Katarska kriza

[vememah]

Ministar spoljnih poslova UAE (pre neki dan izjavio da blokada može trajati godinama) je besan što je Katar objavio tekst ultimatuma, tj. u njegovom rečniku "zahteve/zabrinutost" katarskih suseda:
 

 
Pritom uopšte nije izvesno da je katarska strana objavila zahteve. Lik koji je među prvima objavio kako ultimatum izgleda je neki kolumnista za emiratski The National, a inače živi u Vašingtonu i tamo radi u nekiom arapskom think-tanku.

 
Turci su već rekli da im ne pada na pamet da povlače vojnike iz Katara:
 

Turkey rejected a call from four Arab states on Friday to shut down its military base in Qatar, saying the base was a guarantor of security in the Gulf and demands for its closure represented interference in its ties with Doha.
 
Defense Minister Fikri Isik told Turkish broadcaster NTV that he had not yet seen a request for the closure of the base, but made clear Ankara had no plans to review a 2014 agreement with Qatar which led to it being set up.
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-turkey-minister-idUSKBN19E0OL

 
Urednik spomenutog sajta Middle East Eye (MEE), koji je Saudijcima trn u oku, bivši novinar Guardiana, tvrdi da sajt ne finansiraju Katarci i da se svakako neće ugasiti:
 

David Hearst, Middle East Eye's editor-in-chief, said his organisation was not funded by Qatar - or any other state or group - and was here to stay.

"Middle East Eye is independent of any government or movement and is not funded by Qatar," he said.

"Maybe the fate of Al Jazeera will depend on talks between the government of Qatar and its neighbours. But Middle East Eye is here to stay.

"MEE covers the area without fear or favour, and we have carried reports critical of the Qatari authorities, for instance how workers from the subcontinent are treated on building projects for the 2022 World Cup."
 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/attack-free-thought-middle-east-eye-responds-saudi-demands-1572259574

 
MEE je malo analizirao zahteve iz ultimatuma.
 

Bonfire of vanities: Saudi demands expose fear and loathing of Qatar

A Saudi-led alliance has a list of 13 demands to end the blockade on Qatar. Middle East Eye sifts their content

 

Suraj Sharma
Friday 23 June 2017 15:00 UTC

Saudi Arabia and its allies have issued 13 demands for Qatar to meet if a blockade is to be lifted. But the list shows their main concern is not Qatar's financing of terrorists and cosying up to Iran, but instead a combustible mix of existential fear and attempts to diminish Doha's influence and wealth.

Also clear, given the contradictions and incorrect claims, is that the list was prepared haphazardly after the international community and the Muslim world remained sceptical of Saudi and UAE motives for imposing the blockade on Qatar.
Notable for its absence is any demands regarding Hamas - the Palestinian group which Saudi Arabia and its allies have called "extremist" during the five weeks of diplomatic crisis.
Middle East Eye, which too finds itself targeted in the list, has sifted through each demand in detail, in order.
 

Demand 1: Curb diplomatic ties with Iran and close its diplomatic missions there. Expel members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and cut off any joint military cooperation with Iran. Only trade and commerce with Iran that complies with US and international sanctions will be permitted.   
The ties between Qatar and Iran are by no means those of allies. Qatar and Iran share a major natural gas field, which means Doha has to maintain minimal ties with Tehran and cannot take the ultra-hawkish Saudi position.
Doha and Tehran are at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. This is clearest in Syria, where Shia Muslim Iran backs the Assad government while Sunni Muslim Doha supports Turkish-backed rebel forces. In this light, it becomes difficult to give credence to claims of military cooperation between Doha and Tehran.  
As for trade, the UAE is one of Tehran's biggest trade partners. The UAE played a major role in helping Tehran bust US and international sanctions by facilitating a gold-for-oil deal. Recent media reports based on Turkish statistics indicate that this sanctions-busting gold trade could still be ongoing.  

