Izrael, Palestina i arapske zemlje

[cedo]

Just now, dragance said:

Ovo vredi čitati i da se zauvek prestane zagovarati ubijanje - jednih ili drugih!

 

nitko ne zagovara ubijanje, upravo suprotno

[cedo]

sa druge strane biden sto je video slike obezglavljene dece

 

 

Israeli official says government cannot confirm babies were beheaded in Hamas attack

 

The Israeli government has not confirmed the specific claim that Hamas attackers cut off the heads of babies during their shock attack on Saturday, an Israeli official told CNN, contradicting a previous public statement by the Prime Minister’s office.

“There have been cases of Hamas militants carrying out beheadings and other ISIS-style atrocities. However, we cannot confirm if the victims were men or women, soldiers or civilians, adults or children,” the official said.

 

Spoiler

The explosive allegations that children had been decapitated at the kibbutz of Kfar Aza emerged Tuesday in Israeli media. Israel Defense Forces later described the scene as a “massacre” in a statement to CNN. Women, children toddlers and the elderly were “brutally butchered in an ISIS way of action,” the IDF said.

 

 

Tal Heinrich, a spokeswoman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said on Wednesday that babies and toddlers had been found with their “heads decapitated” in Kfar Aza.

US President Joe Biden appeared to confirm that information. In a roundtable with Jewish community leaders on Wednesday, he said: “I have been doing this a long time, I never really thought that I would see… have confirmed pictures of terrorist beheading children.”

A US administration official later clarified Biden’s remarks, telling CNN that neither Biden nor his aides had seen pictures or had received confirmed reports of children or infants having been beheaded by Hamas. The official clarified that Biden was referring to public comments from media outlets and Israeli officials.

 

 

 

An IDF spokesman, Jonathan Conricus, later in the day said terrorists had likely carried out decapitations of babies in the Be’eri kibbutz.

“We got very very disturbing reports that came from the ground that there were babies that had been beheaded… I think we can now say with relative confidence that unfortunately this is what happened in Be’eri,” he said.

 

[cedo]

ovo se samo siri

 

 

[cedo]

1 hour ago, cedo said:

 

Israelis and Palestinians are facing their moment of greatest danger since 1948 Yuval Noah Harari

 

  Reveal hidden contents

 

 

Israel has just experienced the worst day in its history. More Israeli civilians have been slaughtered in a single day than all the civilians and soldiers Israel lost in the 1956 Sinai war, the 1967 six-day war and the 2006 second Lebanon war combined. The stories and images coming out of the area occupied by Hamas are horrific. Many of my own friends and family members have suffered unspeakable atrocities. This means the Palestinians, too, are now facing immense danger. The most powerful country in the Middle East is livid with pain, fear and anger. I do not have either the knowledge or moral authority to speak about how things look from the Palestinian perspective. But in the moment of Israel’s greatest pain, I would like to issue a warning about how things look from the Israeli side of the fence.

 

Politics often works like a scientific experiment, conducted on millions of people with few ethical limitations. You try something – whether increasing the welfare budget, electing a populist president or making a peace offer – witness the results, and decide whether to proceed further down that particular path; or you reverse course and try something else. This is how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has unfolded for decades: by trial and error.

 

During the 1990s Oslo peace process, Israel gave peace a chance. I know that from the viewpoint of Palestinians and some outside observers, Israeli peace offers were insufficient and arrogant, but it was still the most generous offer Israel has ever made. During that peace process, Israel handed partial control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. The outcome for Israelis was the worst terror campaign they had experienced until then. Israelis are still haunted by memories of daily life in the early 2000s, with buses and restaurants bombed every day. That terror campaign killed not only hundreds of Israeli civilians, but also the peace process and the Israeli left. Maybe Israel’s peace offer wasn’t generous enough. But was terrorism the only possible response?

After the failure of the peace process, Israel’s next experiment in Gaza was disengagement. In the mid-2000s, Israel unilaterally retreated from the entire Gaza Strip, dismantled all settlements there and returned to the internationally recognised pre-1967 border. True, it continued to impose a partial blockade on the Gaza Strip and to occupy the West Bank. But the withdrawal from Gaza was still a very significant Israeli step, and Israelis waited anxiously to see what the result of that experiment would be. The remnants of the Israeli left hoped that the Palestinians would make an honest attempt to turn Gaza into a prosperous and peaceful city state, a Middle Eastern Singapore, showing to the world and to the Israeli right what the Palestinians could do when given the opportunity to govern themselves.

