Evroazijska Unija - to je ta Evropa kojoj težimo!

[Lord Protector]

Ne, nego sam ti ukazao na notornu injenicu da ideje ne samo opisuju, već i oblikuju političku stvarnost.

 

Paralela sa ulogama teoretičara i eksperimentatora u pririodnim nauka je prosto laughable.

 

Mislim da ti dovodiš u isti ravan sve ideje, bilo da su ona bulažnjenja tipa Protokoli sionskih mudraca ili ozbiljna naučna teorija relevantnog političkog teoretičara. Protokoli su fantazmagorija bolesnog uma koja nikad i nije mogla da opiše stvarnost onakvu kakva ona to jeste jer nije postavljena na naučnim pretpostavkama u startu, već na predrasudama koje su je disvalifikovale istog trenutka kada su bile napisane. Laž je bila inkorporirana u Protokolima i ne postoji događaj koji bi to promenio. Hitler je samo preuzeo tu laž i iskoristio je za svoje političke ciljeve. Ako hoćeš da tvrdiš da je Putin čitao Hantingtona pa je povučen zavodljivom argumentacijom harvarskog profesora krenuo u stvaranje EAU onda stvarno ne znam kako da te razuverim u vezi te besmislice.

[Lord Protector]

Ono što realno može da zabrine je da se ovakav sled događaja stvarno i desi, da su religiozne, civilizacijske i kulturološke razlike toliko snažne da je nemoguće da se napravi otkon od takve datosti, da je politika slabija od istorijskih naslaga, i da su presudne civilizacijske razlike a ne civilizacijske sličnosti. To je antropološki jako pesimistična vizija, i dobar deo političkog i filozofskog diskursa bi morao da se napusti kao prevaziđen. Ni malo naivna situacija.

[Filipenko]

Pa ne treba baš biti nobelovac. Ic simpl.

Zauzvrat za klanjanje doživotnom imperatoru i samodršcu svih Rusija, veliki knezovi u pridruženim republikama dobivaju povlaštene cijene energenata i progledavanje raznih Ros....nadzora kroz prste za njihovu robu. I gastarbajtere. I sinove, kćeri, rođake i rođe....

 

 

Javite mi zašto ovo nije kažnjivo, kako bih mogao da počnem da koristim derogativne pojmove za Hrvate, Nemce, Crnogorce...

Edited May 31, 2014 by Prospero
- obrisan uvredljiv termin za 1 narod

[onamonamo]

Ovo je tacno ako se gleda nominalni BDP. Ali ako se gleda po paritetu kupovne moci, Rusija je iznad UK i Francuske, a blizu ili cak prstigla Nemacku(zavisno od institucije koje meri). Drugo, nominalni BDP zemalja evrozone(a jos vise UK) je prenaduvan zbog jake valute koja je posledica bloka zemalja a ne jedne zemlje pojedinacno. To mnogim zemljama evrozone smeta ali to je druga tema.

pitanje je i sta sve ulazi u proracun bdp-a. gde ima vise rada na crno, bdp je nominalno manji, ali je fakticki veci...

a ima i dosta kreativnog knjigovodstva koje jos vise podize bdp

[MancMellow]

Pa nije bitna karta već principi i priroda aktuelnih konflikata u Ukrajini i na Bliskom istoku.

Velike sile sasvim sigurno žele ovladati mnogo većim prostranstvima od onih koje zaposeda njihova ''civilizacija'', no prosto Putin neće moći razbiti tu civilizacijsku barijeru prema Poljacima ili turkofonim narodima, dok mu za Beloruse i Srbe baš i ne treba naročit trud.

 

Jel ti znas koliko turkmenskih naroda zivi u Rusiji? Nema neprobojnih "civilizacijskih barijera" onako kako ih upsrosceno zamisljas. To se vidi tek onda kad se "sidje" sa olimpskih visina "brenda" civilizacije i krene da se ceprka po pretpostavljenom sadrzaju, deo po deo. Ideja da stanovnistvo Sevilje deli zajednicku "civilizaciju" sa stanovnistvom Turkua u vecoj meri nego sto je deli sa stanovnistvom Buenos Airesa je prosto - smesna.