Demand 2: Immediately terminate the Turkish military presence currently in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar.
Turkey has taken pains to assure other Gulf countries that any Turkish military presence in the Gulf is not to threaten any of them but to provide a bulwark against unspecified "common threats", which could potentially include Iran, making the Saudi demand for withdrawal contrary to its own interests.
There are a few dozen Turkish troops in Doha. Seeing a tiny Turkish presence as a bigger threat than Iran's easy reach across the Gulf at any point also reveals the real motive of the demand is to wrest Qatar of its sovereignty.
For Doha to accept this demand would mean allowing interference in its sovereign affairs. Turkey, too, is unlikely to even entertain such thoughts given its determination to not allow third-party meddling in its affairs.
Although highly unlikely, any decision on troop withdrawal from Turkey would come as a result of domestic pressure, where critics have been questioning the need for a Turkish base there since details of the deal began to emerge in 2014. Domestic critics have called the base a projection of the neo-Ottoman dreams held by the Turkish president.      

Demand 3:  Sever all ties to 'terrorist organisations' - specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State group, al-Qaeda, and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Formally declare those entities as terrorist groups.
Doha might be the victim of its own ambitions and of Western betrayal here. Right from the post-9/11 days when Qatar agreed to the Afghan Taliban opening a representation office in Qatar with Western blessing, the tiny Gulf country looked to be the neutral venue where even the harshest of adversaries could meet and talk.
Qatar did not even recognise the Taliban between 1996 and 2001.
With the exception of IS and al-Qaeda, Doha has looked to maintain its role as a neutral and safe venue for potential talks by allowing the presence of representatives of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood on its territory.
The Saudis and other Gulf countries view the Muslim Brotherhood as the main threat to their continued existence but the international community – including Britain and the US - has strong reservations over designating the non-violent movement as "terrorist".
Doha is going to be hard-pressed to accept this demand given that it even succeeded in convincing the Palestinian group Hamas to amend its charter and adopt a softer and more positive tone.  
 

Demand 4: Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organisations that have been designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, the US and other countries.      
Qatar has rejected claims of such funding from the very first moment they were made. No evidence has been provided for such alleged funding.
Including the US in this demand indicates the tenuous nature of the claim. The US does not need the Saudi-led coalition to make demands on its behalf. The US recently signed a $22bn fighter jet deal with Qatar, something it would not do if it believed Qatar was an enemy, and nor would it continue to base 10,000 troops there.
 

Demand 5: Hand over 'terrorist figures' and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired information about their residency, movements and finances.
Again there is no indication that Qatar has refused to cooperate with its Gulf Cooperation Council members within the framework of existing agreements or bilateral agreements with these states, including extradition agreements.
It is a demand Qatar might find difficult to accept if it wants to continue its role as a neutral and fair interlocutor and venue for negotiations between various feuding factions, especially if they represent non-violent movements.

Demand 6: Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations.
Soon after its establishment, Qatar's state-funded Al Jazeera network quickly became the region's only broadcaster able to provide coverage on a par with its established Western counterparts. A huge budget and a drive to recruit the best journalists from around the globe increased its stature. 
The network's stance, however, often meant it was rejected both by the West as being too Muslim-focused and by the region's despots as inciting revolt.
In fairness to Saudi concerns, the network's Arabic-language channel has pushed a stronger line backing popular street movements in the region making the Saudis, the Emiratis and others nervous.
The Al Jazeera network has reflected the view of the royal palace, and has been careful to tame its coverage of Yemen in Saudi Arabia's favour to reflect its neighbour's current anti-Iran policies. The channel's coverage of domestic issues, such as modern slavery, has been muted.

Demand 7: End interference in sovereign countries' internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari citizenship for existing nationals where such citizenship violates those countries' laws.  
A demand that is vague and will prove difficult to monitor even if it is the case. Conversely, the presentation of such a list of demands in itself can be construed as interference in Qatar's sovereign affairs.
Given the intricate family and tribal links between the nationals of Gulf countries, multiple citizenship is common and depriving citizenship rights to individuals without enough evidence warranting it could lead to grave human rights violations.

