Толстый и тонкий

[Lord Protector]

[Zaz_pi]

 

Veruj da bi mnogi slavili, i to na nekim neocekivanim mestima poput Britanije. Nije medju omljenima zbog svog delovanja ali stari natezac, koji privodi koke od 20 godina leta, sa koju milijardu, nece da odapne. Zabole ga.

Znas da je Sloba hteo njega da eliminise sa metkom? Barem se tako prica.

[Eraserhead]

 

 

Sad je vec bolje. Da se resi problem.

[Meazza]

mrznja ubija. idi umij se malo.

[Eraserhead]

mrznja ubija. idi umij se malo.

 

Nisam ja potegao ubijanje polonijumom kao metod borbe.

[Anduril]

Nisam ja potegao ubijanje polonijumom kao metod borbe.

 

Nema veze. Ovo jedno je mrznja ovo drugo je pozeljno. Klasika.

[Meazza]

a ono jes i to sto kazete.

 

jebiga, sta cu kad sam pristrasan. polonijum za uranijum...

[Eraserhead]

a ono jes i to sto kazete.

 

jebiga, sta cu kad sam pristrasan. polonijum za uranijum...

 

Uranijum za Srebrenicu itd. Nikad kraja nesreci.

 

EDIT: Da ne pominjem da ovo sve s uranijumom veze nema.

Edited December 16, 2014 by Eraserhead

[Lord Protector]

Nema veze. Ovo jedno je mrznja ovo drugo je pozeljno. Klasika.

 

+1

[Zaz_pi]

Dzefri Saks i odnosu zapada prema Poljskoj i Rusiji posle pada BZ.

 

Viewpoint: Why the shadow of WW1 and 1989 hangs over world events

My experience in Bolivia in 1985-86 soon brought me to Poland in the spring of 1989, at a dual invitation of Poland's final communist government and the Solidarity trade union movement that strongly opposed it. Poland, like Bolivia, was financially bankrupt. And Europe in 1989, like Europe in 1919, was at a great hinge-moment of history.

Mikhail Gorbachev was in power in the Soviet Union, and was prepared to see Europe reunited in peace and democracy. This great man desired similarly to move his own country to a new democratic order. Poland was the first country in the region to move towards democracy in that momentous year. I quickly became the main outside economic adviser to the new Polish government.

...

These were heady days for me as an economic adviser. My wish, it seemed on some days, was the White House's command. One morning, in September 1989, I appealed to the US Government for $1bn for Poland's currency stabilisation. By evening, the White House confirmed the money. No kidding, an eight-hour turnaround time from request to result. Convincing the White House to support a sharp cancellation of Poland's debts took a bit longer, with high-level negotiations stretching out for about a year, but those too proved to be successful.

...

I wish that I could stop my reminiscing here, with this happy story. But alas, the story of the end of the Cold War is not only one of Western successes, as in Poland, but also one of great Western failure vis-a-vis Russia. While American and European generosity and the long view prevailed in Poland, American and European actions vis-a-vis post-Soviet Russia looks were much more like the horrendous blunders of Versailles. And we are paying the consequences to this day.

In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev's government, seeing the emerging positive results in Poland, asked me to help advise it on economic reforms. Russia at the time was facing the same kind of financial calamity that had engulfed Bolivia in the mid-1980s and Poland by 1989.

In the spring of 1991, I worked with colleagues at Harvard and MIT to assist Gorbachev to obtain financial support from the West as part of his efforts at political reform and economic overhaul. Yet our efforts fell flat - indeed they failed entirely.

Gorbachev left the G7 summit that summer of 1991 and returned to Moscow empty-handed. When he returned to Moscow with no results, a conspiracy attempted to oust him in the notorious August Putsch, from which he never recovered politically. With Boris Yeltsin ascendant, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union now on the table, Yeltsin's economic teamed again asked me for assistance, both in the technical challenges of stabilisation, and in the quest to obtain vital financial assistance from the US and Europe.

I predicted to President Yeltsin and his team that help would soon be on the way. After all, emergency help for Poland was arranged in hours or weeks. Surely the same would happen for the newly independent and democratic Russia. Yet I watched in puzzlement and growing horror that the needed aid was not on the way.

