Deals

[yolo]

jel ti marbovci drze i big pizza, tj digli to da se deca igraju i uce biznisu?

[Ravanelli]

da. plus grade ovo http://www.dekainzenjering.rs/index.php/en/

Edited February 3, 2015 by Ravanelli

[Dr Arslanagić]

jel ti marbovci drze i big pizza, tj digli to da se deca igraju i uce biznisu?

 

Sponzorišu i hokejaški klub Partizan

[nenad]

ne znam zašto nije objavljeno. andrej jovanovic ce biti direktor dfg.

lik koji im vodi blue sea capital je bivši ebrd-ovac.

 

ocekujem jaku^tm ekspanziju po srbiji i regionu. 

[Ravanelli]

š'o?

[nenad]

prvo, nesto slicno je mep odradio sa sbb-om. od kada su kupili sbb do prodaje (sto je nekih 7 godina izmedju) imali su izmedju 15 i 20 akvizicija.

 

meni bi bilo logicno da slicno urade i sa ova, prakticno, 3 biznisa, koja su kupili. ja mislim da ce oni za 5 godina prodavati ta tri biznisa odvojeno.

 

sto se mlekara tice, one jesu velike, i imaju coverage, ali i tu kontam da ce pokusati da uzmu nesto u hrvatskoj, makar brenda radi.

 

knjaz, a pogotovo bambi, su premali i prakticno nisu ozbiljan regionalni igrac. tu ocekujem dosta preuzimanja. heba, nektar, vrnjci u srbiji, i ko zna sta jos u regionu.

 

sama cinjenica da je andrej pristao da bude generalni, znaci da svi ocekuju prilicno veliki povrat na investiciju (jer on sigurno nece to raditi za platu). a taj veliki povrat moze da se ostvari samo preko rasta, koji tesko da moze da bude organski. to su ozbiljni ljudi (pogotovo mep ekipa), nisu oni to kupili "napamet".

[Ravanelli]

ima smisla. znači u sledećem koraku za jedno 5-10 godinna da očekujemo ozbiljne evropske/svetske igrače koji preuzimaju to.

Edited February 4, 2015 by Ravanelli

[nenad]

vrlo verovatno, da.

[Eraserhead]

Sa SBBom su imali dosta akvizicija upravo u regionu kao npr Telemach iz Bosne. Ima logike da ce im i u ovom slucaju cilj biti pravljenje regionalnog igraca kako bi ga za koju godinu utapkali ozbiljnijim igracima.

[Eraserhead]

Interesantan clanak o tome kako dobre ideje i kompanije izgledaju u VC round A VC faze.

[bigvlada]

Koji će to da bude pomor kada pukne mjehur od sapunice zvani mobilne aplikacije.  

[Ravanelli]

Eraseru, evo nesto za svakog m&a menidjera

 

The Fuzzy, Insane Math That's Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies

[hazard]

loodilo

[Eraserhead]

Eraseru, evo nesto za svakog m&a menidjera

 

The Fuzzy, Insane Math That's Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies

 

 

Imam nekoliko problema sa ovim tekstom.

 

U jednom delu navode da je udeo ulagaca iz ranijih rundi smanjen nakon kasnijih rundi. To je normalna praksa kod VC firmi. One se od te prakse brane nekim uslovima koji se navode u ugovoru sto se pominje u tekstu. Ipak ukoliko nakon runde B vrednost ukupne firme poraste to znaci da je VC ulagac iz Runde A moze biti u boljoj poziciji cak i ako se njegov udeo smanji. Uopste ti uslovi koji stite ulagace iz ranijih rundi su posebno bili korisceni nakon tech bubblea od 2001-2003. Nakon toga je njihova vaznost opadala kako se vise fondova vracalo u business i kako je konkurencija rasla.

 

Druga stvar je sto VC firme imaju uspeha sa recimo 20-30 % ulaganja tako da na onim uspesnim moraju da ostvare veliki cash-on-cash povracaj. Njihovi interesi rade suprotno interesima preduzetnika u smislu procene vrednosti. Ukoliko sada precene kompaniju platice vise i nakon toga ce biti teze da obezbede povracaj koji im treba. Zato cesto pribegavaju prefered convertible stock opcijama koje se ponasaju kao dug, ali im ugovorima daju glasacka prava poput obicnih akcija. U slucaju uspeha oni ce konvertovati te akcije u obicne i uzeti vise para. (Plus imju odredjene poreske benefite ali to je druga tema). Ukoliko ne uspe zasticeni su.

 

Takodje u tekstu impliciraju da to sto su kompanije privatne a ne na berzi omogucava ludacke valuacije. Medjutim prvi dan trgovanja FB je bio na oko $38 a danas je na oko $82.

 

Sustinski oni tu ludu matematiku nisu dokazali osim sto su je pomenuli u naslovu i ubacili par zanimljivosti. Mislim da je razlog tome sto njih dvoje ustvari nisu ljudi koji su se bavili M&Aom ili VCom nego ekonomski novinari.