Demand 8: Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other, financial losses caused by Qatar's policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar.
Another vaguely and highly-contestable demand. With no specific compensation sums or the amount of financial loss mentioned, and also no concrete evidence, it makes it impossible for any independent state to accept.

Demand 9: Align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically, as well as on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014.  
Qatar is already part of the Saudi-led Islamic alliance. It is also a fully-integrated member of the GCC. Its economic interests as a major exporter of hydrocarbons means its economic direction is aligned with that of Saudi Arabia.
The only difference appears to be Doha's refusal to adopt the same tone as the Saudis on Iran due to its shared South Pars gas field, and Qatar's backing of popular democratic movements across the region, excluding the Gulf.
This might prove to be one of the demands Doha will find easier and more practical to comply with if the blockade against it is lifted first.   
 

Demand 10: Stop all contacts with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Hand over all files detailing Qatar's prior contacts with and support for those opposition groups.
More signs of a hastily cobbled-together list of demands. Any political opposition in the mentioned countries are strictly monitored by these repressive governments. No evidence has been provided to justify claims of such Qatari actions.
There is little to indicate that Qatar would stand to gain by fomenting tro

uble in its own backyard. In fact, it would stand to lose as its routes to export natural gas, its biggest source of revenue, would be jeopardised.
 

Demand 11: Shut down news outlets that Qatar funds, directly and indirectly, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al Araby Al-Jadeed and Middle East Eye.
MEE is an independently-funded London-based news site dedicated to providing in-depth, impartial and factual coverage of the Middle East.
Reports from countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Syria show that MEE is dedicated to objectivity. It has not hesitated from critical reporting of Qatar allies such as Turkey when provable by facts. It has not spared Qatar either, for instance a series of articles on the ill-treatment of foreign workers used to build its infrastructure.
MEE has also not shied away from covering issues of regional importance that place Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in a very poor light, resulting in access to the site being blocked in those countries and becoming a target of their ire.  
 

Demand 12: Agree to all the demands within 10 days of it being submitted to Qatar, or the list becomes invalid.
It is unlikely that Doha will even be able to evaluate these demands, which often seek to deprive it of its sovereignty or involve instances that don't concern the country such as the demand to shut the MEE, within 10 days let alone agree to any or some of them.
 

Demand 13: Consent to monthly audits for the first year after agreeing to the demands, then once per quarter during the second year. For the following 10 years, Qatar would be monitored annually for compliance.
A demand that is tantamount to Qatar accepting its vassal status to the Saudis and UAE. There is no country on record that has ever acceded to such a demand, unless defeated in war.

 

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/bonfire-vanities-saudi-demands-expose-fear-and-loathing-qatar-382011438

Edited June 23, 2017 by vememah

[vememah]

Boris Džonson nakon objavljivanja liste zahteva:
 

The current tensions in the Gulf must be allayed for the sake of regional stability. Gulf unity can only be restored when all countries involved are willing to discuss demands that are measured and realistic. The UK calls upon the Gulf states to find a way of de-escalating the situation and lifting the current embargo and restrictions, which are having a real impact on the everyday lives of people in the region.

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-gulf-tensions

[vememah]

Katar nazvao zahteve iz ultimatuma nerazumnim i nesprovodivim.

 

Qatar has dismissed a list of demands submitted by four Arab countries as neither reasonable or actionable.

The list was received by Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 22, according to a report by the state-run Qatar News Agency.

"This list of demands confirms what Qatar has said from the beginning - the illegal blockade has nothing to do with combating terrorism, it is about limiting Qatar's sovereignty, and outsourcing our foreign policy," Sheikh Saif bin Ahmed Al Thani, director of the Qatari government's communications office, said in a statement on Friday.

"The US secretary of state recently called upon the blockading nations to produce a list of grievances that was 'reasonable and actionable'. The British foreign secretary asked that the demands be 'measured and realistic.' This list does not satisfy that criteria."

