Ekonomija za decu

[eumeswil]

Na Lutherovu ideju otvaram ovaj topičić.

 

Da li bi i zašto dobro da prirodni monopoli pređu iz državnog u privatno vlasništvo? Koje su prednosti i mane, i lokalno i uopšteno/teorijski?

[Lord Protector]

[Korki]

 

Дотични очигледно не зна како функционише капитализам и историју истог. Нека мало погледа социјално-економску структуру пре два светска рата.

 

Што се тиче монопола, то није једноставно питање и мора да се иде од случаја до случаја. Пример еј Британија, где је приватизација железнице дала лоше резултате,

 

The Rebuilding Rail report, published last year by Transport for Quality of Life, offers a superb analysis of the mess Britain's railways are in. It finds that the private sector has not delivered the innovation and investment that were once promised, that the costs of back-room staff have massively increased, and that the costs of train travel rose by 17% between 1997 and 2010 (while the costs of travelling by car fell). It conservatively estimates that £1.2bn is being lost each year as a result of fragmentation and privatisation. The irony is that some of the biggest profiters are the state-owned rail companies of our neighbours: Deutsche Bahn, for example, owns three UK franchises.

 

Са друге стране у неким секторима услуга приватизација је била успешна. Али зато је уништавање индустријске базе британске економије, јако проблематично и УК покушава то да поврати.

 

Занимљиво је да се Немачка пре Првог светског рата, када се најбрже развијала, заснивала на приватним картелима и монполима(последица исксутва Дуге депресије), слично и дан данас важи за Јапан или Ј. Кореју, који тако штите домаће тржиште а нападају страно. То је било изразито у Јапану до чувеног пуцања крајем осамдесетих 20. века.

[Lord Protector]

Дотични очигледно не зна како функционише капитализам и историју истог. Нека мало погледа социјално-економску структуру пре два светска рата.

 

 

Ne priča o situaciji od pre sto godina već o onome što se dešava sada i što će se dešavati u bliskoj budućnosti. Dakle o modernom kapitalizmu. Ne znam šta hoćeš da kažeš, da će ekstremni  Laissez-faire dovesti do veće jednakosti i novog ekonomskog egalitarizma? Empirija govori upravo suprotno... bogatstvo se gomila u rukama sve manjeg broja ljudi, srednji sloj polako ali sigurno nestaje u onakvom obliku kakvom smo ga znali do sad.

Edited October 28, 2016 by slow

[Korki]

Хоћу да кажем да је на врхунцу Прве глобилазације под Британијом крајем 19. века и почетком 20. века била већа неједнакост него ли 1960.

на прелазу 19/20 века није ни постојала нека средња класа, која је нагло скочила, прво у САД, као последица светских ратова.

 

 

Our modern image of the middle class comes from the post–World War II era. The 1944 GI Bill provided returning veterans with money for college, businesses and home mortgages. Suddenly, millions of servicemen were able to afford homes of their own for the first time. As a result, residential construction jumped from 114,000 new homes in 1944 to 1.7 million in 1950. In 1947, William Levitt turned 4,000 acres of Long Island, New York, potato farms into the then largest privately planned housing project in American history. With 30 houses built in assembly-line fashion every day — each with a tree in the front yard — the American subdivision was born.

http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1882147,00.html

 

Да не говорим како су некретнине грађене уз директну помоћ државних финансијских институција, насталих током Њу дила, већ сада чувенe Fannie Mae. Опет ово је последица позиције $ после Другог светског рата. Узгред, са тиме су повезани неки од највећих расних намира током '60их у САД.

 

Сада се не дешава ништа чудно са капитализмом, он се враћа само где је био већи део свог постојања. Период 1945-1970 је изузетак а не правило капитализма.

Узгред, када би знао структуру бдп САД 1850, био би веома изненађен и каква је трансформација дошла.

Edited October 28, 2016 by Korki

[eumeswil]

Ne priča o situaciji od pre sto godina već o onome što se dešava sada i što će se dešavati u bliskoj budućnosti. Dakle o modernom kapitalizmu. Ne znam šta hoćeš da kažeš, da će ekstremni  Laissez-faire dovesti do veće jednakosti i novog ekonomskog egalitarizma? Empirija govori upravo suprotno... bogatstvo se gomila u rukama sve manjeg broja ljudi, srednji sloj polako ali sigurno nestaje u onakvom obliku kakvom smo ga znali do sad.