Sure, it is difficult to build a Singapore under a partial blockade. But an honest attempt could still have been made, in which case there would have been greater pressure on the Israeli government from both foreign powers and the Israeli public to remove the blockade from Gaza and to reach an honourable deal about the West Bank as well. Instead, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and turned it into a terrorist base from which repeated attacks were launched on Israeli civilians. Another experiment ended in failure.

 

 

This completely discredited the remnants of the Israeli left, and brought to power Benjamin Netanyahu and his hawkish governments. Netanyahu pioneered another experiment. Since peaceful coexistence had failed, he adopted a policy of violent coexistence. Israel and Hamas traded blows on a weekly basis and almost every year there was a major military operation, but for a decade and a half, Israeli civilians could go on living within a few hundred metres from Hamas bases on the other side of the fence. Even Israel’s messianic zealots showed little zeal to reconquer the Gaza Strip, and even rightwingers hoped that the responsibilities involved in ruling more than 2 million people would gradually moderate Hamas.

Indeed, many on the Israeli right saw Hamas as a better partner than the Palestinian Authority. This was because Israeli hawks wanted to go on controlling the West Bank, and feared a peace deal. Hamas seemed to offer the Israeli right the best of all worlds: relieving Israel of the need to govern the Gaza Strip, without making any peace offers that might dislocate Israeli control of the West Bank. The day of horror Israel has just experienced signals the end of the Netanyahu experiment in violent coexistence.

So what comes next? No one knows for sure, but some voices in Israel are veering towards reconquering the Gaza Strip or bombing it to rubble. The result of such policy could be the worst humanitarian crisis the region has experienced since 1948. Especially if Hezbollah and Palestinian forces in the West Bank join the fray, the death toll could reach many thousands, with millions more driven from their homes. On both sides of the fence, there are religious fanatics fixated on divine promises and the 1948 war. Palestinians dream of reversing the outcome of that war. Jewish zealots like the finance minister Bezalel Smotrich have warned even Arab citizens of Israel that “you are here by mistake because Ben-Gurion [Israel’s first prime minister] didn’t finish the job in ’48 and didn’t kick you out”; 2023 could enable fanatics on both sides to pursue their religious fantasies, and re-stage the 1948 war with a vengeance.

 

Even if things don’t go to such extremes, the current conflict is likely to put the last nail in the coffin of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The kibbutzim along the Gaza border have been socialist communes and some of the most tenacious bastions of the Israeli left. I know people from those kibbutzim who, after years of almost daily rocket attacks from Gaza, still clung to the hope of peace, as if to a religious cult. These kibbutzim have just been obliterated, and some of the last peaceniks are either murdered, burying their loved ones, or held hostage in Gaza. For example, Vivian Silver, a peace activist from Kibbutz Be’eri who for years has been transporting ailing Gazans to Israeli hospitals, is missing and likely held hostage in Gaza.

What has already happened cannot be undone. The dead cannot be brought back to life, and the personal traumas will never completely heal. But we must prevent further escalation. Many of the forces in the region are currently led by irresponsible religious fanatics. External forces must therefore intervene to deescalate the conflict. Anyone who wishes for peace must unequivocally condemn the Hamas atrocities, put pressure on Hamas to immediately and unconditionally release all the hostages , and help deter Hezbollah and Iran from intervening. This would give Israelis a bit of breathing space and a tiny ray of hope.

Second, a coalition of the willing – ranging from the US and the EU to Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority – should take responsibility for the Gaza Strip away from Hamas, rebuild Gaza and simultaneously completely disarm Hamas and demilitarise the Gaza Strip.

There are only slim chances that these steps will be realised. But after the recent horrors, most Israelis don’t think they can live with anything less.

 

 

 

ja ne mogu argumentovano da diskutujem sa izraelskim levicarem pa cu to ostaviti "former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations"

 

tema iz gornjeg teksta neka bude :

 

Quote

During the 1990s Oslo peace process, Israel gave peace a chance. I know that from the viewpoint of Palestinians and some outside observers, Israeli peace offers were insufficient and arrogant, but it was still the most generous offer Israel has ever made. During that peace process, Israel handed partial control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. The outcome for Israelis was the worst terror campaign they had experienced until then. Israelis are still haunted by memories of daily life in the early 2000s, with buses and restaurants bombed every day. That terror campaign killed not only hundreds of Israeli civilians, but also the peace process and the Israeli left. Maybe Israel’s peace offer wasn’t generous enough. But was terrorism the only possible response?