Qatar also said it is reviewing the demands and is preparing an official response after confirming the receipt of a document containing demands from several Arab countries that cut ties with it and imposed a blockade against it earlier this month amid a major diplomatic crisis.

"The state of Qatar is currently studying this paper, the demands contained therein and the foundations on which they were based, in order to prepare an appropriate response to it and hand it over to the state of Kuwait," QNA said, citing a statement by the ministry of foreign affairs.

Meshal bin Hamad Al Thani, Qatar's ambassador to the US, also criticised the list of demands.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/qatar-confirms-receipt-saudi-led-bloc-demands-170623214047175.html

 

Erdogan podržao Katar rekavši da su zahtevi iz ultimatuma protiv međunarodnog prava i da predstavljaju napad na suverenitet Katara. Uz to je za pozive da se zatvori turska baza u Kataru rekao da predstavljaju nepoštovanje Turske.

 

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Sunday demands by Saudi Arabia and three other nations are "an attack to Qatar's sovereignty right”.

 

He said Turkey can “appreciate and embrace' Qatar's stance against the 13-article demand by Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.

 

"We consider these demands are against international law," Erdogan told journalists after Eid al-Fitr prayers in Istanbul. "It is a breach of Qatar's sovereignty rights."

...

Erdogan also rejected a demand from Arab states to shut down its military base in Qatar, saying demanding Turkey's military withdrawal is also "a disrespect" towards the country.

 

"Should we get permission when we make a defense cooperation agreement with any country? No offense but Turkey is not such an ordinary country [that will ask for permission]," Turkish President said.

 

http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/erdogan-backs-qatar-against-demands-by-gulf-states/848602

Edited June 25, 2017 by vememah

[nautilus]

erdogan ne pominje slobodu medija :D

[Malvo]

Koliko ce daleko ostali Arapi smeti da idu ako Katar ima makar soft podrsku Turske i Irana? I imaju li mehanizme da ih uguse ekonomski, koje su neke srednjorocne posledice nastavka ovakve blokade?

[nautilus]

Koliko ce daleko ostali Arapi smeti da idu ako Katar ima makar soft podrsku Turske i Irana? I imaju li mehanizme da ih uguse ekonomski, koje su neke srednjorocne posledice nastavka ovakve blokade?

 

Rat u zalivu znaci povecanje cene nafte. To ne odgovara zapadu. Sve ostalo je moguce ali tako daleko nece ici.

[Takeshi]

kaze karl bilt da zahtevi lice na one austro-ugarske srbiji pred prvi svetski rat:

 

[vememah]

erdogan ne pominje slobodu medija :D

 

Zato spominje TRT, onu u Egiptu, kao "ugasio je mnogo medija" :):

 

Inače, evo šta se sve promenilo zbog blokade kada je u pitanju katarska spoljna trgovina:

[vememah]

Premijer UAE, lirska dušica, objavio pesmu na Instagramu sa suptilnom porukom da će Katar pojesti vuk ako ostane van stada.

 

 

 

The UAE's prime minister and ruler of Dubai has urged Qatar to "return to the GCC fold" in a poem he published on his Instagram account.

 

"Now it is time to get united and be one heart and protect each other without grudges or hatred," Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum wrote in the poem in Arabic.

 

The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain have been at the forefront of a blockade against Qatar, accusing Doha of "supporting terrorism".

Qatar has repeatedly denied the allegations.

Al Maktoum, who is known to write poems, struck a more conciliatory tone than the UAE's state minister of foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, who has warned that the blockade against Qatar could "last years" if Doha does not change its policies.

 

The poem, which was published on Tuesday, stresses that the UAE is its neighbours' champion as they come "from one tribe, one flesh, one land and religion".

 

Al Maktoum used a famous Arabic proverb, urging citizens to put their neighbour's interests before their own. "We helped them as they helped us," the poem reads. 

