Толстый и тонкий

[Budja]

+1

 

ovo jeste jedan od njavećih problema, nesposobnost Putina i ekipe oko njega da zavrte ozbiljniju proizvodnju modernih proizvoda i zarade pare ne prodajući samo energente i sirovine. Jedan od razloga je i ogromna korupcija i lopovluk koji se nataložio oko Putina, tj njegov pomirljiv stav prema lopovima i tajkunima koji su mu odani i koji ne rade protiv njegove vlasti. Režim je truo iznutra, potrebno je provetravanje i ciklična smena elite kakva se u Kini dešava već decenijama posle Denga. Putin je već ušao u brežnjevljevsku sklerotičnu fazu.

 

 

Samo da se poserem na stav da je glavni cinilac u tehnolskom razvoju komercijalnih industrija. Eto, da je Putin pametan sada bi Rusi leteli na Jupiter.

 

Je li spisako pare u Skolkovo?

Jeste.

I?

 

Sta izvozi Norveska?

67% razne nafte, pa onda riba, pa aluminijum. Do jaja tehnoloski razvijeno.

 

 

 

Tesko je diversifikovati se ako su rente, iako volatilne, tako visoke u jednoj grani. Mogao je Putin da subvencionise raznorazne ideje za promenu strukture industrije, ali to obicno zavrsava u belim slonovima i "tehnoloskim parkovima". Komercijalna tehnologija se razvija odozdo a ne odozgo.

 

Tu je pre pitanje da li su rezerve od 400 mlrd. mogle biti i vece, da li se renta plasirala pametno tako da se negativni sokovi prezive, itd. 

 

Nikakva aktivna industrijska politika Rusiji ne bi pomogla, kao sto vidimo po Norveskoj i Cileu, dve sasvim razlicite drzave.

[x500]

Budjo,

Postoje dve velike razlike izmedju Norveske i Rusije:

- velicina i broj stanovnika

- nivo medjunarodnog kurabecanja - Norveska je mirno i umiljato mace; Rusija je pijani medved koji pravi sranja unaokolo

 

Dakle, Norvezani mogu da se oslone samo na naftu. Rusija to ne moze.

 

Pozdrav,

X500

[hazard]

Nikakva aktivna industrijska politika Rusiji ne bi pomogla, kao sto vidimo po Norveskoj i Cileu, dve sasvim razlicite drzave.

 

Zapravo, Rusija i ima aktivnu industrijsku politiku, koju sprovodi kroz zastitu sopstvenog trzista carinskim barijerama kako bi terala strane firme koje drze dobar deo ruskog trzista ovoga ili onoga da otvaraju proizvodne pogone u Rusiji. Zato se Srbiji ne dozvoljava bescarinski izvoz FIATa u Rusiju - da bi Reno tamo pravio Renoe, Nisane, Dacije, i od nedavno - Lade. Pa opet ne pomaze.

 

Sad, opet, x500 ima finu zamerku gore, da poredjenje s Norveskom ili Cileom nije skroz na mestu zbog broja stanovnika (a nekakvoj istoriji industrijalizacije i tehnoloske/naucne inovacije da ne pricamo). No to opet govori da problem u razvoju ruske industrije i tehnologije nije u lose plasiranim parama od nafte, vec u nedostatku institucija koje bi podrzale razvoj tehnoloske privrede, kao sto to ti kazes, "odozdo". Rusija i dalje ljudske resurse za to, ali pitanje njihovog iskoriscavanja u smislu razvoja nije pitanje toga koliki deo naftnih prihoda dobijaju na raspologanje.

[Lord Protector]

Samo da se poserem na stav da je glavni cinilac u tehnolskom razvoju komercijalnih industrija. Eto, da je Putin pametan sada bi Rusi leteli na Jupiter.

 

Je li spisako pare u Skolkovo?

Jeste.

I?

 

Sta izvozi Norveska?

67% razne nafte, pa onda riba, pa aluminijum. Do jaja tehnoloski razvijeno.