Edited May 31, 2014 by MancMellow

[Filipenko]

Ono što realno može da zabrine je da se ovakav sled događaja stvarno i desi, da su religiozne, civilizacijske i kulturološke razlike toliko snažne da je nemoguće da se napravi otkon od takve datosti, da je politika slabija od istorijskih naslaga, i da su presudne civilizacijske razlike a ne civilizacijske sličnosti. To je antropološki jako pesimistična vizija, i dobar deo političkog i filozofskog diskursa bi morao da se napusti kao prevaziđen. Ni malo naivna situacija.

 

 

To je i logično. Istorijsko i svako drugo pamćenje je danas daleko duže i jasnije, uobličeno po formi i prenaglašeno po suštini. Nije ovo više vreme nepismene mase koja nije sasvim sigurna kakve su odlike ljudi koji žive 100 kilometara dalje.

 

No, ovakva vizija je istovremeno i jako iskrena, i lišena svih zabluda i laži. Vidim da nam se proriče da ćemo potpasti pod diktaturu, vlast oligarha, da će se neko poigravati sa našim pravima i slobodama, da ćemo finansijski propadati. Mislim, hello??? Što je najgore, kapiram da bi nam, u nekoj suludoj varijantu, članstvo u EAU bilo prečica na putu do EU - kakvi god da uđemo u EAU primili bi nas smesta nakon toga u EU ako bismo hteli da promenimo tabor, samo da napakoste Rusima.

[Turnbull]

да, да, политичaри читају Хантингтона и онда спроводе његове идеје у дело, имаш ли још неку овако лепршаву теорију лишену сваке логике и разума?

 

Ti to ozbiljno?

 

 

 

The principal policy makers who were compelled to improvise a forceful

response to 9/11 woke up earlier that morning with their own stubbornly

entrenched mental frameworks, theoretical commitments, and habits of

thought. Worldviews can be shaken by violent events, but they are unlikely

to be shed at a moment’s notice. For all its academic subtleties and ambiguities,

Huntington’s bold 1996 book helps us understand the preexisting

prisms and ideological schemes through which Bush’s top officials came to

view the still-smoldering disaster. This is important, once again, because

the way the war cabinet interpreted 9/11 decisively shaped its tragically

misguided response.

Writing of Vice President Cheney, for example, George Packer reports

that “his speeches after the terror attacks conveyed almost a sense of relief

that here finally was a global enemy on the scale of communism.”126

That mental habits developed during the Cold War survived the demise

of the Soviet Union is not particularly surprising. In the United States,

the most important residue of that long and bitter conflict was probably

the mythical assumption that the world was a battleground between the

forces of good and the forces of evil. Although deeply etched in American

self-understanding, the “morally clear” idea of an irredeemably wicked

global enemy became suddenly useless in 1991. This discarded template

was dusted off and put back to work on the afternoon of 9/11, however.

Although the Administration’s retrieval of a “paradigm lost” may have

provided some sort of short-term psychological comfort to officials working

under unbearable pressure, it also obscured and distorted, with fatal

effects, the Cheney-Rumsfeld group’s view of a wholly unprecedented

threat.

Eight years before 9/11, as we have seen, Huntington boldly envisaged

the possibility that a transnational Islamic enemy could reoccupy

the position vacated by the Soviet Union. Searching for a new framework

to help orient American policy makers after the Cold War, he even suggested

that Americans should transfer their existential enmity from the

now-defunct U.S.S.R. to the “upsurging” Muslim world.

Despite his verbal gestures toward Islam as a great and peaceful

religion, Bush’s policy after 9/11 closely tracked Huntington’s “musical

chairs” approach to shifting geopolitical threats. According to Gilles

Kepel, moreover, this conscious or unconscious fidelity to the Huntingtonian

fantasy helps explain why the American response to 9/11 has ended

in bloody catastrophe. The impulse to see Islam as America’s new global

enemy is fatally misleading, Kepel argues, for the simple reason that Islam

in no way resembles the Soviet Union. Mecca is not Moscow, al Qaeda

is not the KGB, and the Islamic world is much too vast, disorganized,

and heterogeneous – and its connectedness to the West much too intimate

– to be thrust into the role of a unified enemy, the “evil” adversary

of American “goodness.” This misalignment of inherited categories and

contemporary realities had disastrous consequences, according to Kepel:

Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory facilitated the transfer to

the Muslim world of a strategic hostility the West had inherited from

decades of Cold War. The parallel drawn between the dangers of communism

and those of Islam gave Washington’s strategic planners the

illusion that they could dispense with analyzing the nature of the

Islamist “menace” and could simply transpose the conceptual tools

designed to apprehend one threat to the very different realities of the

other.127

One implication of Kepel’s diagnosis is that the Administration did not

respond to 9/11 by tearing up the rulebook and radically rethinkingU.S. national-security policy. Rather, it clung obtusely to old patterns

of thought and action, blinded by a false analogy between the old enemy

and the new.

