his Government’s defeatist posture and adherence to the Tripartite Pact, and go on the offensive in Albania. But the Foreign Office was very pessimistic about the chances of success; Tupanjanin’s positive reports had been repeatedly discounted on the grounds that he and his party were financed by Britain. Southern Department was already devoting considerable thought of how best to manage Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact: either by maintaining relations with Prince Paul’s Government, or by seeking to foster a separatist regime in southern Serbia with the support of the strategically key Southern Serb Army. The British Minister in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, had already been instructed to co-operate with General Papagos in a joint effort to ‘bring about the secession of the Yugoslav Southern Army.’ There was no contingency planning for the actual outcome of the coup: namely, a military figurehead and a government of national unity based on all political parties.

 

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Naturally, the United Kingdom, as an imperial great power, in the grip of total war against fascism, looked to her own national interests and was guided by her own geostrategic imperatives. The fundamental flaw in this policy, from the point of view of the successful achievement of British aims in, and through Yugoslavia, therefore is that policy was dictated by London’s political preoccupations and Britain’s wider strategic imperatives, with insufficient attention to the local Yugoslav dynamic. That the UK entertained expectations before the coup, only to have these rudely disabused, was a product of the great power mindset of the London political and bureaucratic elite.

Given lack of British investment in Yugoslavia in terms of arms, war material, economic links and broader political ties, the immediate success of the coup – as a striking gesture of defiance against Nazi Germany – should be seen as a fortunate coincidence of UK strategic imperatives and Yugoslav (predominantly, but not exclusively, Serb) domestic and international concerns. Britain’s support was borne of her desperate attempts to salvage something from the wreckage of her Balkan policy: failure to equip Balkan states with sufficient arms and consequent confidence to withstand German pressure; failure to establish any sort of economic and financial leverage in Yugoslavia, in part because of the fixation of the Ministry of Economic Warfare with the efficacy of economic blockade; failure to broker a Balkan front against Germany’s relentless advance; failure to reinforce adequately and in good time their ally, Greece; failure to persuade Russia to come to the aid of fellow Slavs. For Britain the aftermath of the March coup proved a bitter irony: it was the triumph of Yugoslav democracy, whereas the immediate interests of democratic Britain would have been better served by an authoritarian separatist regime in Southern Serbia – one of the options the Foreign Office was contemplating.

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The immediate image of the coup was a triumphant rejection of the Axis. Certainly, unlike in every other Balkan country which had succumbed to German pressure, Britain did contribute to a flare of defiance against fascism. However, this should not detract from the reality of the outcome of the coup as a defeat for British policy. British policy had been hoist on its own petard in using a minority Serbian party, to further London’s ambitions. Therefore the ‘detonator concept’ on which London (and Dalton) had pinned so much, was revealed to be unstable ordnance. The fact that the coup ‘misfired’ revealed the limits of British contacts within broader Yugoslav society – in part a product of the legacy of the1930s, also of the conscious political decision to focus on Belgrade, and failure to build up contacts within wider Yugoslav political society. Thus London’s political expectations had been attached to unstable local factors.

 

 

 

[nera]

 

Naleteo sasm na ovaj, IMHO odličan (iako star 10ak godina), pregled britanske politike prema Jugoslaviji pred rat:

 

 

 

 

 

 

nece da otvori link

[Prospero]

http://kmi-web23.open.ac.uk:8081/display/112802

 

Meni uredno otvara

 

 

http://kmi-web23.open.ac.uk:8081/download/pdf/112802.pdf

Edited May 27, 2015 by Prospero