Trump - hoće li biti impeachment ili 8 godina drugačijeg predsednikovanja?

[Gandalf]

neokoni... 

[Gandalf]

5 hours ago, Anduril said:

Banon od pocetka prica o borbi protiv Kineza za dominaciju planetom. Prema tome, (americki) imperijalizam je logicki nastavak (americkog) nacionalizma. Nacionalizam sluzi unutrasnjoj konsolidaciji nacije i otporu stranom (kineskom) imperijalizmu, a imperijalizam sluzi spoljnoj konsolidaciji nacije u odnosu na druge nacije. 

...

U pitaju je uglavnom naivnost ovih americkih libertarijanskih ovaca kojima su nacionalisti po ko zna koji put prodali anti-imperijalisticku ciglu. Nesto slicno kao kad levicari zavrse u krevetu sa nacionalistima (kao kod nas ili u sire u Evropi) po pitanju anti-imperijalizma pa se probude u fasizmu. 

tako nekako. Banon je s te strane sličan neo-realistima (u američkim okvirima, neo-kisindžerijancima) - kojima insistiranje na liberalizmu i demokratiji predstavlja problem, i koji bi da priču prebace u čisto nacionalističke okvire. što na ovaj ili onaj način imponuje i levim i desnim budalama.

Edited December 21, 2018 by Gandalf

[Paul]

and step by step, odlaze odrasli 

[Lord Protector]

Libertarijanski ideološki koreni trampizma, Rothbard kao Lenjin 

 

Quote

Rothbard Was Right

Populism and libertarianism

by Justin Raimondo Posted on December 17, 2018

 

Political pundits and ideologues of all sorts are possessed of a kind of double vision, a two-track perspective on the world that informs and modifies their worldview. This condition, which might normally be considered a disability, requires the strictest discipline, because it involves the ability to distinguish what one thinks will probably happen from what one passionately wants to happen.

For the ideologue, the integration of these two tracks into a single narrative is his life’s work. It’s the difference between a successful ideological entrepreneur and some crank handing out tattered leaflets on a street corner. It’s the difference between those who warned that the invasion of Iraq would end in a tragic disaster and Bill Kristol who said we’d win in “two months.” Elevating the playing field a bit, it’s the difference between Ludwig von Mises, who back in 1920 said socialism could not work, and the leading intellectuals of the time who claimed capitalism was doomed and the only question was what authoritarian system would replace it.

Among libertarians, the art of ideological entrepreneurship is virtually unknown, while the economic entrepreneur is lionized. One of the very few libertarians with a thorough understanding of both was Murray Rothbard, the economist and philosopher who founded the modern libertarian movement. Anyone can have an ideology: the point is to make it a living reality. All too many libertarians treat their worldview like a game: to be contemplated, and enjoyed, but never implemented. Rothbard had the exact opposite attitude: he was serious about ideas.

Which meant his two-track perspective was in fine working order: he knew what ought to be, and also knew enough to be able to distinguish it from what is.

Sometime in the mid-1970s, the billionaire Charles Koch, a devoted libertarian in those days, decided to fund the libertarian movement as it has never been funded before. An elaborate network of groups was set up, including the Cato Institute, but not before the principals involved – Koch, Rothbard, and a bevy of distinguished longtime libertarian scholars and activists – had discussed the strategic conception behind the project. They all wrote papers on different aspects of what a libertarian strategy for victory would require, and a series of private seminars took place, with Rothbard giving the main talk. Aside from delving into organizational issues, he took up the question of what kind of audience they were addressing.

Rothbard saw the conservatives, our old allies, as practically hopeless, given their fanatical pro-war orientation and obsession with the Soviet Union. For the current period, our audience, he concluded, was the liberal public, the type of person who reads the New York Times. All agreed with this orientation – but the comity didn’t last long.

As the Libertarian Party ran Edward H. Clark, a corporate lawyer, for President, Rothbard began to see the compromises this entailed, and was soon in open conflict with the campaign. Aside from that, something was stirring in Rothbard’s mighty brain, an intuition that the future did not belong to enthusiastic readers of the New York Times. In working with Rothbard in the LP, we had formed the “Radical Caucus,” which was mainly a parody of a left-wing grouplet but which Murray kindly saw as a valuable addition to the libertarian coalition: a “cadre” he could count on. And yet now Rothbard kept talking about how we needed a “Redneck Caucus”! Long before Donald Trump made his appeal to “the forgotten man” of radicalized Middle America, Rothbard had developed a strategic vision that envisioned a right-wing populist rebellion against precisely those New York Times-reading liberals who were supposed to be libertarians’ original audience.