 

 

 

Tesko je diversifikovati se ako su rente, iako volatilne, tako visoke u jednoj grani. Mogao je Putin da subvencionise raznorazne ideje za promenu strukture industrije, ali to obicno zavrsava u belim slonovima i "tehnoloskim parkovima". Komercijalna tehnologija se razvija odozdo a ne odozgo.

 

Tu je pre pitanje da li su rezerve od 400 mlrd. mogle biti i vece, da li se renta plasirala pametno tako da se negativni sokovi prezive, itd. 

 

Nikakva aktivna industrijska politika Rusiji ne bi pomogla, kao sto vidimo po Norveskoj i Cileu, dve sasvim razlicite drzave.

 

Čekaj, kako su onda Južna Koreja i Tajvan uspeli a Rusi to ne mogu? Ne razumem šta to znači razvijati komercijalne tehnologije odozdo. Tajvan je kompletan know-how  za proizvodnju kompjuterskih integrisanih kola i fabrike za izradu istih implementirao u Kini na goloj ledini, to je bila odluka odozgo, tajvanskih elektronskih kompanija. Nije se čekao postepen razvoj elektronske industrije u Kini.

Meni se čini da su Rusi skloni pravljenju Potemkinovih sela (aka Stolkovo) i da nisu ozbiljni kada dođe do realizacije same masovne proizvodnje i komercijalizacije proizvoda. Kao da im je to ispod nivoa, može plemićka svemirska tehnologija, može najsavremenija vojna tehnika, mogu fundamentalna istraživanja ali ne može plebejska proizvodnja roba široke potrošnje. Neće da prljaju ruke sa efemernostima. A nije da nisu sposobni za masovnu proizvodnju, treba se samo setiti štancovanja vojne tehnike. Mislim da je ovde presudan psihološki faktor.

Edited December 19, 2014 by slow

[Budja]

Čekaj, kako su onda Južna Koreja i Tajvan uspeli a Rusi to ne mogu? Ne razumem šta to znači razvijati komercijalne tehnologije odozdo. Tajvan je kompletan know-how  za proizvodnju kompjuterskih integrisanih kola i fabrike za izradu istih implementirao u Kini na goloj ledini, to je bila odluka odozgo, tajvanskih elektronskih kompanija. Nije se čekao postepen razvoj elektronske industrije u Kini.

Meni se čini da su Rusi skloni pravljenju Potemkinovih sela (aka Stolkovo) i da nisu ozbiljni kada dođe do realizacije same masovne proizvodnje i komercijalizacije proizvoda. Kao da im je to ispod nivoa, može plemićka svemirska tehnologija, može najsavremenija vojna tehnika, mogu fundamentalna istraživanja ali ne može plebejska proizvodnja roba široke potrošnje. Neće da prljaju ruke sa efemernostima. A nije da nisu sposobni za masovnu proizvodnju, treba se samo setiti štancovanja vojne tehnike. Mislim da je ovde presudan psihološki faktor.

 

Dokle vise sa Juznom Korejom?

Svaki diktatorcic i protivnik "neoliberalizma" vlazi na Juznu Koreju.

Zasto ne pomenes svaku latinomaricku drzavu iz sedamdesetih? Jer je bila katastrofa.

 

A ovo sa psiholoskim faktorom necu ni da komentarisem.

 

 

Hazard je donekle rekao u cemu je stvar: stranci donose prozivodnju i tehnologiju da bi usli na trziste ali se ona ne prenosi na domacu privredu. To, koliko shvatam, nisu izvozno orijentisani auto prozivodjaci vec rade upravo za domace rusko trziste.

 

Da bi se razvila tehnologija odozdo, da bi neko usao u rizik, ocekivani prinos mora da bude astronomski i veci od nafte. Zasto bi  to neko radio? Zato je Norveska dobar primer - iskoriscavanje resursa je profitabilnije i tamo ide kapital, i to nema veze sa geopolitickim razlozima. 

Da li su Norverzani, kako Svedjani misle, zaista gluplji pa rade samo sa naftom dok Svedska i Finska rade i druge stvari?

 

U tom smislu, mene zanima kakav je kvalitet inzenjera tehnologije koji se obrazuju u Rusiji, ili vani, ali koji rade u naftnoj ruskoj industriji. Pretpostavljam da bi trebalo da bude prilicno visok.