 

Ono sto je u svemu tome zanimljivo jeste ono sto vas od prvog dana business schoola uce, a to je da je valuacija firmi "more art than science". I to cujete sto puta u komunikaciji sa profesorima i bankarima. Kad pocnete da radite u investicionoj banci onda to izgleda tako da MD ili VP dodju oko i kazu vam da uradite DCF. Kada ga uradite i kazete da ste dobili $200m recimo oni kazu "malo je to vidi ako mozemo da dobijemo $250m". Ti o2nda kao associate ako si ok sednes i mozgas sta bi mogao da promenis da dobijes 250. Da li ces da povecas projekcije, da li ces da nekako smanjis diskontnu stopu (sto je obicno teze). Kad ti dosadi ti onda oko 11PM odes kod analysta i njemu kazes da "proba on da resi" onda ti analyst posalje u 3AM njegovo resenje i ti to ujutro u 8AM pogledas, jos nesto doteras i u 9AM posaljes VPu ili MDu u emailu. :D

 

Evo sta Peter Thiel kaze na temu novog tech bubble-a

[Eraserhead]

Dave McClure je osnivac seed fonda i startup akseleratora 500startups:

 

Bubble, My Ass: Some Unicorns Might Be Overvalued, But All Dinosaurs Gonna Die.

 

Summary: pundits argue billion-dollar startups are overvalued, but few realize why public company valuations might also be too expensive. Traditional P/E ratios of 15–20+ are likely too optimistic, relative to how long the future cash flows and operating margins of big dumb companies can be sustained. Unless they innovate more rapidly (or acquire their internet peers), expect most S&P 500 Dinosaurs to be disrupted and destroyed by an endless march of VC-funded Unicorns that will bash their tiny little reptile brains in with software and internet marketing.

 

Lately it’s become fashionable to suggest that Unicorns are Overvalued.

 

For sure there’s a shit-ton of billion-dollar valuation companies that seem to come out of nowhere recently. And while a few appear to be well on their way to becoming huge wins (Uber, Xiaomi, Airbnb), there are arguably as many losers ahead as winners. But it’s exactly due to these asymmetric outcomes that most unicorns become overvalued, and also why a lucky few Power Law outliers are always going to be severely UNDER-valued as well.

 

The nature of venture capital is such that for any given category, one big gorilla will run away with most all of the value, and the remaining chimps and monkeys will be worth little or nothing at all. But prior to the dust being settled, all the monkeys (and their investors) want to believe they are going to be the big damn gorilla… unfortunately almost all of them will be wrong.

 

Still, while it may be easy to predict the future demise of many unicorns and gorillas, we are probably overlooking the fact that many public companies (hereafter “Dinosaur Companies”) are substantially overvalued as well.

 

Why do I believe this to be true? There are three basic reasons:

 

Dinosaur Companies Don’t Innovate. This isn’t a new story; smarter & more eloquent folks than I have written about this topic (Schumpeter: Creative Destruction, Christensen: The Innovator’s Dilemma), so I won’t belabor the point. Dinosaur companies are easily addicted to mature lines of revenue & profit, and don’t take much risk going after possibly better alternatives. Over time, they slowly lose their edge to upstarts.

 

Dinosaur Companies have a tough time recruiting & retaining top technical talent. Dinosaurs may know that technology is important, and they might even realize that Software is Eating the World, but regardless most geeks dream of tomorrow’s million-dollar stock options over the more mundane reality of today’s fat paycheck (note: sometimes Wall Street does pay well enough to be an exception to this rule). As a result, Dinosaur Companies lose the competitive battle for tech talent, and thus also the larger war on innovation. Game over, man… game over.

 

Dinosaur Companies don’t get how critical internet marketing is becoming. They also don’t understand how important online platforms are to acquire & retain customers, and thus sustain operating margins and future profits. This third point is perhaps the most subtle, as it may not be obvious to most public companies how quickly their customers are shifting from offline to online. For the same reason as #2 above, acquiring and retaining top online marketing talent is extremely competitive. Yet most Dinosaur Companies don’t have any idea they should be racing as quickly as possible to hire growth-hacking nerds.

 

Fundamental to all of the above is the following observation: most public companies have not taken to heart how absolutely mission-critical software technology & internet marketing have become to business competitiveness. Thus, almost every Dinosaur Company is extremely vulnerable to a Startup Unicorn eating their lunch (stated so eloquently this past week by none other than JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon).

 

Put simply: the average public company P/E ratio of 15–20 means Mr. Market assumes Dinosaur Company X is going to have 15–20 years of continued cash & profits from business as usual. EXCEPT THIS ASSUMPTION IS VERY FUCKING WRONG — DINOSAUR COMPANY X IS GONNA GET ITS ASS KICKED BY A GODDAMN UNICORN IN UNDER A DECADE.

 

By now, you’re probably saying to yourself: wow, dude is seriously high on his own supply. Clearly this over-eager internet moron is clueless on how capitalism & economics really work. Because if any of this were really true, why then the market would self-correct & gradually reduce the stock price & associated market cap of any such “overvalued” dinosaur company… right?

 

Since I’m such a well-behaved venture capitalist and armchair economist, I’d like to agree Mr. Market usually finds a balance. Except for one little problem: you can’t short the public market for an extended period of time, and certainly not for five to ten years. There isn’t really an appropriate short or hedging / derivative instrument that captures this Unicorn Disruption effect, and so the only alternative is to go long on the Unicorns themselves.

 

Which is exactly what Mr. Market is doing, and exactly why those pesky Unicorns seem to be so overvalued, and why All Dinosaurs Gonna Die.