Where Poland had been granted debt relief, Russia instead faced harsh demands by the US and Europe to keep paying its debts in full. Where Poland had been granted rapid and generous financial aid, Russia received study groups from the IMF but no money. I begged and beseeched the US to do more. I pleaded the lessons of Poland, but all to no avail. The US government would not budge.

 

Ono najvaznije:

 

It took me 20 years to gain a proper understanding of what had happened after 1991. Why had the US, which had behaved with such wisdom and foresight in Poland, acted with such cruel neglect in the case of Russia? Step by step, and memoir by memoir, the true story came to light. The West had helped Poland financially and diplomatically because Poland would become the Eastern ramparts of an expanding Nato. Poland was the West, and was therefore worthy of help. Russia, by contrast, was viewed by US leaders roughly the same way that Lloyd George and Clemenceau had viewed Germany at Versailles - as a defeated enemy worthy to be crushed, not helped.

A recent book by a former Nato commander, General Wesley Clark, recounts a 1991 conversation he had with Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the Pentagon's policy director. Wolfowitz told Clark that the US had learned that it could now act with impunity in the Middle East, and ostensibly in other regions as well, without any threat of Russian interference.

In short, the US would behave like a victor and a bully, claiming the fruits of Cold War victory through wars of choice if necessary. The US would be on top, and Russia would be unable to stop it.

:)

[Meazza]

Uranijum za Srebrenicu itd. Nikad kraja nesreci.

 

EDIT: Da ne pominjem da ovo sve s uranijumom veze nema.

Slazem se u potpunosti. Drago mi je sto si izjednacio zlocince ratka mladica sa teroristima iz USA.

 

Samo objasnjavam svoju pristrasnost, nista vise.

[Lord Protector]

Dzefri Saks i odnosu zapada prema Poljskoj i Rusiji posle pada BZ.

 

Ono najvaznije:

:)

 

A recent book by a former Nato commander, General Wesley Clark, recounts a 1991 conversation he had with Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the Pentagon's policy director. Wolfowitz told Clark that the US had learned that it could now act with impunity in the Middle East, and ostensibly in other regions as well, without any threat of Russian interference.

In short, the US would behave like a victor and a bully, claiming the fruits of Cold War victory through wars of choice if necessary. The US would be on top, and Russia would be unable to stop it.

 

Tu se Putin i zeznuo zadnjih godina, počeo je da prčka opasno po Bliskom istoku i ugrožava američke interese, dobio je sankcije i veliku krizu u dvorištu, i ne vidim kako će izvući zemlju iz tih kandži bez ogromnih posledica. Kinezi to mnogo pametnije rade, oni se rukovode samo svojim ekonomskim interesima i ničim drugim. Nema šanse da bi se ovo njima desilo što se desilo Rusima.

[Meazza]

pa pitanje je i koliko bi mu se nemesanje isplatilo na duge staze. lose-lose situacija, realno. plus ne mozes da poredis kinesku ekonomiju sa ruskom.

[Lord Protector]

Koliko je matori gmaz opasan treba videti iz ova dva članka iz marta meseca:

 

 

To Punish Russia, Soros Says U.S. Should Open Oil Reserve

By Isaac Arnsdorf - Mar 27, 2014

America’s emergency stockpile of oil stands twice as large as the amount required by an international pact. George Soros has proposed selling some now to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin -- and U.S. lawmakers are starting to listen.

As the U.S. and its European allies seek to rebuke Russia for taking over the Crimea region of Ukraine, America could push down global oil prices by as much as $12 a barrel by selling 500,000 barrels a day from its strategic reserve, said Philip Verleger, a consultant who worked in the Ford and Carter administrations. The lower prices would cost Russia about $40 billion in lost income from oil and gas sales, equivalent to 2 percent of its economy, he said.

While Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz has dismissed the idea, it was raised before a congressional hearing yesterday, less than a week after Soros discussed the subject at a panel in Berlin. The strongest sanction against Putin for taking control of Crimea “is in the hands of the United States” because America could sell oil reserves to depress prices, the billionaire investor said March 20.