 

 

a odgovor

 

Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed

 

 

Spoiler

Sitting on the South Lawn of the White House on Sept. 13, 1993, I couldn’t believe what I was seeing. Under a brilliant, cloudless sky, an uncomfortable Israeli prime minister and a beaming Palestinian leader clasped hands in pursuit of peace as an exuberant U.S. president embraced the duo, smiling like a proud parent.

The occasion was the signing of the first agreement of what came to be known as the Oslo Accords, which established an interim framework that, if implemented successfully, might actually lead to final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Even with all the challenges that lay ahead, I was convinced that the Arab-Israeli peace process was now irreversible.

Efraim Halevy, who in just a few years would become the head of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, would later write to me questioning my faith in that irreversibility and fearing the confrontation that could follow. Halevy’s analysis proved all too prescient. Today, 30 years after that historic day, what remains of the spirit and much of the substance of the Oslo agreement lies bloodied, buried, and betrayed across an Israeli-Palestinian landscape that seems to leave little room for hope and none for illusions.

The most right-wing and fundamentalist government in Israel’s history sits in Jerusalem, committed to the annexation of the West Bank in everything but name only, as well as expanding settlements and enabling settler terror and violence against Palestinians. The Palestinian national movement is deeply divided, resembling a kind of Noah’s Ark where there are two of everything—constitutions, governments, security services, patrons, and even visions of Palestine. In Gaza, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad plan and encourage terror attacks against Israelis, while in Ramallah, a weak and discredited Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority is unable or unwilling to control terror emanating from the northern West Bank.

Yet the lessons of Oslo still have some relevance, whatever the future holds for Israelis and Palestinians. Having had a ringside seat during those fateful years, four key takeaways stand out for me personally.

 

1. Interim can’t be final.

On paper, the Oslo Accords seemed logical and compelling. Territory would be transferred gradually to the Palestinian Authority in exchange for its assumption of security responsibilities. As we’ll see, the perverse dance between the occupier and the occupied would doom this approach. But it might have survived had the two sides been willing to make it clear from the outset what final outcome the interim period was supposed to produce, and then taken mutually reciprocal actions on the ground to prepare for it.

 

For Palestinians, that final outcome was an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. For Israelis, it was TBD—to be determined. Driven by domestic politics and their own doubts about the Palestinians’ capacity for statehood and what it might mean for Israeli security, neither Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin nor his successor Shimon Peres were prepared to commit to any agreed outcome—even as an aspirational vision. You can look long and hard for the term “Palestinian state” in the Oslo documents, but you won’t find it. It would take another half-dozen years before the idea of statehood worked its way into Israel’s negotiating assumptions. Not until 2001, as U.S. President Bill Clinton left office, did the United States formally and publicly articulate support for a two-state solution.

With no clear end goal to work toward, the process floundered. By 1999, not a single Oslo deadline had been met. Negotiations on permanent status had begun three times but produced nothing, and neither Israelis nor Palestinians could see where things were headed. But both had grown weary and wary of a seemingly never-ending interim process punctuated by Palestinian terrorist attacks and Israeli settlement expansion.

The result was the situation we have now: a strategic cul-de-sac in which the two sides are stuck and the gaps on issues such as borders and Jerusalem are as wide as the Grand Canyon, with no shared vision and no faith that one will ever materialize.

 

2. Leaders—and not just their negotiators—have to be willing to yield.

It seems like another world now given the state of relations between Israelis and Palestinians today, but back then, the negotiators for both sides actually worked hard together to solve problems and manage the ones they couldn’t. It was less so for the leaders who had to deal with the politics of the negotiating process and defend what they could—and punt and parry the issues they couldn’t.

In the early Oslo years before Rabin’s murder in November 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians doing the negotiating laughed, yelled, and cried together against the backdrop of a roller coaster environment that included agreements, missed deadlines, Palestinian and Israeli terror attacks, and continuing frustrations and suspicions. They became friends. I saw security officials from both sides—hard men with blood on their hands—engage with one another with respect and even affection. At one negotiating session at the Laromme Hotel in Jerusalem, an exhausted West Bank security chief Jabril Rajoub laid down in the same bed with Israel Defense Forces’ central commander Shaul Mofaz, jokingly pretending to take a nap.