When the Soviet Union fell, and the issue of communism was moot, Rothbard joined with a dissident faction of the conservatives to forge a new right-wing populist movement. The country, Rothbard realized, was in rebellion against the increasingly statist liberals, who had now become brazen militarists: Kosovo, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq – the post-cold war foreign policy of the left was barely distinguishable from that of the neoconservatives. Together the two factions united to drag us into Iraq and beyond.

Meanwhile, on the right, the power of the new right-wing populism was growing: “isolationist,” culturally conservative, distrustful of centralized power, and explicitly anti-elitist, this trend birthed the presidential campaigns of Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan. “America First” – the moniker of the biggest anti-interventionist movement in our history — was the common theme, and it all culminated in the Trumpian insurrection, which did what its predecessors could not: win the White House.

Rothbard was right: he saw the direction the country was going and he sought to put it to the advantage of our movement. In his historic speech to the John Randolph Club, he presciently pointed out that with Bolshevism gone the new enemy is Menshevism – the “soft” authoritarian globalism of the Davos crowd. A new movement, he predicted, would arise to defy and defeat the globalist elites – and we are seeing it today as it jumps the Atlantic and takes Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, and rips the façade of stability off the pompous face of the EU.

There are several lessons here, and no space to explore them all, but one final point needs to be made.

Rothbard had broken with the right in the 1960s in a bitter split full of mutual recriminations. When the Vietnam era rolled around, he was embedded in the New Left, preaching libertarianism to the commies (and the sincere liberals). Further back, despite his “right-wing” views, he had supported Adlai Stevenson for President on the grounds that the Democrat wanted peace with the Soviet Union. So this turn toward right-wing populism was something he had to challenge himself with: he had to reexamine his previous assumptions and put them to the test. And he had to have the courage to change course and swim against the tide within his own libertarian movement.

This is the strategic orientation that guides me today. History, as they say, will absolve me. In the meantime, this is by way of an explanation to those of my readers who have questions about my view of Trump and the international situation in general.

 

Edited December 22, 2018 by slow

[borris_]

16 hours ago, Radoye said:

 

 

 

+1

[Lord Protector]

17 hours ago, Radoye said:

Ima tu dva zeca u tom Middle East First taboru - jedan od njih jeste taj intervenisticki neocon svetski policajac fazon koji u permanentnom ratu sirom sveta vidi zamajac za svoje uske ekonomsko-finansijske interese i mogucnost za dodatno grabljenje resursa koji jos uvek nisu pod njihovom kontrolom, ali ovaj drugi je nista manje uticajan u ovom konkretnom slucaju a to je fundamentalisticko-religiozni. Naime, ekstremni evangelisticki protestantski fanatici su se (izmedju ostalog) istripovali da je postojanje Drzave Izrael znak da je drugi Hristov dolazak blizu i da ce uskoro Armagedon u kojem ce oni kao jedinomoguci ispravni naravno da pobede i onda uzivaju vecni zivot u raju na zemlji. Iako su mnogi od njih po ubedjenju antisemiti (jer, prokleti Zidi su ubili Hrista), oni podrzavaju Izrael jer veruju da ce onog momenta kada svi Jevreji na svetu budu ziveli pod okriljem svoje drzave biti ispunjeno biblijsko prorocansktvo kojim se najavljuje uspostavljanje Carstva Bozijeg. (A uzgred ce znaciti i to da Jevreji koje oni nikako ne vole nece vise ziveti medju njima nego tamo gde im je mesto.)

 

Tako da cak i mnogi oni koji su generalno protiv intervencionizma i zalazu se za disengagement SAD od svetskih dogadjaja u slucaju Izraela cine iznimku i podrzavaju svaku intervenciju koja je u skladu sa njihovim vidjenjem interesa Drzave Izrael, iako na licnom / pojedinacnom nivou nuzno ne gaje simpatije prema Jevrejima ili su cak i otvoreno neprijateljski raspolozeni prema njima.