A second and equally brilliant French student of Islamic radicalism,

Olivier Roy, agrees, explaining “the appeal in Muslim societies of Huntington’s

concept of ‘the clash of civilizations’”128 in roughly the following

way. Feeling besieged by Western power and influence, Islamists seek to

identify the one true essence of Islam that they need to preserve. Huntingtonians

and radical Islamists make the same mistake, according to Roy.

They both act as if there were a definitive answer to the question: “What is

Islam?” As a result, they read too much unity and coherence into “Islam,”

treating this vast, sprawling and kaleidoscopically evolving tradition as if

it were much simpler and coherent than it is: “Islam is seen as a discrete

entity, a coherent and closed set of beliefs, values, and anthropological

patterns embodied in a common society, history, and territory, which

allows us to use the term as an explanatory concept for almost everything

involving Muslims.”129 Centuries of disputation and diversity inside Islam

(not to mention the variety of reactions within the Muslim world to 9/11,

ranging from celebration to disgust and shame) should suffice to discredit

this simplifying approach. Nonetheless, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman

are not wrong when they claim to discern, behind any number of Administration

policies, “the lumping together of radically different elements in

the Muslim world into one homogeneous enemy camp.”130 The same

authors add that “Weak, isolated, and despised regional states with a

tiny fraction of America’s power are elevated into new equivalents of the

Soviet superpower, and mortal threats to American dominance.”131 That

such distortions, illusions, and false clarities can stubbornly survive the

most withering criticism is just another distressing lesson of the post-

9/11 world.

 

 

Al-Jazeera: What is your opinion about what is being said concerning

the “Clash of Civilizations”?

Osama bin Laden: I say that there is no doubt about this. The

[Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven in the Qur’an

and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer who claims

to be faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths.

 

 

 

How has the ‘clash of civilizations’ been applied to the ‘war on terror’? This question, perhaps unsurprisingly, offers a large number of Western politicians, scholars and commentators who see in the post-9/11

world a confirmation of Huntington’s predictions. But it also shows that this link can be found in the thinking of another group- the al-Qaeda network. Huntington’s definition of ‘the civilization’ itself  has influenced and shaped the

rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’. Kepel suggests that Huntington’s article is, “[p]art of the theoretical underpinning,” for US policy-makers’ distinction between ‘civilized nations’ and ‘rogue’ states.”

13 This is certainly borne out in former-Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s comment that

, “f one looks down from outer space on earth, you find a couple of handfuls of countries that are

generally like thinking, and they tend to be Western Europe and North America.

They have freer economic systems, and tend not to covet the land or property or

lives of other nations.”

14 Furthermore, the phrase ‘war on terror’ itself “was engineered to heighten fear while simultaneously tapping the righteous

indignation of citizens in ‘civilized nations’ against barbaric murderers who would perpetrate despicable atrocities on innocent victims.”

15 Thus, ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric is intertwined with the very language of the

‘war on terror’. Rumsfeld – a leading advocate of US involvement in the ‘war on

terror’ – believed that there were just a small handful of (well-off, Western)

nations that could be trusted not to covet the commodities and “lives” of others.

For every instance in which President George W Bush stated that “there is no

clash of civilizations,”

16 or dismissed it as “a passing myth of history,”

17 one can find him alluding to the need for ‘civilized people

’ to unite against ‘rogue states’.

In his speech to Congress on 19 September, 2001, for example, Bush outlined his

vision for the ‘war on terror’ stating, “[t]his is civilization’s fight.”

18 Whilst the US government may have seemingly sought to avoid the notion of a clash

between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, the rhetoric of ‘civilizations’ still crept into its

dialogue.

 

The work of the academic Bernard Lewis is important in this context since, while

not a member of the government, he has had significant influence on key

members of the Bush administration: “Lewis has been especially sought after in

Washington since September 11th. Karl Rove invited him to speak at the White

House. Richard Perle and Dick Cheney are among his admirers ... And his best-

selling book ‘What Went Wrong?,’ about the decline of Muslim civilization, is

regarded in some circles as a kind of handbook in the war against Islamist

terrorism.”