[Zaz_pi]

Ne bih ja petljao u ovo Monroovu doktrinu, nije joj ni vreme ni mesto, a nije ni u kontekstu.

Jednostavno sam pomenuo Krimski rat kao primer neke vrste kontrolisane krize u kome su se tadasnji veliki igraci dohvatili na periferiji.

I ciljevi su bili ograniceni, ali taj rat donekle pokazuje koalicione mehanizme u koalicijama ciji clanovi imaju poprilicno razlicite ciljeve ali i zajednicke interese: najinteresantnije je sto ima poprilicno slicnosti ondasnje Evrope sa sadasnjom, pa tako imamo dug period mira zasnovan na principima koje je postavila jos Sveta alijansa, imamo fazu rusenja tih prinicipa i uvodjenje nekih novih pravila ili barem pokusaje.

Jos je interesantnija telativna umerenost koju su sve strane pokazale pri okoncavanju Krimskog rata: izbegnuto je ponizavanje Rusije, kod zainteresovanih strana je postojala itekakva svest da je Rusija vazan cinilac u evropskoj politici koga se ne sme olako otpisivati, koji koliko sutra moze da zatreba kao saveznik i kome se nije dobro zamerati jer je bila i uvek ce biti deo Evrope...

 

Kakvoj perriferiji? Krimiski rat se vodio na svim granicama Rusije. Je l' si cuo za opsadu Petropavlovska Kamcatskog na Tihom okeanu avgusta 1854. kada su Francuzi i Britanci zajednicki, dosta brojcano nadmocni pokusali izvrsiti invaziju ali su izgubili? Borbe su se vodile na Baltiku i severnim morima, Balkanu i Kavkazu. Inace su Britanci usli u rat poptuno samouvereni u velicanstvenu pobedu i zeleli su sto vise da poraze i ponize Rusiju, medjutim, desilo se prilicno suprotno. Na samom pocetku rata to je bilo opste odusevljnje u Britaniji. A, onda je dosla 1854 i vise niko nije bio odusevljen. Cak i kada su se pravili mali pomaci na Krimu cesto bi se desili i gubici i nista se znacajno nije postizalo. Ljudi su masovno umirali, sto od rata, sto od lose organizacije medinicinske sluzbe u okviru britanske vojske. Veliki udarac se desio cuvenoj britanskoj lakoj konjici u Bici kod Balaklave. Veliki sok je to bio, posle pisali pesme o tome, poput Kiplinga*

Sve ovo je vodio da je rat postao izuzetno nepopularan i skup u UK i Francuskoj, cak su se te dve zemlje izmedju sebe zakrvile zbog losih odluka u bitkama. I samo je to razlog zasto je Rusija relativno lako izasla iz celog rata. Ovo govorim o konacnim rezultatima sa tacke pozicije drzave ne i velikih ljudskih zrtava koje je Rusija imala u ratu, tako da je i i Rusija zelela sto pre kraj rata.

Ista prica je i sada oko Ukrajine. Pokusaj da se pucem ponizi Rusija, dobrim delom jer je Rusija bila uspesna na Bliskom istoku i odvajanju Janukovica od EU, a onda dodje Krim, koji je lagano uzet i sve se preokrene i pocne panika na zapadu, narocito zbog Baltika i Poljske.

 

edit:*

 

 

The Last of the Light Brigade

 

There were thirty million English who talked of England's might,

There were twenty broken troopers who lacked a bed for the night.

They had neither food nor money, they had neither service nor trade;

They were only shiftless soldiers, the last of the Light Brigade.

 

They felt that life was fleeting; they knew not that art was long,

That though they were dying of famine, they lived in deathless song.

They asked for a little money to keep the wolf from the door;

And the thirty million English sent twenty pounds and four !

 

They laid their heads together that were scarred and lined and grey;

Keen were the Russian sabres, but want was keener than they;

And an old Troop-Sergeant muttered, "Let us go to the man who writes

The things on Balaclava the kiddies at school recites."

 

They went without bands or colours, a regiment ten-file strong,

To look for the Master-singer who had crowned them all in his song;

And, waiting his servant's order, by the garden gate they stayed,

A desolate little cluster, the last of the Light Brigade.