Ali ovo što imamo danas nije baš laissez faire, ne? Već kronizam, bankama i korporacijama se ne dozvoljava da propadnu već se socijalizuju gubici. Taj knjiški model slobodnog tržišta nikad nije postojao osim u početnoj kompetetivnoj fazi, ali to je bio horor za sve osim za kapitaliste. Na stranu eksternalizovanje troškova degradacije okoline, koga zabole za to, otići će na Mars i započeti novi, svemirski ciklus akumulacije.

Edited October 28, 2016 by miki.bg

[Lord Protector]

I meni se čini da je to terminološka dosetka da se prikriju očigledni nedostaci tržišnog ekstremizma. Nije navodno problematičan početni koncept već udaljenje od početnog koncepta, etatističko skretanje tržišnih jeretika. Crony mangupi u redovima kapitalističkih revolucionara koji su upropastili svetsku tržišnu revoluciju. O da, taj mrski tržišni staljinizam nije nastao iz tržišnog marksizma, koji je čist i nevin kao suza.

Edited October 29, 2016 by slow

[eumeswil]

Čim tržište reguliše pristup osnovnim životnim potrebama, nema bekstva od eksploatacije.

 

The Lessons of Agrarian Capitalism

What, then, does all this tell us about the nature of capitalism? First, it reminds us that capitalism is not a “natural” and inevitable consequence of human nature, or even of age-old social practices like “truck, barter, and exchange.” It is a late and localized product of very specific historical conditions. The expansionary drive of capitalism, to the point of virtual universality today, is not the consequence of its conformity to human nature or to some transhistorical natural laws but the product of its own historically specific internal laws of motion. And those laws of motion required vast social transformations and upheavals to set them in train. It required a transformation in the human metabolism with nature, in the provision of life’s basic necessities.
 

The second point is that capitalism has from the beginning been a deeply contradictory force. We need only consider the most obvious effects of English agrarian capitalism: on the one hand, the conditions for material prosperity existed in early modern England as nowhere else; yet on the other hand, those conditions were achieved at the cost of widespread dispossession and intense exploitation. It hardly needs to be added that these new conditions also established the foundation for new and more effective forms of colonial expansion and imperialism, as well as new needs for such expansion, in search of new markets and resources.
 

And then there are the corollaries of “improvement”: on the one hand, productivity and the ability to feed a vast population; on the other hand, the subordination of all other considerations to the imperatives of profit. This means, among other things, that people who could be fed are often left to starve. In fact, it means that there is in general a great disparity between the productive capacities of capitalism and the quality of life it delivers. The ethic of “improvement” in its original sense, in which production is inseparable from profit, is also the ethic of exploitation, poverty, and homelessness.

 

The ethic of “improvement,” of productivity for profit, is also, of course, the ethic of irresponsible land use, mad cow disease, and environmental destruction. Capitalism was born at the very core of human life, in the interaction with nature on which life itself depends. The transformation of that interaction by agrarian capitalism revealed the inherently destructive impulses of a system in which the very fundamentals of existence are subjected to the requirements of profit. In other words, it revealed the essential secret of capitalism.
 

The expansion of capitalist imperatives throughout the world has constantly reproduced some of the effects that it had at the beginning within its country of origin. The process of dispossession, extinction of customary property rights, the imposition of market imperatives, and environmental destruction has continued. That process has extended its reach from the relations between exploiting and exploited classes to the relations between imperialist and subordinate countries. More recently, the spread of market imperatives has taken the form, for example, of compelling (with the help of international capitalist agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) farmers in the third world to replace strategies of agricultural self-sufficiency with specialization in cash crops for the global market. The dire effects of these changes will be explored elsewhere in this issue.
 

But if the destructive effects of capitalism have constantly reproduced themselves, its positive effects have not been nearly as consistent. Once capitalism was established in one country and once it began to impose its imperatives on the rest of Europe and ultimately the whole world, its development in other places could never follow the same course it had in its place of origin. The existence of one capitalist society thereafter transformed all others, and the subsequent expansion of capitalist imperatives constantly changed the conditions of economic development.
 

We have now reached the point where the destructive effects of capitalism are outstripping its material gains. No third world country today, for example, can hope to achieve even the contradictory development that England underwent. With the pressures of competition, accumulation, and exploitation imposed by other more developed capitalist systems, the attempt to achieve material prosperity according to capitalist principles is increasingly likely to bring with it only the negative side of the capitalist contradiction, its dispossession and destruction without its material benefits, at least for the vast majority.
 