 

The prime minister also wrote: "We will keep advising Qatar openly in line with the instructions of Prophet Muhammad, who said: A wolf only eats sheep that leave the flock."

 

https://www.instagram.com/p/BV2QkobDCRF/

 

Premijer je desno na slici, levo je Vučićev drugar Bin Zajed, emiratski prestolonaslednik.

 

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/uae-pm-pens-poem-urges-qatar-return-gcc-fold-170629110822117.html

Edited June 30, 2017 by vememah

[namenski]

 

Koja 2 degenerika 

Pa ovo bi imalo problem i da se uclani u neki naprednjacki mesni odbor; posle kazu da ne moze gore nego u Srbiji 

Jednom recju - Srbija pri^tm parama, a sa svetom koji ovakve likove uzima za ozbiljno, vodi neku politiku, itd, itd, nesto izistinski nije u redu.

[Lord Protector]

 

 

Levo Vučić, desno Šešelj 

[Mr.Mxyzptlk]

makar ima jeftinih karata

[Bojan]

 

Tokom posete Rimu, šef diplomatije Katara šeik Mohamed bin Abdulrahman al Tani ponovo je odbacio listu zahteva kao narušavanje suvereniteta te države.

 

 

 

Катаре овцо појешће те вук!

[Redoran]

Po mom skromnom mišljenju ovo je možda i najbolji dajdžest™ aktuelne krize. Vredi pročitati, ima dosta zanimljivih detalja a autor ima solidne reference.

 

 

What the Hell Is Happening With Qatar?

 

President Donald Trump made Saudi Arabia the first stop on his foreign trip, and it wasn’t long after his departure from Riyadh that one of the Gulf’s long-seething tensions spilled over into a messy, dangerous standoff. Early last week, several Arab states — including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen — cut off all diplomatic and economic ties with the tiny Gulf state of Qatar. Those countries accused Qataris of funneling money to Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and of keeping inappropriately close ties with Iran. By Tuesday, Trump himself was involved, adding fuel to the rivalry by tweeting support for the Saudi coalition — despite Qatar’s indispensable role in the United States’ military operations in the region. The planes that bomb ISIS targets in Syria take off from the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command.

 

The rest of the administration, led by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, scrambled to undo the damage, and reportedly got Trump on the phone to talk to both sides. But Trump undercut those efforts on Friday by calling Qatar a funder of terrorism at a “very high level.” The diplomatic meltdown may sound oddly familiar in its cast of characters, which includes alleged Russian hackers and fake news. But the roots of the crisis go back decades, and are unfamiliar to most Americans not steeped in the fine points of political tensions within the Arab world. To give context to the standoff, Daily Intelligencer spoke with Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. He has studied and written extensively about the region, and is the author of the book Qatar and the Arab Spring, which happens to be a solid place to begin to understand the current tensions

 

Can you walk through exactly what’s going on?
To start with, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain did the same thing in March 2014, and relations remained disrupted for nine months. What’s different now is that several other countries have joined in, and they have economic sanctions. They’ve also closed off air, land, and sea links with Qatar, and ordered their own nationals to leave Qatar and ordered Qataris to leave their countries, too. So they’ve gone a lot further than in 2014.

 

But at its very heart, [the conflict] is rooted in the Arab Spring, when Qatar supported Islamist groups — in North Africa, and in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt — and were much more supportive in general of the uprisings. But Saudi Arabia and the UAE were very fearful the uprisings could potentially spread to the Gulf. The Qataris had basically no prospect of any potential unrest in 2011 because it’s such a wealthy state with a very small number of citizens enjoying huge amounts of personal wealth. So they saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to cast Qatar as something distinct. The Qataris also have Al Jazeera, which gave them a global profile, and they had just won the 2022 World Cup hosting rights. Their self-confidence was at its height, so they figured they could do anything if they threw enough resources at it.