For the negotiators, Oslo was not about zero-sum advantage but mutual benefit. That view was best embodied by Oslo’s two lead negotiators, Uri Savir and Abu Ala (both of whom have since died), who would become fast friends. Interviewing them both in 2013 on the 25th anniversary of Oslo, that sense of partnership was front and center. Abu Ala, also known as Ahmed Qureia,  opined about the promise Oslo held: After decades of bitter struggle, during which both saw each other only through a barrel of a gun, they realized that it is possible to overcome hatred, misgivings, denial, and their own red lines. Neither man was a dreamer, but both saw the opportunity that Oslo offered to better understand the needs of the other and to humanize the adversary.

I sometimes thought that, had the decision-making been left to Abu Ala and Savir, Oslo would have had a better chance of delivering. But in the hard and cruel world of Israeli and Palestinian politics, leaders had their own personal and political constraints with which to reckon.

For Rabin, dealing with the Palestinian issue was never his first choice. It is true that as defense minister during the First Intifada, Rabin began to understand that the conflict had no military solution, and by the spring of 1993, he had reached the conclusion that no one—not Jordan, not West Bankers, not Gazans—could replace the PLO as an interlocutor. But peace with Syria was his preference because of its strategic character and its avoidance of hot-button issues such as Jerusalem. Then, in August 1993, with the U.S.-mediated Israeli-Syrian channel making progress but with little chance of a dramatic breakthrough, the secret Oslo channel delivered—and suddenly, Rabin was thrust into dealing with the Palestinian issue head on.

 

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin made a historic decision with respect to the Palestinians. But translating that to an Israeli bureaucracy and security establishment that held the key to making life better for Palestinians on the ground proved much harder. By 1993, the policies of the Israeli occupation had become deeply entrenched in Israeli politics and day-to-day relations with Palestinians.

Rabin had also locked himself into a public commitment not to dismantle any settlements during the interim period, and to do so only as part of a permanent status negotiations. He would later regret that decision when, in the wake of an Israeli settler massacring 29 Palestinians in Hebron, he resisted pressures from within his own government to remove the 400 settlers living there who required a large Israeli military presence to protect them. Rabin was fearful of reaction from the right-wing opposition and worried that Yasser Arafat, then the chairman of the PLO, would exploit the crisis to push for an international presence in the West Bank. Yet Rabin’s unwillingness or inability to limit, let alone halt, settlement expansion diminished Palestinian willingness to implement their own commitments under Oslo.

As for Arafat, I was never really sure of his motives for accepting the Oslo Accords. They compelled him, at least for the moment, to recognize Israel without achieving any of the Palestinians’ demands—not self-determination, not statehood, not East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital, not the right of return for Palestinian refugees. My best guess is that for Arafat, Oslo represented Israel’s, the United States’, and the international community’s validation of himself and the PLO as the only legitimate avenue for dealing with the Palestinians. Arafat put up with the interim process because, in essence, the entire world recognized him as the exclusive address for all matters Palestinian. It was the triumph of personal ego over national interest.

But Oslo proved to be the first and last concession that Arafat was prepared to make. In March 2002, during a mission with the George W. Bush administration’s special envoy, Anthony Zinni, we saw Arafat at his headquarters surrounded by Israeli forces. Entrances barricaded, windows blacked out, candles on the table lighting an otherwise darkened conference room, there was Arafat with his black machine gun on the conference table, talking about martyrdom for the cause of Palestine.

He had come a long way, but could never quite make the transition from the mentality of a revolutionary leader committed to armed struggle and the use of violence against Israel to the world of compromise and diplomacy that would have been required, together with a foresighted Israeli leader, to bring about the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3. The occupier and the occupied aren’t equals in negotiations.

The good news about Oslo was that Israelis and Palestinians had managed to hammer out a substantive and complex agreement between themselves directly, face-to-face. It’s like that old adage: In the history of the world, nobody has ever washed a rental car. Why? Because folks only care about what they own. Oslo was an example of authentic ownership. Agreement was reached because the parties themselves had a sense of urgency and a need for their own interests to come together without external pressure.