“America can and should be an energy superpower,” Senator Mary Landrieu, chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said this week at her first hearing as head of the panel. “The last thing Putin and his cronies want is competition from the United States of America in the energy race,” said the Louisiana Democrat.

Strategic Reserve

Selling U.S. oil is a more immediate option than allowing more exports of natural gas, which requires infrastructure that doesn’t yet exist, according to Verleger.

“We have plenty of oil, we don’t need this oil, we can sell this oil today and put economic pressure on Russia,” Verleger, president of PKVerleger LLC in Carbondale, Colorado, said in a phone interview.

The U.S. keeps 696 million barrels in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, stored in underground salt caverns in Texas and Louisiana, according to the Energy Department. The stockpile was created in 1975 to protect against supply interruptions after an Arab embargo. The last major drawdown was a 30-million-barrel sale in 2011 amid unrest in Libya.

While the nation is committed to holding enough oil to cover 90 days of imports, it currently has enough for more than 200 days, according to the International Energy Agency, the organization of oil-consuming countries that coordinates stockpiles.

Test Sale

“With more domestic oil production and decreasing oil imports, the United States will rely less on the SPR to replace disrupted supply,” Elizabeth Rosenberg, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at a hearing yesterday. “Therefore, it has increasing flexibility to use this stockpile to influence the market for other, possibly geopolitical, reasons.”

President Barack Obama’s administration said this month it would sell 5 million barrels of crude from the reserve to test the distribution system, including a pipeline whose flow was recently reversed. It has nothing to do with Ukraine, Moniz said at a March 21 Bloomberg Government breakfast with reporters and editors in Washington.

WTI Price

The release signaled that the U.S. is willing to use its reserves if the conflict escalates and supplies are disrupted, said Greg Priddy, director of global energy and natural resources at the Eurasia Group in Washington. The U.S. conducted two previous test sales from the oil reserve, including a 4 million barrel sale in August 1990, the month Iraq invaded Kuwait.

West Texas Intermediate crude has averaged $98.51 a barrel this year versus $107.87 for Brent, the international benchmark. Europe imports about 30 percent of its natural gas from Russia through pipelines that cross Ukraine. Oil and gas account for about 50 percent of Russia’s government revenue, the Energy Department estimates. Obama said on March 25 that Russia faces more sanctions if it encroaches further into the east of the country after annexing Crimea.

“I don’t think anyone is saying the oil markets are badly supplied,” Moniz said in the interview last week. Using the oil reserves requires a presidential declaration of emergency, he said.

Representative Tim Ryan, an Ohio Democrat, wouldn’t oppose releasing oil stockpiles along with other initiatives such as approving natural gas exports, Michael Zetts, a spokesman, said by phone yesterday.

Small Effect

The effect on oil prices would be small and temporary, according to Tom Finlon, Jupiter, Florida-based director of Energy Analytics Group Ltd. Prices quickly recovered after previous releases, he said. Brent futures rose 0.7 percent to end the session at $107.83 a barrel today on London’s ICE Futures Europe exchange. They’re down 2.7 percent this year.

The reserve exists to offset shortages in an emergency, not to manipulate prices, said Edward Chow, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington.

The U.S. probably wouldn’t try to push down prices because its own producers would also suffer, Amrita Sen, an analyst at Energy Aspects Ltd. in London.

“If you use oil and aim it at Russia, you’ll hit Texas,” said Kevin Book, managing director of ClearView Energy Partners LLC, a Washington-based consultant. “Besides the intrinsic problem of taking your safety net and burning it for a flash in the pan, we’re not the low-cost producer.”

Win, Win

Releasing oil from the reserve would further reduce U.S. imports while also boosting exports of finished fuels as refiners benefit from cheaper feedstocks, Carl Larry, president of Oil Outlooks & Opinions LLC, said by phone from Houston.

“We can increase exports and the U.S. wins on all levels,” Larry said. “Refiners have better margins in the U.S. and we push out exports from Russia.”

U.S. imports are declining because domestic production is growing the most in history as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing unlock supplies from shale rocks deep underground. The country may be able to meet all its own energy needs by 2035, BP Plc estimates.

Domestic fields are pumping 8.19 million barrels a day, up 15 percent from a year ago, near the highest level since 1988, Energy Department data show. Net imports will decline to 25 percent of liquid fuels consumption next year, the lowest since 1971, the department predicts.