There is also a more general lesson to be drawn from the experience of English agrarian capitalism. Once market imperatives set the terms of social reproduction, all economic actors—both appropriators and producers, even if they retain possession, or indeed outright ownership, of the means of production—are subject to the demands of competition, increasing productivity, capital accumulation, and the intense exploitation of labor.
 

For that matter, even the absence of a division between appropriators and producers is no guarantee of immunity (and this, by the way, is why “market socialism” is a contradiction in terms): once the market is established as an economic “discipline” or “regulator,” once economic actors become market dependent for the conditions of their own reproduction, even workers who own the means of production, individually or collectively, will be obliged to respond to the market’s imperatives—to compete and accumulate, to let “uncompetitive” enterprises and their workers go to the wall, and to exploit themselves.

 

The history of agrarian capitalism, and everything that followed from it, should make it clear that wherever market imperatives regulate the economy and govern social reproduction there will be no escape from exploitation.

 

 

http://monthlyreview.org/1998/07/01/the-agrarian-origins-of-capitalism/

Edited October 29, 2016 by miki.bg

[eumeswil]

 

 

Crack open a really banal mainstream neoclassical economics textbook and you'll learn that free market solutions are generally the efficient ones (i.e., they create the biggest economic pie regardless of distribution) with a few minor exceptions:

 

— The air pollution impacts of modern electrical power generation, industrial activity, and transportation can't be efficiently bargained away because the transaction costs are way too high.

— So-called "public goods" like basic scientific research or musical recordings will be underproduced absent some combination of state subsidy and state-created intellectual property monopolies.

— Basic infrastructure (roads, electrical lines, sewers) won't be provided properly without some eminent domain and they won't be priced correctly due to the monopolistic nature of the market.

— Absent deposit insurance and regulation, banks will be subject to runs and economically destructive panics.

— Without a central bank minding the store properly, the entire macroeconomy will fall into periodic recessions lasting months or years.

 

Obviously there's lots of other stuff people disagree about—health care and education, importantly—but this is the banal core. Unfettered markets are fine except for activities that might involve the transportation or production of goods, the production or transmission of electricity or scientific knowledge, or access to the financial system. So actually when you think about it, that's basically everything. The basic economic foundations of industrial capitalism as we've known them for the past 150 years or so have an activist state at their core. Building political institutions capable of doing these things properly is really difficult, and one of the main things that separates more prosperous places from less prosperous ones is that the more prosperous places have done a better job of building said institutions. There's also the minor matter of creating effective and non-corrupt law enforcement and judicial agencies that can protect people's property rights and enforce contracts. 

 

The point is, it takes an awful lot of politics to get an advanced capitalist economy up and running and generating wealth. A lot of active political decisions need to be made to grow that pie. So why would you want to do all that? Presumably because pie is delicious. But if you build a bunch of political institutions with the intention of creating large quantities of pie, it's obviously important that people actually get their hands on some pie. In other words, you go through the trouble of creating advanced industrial capitalism because that's a good way to create a lot of goods and services. But the creation of goods and services would be pointless unless it served the larger cause of human welfare. Collecting taxes and giving stuff to people is every bit as much a part of advancing that cause as creating the set of institutions that allows for the wealth-creation in the first place.

 

The specifics of how best to do this all are (to say the least) contentious and not amenable to resolution by blog-length noodling. But the intuition that there's some coherent account of what the "market distribution" would be absent public policy is mistaken. You have policy choices all the way down.

On The Distribution Of Income

[eumeswil]

1 teorijski papir:

The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy
 

[eumeswil]

Nietzsche’s Marginal Children: On Friedrich Hayek:
 

How did the conservative ideas of Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian school become our economic reality? By turning the market into the realm of great politics and morals.

By Corey Robin

 

[hazard]

1 teorijski papir:

 

The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy

 

 

Ovo nije bas za decu :D

[eumeswil]

Mark Carney's history lesson shows we haven't learned on globalisation

 

 

The Bank of England governor’s look back at previous crises suggests action needs to be taken to stop capitalism from eating itself

 

Kada guverner banke priznaje problem, onda znaš da je sranje zaista udarilo u ventilator.

[eumeswil]

Informativan blog ovog profesora.

https://capitalistdemocracy.wordpress.com/

[eumeswil]