 

What were the consequences of that?
The bet the Qataris placed on the Brotherhood seemed to pay off, at least in the beginning. But then, in 2013, you had the counter-coup in Egypt, when you had Mohammed Morsi being toppled, and then, of course, you had the uprisings in Syria and Libya turning into these never-ending civil wars. The big bet Qatar made failed. They backed the wrong horse. The Saudis and the Emiratis are not going to let them forget that.

 

But what prompted the Saudis, the UAE, and others to act now?
Saudis and the UAE feel emboldened, obviously by Trump’s election and his initial sign that the administration is going to be much more hawkish than its predecessor on Iran and Islamism. Those are exactly the two issues that Qatar was so different on in its approach. The Saudis and Emiratis feel this is now the time to put Qatar back into its box once and for all.

 

Once and for all?
This has been going on for 20 years, since the current emir’s [sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani] father [sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani] seized power from his own father in 1995 and began to set Qatar on a much more distinct path — in part to escape the Saudi shadow. The lesson Sheik Hamad, the ruler of Qatar, took in 1995 was from Kuwait in 1990, when it was invaded by Saddam Hussein. You have a 34-country coalition led by the U.S. mobilized within weeks because Kuwait has something of value to the global economic community. The lesson to Qatar was if we create these links around the world, we’ll potentially have people who will have a direct stake in our survival. So ’95 and onward, Qatar has tried to diversify its sources of international relations and security away from Big Brother next door.

 

So is this Saudi Arabia’s endgame — to assert its influence again over its little brother?
The UAE is also a key figure in this — it’s not just a Saudi thing. The Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, who’s this 31-year-old, very ambitious young prince; and then his mentor, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, have become this new axis of hawkish policymakers. Under the Obama administration, the Saudis and Emiratis didn’t feel they had the U.S. government backing. They didn’t believe Obama understood the security concerns about Iran and about Islamism. They were horrified by the Iran nuclear deal, and by the U.S. government’s acceptance of the uprising in Egypt in 2011 that, for them, swept away one of the U.S.’s longest security and political partners in the Middle East. They were thinking, Well, if that could happen to them, it could happen to us. In Abu Dhabi and in Riyadh, they thought for the first time in decades that if they couldn’t rely on the U.S. to ensure security, they would have to do it themselves.

And they also got pushed to become more assertive by Qatar, because Qatar was becoming much more regionally interventionist on the side of the Islamists. But the Saudis and Emiratis came out on top because, by 2013, the initial phase of the Arab Spring was more or less crushed.

 

But what triggered the Saudis and Emiratis to take action now?
In December 2015, a Qatari hunting group, including at least 12 or 13 members of the royal family, were taken hostage in southern Iraq by a Shia militia called Kata’ib Hezbollah, which has links back to Iran. For a long time, the Qatari government refused to make any ransom payments. Finally, in April, the Qataris came to a very complex agreement with Iran, with Hezbollah, and with a couple of Sunni groups in Syria. It involved prisoner exchanges and resettlement of villages in Syria. It also involved large amounts of money changing hands. The exact details are not known, but rumors were that the Qataris paid between $200 to $300 million. Just this week, the Financial Times [reported] up to $1 billion. Again, it’s very murky, but it seems a lot of the money ended up either in Shia militias’ and/or in Iran’s pockets. The Iraqi government was furious, claiming that it hadn’t been consulted and it was destabilizing to Iraq to strengthen these militias and strengthen Iran. The Gulf states said the same thing. This is now being used as the casus belli.

 

You say being used as the casus belli.
I think the trigger was Trump’s visit, and the feeling in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that they got a green light to be much more assertive. But the ransom payments are what they’re using as a justification. It reinforces the perception that Qatar is supporting all sorts of dodgy groups. It does so in a way that resonates; it plays well in D.C. The Gulf states, the Saudis, and the Emiratis know the U.S. government is not going to look favorably on a country that’s supporting Islamist groups and Iran. They know that this can damage Qatar’s reputation.