19

In 2004, Time included Lewis in its list of 100 most influential

scientists and thinkers, 20 and Edward Said suggested that, “[w]hat made Lewis ’s

work so appalling in its effects was the fact that without any other views to

counter his, American policy-makers...fell for them.”

21 It was Lewis, in fact, who coined the term ‘clash of civilizations’ in a 1990

Atlantic article 22, and much of his work is based upon the assumption that clearly

defined ‘civilizations’ exist- and that conflict between them is inevitable.

 

 

 

What do the al-Qaeda network have to say about the‘clash of civilizations’?

Significantly, and perhaps not surprisingly, Huntington’s book  is a bestseller in

the Middle East, “no doubt one of the most widely available of the Western works

translated into Arabic.” The al-Qaeda network's militants “adore” Huntington, “for he brings grist to their mill: the two civiliz

ations are incompatible.”

30 Huntington's work, in fact, “is the top reference for all Islamist militants, thrilled

by the cultural rift that gives credence to their confrontational ideology.”

31 Olivier Roy shows that the ‘clash of civilizations’ has become a convenient form

of discourse on both sides of the conflict: “Huntington is regularly accused of having introduced the concept of the ‘clash of civilizations’ ... But this approach is also shared by fundamentalists and conservative

Muslims” [italics mine].

32 These specific points are vital: ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric is not limited to the US and Europe- many al-Qaeda militants also view th e current US-led conflicts in the Middle East as proof of a clash between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.

 

 

 

 

Edited May 31, 2014 by Turnbull

[Turnbull]

To je i logično. Istorijsko i svako drugo pamćenje je danas daleko duže i jasnije, uobličeno po formi i prenaglašeno po suštini. Nije ovo više vreme nepismene mase koja nije sasvim sigurna kakve su odlike ljudi koji žive 100 kilometara dalje.

 

No, ovakva vizija je istovremeno i jako iskrena, i lišena svih zabluda i laži. Vidim da nam se proriče da ćemo potpasti pod diktaturu, vlast oligarha, da će se neko poigravati sa našim pravima i slobodama, da ćemo finansijski propadati. Mislim, hello??? Što je najgore, kapiram da bi nam, u nekoj suludoj varijantu, članstvo u EAU bilo prečica na putu do EU - kakvi god da uđemo u EAU primili bi nas smesta nakon toga u EU ako bismo hteli da promenimo tabor, samo da napakoste Rusima.

 

 

Kakvo neverovatno lupetanje.

 

Inače, najgore u ovakvim teorijama je što se predstavljaju kao surovi realizam, "lišen svih zabluda i laži", when in truth they're anything but.

[DarkAttraktor]

a da ni ne spominjemo da al Kaida kao jedinstvena, kohezivna organizacija sa takvim imenom nije postojala pre da se nije odomacila kao takva u zapadnoj stampi, tj. kod stenografa americke vlade. i da su sve te rastrakane teroristicke celije pocele da se zovu al Kaida tek posto su culi da ih ovi tako zovu. i tako danas imamo al Kaidu as we know it out of pure fabrication.

 

jos jedan primer opisivanja koje defakto proizvodi realnost. self-fulfiling prophecy. you want it - you got it (Toyota).

Edited May 31, 2014 by DarkAttraktor

[stoka]

Ako svet otkrije zamenu za naftu i gas, Rusija i arapski svet propadaju. Nestaće ucene na svetskom nivou, pretnje ratom, terorizam. Radikalno će se promeniti odnos država i zasnivaće se samo na tehnološkoj inovativnosti i stepenu demokratičnosti. Drugim rečima, država koja bude demokratskija i tehnološki inovativnija, biće moćnija ...

Edited May 31, 2014 by stoka

[Zaz_pi]

Pa ne treba baš biti nobelovac. Ic simpl.

Zauzvrat za klanjanje doživotnom imperatoru i samodršcu svih Rusija, veliki knezovi u pridruženim republikama dobivaju povlaštene cijene energenata i progledavanje raznih Ros....nadzora kroz prste za njihovu robu. I gastarbajtere. I sinove, kćeri, rođake i rođe....

 

Kazahstan je zemlja koja je:

1) ogromna(veci je od Francuske, UK, Italije, Spanije i Nemacke zajedno)

2) ima dovojno poljoprivredne proizvodnje za sebe(jedan od najvecih proizvodjaca psenice na svetu i ima jos gomilu proizvoda koje ni Rusija nema zbog tople klime na jugu poput pamuka)

3) Ima gomile razlictih sirovina, u SSSR posle Rusija zemlja sa najvse sirovina. Zalihe nafte/gasa vece od SAD(konvencionalno, oni jos ni nemaju potrebe za nekonvencionalnim izvorima), ogromne zalihe uranijuma, razliciti metali...