But the Israeli and Palestinian dual act was also bad news because of the power imbalance between the two parties: one the occupier, Israel, and one the occupied, the Palestinians. Given this reality, it was remarkable that anything got done at all in terms of territorial transfer, economic and security cooperation, and building Palestinian institutions.

The asymmetry of power was clear: As the occupier, Israel wielded the power of the strong—the capacity to impose its will on the Palestinians. This took the form of everything from settlement construction, land confiscation, and housing demolitions to closures of the West Bank cities and towns (preventing travel), and targeted killings. Settlement construction was especially egregious, with 115,700 Israeli settlers residing in the West Bank and Gaza at the end of 1993; by mid-1999, that number had risen to 176,973.

 

Palestinians, on the other hand, wielded the power of the weak: terrorism. As the weaker party in the negotiations, Palestinian leaders rationalized the use of terror and violence and the armed struggle against Israel as an acceptable instrument to fight back against Israeli occupation and the ongoing settlement expansion. Even though most of the terrorist attacks in the early Oslo years were carried out by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad outside of the Palestinian Authority’s control, Arafat—who never abandoned the use violence as potential tool—could or would not do more to prevent terrorist attacks or arrest the perpetrators.

From Israel’s perspective, land was transferred to the Palestinians, yet the terrorism continued, raising questions about the PLO’s reliability. From the Palestinian perspective, Israel had put Palestinians on probation. Israel was appropriating land that Palestinians believed to be theirs, and any confidence-building measures were only offered in return for Palestinian performance and good behavior. These mindsets produced a barrier that, in the absence of a third party that could help balance the power asymmetry and press each side to implement their commitments, proved insurmountable.

 

4. A mediator must be present—and credible.

In many respects, the early years of Oslo were a U.S. negotiator’s dream. Israelis and Palestinians had finally done what we had been encouraging them to do for years: get together and work through their own problems themselves. Rabin briefed U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on the outlines of the Oslo breakthrough in July, minus the mutual recognition package. But neither Rabin nor Arafat wanted Americans in on the substance—Rabin wanted the United States involved only to pressure the Palestinians but was wary that the Americans might adopt a pro-Palestinian position, and Arafat was concerned they’d side with the Israelis.

And so, in the early years until Rabin’s murder in late 1995, Washington’s role was limited to hosting signing ceremonies, rallying donors, and playing firefighter at critical points when negotiations reached a crisis—such as when a terrorist attack occurred, or when Israeli settlement expansion or other unilateral acts threatened the process. What the United States didn’t—and couldn’t—do, largely because of Israel’s objections, was create the one thing that might have actually given the Oslo process durability: a monitoring mechanism to hold each side to the commitments they had made and, if necessary, impose costs for a breach.

Doing so was a bridge too far. This was partly because of the United States’ traditional special relationship with Israel, which made getting tough with the Israelis, especially on settlement expansion, off limits; partly because of the Clinton administration’s determination to improve relations with Israel after the stormy years of former President George H.W. Bush; and partly because, when it came to Oslo violations, terrorist attacks were understandably viewed as more lethal than settlement expansion and pushed the United States to side with Israel.

From Oslo on, with Rabin’s pro-peace successor Peres and especially with Ehud Barak at the Camp David summit, Clinton didn’t want to jam up Israeli prime ministers. Far too often, Americans—myself included—essentially acted as Israel’s lawyer. What this meant in practice was a disposition favoring Israel on process, substance, tight coordination, and no surprises.

I’ll never forget: On the fourth day of the summit, I saw the late Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat on one of the walking paths. He stopped and asked when the Palestinians were going to receive the draft of a paper that we were preparing on the core issues. I said it was taking more time to prepare than we thought. Smiling, Saeb replied, “Aaron, you’ve given it to the Israelis first, haven’t you?” I smiled back and kept on walking.

In the wake of Rabin’s murder, the United States tried to take a more active role. From 1995 to 2000, working with Arafat and two Israeli prime ministers—Benjamin Netanyahu and Barak—Americans were able to keep the process alive, broker three interim accords, and strengthen Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, with the CIA working directly with the Palestinians. But the same structural factors that made Oslo a long shot even in the heady days of the fall 1993—the absence of an agreed political vision, the perverse dance between the occupier and the occupied, and terrorism and settlements—were simply too much to overcome.