 

They strove to stand to attention, to straighen the toil-bowed back;

They drilled on an empty stomach, the loose-knit files fell slack;

With stooping of weary shoulders, in garments tattered and frayed,

They shambled into his presence, the last of the Light Brigade.

 

The old Troop-Sergeant was spokesman, and "Beggin' your pardon," he said,

"You wrote o' the Light Brigade, sir. Here's all that isn't dead.

An' it's all come true what you wrote, sir, regardin' the mouth of hell;

For we're all of us nigh to the workhouse, an' we thought we'd call an' tell.

 

"No, thank you, we don't want food, sir; but couldn't you take an' write

A sort of 'to be continued' and 'see next page' o' the fight?

We think that someone has blundered, an' couldn't you tell 'em how?

You wrote we were heroes once, sir. Please, write we are starving now."

 

The poor little army departed, limping and lean and forlorn.

And the heart of the Master-singer grew hot with "the scorn of scorn."

And he wrote for them wonderful verses that swept the land like flame,

Till the fatted souls of the English were scourged with the thing called Shame.

 

They sent a cheque to the felon that sprang from an Irish bog;

They healed the spavined cab-horse; they housed the homeless dog;

And they sent (you may call me a liar), when felon and beast were paid,

A cheque, for enough to live on, to the last of the Light Brigade.

 

O thirty million English that babble of England's might,

Behold there are twenty heroes who lack their food to-night;

Our children's children are lisping to "honour the charge they made - "

And we leave to the streets and the workhouse the charge of the Light Brigade!

Edited December 19, 2014 by Zaz_pi

[namenski]

Obzirom na komplementarnost interesa US i UK u tim stvarima (kočenje evrokonti alijanse), glavni sprovoditelj doktrine po belom svetu veoma dugo je bila, rekoh, britanska mornarica. Monro doktrina je bila osnova za sporazum o specijalnim vezama te dve zemlje koji je, podsećam, još uvek na snazi.

 

Monroe is the key, a dugoročni ishod ove igrarije će odlučivati da li će granica između istoka i zapada biti iza Donjecka i St. Petersburga ili iza Lisabona i Lamanša.

Jebes Stratfor, a masis i sa Monroom.

Ima nesto drugo, kad se vec setkamo po proslosti: takozvane elite su u Krimskom ratu bile izuzetno bliske po nacinu razmisljanja, obrazovanju, itd, itd...

Na Krimu je svaki ruski visi oficir mogao da kao sa sebi ravnim razgovara sa bilo kojim prisutnim evro oficirom i obrnuto; delile su ih minimalne razlike u kulturi i vaspitanju.

Posle je doslo doba ideologija i to vise nije bilo tako; danas su se stvari promenile.

Posle pada komunizma, Zapad i Rusija nikad nisu bili blize: deklarativno se zalazu za iste vrednosti, slede iste ili skoro iste kulturne obrasce, a u Rusiji je vec podobro u vlasti, od politike do ekonomije, generacija koja prakticno ne pamti komunizam i funkcionise i razmislja kao svaki zapadni korporativac.

Pokusavam da kazem sledece u prilog cinjenici da neki geopoliticki i strateski postulati ostaju na snazi bez obzira na ideologije: ideologija navodno vise nema, komunizam, neprijatelj #1 je pobedjen, ali su svi elementi dovoljni za konfrontaciju i dalje tu sa sve geopolitickim i strateskim antagonizmima.

Carska Rusija je isto tako dobar prijatelj/neprijatelj koliko je to bio SSSR.

Edited December 19, 2014 by namenski

[Lord Protector]

Dokle vise sa Juznom Korejom?

Svaki diktatorcic i protivnik "neoliberalizma" vlazi na Juznu Koreju.

Zasto ne pomenes svaku latinomaricku drzavu iz sedamdesetih? Jer je bila katastrofa.

 

A ovo sa psiholoskim faktorom necu ni da komentarisem.