The U.S. would need to make sure that releasing stockpiles wouldn’t be offset by other producers cutting output, said Gary Hufbauer, a researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. Saudi Arabia might cooperate because it opposes Russia’s role in Syria, he said.

Export Lobby

Verleger said the effect on domestic producers would be muted because they already make less than global prices. About 70 percent of U.S. reserves would remain profitable at $75 a barrel, according to Wood Mackenzie, an industry research company.

The oil industry has begun lobbying to change the ban on most crude exports, also arising from the 1970s. Exxon Mobil Corp. said in a December report it supports lifting the limits. Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the senior Republican on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said in a Jan. 7 speech she also supports changing the rules.

Supporters of exporting natural gas are also seizing on the Crimea crisis in an effort to accelerate approvals to sell natural gas to countries without free trade agreements, including all 28 members of the European Union.

Facilities Review

The Energy Department is reviewing more than 20 applications from companies to build multibillion-dollar facilities to liquefy gas so it can be loaded onto oceangoing tankers. On March 24, the department approved Jordan Cove Energy Project LP’s application to build a terminal in Oregon, the seventh proposal cleared since Obama took office.

If all of the seven approved LNG projects are built, the U.S. could export about 9.3 billion cubic feet a day, according to the Energy Department. The first project, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG)’s Sabine Pass facility, won’t be finished until late next year.

Even if the gas wouldn’t reach Europe for years, approving the projects signals that the U.S. can provide alternatives to Russian supplies, Murkowski said at a committee hearing this week.

“We are in an enviable position as a nation,” she said at the hearing. “To be able to discuss our natural gas, our oil, our other resources as truly a strategic asset is something that I think is a remarkable story.”

Philip Revzin

 

i onaj intervju NYT:

 

 

The Future of Europe: An Interview with George Soros

George Soros and Gregor Peter Schmitz

April 24, 2014 Issue

Parts of the following interview with George Soros by the Spiegel correspondent Gregor Peter Schmitz appear in their book, The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?, just published by PublicAffairs.

 

Maxim Shemetov/Reuters Supporters of the Russian annexation of Crimea at a rally in Red Square, Moscow, March 18, 2014

Gregor Peter Schmitz: The conflict in Crimea and Ukraine has changed the shape of European and world politics, and we will come to it. But let us first talk about a subject on which you’ve taken a critical position over the years: the crisis of the European Union: With regard to the euro, isn’t the worst over?

George Soros: If you mean that the euro is here to stay, you are right. That was confirmed by the German elections, where the subject was hardly discussed, and by the coalition negotiations, where it was relegated to Subcommittee 2A. Chancellor Angela Merkel is satisfied with the way she handled the crisis and so is the German public. They reelected her with an increased majority. She has always done the absolute minimum necessary to preserve the euro. This has earned her the allegiance of both the pro- Europeans and those who count on her to protect German national interests. That is no mean feat.

So the euro is here to stay, and the arrangements that evolved in response to the crisis have become established as the new order governing the eurozone. This confirms my worst fears. It’s the nightmare I’ve been talking about. I’m hopeful that the Russian invasion of Crimea may serve as a wake-up call. Germany is the only country in a position to change the prevailing order. No debtor country can challenge it; any that might try would be immediately punished by the financial markets and the European authorities.

Schmitz: If you said that to Germans, they would say: Well, we have already evolved a lot. We are more generous now and have modified our policy of austerity.

Soros: I acknowledge that Germany has stopped pushing the debtor countries underwater. They are getting a little bit of oxygen now and are beginning to breathe. Some, particularly Italy, are still declining, but at a greatly diminished pace. This has given a lift to the financial markets because the economies are hitting bottom and that almost automatically brings about a rebound.

But the prospect of a long period of stagnation has not been removed. It’s generally agreed that the eurozone is threatened by deflation but opposition from the German Constitutional Court and its own legal departments will prevent the European Central Bank (ECB) from successfully overcoming the deflationary pressures the way other central banks, notably the Federal Reserve, have done.