 

Dok neoconi u intervencijama i permanentnom ratu vide sredstvo za zgrtanje bogatstva (u kome imaju nameru da uzivaju jos dugo, sto je to duze moguce) ovi drugi to gledaju kao nuzno zlo ciji je cilj ubrzanje dogadjaja vezanih za kraj sveta, po mogucnosti sada i odmah, nisu zainteresovani za materijalnu dobit nego racunaju na vaskrsenje i vecni zivot. Tu pre svega vidim i ove Breitbartovce sto ih cini jos opasnijima jer ne operisu na racionalnom nivou i njihove odluke nisu zasnovane na objektivnom sagledavanju cinjenica nego slepom verovanju.

 

 

dobro rečeno, veliki plus i od mene

[borris_]

Régis Debray je vise puta pisao o tome u Francuskoj, ali uvjek je nekako prolazilo ispod radara.

[aram]

japanci kratko i jasno

Departure of Jim Mattis stirs world of worries from Brussels to Beijing

[Anduril]

On 21.12.2018. at 13:01, slow said:

Ono što je Breitbart ekipa uspešno krila je Middle East first agendu umesto America First koja je proklamovana na izborima.  Ne znam šta podrazumevaš pod pojmom američkih nacionalista/patriota, mnogi se trpaju tu, ali ekipa kojoj Amerika nije na prvom mestu definitivno nije američki nacionalistička, ona je lažno zaogrnula američku zastavu i nastavila starim stazama neocon imperijalne politike. Ta politika je zaslužna za onaj deo antiislamističke i antiimigracione priče koja je sveprisutna na Breitbartu i koja bode oči u svojoj grotesknosti. Prvi koji su to primetili su ljudi kojima je America First najznačajnija agenda, a to su uglavnom izolacionisti, paleokonzervativci i ostala desna non-dispensational ekipa.

 

Poenta je u tome ovo sto si spomenuo - u americki nacionalizam se trpaju mnogi.

A ako uzmes u obzir kako sistem funkcionise na bazi podele moci izmedju raznih frakcija, to znaci da jedna ekipa gotovo nigde ne moze da odnese prevagu.

Iz toga sledi da americkim institucijama, Pentagonom, Stejt Departmentom, ekipom oko predsednika, GOP-om, think-thankovima, univerzitetima, itd. ne moze da preovladava jedna verzija americkog nacionalizma i spoljne politike, jedan America First koncept, nego samo koalicija raznih uticaja od neokona (Boltona, Pompeo), preko konzervativnih realista do izolacionista.

Tramp samo pokusava iz cistog politickog instinkta da usreci jednu od tih zavadjenih frakcija u zavisnosti od situacije u kojoj se nalazi. 

I nije to nista novo - za vreme Klintona su bitku vodili uglavnom liberalni realisti (Voren Kristofer) i liberalni intervencionisti (Medlin Olbrajt) dok se levicarski izolacionisti nisu previse pitali. U vreme Busa to je bila uglavnom bitka izmedju neokona (Volfovic, Perl, Cejni, Rumsfeld) i konzervativnih realista (Rajs i Pauel).

Prema tome, po meni, pogresno je videti Trampov America First kao nekakav Bjukenenov revival nego je to prosto pobednicka koalicija prilicno razlicitih desnicarskih filozofija - to je ono sto recimo Benon shvata a ova ekipa izolacionista slabo. 

 

On 21.12.2018. at 15:27, Radoye said:

Ima tu dva zeca u tom Middle East First taboru - jedan od njih jeste taj intervenisticki neocon svetski policajac fazon koji u permanentnom ratu sirom sveta vidi zamajac za svoje uske ekonomsko-finansijske interese i mogucnost za dodatno grabljenje resursa koji jos uvek nisu pod njihovom kontrolom, ali ovaj drugi je nista manje uticajan u ovom konkretnom slucaju a to je fundamentalisticko-religiozni. Naime, ekstremni evangelisticki protestantski fanatici su se (izmedju ostalog) istripovali da je postojanje Drzave Izrael znak da je drugi Hristov dolazak blizu i da ce uskoro Armagedon u kojem ce oni kao jedinomoguci ispravni naravno da pobede i onda uzivaju vecni zivot u raju na zemlji. Iako su mnogi od njih po ubedjenju antisemiti (jer, prokleti Zidi su ubili Hrista), oni podrzavaju Izrael jer veruju da ce onog momenta kada svi Jevreji na svetu budu ziveli pod okriljem svoje drzave biti ispunjeno biblijsko prorocansktvo kojim se najavljuje uspostavljanje Carstva Bozijeg. (A uzgred ce znaciti i to da Jevreji koje oni nikako ne vole nece vise ziveti medju njima nego tamo gde im je mesto.)