 

 

Hazard je donekle rekao u cemu je stvar: stranci donose prozivodnju i tehnologiju da bi usli na trziste ali se ona ne prenosi na domacu privredu. To, koliko shvatam, nisu izvozno orijentisani auto prozivodjaci vec rade upravo za domace rusko trziste.

 

Da bi se razvila tehnologija odozdo, da bi neko usao u rizik, ocekivani prinos mora da bude astronomski i veci od nafte. Zasto bi  to neko radio? Zato je Norveska dobar primer - iskoriscavanje resursa je profitabilnije i tamo ide kapital, i to nema veze sa geopolitickim razlozima. 

Da li su Norverzani, kako Svedjani misle, zaista gluplji pa rade samo sa naftom dok Svedska i Finska rade i druge stvari?

 

U tom smislu, mene zanima kakav je kvalitet inzenjera tehnologije koji se obrazuju u Rusiji, ili vani, ali koji rade u naftnoj ruskoj industriji. Pretpostavljam da bi trebalo da bude prilicno visok.

 

Pomenuo sam i Tajvan, ne samo Južnu Koreju. Mislim  da olako prelaziš preko psiholoških i kulturoloških faktora. Dosta autora govori o vezi ubrzanog ekonomskog razvoja u istočnoj Aziji i konfučijanske etike. Ne znam zašto bi to bio tabu. 

 

 

http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/W11_Courses/pols459-week6.pdf

[namenski]

Kakvoj perriferiji? Krimiski rat se vodio na svim granicama Rusije. Je l' si cuo za opsadu Petropavlovska Kamcatskog na Tihom okeanu avgusta 1854.

Cuo sam nesto, nacuo, poznato je naime da je Petropavlovsk na Kamcatki bio srce Rusije, odmah posle Kizija.

[Zaz_pi]

Znaci zanima te srce Rusije, sto ne kazes. Je l' znas gde se nalazi Kronstad?

[namenski]

Znaci zanima te srce Rusije, sto ne kazes. Je l' znas gde se nalazi Kronstad?

Ovo?

 

Церковь Преображения Господня nalazi se gde?

 

BTW, samo za bilmeza kao sto si ti Kronstat moze da predstavlja srce Rusije.

Mene stvarno zabavlja tvoje lupetanje povodom i oko Rusije, ali daj bre covece mani se corava posla, mene u ovoj situaciji najvise brine sto je Rusija spala na to da je brane i zastupaju likovi kao sto si ti.

[Zaz_pi]

Kronstad je prakticno deo Petrograda, koji je tada bio prestonica Rusije. E, tu su Britanci i Francuzi pokusali da prodju i napadnu sam Petrograd ali nisu uspeli da zauzmu Kronstad. Moguce da ti imas nekakv poremeceni sistem vrednosti pa smatras da je Jekaterinburg u to vreme bio srce Rusije ali se time ne bih zamajavao.

[namenski]

А ова црква, иначе уписана у такозвану светску културну баштину је у Јекатеринбургу Свердловску?

Добро сам те разумео?

[Lord Protector]

salon.com 

 

These are lies the New York Times wants you to believe about Russia

 

Our sanctions caused Russia's downturn. They protect Big Oil, the well-connected, and make the world more dangerous PATRICK L. SMITH

Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, looks back at US President Barack Obama, left, as they arrive with Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, at the the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit.(Credit: AP/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

You can look at the Russian economy two ways now and you should. So let’s: It is an important moment in the destruction of something and the construction of something else, and we had better be clear just what in both cases. The world we live in changes shape as we speak.

 

Truth No. 1: Russians are besieged. Sanctions the West has insisted on prosecuting in response to the Ukraine crisis — Washington in the lead, the Europeans reluctant followers — are hitting hard, let there be no question. Oil prices are at astonishing lows, probably if not yet provably manipulated by top operatives in the diplomatic and political spheres.

Truth No. 2: Russians are hot. With an energetic activism just as astonishing as the oil prices, Russian officials, President Putin in the very visible lead but with platoons of technocrats behind him, are forging an extensive network of South-South relationships — East-East, if you prefer — that are something very new under the sun. Some of us were banging on about South-South trade and diplomatic unity as far back as the 1970s; I have anticipated the arriving reality since the early years of this century. But I would never have predicted the pace of events as we have them before us. Stunning.