 

In the 30 years since the Oslo Accords, Israeli-Palestinian peace turned out to be anything but inevitable. Looking back, Oslo represented a moment when Israelis and Palestinians came together in hopes of securing a better future.

Paradoxically, talk of potential Israeli-Saudi normalization has revived a key concept of the Oslo process focusing on the so-called Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of the West Bank and is where most of Israel’s settlements are located. There are credible reports of various proposals made by the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and Saudi Arabia arguing that Israel should agree to transfer a significant portion of Area C to Palestinian control as part an agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem to normalize relations.

Such a proposal will almost certainly be resisted by extremist ministers in Netanyahu’s government, and it’s unclear how flexible Netanyahu—who is desperate for a deal with the Saudis—will be. Still, it would be quite extraordinary if the presumed dead and buried architecture of the Oslo process was resurrected to try to redeem the fast-fading hopes of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

But even with this potential opening, there’s still no clear pathway to end the conflict, and no organizing principle around which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians can rally. Without giving up hope—and we cannot—we also should not succumb to facile illusions and assumptions about silver bullets that can redeem a peaceful future for both peoples. If Oslo demonstrated anything, it’s that even with leadership and partnership, the journey is long, hard, and strewn, more often than not, with failure.

None of this means that the past is inexorably prologue. None of us can see around corners, and abandoning the search for an equitable and durable Israeli-Palestinian peace is neither morally nor ethically responsible—and it’s not in U.S. interests. We need leaders who see peace as critical to their own people and who are prepared to understand and work to accommodate the needs of the other side; a mediator who’s prepared to be reassuring, patient, and tough on both sides when necessary; and an end state that recognizes that a durable and equitable solution depends on a balance of interests, not an asymmetry of power.

None of these things is available now. Yet the United States may someday have another opportunity to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and we should do so without illusion and without believing we can do it alone or abandoning that pursuit if we run into serious challenges. And with right-thinking and courageous Israelis and Palestinians, support from the Arab world and beyond, and a fair amount of luck, one day—who knows—we might just get there.

 

 

Edited October 12, 2023 by cedo

[Lo Zingaro]

Cedo brate, ubacuj spojlere, ne mogu da se naskrolujem ovih carsafa.

[x500]

@cedo 

Probaj te dugacke copy&paste da turis u "spoiler". 

Spoiler

Kad se cita na telefonu moze da se izgrebe ekran od "skrolovanja".

 

Bivsi premijer je direktno optuzio Bibija za Hamasov napad. 

 

[Budja]

5 hours ago, Anduril said:

 

Ali bas svaki topik mora da se usere pricom o tome kako je Zapad licemeran bez obzira da li su direktno ili indirektno umesani.

I to ide jos od Sirije, preko Ukrajine i sada do Palestine da bi se pokazao neki moralno superioran stav (u odnosu na Zapad, mos misliti) ili kompenzovali neki kompleksi.

Istovremeno se, sa moralnog stanovista, pisu ili precutkuju mnogo gore stvari nego sto ovde izjavljuju neki zvanicnici ili se prosto ignorisu mnogo masivniji problemi.

Kad su nam stigli izvestaji o napadu Hamasa i masovnom masakru civila, dobili smo komentare tipa "oh, to je prosto odmazda" ili "sta oni uopste imaju da prave zurke pored Gaze". Sorry, ako vec neko hoce po ko zna koji put da se bavi apsolutistickim moralom na topiku o politici, sto je glupo samo po sebi, onda ovakve izjave nisu nista bolje od onog sto sto se ovde izjavljuju neki politicari.

 

Jeste, Zapad je licemeran. Otkrili ste toplu vodu. Licemeran je i Arapski svet, i to u mnogo vecoj meri. Licemerne su i palestinske vodje. Licemeri su i pola palestinske i pola izraelske populacije koju podrzavaju totalno unistenje onih drugih. Licemeri su i forumasi koji pricaju o bogom danim sferama uticaja nuklearnih sila (Rusije recimo) a sada odjednom imaju problem sa ovim izraelskim fasistima. O licemerju povodom unistenja Sirije, gde su maltene svakodnevno bacane prvo barel bombe a kasnije teske ruske bombe po civilima, i to se onda pravdalo glavosecama (bukvalno istim ovakvim kao sto je ovde Hamas), da ne govorimo. Argument sa licemerjem i posebno moralnim apolutistickim standardima jednostavno nema smisla u politici jer sluze uglavnom manipulaciji kao i u religiji. U politici treba da se porede pre svega rezultati a ne mitske price o moralu i licemerju. Kako ljudi gde zive, koja prava imaju, kakva je nejednakost, itd. Sta ti vredi politicar koji je manji licemer ali je zato otvoren cinican zlocinac koji ubija i svoje i druge. Mos mislisti, Ursula najgora pored svih ovih drugih zbirova.