Tako da cak i mnogi oni koji su generalno protiv intervencionizma i zalazu se za disengagement SAD od svetskih dogadjaja u slucaju Izraela cine iznimku i podrzavaju svaku intervenciju koja je u skladu sa njihovim vidjenjem interesa Drzave Izrael, iako na licnom / pojedinacnom nivou nuzno ne gaje simpatije prema Jevrejima ili su cak i otvoreno neprijateljski raspolozeni prema njima.

Dok neoconi u intervencijama i permanentnom ratu vide sredstvo za zgrtanje bogatstva (u kome imaju nameru da uzivaju jos dugo, sto je to duze moguce) ovi drugi to gledaju kao nuzno zlo ciji je cilj ubrzanje dogadjaja vezanih za kraj sveta, po mogucnosti sada i odmah, nisu zainteresovani za materijalnu dobit nego racunaju na vaskrsenje i vecni zivot. Tu pre svega vidim i ove Breitbartovce sto ih cini jos opasnijima jer ne operisu na racionalnom nivou i njihove odluke nisu zasnovane na objektivnom sagledavanju cinjenica nego slepom verovanju.

 

Ovaj, jel mozes da mi navedes jednog uticajnog americkog evagelistickog fanatika u okviru Pentagona, Stejt Departmenta ili Bele Kuce sa nekim uticajem na spoljnu politiku?

Nesto poput ovih ostalih frakcija koje sam naveo gore.

Sami neokoni sasvim dobro pokrivaju taj evangelikanski fanatizam - doktrina Axis of evil je direktno iz Biblije. Neokoni zapravo imaju pocetke na liberalnoj/demokratskoj strani, zato su i slicni liberalnim intervencionistima, ali im je zato moralizam biblijski, za razliku of ovih drugih. O americkim jevrejskim vezama sa neokonima a time i Izraelom da ne govorimo. 

Sam GWB je bio njuborn evangelikanac - klasicna prica od posrnulog alkoholicara do coveka koji je spoznao boga.

 

9 hours ago, slow said:

Libertarijanski ideološki koreni trampizma, Rothbard kao Lenjin 

 

Kao sto vec rekoh - Trampizam je koalicija u kojoj su neokoni i realisti i dalje daleko uticajniji od Rotbardovih izolacionista. Ne znam nijednog koji bi bio blizu neke vaznije pozicije.

Meni je i dalje smesno, kako je neko poput Rotbarda, koji je pisao odlicne clanke o korupciji i vezama americkih tajkuna 19. i 20. veka sa establismentom, zavrsio u krevetu sa tajkunima poput brace Koch.

Sama pomisao da bi razni Kochovi, Adelsonovi i Murdokovi, koji drze dobar deo Trampove baze u saci imali neki interes da zaista podrze nesto Rotbardovih spoljnopolitickih ideja smesna. Rotbard, kao i ostali ideolozi, se u americkoj politici koristi samo selektivno kad treba smanjiti poreze, smanjiti regulaciju za naftne kompanije i rezati socijalnu drzavu, a kad dodje red na Pentagon - no, no. 

[namenski]

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

predsednik

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

GOP

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

think-thankovi

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

univerziteti

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

americki nacionalizam

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

America First koncept

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

neokona

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

izolacionista

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

liberalni realisti

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

liberalni intervencionisti

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

levicarski izolacionisti

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

konzervativnih realista

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

Bjukenenov revival

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

ekipa izolacionista

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

uticajni americki evagelisticki fanatik

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

evangelikanski fanatizam

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

doktrina Axis of evil

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

moralizam biblijski

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

njuborn evangelikanac

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

klasicna prica od posrnulog alkoholicara do coveka koji je spoznao boga.

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

Trampizam

 

22 minutes ago, Anduril said:

Rotbardov izolacionista

 

 

Edit: anduril ili 100 nacina da se kaze 'isti kurac drugo pakovanje'...