 

Has Qatar’s opportunism — trying to play so many sides — come back to haunt it?
Qataris would say it’s pragmatic. I can see why it looks to outsiders as opportunistic. For example, you have Qatar being much closer to Iran and at the same time being the host of U.S. Central Command. But from a Qatari perspective, they’re trying to hedge their bets. Qatar’s wealth comes from its possession of the world’s largest gas field, which is not associated with an oil field. But that gas field is in the middle of the Gulf; it straddles the Qatari-Iranian border, and Iran has a portion of it. They wouldn’t do anything that would endanger the oil fields that built Qatar to what it is today. But the Qataris don’t want to become too vulnerable to any Iranian pressure, so having CentCom allows Qatar this security guarantee — even though it doesn’t look like a natural fit. But when it goes wrong, like it has done now, they’re vulnerable to this kind of accusation of being an unreliable partner.

 

It seems as if Qatar has plenty of friends. What did Saudi Arabia, UAE, and others hope to gain by cutting off Qatar?
I think they thought the addition of so many other countries to the protest and economic sanctions would create shock and awe. I think they were hoping Qatar would immediately cave. The Qataris haven’t done so. To some extent rightly so, because Qatar hasn’t exactly done anything differently than it was already doing. And the Qataris have now acted, again, to diversify their own sources of support. You had the Turkish government fast-tracking legislation in Turkey to put troops in Qatar, where it has a base. You had Vladimir Putin, quite opportunistically, calling the emir on Tuesday to offer his support — right after Donald Trump’s tweets. The Qataris are showing the Saudis and the Emiratis that they have friends. It’s almost playing a game of bluff.

 

Speaking of Trump’s tweets, reports surfaced on Thursday that the president wasn’t aware of the U.S. military base in Doha. How significant is the U.S.’s military partnership with Qatar?
In the 1990s, the U.S. continued to maintain a presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. In 2002, the Qataris sensed an opportunity, especially after 9/11, to entice the U.S. to leave. So they constructed and financed this entire base, Al Udeid. They basically presented CentCom with a ready-made facility to move into — which it did, in 2003. The U.S. now has two bases in Qatar, which are instrumental. And the Qataris have always been careful to keep the U.S. presence carefully hidden away in the desert — you wouldn’t see U.S. soldiers walking through downtown Doha, but they’re there. And they’re there for a reason. Maybe the only thing that stops the Saudis from moving into Qatar is the knowledge that they’ll run into U.S. CentCom. The Qataris know that. As long as the U.S. is there, it’s underpinning Qatar’s external security posture.

 

What do you make of the rest of the Trump administration, led by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, trying to do damage control?
Tillerson, before he became Secretary of State, was head of ExxonMobil, and that company has enormous interests in Qatar. Tillerson, as its CEO, was instrumental in expanding those interests. He knows the emir, he knows the emir’s father — the previous emir — extremely well. So does Mattis, from when Mattis was commander of CentCom. So these two, unlike Trump, have extensive experience with the commercial and strategic value of Qatar to the U.S., and they also have personal relationships with the rulers going back years. I think they were definitely pushing back.

 

Backtracking a bit, it seems that a hacking scandal has also helped escalate this crisis. Can you explain how that’s relevant?
There was an allegation of hacking of the Qatar News Agency after a fake article appeared that described comments the emir allegedly made at a military graduation ceremony in Doha, just two days after Trump’s visit, on the 23rd of May. The Qatari emir was presiding over the ceremony, but he never gave a speech. Diplomats who were there said he never gave a speech. But that night of [May 23], a news story on the Qatar News Agency site claimed the emir made a speech and criticized Trump, saying Qatar had a difficult relationship with the U.S., saying that Iran has to be recognized as an important Islamic power, saying [Qatar has] a great relationship with Israel. All things that would be incendiary. And based on Qatar’s own past, one could imagine the emir could have said those things. It wasn’t so completely outlandish.

