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Permanentna kriza domaće ekonomije


Lord Protector

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U pravu je Anduril, jedva jednom: sve je to smuti pa prospi - ukljucujuci i Radulovicev ekonomski entuzijazam - dok i ovde i tamo, na izbornoj temi ne cujemo sta i kako sa Strukturama i ostalim reliktima jedne drzave koja je ustrojena da funkcionise na principu da su podanici tu nje radi, a ne obrnuto.

Obilaziti tu temu je ili znak ogromnog i nedopustivog nepoznavanja stanja stvari ili nepogresiva indikacija da tu nisu cista posla.

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Nemojte o šestom oktobru i mafijaškim strukturama koje nisu rasformirane ovde k'o Boga vas molim. Niti se to maže na hleb niti se sipa u traktore.

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Nemojte o šestom oktobru i mafijaškim strukturama koje nisu rasformirane ovde k'o Boga vas molim. Niti se to maže na hleb niti se sipa u traktore.

U pravu si, ne maze se na leba i ne sipa u traktore, al da znas kako dobro jebe...

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Nemojte o šestom oktobru i mafijaškim strukturama koje nisu rasformirane ovde k'o Boga vas molim. Niti se to maže na hleb niti se sipa u traktore.

Hoces da kazes da se recimo ovih 140mil kredita koje tajno vraca drzava umesto tajkuna i anonimnih firmi ne maze na hleb?

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Hoces da kazes da se recimo ovih 140mil kredita koje tajno vraca drzava umesto tajkuna i anonimnih firmi ne maze na hleb?

 

Gordijevi čvorovi moraju da se seku u hodu, jedan po jedan, ne može da se ide u reformu države kao na svadbu, čoporativno, sa barjacima i šenlučenjem. I da se pravi petogodišnji plan političkih reformi koje će ekonomija demantovati na prvoj krivini. Ne lomi se to preko kolena, to je inkrementalan proces. Tačnije iterativan. Programeri znaju za agile metodologiju, ona ovde najviše odgovara.

Edited by slow
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Pa ko prica o reformi kao svadbi, sa barjacima i petogodisnjem planu?

Ja recimo mislim na krivicne prijave (kao sto radi vec DJB), masivnu popularizaciju 5 najvecih skandala/kradja, konstantno ponavljanje pitanja oko istih sve dok 90% populacije cuje za to, zatim prozivanje direktno odgovornih, sprdanje, satira, karikature, grafiti, bilbordi, posteri, na FB, YT, baneri, vratite pare, itd. Kad se odradi to, krece slicna prica na lokalu, itd.

U kombinaciji sa tim obecanje da ce ukradene pare biti direktno vracene gradjanima - recimo svakom po 100 evra/5 mil gradjana iz fonda za ukradene pare.

 

Ovo zvuci simbolicki i kao cist populizam ali takva su vremena a simbolika moze da ima ogroman uticaj na drustvo i politiku.

Ja recimo mislim da bi takve neideoloske anti-korupcijske kampanje vremenom nasle siroku podrsku a i popularnost cime bi i delovi politicko-ekonomskih struktura morali da reaguju i eventualno promene nacin vladanja. Politika putem kampanja moze biti mnogo efektivniji metod za promene u okostalim politickim partokratskim sistemima. Neke od najvecih politicko-ekonomskih i drustvenih promena se ostvarene na taj nacin u poslednjih 150 godina sirom sveta.

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"HESTIL" ŠIRI BIZNIS U SRBIJI

Kinezi hoće još tri fabrike

 
S. Vukađinović/M. Đorđević | 19. 04. 2016 - 20:11h
Blic
 

Kineski “Hestil” kupio je Železaru Smederevo za 46 miliona i planira da u nju uloži više stotina miliona evra. „Hestil“ želi još tri posrnule fabrike u Srbiji.

- “Hestil” planira da još ulaže u Srbiju i pregovori sa njima o privatizaciji nekih metalskih giganata su započeli. Predstavnici “Hestila” su u razgovoru sa srpskim vlastima pokazali veliko interesovanje za ulaganje u metalski sektor. Njih ne brinu trenutni problemi u ovoj industriji jer razmišljaju dugoročno. Zato su zainteresovani za “Prvu petoletku”, Fabriku kablova u Jagodini, kruševački “14. oktobar”, ali i za druge srpske posrnule gigante. Pored toga, pokazali su interesovanje i za RTB „Bor“, gde bi mogli da budu strateški partner, kao i za FAP - kaže naš izvor iz Vlade Srbije.
Edited by slow
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Pa nije da nismo jeftinija radna snaga...

 

Evo zanimljivog članka za historiju perpetualno-permanentne krize...

 

 

From Bernie Sanders in the US to Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, socialist tendencies have been on the rise ever since the global financial crisis. Along with it, so have been defences of the free market system. Whilst nothing is more persuasive than actual historical experience, debates have tended to instead take place in the theoretical sphere and, even when past experience has been drawn upon, it’s been limited to the obvious countries, to Russia, North Korea and Cuba.