 

Ono sto radi Izrael je zlocin, i u Gazi i na Zapadnoj Obali - samo, nije mi jasno zasto nema ovakvih odjeka (ne samo na forumu, nego u islamskom svetu, Srbiji, uopste delovima pro-palestinskog levicarskog pokreta na Zapadu) na mnogo masivnije zlocine sirom islamskog sveta koje nisu pocinili Izraelci nego uglavnom muslimani nad muslimanima. Ima svega, od masovnom ubijanja, preko prepunih zatvora (ali bukvalno a ne tipa Gaza), silovanja, masivnog etnickog i religioznog ciscenja, do preuzimanja kuca, ma citavih kvartova, gradova i zemalja. I nista, to se spomene samo ako je Zapad nekako umesan ili se prosto Zapad direktno krivi za te zlocine. Klasicna ideoloska ili navijacka kvazimoralna prica. Ako je Zapad vec najgori, Ursula najgora, sto se moralne gromade lepo ne pokupe da uzivaju u rajevima koji su bolji. Pa ne, razlozi iza te kritike su ocigledno drugi i veoma razliciti pa bi bilo bolje malo razgovarati o njima.

 

 

Blinken je danas malo povukao rucnu.

 

I rekao nesto vazno upravo za ovo sto pises:

He said democracies distinguish themselves from terrorists by holding themselves to different standards, holding themselves to account when they fall short.

"Our humanity, the value we place on human life and human dignity... is what makes us who we are,” he said.

"That’s why it is so important to take every possible precaution to avoid harming civilians. And that’s why we mourn the loss of every innocent life, civilians of every faith, every nationality that have been killed."

 

Dakle, ako su demokratije moralno superiornije (held to higher standard) onda je i kritika takva, tj. kritikuje se licemerje: prkolamovano vs praktikovano.

Ako jedna drzava ne proklamuje ljudska prava kao vrednost (diktature, teokratske demokratije kao Iran, i sl.) onda ta drzava ne moze da se kritikuje za licemerje, vec samo za nepostovanje ljudskih prava.

 

 

[vememah]

 

Quote

Urgent statement
To the residents of the Beit Lahia area,
The operations of the Hamas terrorist organization forced the IDF forces to act against it in your areas of residence. For your safety, you must evacuate your homes immediately and go to known shelters. The IDF is not interested in harming you or your family members. Anyone who is near Hamas terrorists or their facilities will put their lives in danger. A house used by terrorist organizations will be targeted. Adhering to IDF instructions will prevent you from being exposed to danger.

Izvor: twitter.com/TheMossadIL/status/1712452818198474909

 

 

 

[Budja]

1 hour ago, dragance said:

Ovo vredi čitati i da se zauvek prestane zagovarati ubijanje - jednih ili drugih!

 

Yuval na pocetku kaze da pise iz izraelsko-jevrejske perspektive i to je ok da bi citalac ocenio pristrasnost koja je u clanku nesumnjiva.

 

Pristrasnost se vidi po tome sto, eto, Izrael je sve pokusavao in a good faith ali nista ne vredi, prilicno eskivirajuci odgovornost Izraela i cherry pikujuci neke cinjenice i dogadjaje.

 

Stoga je i zakljucak o koaliciji voljnih i eliminaciji Hamasa bezveze.

[vememah]

 

[vememah]

 

[Venom]

Jel ima negde neki brojač koliko je dece ostavljeno u ruševinama danas da umiru polako u narednim danima? Ili je to previše uznemirujuće za civilizovan svet?

[copkillah]

1 minute ago, Venom said:

Jel ima negde neki brojač koliko je dece ostavljeno u ruševinama danas da umiru polako u narednim danima? Ili je to previše uznemirujuće za civilizovan svet?

 

evo čime se civilizovan svet bavi:

 

 

[zorglub]

Zašto napad na sirijske aerodrome?

[BWA]

Zato što su tako u mogućnosti.