Edited December 22, 2018 by namenski

[Lord Protector]

Quote

 

Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due – Trump Is Right on Syria
Neither the mainstream left or the interventionist right is willing to admit that Trump is capable of cogent policy. Sometimes they’re right – on Syria, they’re wrong!

by Maj. Danny Sjursen  December 20, 2018

 

"Impulsive, irresponsible, and dangerous." Such was the way, just this morning on CNN, that Democratic Representative, and House Minority Whip, Steny Hoyer described President Trump’s recent announcement that he’s bringing home the 2,000 U.S. troops currently in Syria. Last night, Republican Senator Lindsay Graham – a true hawk’s hawk – declared on the Senate floor that Trump’s decision is a "disaster," and a "stain on the honor of the United States." Two points here, one minor, one major – let’s begin with a semantic quibble: when maintaining national "honor" becomes a last ditch argument for continuing indecisive, perpetual war, perhaps it really is time to leave. And, more importantly, there’s this: anytime that Steny Hoyer and Lindsay Graham are in agreement and share a disdain for a foreign policy decision – even a Trump decision – well, then, the president might just be on to something.

My point is this: the bipartisan interventionist/militarist consensus of centrist Dems and hawkish Republicans has brought only disaster, death, humanitarian crisis, exploding debt and endless war for nearly two decades. For ample evidence see Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, etc. So, why are we still listening to these folks? Well, partly because the United States is an increasingly militarized (ostensible) republic in which a world-leading domestic arms industry all but owns Congress and the corporate media. Then there’s the matter of Trump – a man that the bipartisan Washington establishment simply loathes. Indeed, The Donald can do no right as far as these folks are concerned. Now, few authors – especially serving on active-duty in the military – have been as (constructively) critical of this president as I have, but occasionally the man demonstrates good sense, especially in foreign affairs. Fairness demands that we recognize this, whatever we think of the president’s general personality.

Let us return, then, to Syria, and take Representative Hoyer’s assessment apart one piece at a time. In point of fact there was nothing particularly "impulsive" about President Trump’s announcement. More than six months ago, in May, he announced that the US military would be withdrawing from Syria "like, very soon." In fact, arguably the only reason American troops have remained in the country as long as they have can be attributed to poor advice from the last "adult-in-the-room," Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Candidate Trump ran on a largely anti-interventionist platform, and – during the Obama presidency – regularly tweeted that the US should "stay out" of Syria. So there’s nothing exceptionally impulsive or surprising about Trump’s latest decision on troop withdrawal.

Next, Hoyer called Trump’s decision "irresponsible." But is it, really? One could, in fact, argue the exact opposite. Besides the originally stated mission to defeat ISIS’s physical caliphate – which has essentially been accomplished – ever more expansive, unachievable, and flimsy justifications for a perpetual US troop presence in Syria have begun to creep in. Trump’s own cabinet members, and the usual (perennially wrong) Beltway insiders have alternately argued that America must stay in Syria to check Russia, counter Iran, deter Turkey, protect the Kurds, and on and on. No one, not Trump nor his "grown-up" advisors, seemed capable of articulating a cogent, sustainable strategy or communicating an exit strategy. And military occupation of a sovereign country – sanctioned neither by the US Congress nor the United Nations – ought to be driven by more than policy inertia.

Only that’s become the norm in US Mideast policy. We stay because we don’t know what else to do – remaining not for positivist goals but out of fear of negativist what-ifs. When policy goals are muddled and end-states unclear, now that’s "irresponsible." If Trump’s team can’t enunciate a vital national interest in maintaining a military intervention – which they’ve proven time and again that they can’t – then the president has a duty to pull the plug on the latest forever war.

Then there’s Hoyer’s claim – echoed by Senator Graham, every pundit on CNN and MSNBC, and just about every vacuous D.C. analyst – that pulling out of Syria is "dangerous." It’s not, or, put another way, it’s at least less dangerous than staying. This author has argued for over a year that Syria is the next great Middle East trap, all risk and no reward for the United States. Let’s review just why this is. Here’s what the US stands to gain by staying put in Syria – a temporary denial of Assad and his allies’ forces entering the country’s far east, a limited zone of unsustainable Kurdish autonomy, and tough-guy bragging rights on the international scene.