Eastern Europe offers a whole wealth of experience on the Russian side of the iron curtain, and it’s an experience that is still to be properly tapped by economic researchers. New research is now helping to shed light on our understanding of the region, including that presented on Yugoslavia this month at the annual conference of the Economic History Society, held this year at the University of Cambridge. In summary, it tells us one thing: we need to be very weary of repeating past mistakes, particularly in regard to the idea that workers can operate successfully by eschewing their capitalist managers.

Socialism was the greatest political and economic experiment of the twentieth century and of all the countries in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia is, perhaps, the most fascinating from which to learn.

Yugoslavia was the fastest growing socialist economy in the post World War Two era. In fact, as noted by Balassa and Bertrand in 1970 , it was one of the fastest growing countries in the world – despite, some might say paradoxically, being socialist. Whilst the country might at first seem to present itself as a poster boy for those on the left, the Yugoslavian socialist engine eventually ran out of steam, leading Leonard Kukic, a young researcher from the London School of Economics, speaking at the Conference and the author of the new research, to ask: what went wrong?

Two key possibilities present themselves: technology and labour. In other words, a failure of what economists call total factor productivity (TFP) growth, which could revolve around the supposed limited technological potential of non-market economies, or labour constraints – workers whose incentive structures under socialism were not conducive to economic growth. Whilst both could have potentially played a role, the trick is to measure the relative contribution, to see whether socialism in action hampers the economy more through technology or through distorted labour incentives.

Using a relatively new business cycle accounting technology, and based on a standard Ramsay-Cass-Koopmans growth model, Kukic models the Yugoslavian economy from 1952 to 1989 allowing for four “wedges”. These wedges reflect the potential deviation of the socialist economy from free-market efficiency principles in the realms of labour, capital, TFP (technology) and demand. By estimating these wedges, he attempts to identify the causes of Yugoslavia’s initial success in the post War period (in the 1950s and 1960s) – and of it’s eventual growth slowdown in the 1970s and 1980s.

Kukic finds that total factor productivity growth actually became more and more important for economic growth in Yugoslavia during its golden age in the 1950s and 1960s. This includes through the efficiency enhancing effects of structural change (shifting labour out of low value-added sectors such as agriculture) and the entry of the country to GATT in 1966, which helped open Yugoslavia to global markets. By the 1980s, however, TFP was starting to stagnate.

Interestingly, however, Kukic finds that stagnating total factor productivity wasn’t the most important factor behind Yugoslavia’s growth slowdown. Instead, labour distortions should take more of the blame.

Kukic dates the labour driven slowdown to 1965, when Yugoslavia introduced reforms that shifted control of production towards the work councils of labour-managed firms. Control was taken from the hands of the state and placed directly in the hands of the workers. What, you might wonder, could possibly go wrong?

Amongst other things, these work councils were now free to decide on the distribution of income between wages and investment. In one sense, this policy change was a success: income per worker increased and wages became a bigger share of the economic pie. However, labour-managed firms seem to have reaped such rewards by hurting other members of the labour force, restricting the employment of new workers so as to limit the worker-based labour market competition that could scupper the wage demands of the “insiders”.

Naturally, unemployment soared, from under 5% in the 1960s to close to 15% by the end of the 1980s. Whilst in a free-market economy there would have been an incentive for new businesses to enter and compete with incumbents, employing some of the unemployed labour along the way, the entry of firms was severely restricted under the socialist regime. Business people were viewed with suspicion.

The result: the insiders, whether already employed workers or already established firms, gained at the cost of the outsiders (new workers, including the youth, and potential but never established new firms).

All in all, then, it seems that the problems socialist economies face revolve more around labour than they do technology. Of course, given Russia’s success in the space race, something which shocked America at the time, we shouldn’t be that surprised. However, what the findings do provide is an important warning to those on the left who look to the good old days of worker power and worker management with rose-tinted spectacles. Not only can the economy suffer when it lacks “capitalists”, but so can workers that fall outside of the privileged (already established) groups.

It’s sometimes a matter of better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.

Victoria Bateman is Director of Studies, Fellow & College Lecturer in Economics at Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge and Fellow of the Legatum Institute, London. She is author of the book Markets and Growth in Early Modern Europe, published in 2012 by Pickering and Chatto.

 

 

 

 

 

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Jugoslavija je pukla zbog lošeg upravljanja preduzećima itekako, ali se ovde zanemaruje još jedna bitna stvar - administrativno-političko uređenje, makroekonomski okvir, polukonfederalno ustrojstvo koje ju je u uslovima autarhične privrede činilo 1 failed state i dovelo do toga da je u njoj bilo 6 železara a svog gvožđa jedva za jednu i sličnih takvih promašaja. Ne samo radničkih saveta.

 

Opet, braća Slovenci su bukvalno zadržali paradruštvenu svojinu deljenjem akcija svima, a problem lošeg upravljanja rešili time što su akcije gurane u investicioni fond, koji se postavljao kao middleman između akcionara i kompanije i birao menadžment, po kriterijumu stručnosti.

 

Prosto milina jedna, imaš platu tamo gde radiš i na kraju godine dividendu od akcija, a sa druge strane kompanija čiji si akcionar posluje po full ekonomskoj logici.

 

Sredina neka, taj rad, ekonomska demokratija. A ovi gore u članku sa LSE seru, stoje na braniku tačerizma i računa u ofšor bankama postojano kano klisurine.

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