Holiday surprise: There is a Truth No. 3 and it is this: Truth No. 1, the siege of the Russian economy, is proving a significant catalyst in the advance of Truth No. 2, the creative response of a nation under ever-mounting pressure.

Timothy Snyder, the Yale professor whose nitwittery on the Ukraine crisis is simply nonpareil (and praise heaven he has gone quiet), exclaimed some months ago that Putin is threatening to undermine the entire postwar order. I replied in this space the following week, Gee, if only it were so.

Already it seems to be. But miss this not: Russia is advancing this world-historical turn with a considerable assist from its adversaries in the West, not alone. For all the pseuds who pretend to know Schumpeter but know only one thing, the creative destruction bit, how is this as a prime example of the phenom?

Details in a sec, but this thought first: We are all bound to pay close attention to these events because they matter to everyone, whether this is yet obvious or not. Probably in our lifetimes — and I had it further out until recently — we will begin to inhabit a different planet.

And it stands to be a better one, if you accept that equilibrium, interdependence, cooperation and all those other notions Washington is frightened to death of will make for a more secure world than our lopsided primacy, incessant confrontations, drone murders, waterboarding, nuclear arsenals and the National Endowment for Democracy’s subversions will ever deliver for us.

How much more capable, equally, will be a human community that addresses its problems with the wisdom not of one civilization, which happened by historical circumstance to modernize in the material sphere before others, but with the smarts and imaginations and perspectives of many?

Those details come in flurries now and fall into two files, destruction and construction. To the former first.

The economics ministry in Moscow has just forecast a swoon in its outlook for 2015. On a dime, it shifts from a prediction of 1.2 percent growth to 0.8 percent contraction. The math is easy: This is a rip of 2 percentage points right out of Russia’s middle. No sentient American should have any difficulty understanding what these numbers will mean to many millions of ordinary Russians.

The ministry’s report is the first to anticipate the consequences of the several rounds of sanctions imposed this year, the 34 percent drop in the ruble’s value this year and the collapse in oil prices. The last are now far below what Russia needs — about $105 a barrel — if the petroleum sector is to contribute to national revenues. As detailed in this space a few weeks ago, there are ample grounds to question whether price patterns in global oil markets are the consequence of American manipulations.

As to the ruble, we saw this coming months ago as reports of “silent sanctions,” as financial services people call them, began to come through. Off-the-books sanctions is the better term. A few at a time — HSBC, Lloyd’s — banks began denying credit to Russian enterprises; as documented, these decisions were at the  Treasury Department’s informal urging.

Reflecting the creep of interdependence in the global economy, financing from Western banks is vital to Russian corporations of all sizes. At this point, my sources in the markets tell me, the spigot is off: Credit and all customary loan rollovers are virtually unavailable across the board.

This is the anatomy of much suffering that is about to get done. Is the course wise? Is there a point? Is it other than ridiculous to posit some “net-positive” justification for this?

I see nothing good in this whatsoever. I see recklessness.

Think of it this way, as an old friend from Asia days suggests. Currency speculators abandoned the Thai baht en masse in 1997 and before we knew it Thailand had dragged all of East Asia into prolonged crisis. Remember? Now consider the size of the Thai economy — tiny in the scheme of things, and heavily agricultural still.

Now consider the size of the Russian economy. It is the world’s No. 2 producer of natural gas and No. 3 producer of oil. In terms of nominal gross domestic product — standard measure — Russia’s economy, at $2.1 trillion, is slightly larger than Italy’s. Another measure, purchasing power parity, values Russia’s economy at $3.5 trillion, but never mind: Even by nominal GDP, Russia is the world’s No. 8 economic power.

Comfortable now with the sanctions regime, are we?

The cliques in Washington are because the U.S. trades very little with Russia and they have no grasp of limits of any kind. This is cynicism made flesh when you consider Europe’s vulnerabilities. The contagious economic and social crisis is already spreading to nations near Russia’s borders.

As Germans and other Europeans understand, take down this beast and the blood will spatter everywhere. Now you can see, maybe, why one consequence of the Ukraine crisis is a serious deterioration of relations between America and those known as “the allies,” a term that has masked many complications since the Cold War’s onset.