Up against this are the truly "dangerous" – and arguably unacceptable – risks of perpetual military occupation. As if the latest (unnecessary) iteration of Cold War with Russia in Eastern Europe isn’t treacherous enough, in Syria today US troops (and allies) face-off with Russian troops (and their allies) on an unstable front along the Euphrates River. Despite some limited deconfliction measures in place, we now know that American and Russian soldiers have – according to the special US ambassador – exchanged gunfire "more than once" along this precarious boundary. In one particularly disturbing incident several months back, US airstrikes killed "dozens" of Russian mercenaries in a four-hour battle. Luckily Putin showed restraint after that exchange. Can we count on that in the future? Who knows. What’s certain is that Russia holds the stronger hand in Syria, has been invited there by Assad, and possesses thousands of nuclear weapons. De-escalation seems more than prudent given these undeniable truths.

Then there’s the minor matter of Turkey, a treaty ally with the second-largest army in NATO. President Erdogan has repeatedly threatened US troops, actually invaded Northern Syria, and refuses to recognize any sort of Kurdish autonomous entity (and he never will). All this bluster led the Pentagon, in November, to announce a new strategy of placing outposts along the Turkish border to deter Ankara. Tell me how this risky "strategy" contributes to the stated mission of US troops in Syria – the defeat of ISIS? It doesn’t. Again, plentiful risk, scant reward.

Finally, if 17+ years of indecisive war in the Greater Middle East should have taught Washington anything, it’d be this: prolonged ground-force occupation of sovereign Islamic states or regions is ultimately counterproductive. The longer the US stays in Syria – or anywhere for that matter – the greater the chance of an outbreak of armed insurgency. Turns out (gasp!) that folks don’t appreciate being occupied by a foreign superpower. Sure, the Kurds want our protection, but Eastern Syria is home to more than just a Kurdish minority. Indefinite US military presence could enflame Sunni tribal hostilities, reestablishing that perilous, if ubiquitous, alliance between nationalist Sunnis and Islamist jihadis – something we’ve seen percolate in both Afghanistan and Iraq. And just wait: should such an insurgency break out – and I predict it eventually would – well then the Pentagon and professional DC pundits would tell us we have to stay and sprinkle some magic counterinsurgency dust on that new enemy. It is thus that America’s post-9/11 wars have become self-sustaining quagmires.

US strategy, especially military strategy, should be undergirded by realism, policy sobriety, and facts. And here’s the most relevant, if inconvenient, fact: Bashar al-Assad’s regime – backed by Iran and Russia – has already won the civil war. Nothing the US has done, can do, or is willing to try, will change that salient truth. The endgame in Syria – just as in Afghanistan someday soon – will be messy, uncomfortable, and optically unsettling. Syria will remain what it’s been for half-a-century, a minor "adversary’s" ally stably situated in the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Iranian camp. So it has been and so it shall remain. Assad’s Syria is eminently containable – as is Iran, for that matter – and presents no existential threat or vital interest to U.S. security. Indeed, though Assad is undoubtedly a monster, his secular regime is actually more likely to suppress transnational terror threats than a divided Syria at war with itself. Extremism feeds on instability and division – precisely what continued American military intervention would ensure.

It is long past time to leave behind childish things – excessive optimism, sentimentality (for the Kurds, for example), and the foolish fantasy of America’s special mission to transform the world – in the interest of sound strategy. Love Trump or hate him, his decision on Syria is neither "impulsive," "irresponsible," or unacceptably "dangerous." The president is delivering on his – albeit muddled – campaign promise to eschew risky interventionism and put American interests first in foreign policy. Let us give credit where credit is do.

Danny Sjursen is a U.S. Army officer

 

 

Edited December 22, 2018 by slow

[Paul]

mainstream...dada   

[Budja]

Prenosim sa Burundija.

 

Rand Paul u elementu.

 

https://twitter.com/RandPaul/status/1076928042616918017




Speaking of criminal justice reform, I have to give Jared Kushner credit. He was great on this. And I’m glad I got to know him, because before that I was a bit suspicious he was the kid from the Omen movie all grown up.


My friend Lindsay Graham is a bit mad right now. You see, he’s never seen a war end before. He’s going to have to console himself with the fact that we still are in about 8 more. I know it will be hard for him, but I think he’ll get by.


I’m going to go a bit easier on the grievances against the neocons and warmongers this year though. The Weekly Standard has folded, wars are ending — I really think their holiday is already bad enough, I don’t want to pile on.
Well, actually…let’s talk about John Bolton. I don’t have a grievance. I just really would have liked to have been in the room when the POTUS told him to END a war. How many times do you think he made the President repeat it because he didn’t even know what the words meant?

[3opge]

 

[Paul]

nagovjestio obracanje naciji, spremte kokice 

 

placipicka