 

Doduse, jug zemlje je dobrim delom pustinja ali, ako se dobro secam, na jugo-istoku su napravljeni sistemi za navodnjavanje jos za vreme SSSR. To se vuce sa Altaja, ako se dobro secam.

Uglavnom, EAU ima ogromnu perspektivu ako se ne udje u ludjenje sa nekakvim obnavljanjem SSSR vec se zadrzi sve na ekonomiji. Ogroman prostor(kao zajedno Kanada, SAD(2 i 4 zemlja po velicini na svetu respektivno), i pola EU) uglavnom ravan. Sa velikim mogucnostima za rast populacije. Imaju svega u ogromnim kolicinima sto se tice prirodnih resursa. U sustini, tu je Belorusija najbolje prosla jer je ona najveci proizvodjac industrijskih proizvoda po glavi stanovnika u tom trouglu te ce imati veliki benefit od jeftinih sirovina i velikog za, nju, trzista.

Edited May 31, 2014 by Prospero
obrisan uvredljiv termin za 1 narod

[Eraserhead]

Secam se na vaterpolu izmedju Srbije i CG srpski navijaci skandiraju Crnogorcima "Siptari!" A ovi im odgovaraju kontraskandiranjem "Srbi!" :D

[Roger Sanchez]

Čemu onda korišćenje pogrdnih izraza koji su u istom rangu sa niskostima tipa balije, šiptari i sl?

Zbog npr. tvojeg preuzimanja epitetima bogatog riječnika ovog propagandnog rata. Zovu i Moskviči ove dolje hoholji, poprilično liberalno i često, samo ti za to nisi čuo. Nema ko da pronese glas...

[Muwan]

Ja pričam o načinu izražavanja na ovom forumu a inače mi je dobro poznato koje sve termine obe strane imaju na raspolaganju i obilato ih koriste. Sikćeš otrov u pogrešnom pravcu.

[Zaz_pi]

Ako svet otkrije zamenu za naftu i gas, Rusija i arapski svet propadaju. Nestaće ucene na svetskom nivou, pretnje ratom, terorizam. Radikalno će se promeniti odnos država i zasnivaće se samo na tehnološkoj inovativnosti i stepenu demokratičnosti. Drugim rečima, država koja bude demokratskija i tehnološki inovativnija, biće moćnija ...

 

Hoce ako napredujemo dovoljno u nanotehnologijama pa pocnemo da sintetisemo materijale/sirovine vestacki. Ali mislim da ce Rusi tu biti medju prvima, a kada se to desi, ne verujem da ce nam biti dobro, nevezano za Rusiju, vec globalno, jer ce se tako nesto prvo iskoristiti za rat. :)

U svakom drugom slucaju nece. Jer za dobijanje energije/prenos iz vetra, sunca...potrebno je nesto sto se zove retki zemljini elementi. Kao sto vidis, oni su retki ali ne samo to, oni su najvise zastupljni u Kini i Rusiji :) Jedan od razloga zasto velike tehnoloske kompanije otvaraju svoja postrojenja po Kini i to sto im ona nudi veliku kolicinu retkih zemljinih elemenata. U stvari su pokusali pre par godina da to svoju dominaciju, kontrolisu ogroman deo trzista, iskoriste da ucene Japan. Rusi tek sada krecu sa ozbiljnijom eksplatacijom. Inace Srbija ima velike zalihe jednog elementa ali mislim da smo to sve rasprodali. :) Takodje Rusija i Kina, imaju ogromne zalihe tzv. obnovljivih izvora energije. Kina je tu lider. A, Rusija koristi svega 20-30% hidro potencijala(Rusija ima nekoliko reka medju Top 10 najvecih) a vetar jos prakticno nista iako imaju neverovatan potencijal. Cak i sunce jer imaju vecu osuncanost od Nemacka(o Holnadiji i UK da ne govorim) u centralnim i juznim oblastima, koje su povrsinske znatno vece od navedenih zemalja.

Arapi su vec krenuli da ulazu u energiju iz sunca ali i nuklearke. Arapi imaju neka cuda tehnologije poput LNG terminala u Kataru.