As to the point of it all, it gets bitterer the more we learn of Ukraine and its arriving future.

Long ago, an English diplomat in Tokyo wrote to his Foreign Office in London, “The Japanese can neither love the Americans nor endure being loved by them.” It is dead on the fate of Ukrainians so far as one can make out. All signs are they are in for the suffocating embrace. Here comes the neoliberal order. It will be very weird to watch.

My jaw hit the corner of my desk when I read last week that Ukraine’s new finance minister, one Natalie Jaresko, is 1) an American citizen, granted a Ukraine passport simultaneously with her cabinet appointment, 2) a former State Department officer, 3) recipient of hundreds of millions of dollars in that $5 billion Victoria Nuland famously bragged of spending in State’s effort to yank Ukraine westward and 4) a participant in apparently extensive insider dealing via the investment management company she co-founded after leaving State.

Get this:

Jaresko served as president and chief executive officer of Western NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF), which was created by the U.S. Agency for International Development with $150 million to spur business activity in Ukraine. She also was co-founder and managing partner of Horizon Capital, which managed WNISEF’s investments at a rate of 2 percent to 2.5 percent of committed capital, fees exceeding $1 million in recent years, according to WNISEF’s 2012 annual report.

Her title at Horizon Capital must be CCIO, chief conflict of interest officer.

Full credit, given with gusto: The above passage is from the long exposé of this sordid business by Robert Parry, whose work on Ukraine is invaluable. Read this piece here: a riveting read covering a tangled web. Parry, in turn, cites John Hellmer, a former Moscow correspondent who recently explored Jaresko’s story as State Department official (and diplomat in post-Soviet Kiev) turned recipient of USAID funds.

Surely this is the right person to regulate Ukraine’s financial markets, counter corruption with archangelic purpose and negotiate with Washington, the Europeans and the IMF in behalf of Ukrainians’ interests. No wonder the parliament in Kiev erupted when Jaresko’s appointment was announced.

Footnote here: That $150 million fund State handed Jaresko has lost more than a third of its value since the Ukrainian economy tanked. As she steps into office, Kiev’s foreign reserves are down to $10 billion and shrinking, while inflation roars at 22 percent.

My jaw has been bruised, to be honest, since, as the Ukraine crisis got hot, Vice President Biden’s son, R. Hunter, was named to the board of Burisma Holdings, Ukraine’s No. 1 producer of natural gas. I cannot make out who is the chief conflict of interest officer here, Joe or the boy.

News comes of our Hunter, it turns out. The Wall Street Journal reported recently that he was bounced from the U.S. Navy Reserve earlier this year after a positive drug test. If the 44-year-old were Ukrainian (or any other nationality) and had been so charged, he would not be allowed into this country. This is the kind of person America is now happy to send abroad.

More substantively, Burisma announced last month that it will now commence drilling near Slavyansk, where Ukrainian troops have been dodging bullets while installing the company’s hydraulic fracturing equipment. Slavyansk, alert readers will recall, was the object of three months’ sustained bombing and artillery shelling prior to this announcement.

Overseeing all this is Jaresko and — second of three foreigners named to a new cabinet — Aivaras Abromavicius, a Lithuanian and a partner in an asset-management firm called East Capital. He will be the incoming economy minister, such as there is an economy.

Why these foreigners? In my read, Biden is a straight-out emissary sent to shepherd American corporations into the resource game via joint ventures or what have you, we will have to see, and the others are roughly the equivalent of compradors — in effect, bought-off locals.

Here is a tableau worth a moment’s consideration: Over here, Vicky Nuland stands before a Chevron plaque as she explains to business executives how well the $5 billion was spent. Here we have Hunter Biden doing Burisma’s legal work. Over here we have a small-town mayor in Romania who is run out of town for selling Chevron a fracking lease. (This you can read of in the Times.) And over there, also in the Times report, we have the Lithuanians forcing Chevron to abandon a shale-drilling project after widespread demonstrations opposing it.