 

Who might have been responsible for the alleged hack?
An FBI intelligence assessment concluded that Russia was somehow involved. It’s not known whether or not it was the Russian government, or freelancers in Russia seeing if they could cause some mischief. If it was the Russian government, you can imagine that this could have easily been an attempt to undermine the U.S. military stance in the Middle East by driving a wedge between the U.S. and one of its most important partners. If that was the intention, then initially it worked very well with Trump’s tweets. It seemed as if the U.S. was ready to cast off its relationship with Qatar. It would have been a huge thing.

 

But that wasn’t the last hack, right?
Last weekend, you had the hack and release of emails belonging to the UAE ambassador to D.C.. We don’t know who the hacker is, and the Qataris have said it had nothing to do with them — but it looks like a tit for tat. Among the released emails were those showing the UAE ambassador was really pulling strings behind the scenes with a lot of influential people in D.C. to paint Qatar in this negative light. So it all seemed to reinforce a feeling it was part of a campaign to discredit the Qataris

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Do you think that hack prompted Saudia Arabia and the UAE, joined by others, to act against Qatar?
It could be linked. They could have seen it as an unacceptable provocation, and finalized their plans to take action in response. I have no proof of that, we’ve seen a lot of these hacks, and the timing seems to escalate every single time.

 

So what happens now? Where do Saudi Arabia and its partners go from here?
I’m not entirely sure the Saudis and Emiratis have a plan for what they’re going to do next. They could tighten sanctions, they could extend financial sanctions on Qatar. The Saudis and others have already gone in at such high-level pressure, they don’t have much more to do before they have outright acts of war. They could try to work the U.S. government into joining in and force it to take sides. Trump’s tweets played into that narrative. But there’s been a lot of pushback — at least from the institutional parts of the U.S. government in charge of the nuts and bolts of the bilateral relationship that have said, ‘actually, this is too valuable to put in jeopardy.’ [Ed. note: Trump slammed Qatar again Friday.]

 

Who else, besides the United States, may be trying to ease tensions?
Kuwait’s been very active in negotiations. The Kuwaiti emir is 88 next week, he’s the Gulf’s elder statesmen, and he sees himself as a regional diplomat. He has a very close relationship with the emir of Qatar. The Kuwaitis will try to find a resolution that gives enough of something to everyone that would allow all parties to back off without losing faith. That’s going to be the key — whatever that is.

 

How do you see this situation resolving, if at all?
I think it’s going to be hard for the Saudis and Emiratis to back down because it would involve a loss of face. The key would be to try to negotiate a resolution that allows everyone to bow down gracefully, but it’s been so confrontational and acrimonious, I don’t see how that could happen.

 

On the other hand, if the blockade continues for weeks and months, that will do real damage to the Qatari economy. Qatar has a land boundary with Saudi Arabia, and 40 percent of its food imports come through it and all its construction materials for the mega projects and World Cup projects. So the Qataris will have to think about what kind of concessions they could offer.

 

How does this fit into the larger tensions in the region — between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for instance — that have bubbled up after Trump’s foreign trip?
The signals the administration was giving may embolden the Saudis and the Emiratis to become much more assertive. The fact that you have key people within the Trump administration who may be inexperienced also gave the Saudis and the Emiratis an opportunity to begin to try to shape how the administration would think about the Middle East, which seems to have happened. For example, it was reported in January that al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador to the U.S. — the guy whose email was hacked — was in almost daily contact with Jared Kushner, effectively mentoring him on Middle East politics. If that’s al Otaiba’s level of access to the administration, he’s passing on a vision of a Middle East that’s very much in the UAE’s interest. And there’s a vacuum in the Middle East right now, and governments are going to rush in to fill that vacuum.

 

Why is there that vacuum?
There’s a feeling that the U.S. is focused on domestic issues. There’s a sense of disconnect or drift in U.S. foreign policy. There’s a perception that countries and people are working off, that maybe this is a good time to make a move.

 

Edited July 2, 2017 by Redoran

[Frank Pembleton]

Ali ovo za AJ je šampionski...

 

....shit has hit the fan...