You want to know why I hold the neoliberal agenda and those who advance it in contempt? This is why. We watch a corporate shark-feed. It has nothing to do with democracy. There is nothing in this for Ukrainians. They are about to hear their first lectures on the virtues of “austerity.”

I have three remarks.

One, the greed at the cost of human life and society is so brazen here it causes me to stop typing to reread the sentences. Can market-consciousness have brought us this low?

Two, please count the number of times you have read the words “Chevron,” “Burisma” or “shale-gas interests” in any account of Ukraine by correspondents covering it. I can find no mention of any from those in the field. This is “the power of leaving out,” as I often put it, in spades. I rest the case (for now).

Three, there is a deeper tragedy. Ukrainians live between East and West. This is not only a matter of geography: There is among them a mix of Eastern consciousness and Western consciousness. Accordingly, they had a chance to stand as the very best the new century offers us, a planet whose old divisions could be erased in favor of a more fulsome idea of the successful society and its potential.

This chance is now all but lost — destroyed by those who resisted it.

What I find remarkable now is that Moscow does not seem to be taking Ukraine’s misfortune and the West’s aggressions against Russia itself passively — or even negatively, for that matter. So we pass from the destructive file to the constructive.

Neil MacFarquhar, a standout in the New York Times’ Moscow bureau for his full-frontal prejudices, gave as negative an account as he could when he covered Putin’s year-end address. I had another read. This guy is bloodied, O.K., but he is not bowed, and I would advise against waiting for it.

I did like the Times’ head, parenthetically: “Putin, Amid Stark Challenges, Says Russia’s Destiny Is at Hand.” Without going histrionic, that is likely to prove precisely what is at hand. My favorite MacFarquhar sentence: “Mr. Putin enjoyed ever-greater support from March to August, but in the months since, as sanctions began to bite with inflation, support began to erode — though his approval ratings remain in the 80s.”

You have to love a paper that will publish this. Somehow.

Look at Putin’s foreign agenda this past year: Latin America just as the sanctions came in — an intentional finger in Washington’s eye, as I read it — then China, China again recently, Turkey more recently, India just now. He has not been to Iran, but there, as in all these other places, he has forged or reiterated promising relations. The deals cut are too numerous to list.

A couple are worth mentioning. The twin gas deals with China, worth nearly three-quarters of a trillion dollars, are historic all by themselves. In six years’ time China will be buying more gas from Russia than the latter now sells to Europe. And do not miss this: My sources tell me that this gas can be priced such as to crowd the U.S. at least partially out of the Asian market.

Other side of the world: Putin has just canceled a planned pipeline to southeastern Europe, the South Stream. This is the defeat Western media put it over as, surely: Russia loses some customers. But two points: One, it was soon enough clear that the Europeans, having used South Stream as leverage in the sanctions game, probably overplayed their hand. The day following the announcement they were struggling for composure so far as I can make out.

Two, Putin stunned everyone with his decision from Ankara, where he stood with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to announce that South Stream would be rerouted to serve the Turkish market. Think about this: It is more than a new deal; there are significant political and diplomatic implications in this, given Turkey’s traditional alliances, its EU aspirations and so on.

This is the way the world changes shape, the way new worlds get built. Think of these new ties in terms of the old trade routes. Many things other than goods traveled along them. As then, the traffic will run in both directions, making our latest globalization the two-way street it should have been from the first.

One could say it is not the West’s world any longer, and I called it “post-Western” in a book several years ago. This is not quite so. It is ours, but only to the extent that it is destined to be everybody’s, if I read history rightly. As an American, my biggest regret on this score — apart from all the suffering caused in our names — is  that my country seems bent on doing almost everything it can to lose out on a great deal of what would be its share in the arriving era; this in the name of prolonging a time that is no longer.

Patrick Smith is the author of “Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century.” He was the International Herald Tribune’s bureau chief in Hong Kong and then Tokyo from 1985 to 1992. During this time he also wrote “Letter from Tokyo” for the New Yorker. He is the author of four previous books and has contributed frequently to the New York Times, the Nation, the Washington Quarterly, and other publications. Follow him on Twitter, @thefloutist.

Edited December 19, 2014 by slow

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Edited December 19, 2014 by Zaz_pi