The prospect of stagnation has set in motion a negative political dynamic. Anybody who finds the prevailing arrangements intolerable is pushed into an anti-European posture. This leads me to expect the process of disintegration to gather momentum. During the acute phase of the euro crisis we had one financial crisis after another. Now there should be a series of political rather than financial crises, although the latter cannot be excluded.

Schmitz: You say that current arrangements are intolerable. What exactly needs to change? What needs to be reformed?

Soros: At the height of the euro crisis, Germany agreed to a number of systemic reforms, the most important of which was a banking union. But as the financial pressures abated, Germany whittled down the concessions it had made. That led to the current arrangements, which confirm my worst fears.

Schmitz: As we speak, European finance ministers are in the process of concluding an agreement on the banking union. What do you think of it?

Soros: In the process of negotiations, the so-called banking union has been transformed into something that is almost the exact opposite: the reestablishment of national “silos,” or separately run banks. This is a victory for Orwellian newspeak.

Schmitz: What’s wrong with it?

Soros: The incestuous relationship between national authorities and bank managements. France in particular is famous for its inspecteurs de finance, who end up running its major banks. Germany has its Landesbanken and Spain its caixas, which have unhealthy connections with provincial politicians. These relationships were a major source of weakness in the European banking system and played an important part in the banking crisis that is still weighing on the eurozone. The proposed banking union should have eliminated them, but they were largely preserved, mainly at German insistence.

Schmitz: That is a pretty drastic condemnation. How do you justify it?

Soros: In effect, the banking union will leave the banking system without a lender of last resort. The proposed resolution authority is so complicated, with so many decision-making entities involved, that it is practically useless in an emergency. Even worse, the ECB is legally prohibited from undertaking actions for which it is not expressly authorized. That sets it apart from other central banks, which are expected to use their discretion in an emergency.

But Germany was determined to limit the liabilities that it could incur through the ECB. As a result, member countries remain vulnerable to financial pressures from which other developed countries are exempt. That is what I meant when I said that over-indebted members of the EU are in the position of third-world countries that are overindebted in a foreign currency. The banking union does not correct that defect. On the contrary, it perpetuates it.

Schmitz: You sound disappointed.

Soros: I am. I left no stone unturned trying to prevent this outcome, but now that it has happened, I don’t want to keep knocking my head against the wall. I accept that Germany has succeeded in imposing a new order on Europe, although I consider it unacceptable. But I still believe in the European Union and the principles of the open society that originally inspired it, and I should like to recapture that spirit. I want to arrest the process of disintegration, not accelerate it. So I am no longer advocating that Germany should “lead or leave the euro.” The window of opportunity to bring about radical change in the rules governing the euro has closed.

Schmitz: So, basically, you are giving up on Europe?

Soros: No. I am giving up on changing the financial arrangements, the creditor–debtor relationship that has now turned into a permanent system. I will continue to focus on politics, because that is where I expect dramatic developments.

Schmitz: I see. Obviously, people are concerned about the rise of populist movements in Europe. Do you see any opportunity to push for more political integration, when the trend is toward disintegration?

Soros: I do believe in finding European solutions for the problems of Europe; national solutions make matters worse.

Schmitz: It seems the pro-Europeans are often silent on important issues because they are afraid that speaking up might increase support for the extremists—for example, in the case of the many refugees from the Middle East and Africa who hoped to reach Europe and were detained on the Italian island of Lampedusa.

Soros: Like it or not, migration policy will be a central issue in the elections. We must find some alternative to xenophobia.

Schmitz: What do you propose to do about it?

Soros: I have established an Open Society Initiative for Europe—OSIFE for short. One of its first initiatives is Solidarity Now, in Greece. The original idea was to generate European solidarity with the plight of the Greek population that is suffering from the euro crisis and Greek solidarity with the plight of the migrants, who experience inhuman conditions and are persecuted by the ultranationalist Golden Dawn party. It took us some time to get the project off the ground, and by the time we did, it was too late to generate European solidarity with the Greeks because other heavily indebted countries were also in need of support. So we missed that boat, but our initiative has had the useful by-product of giving us a better insight into the migration problem.

Schmitz: What have you learned?

Soros: That there is an unbridgeable conflict between North and South on the political asylum issue. The countries in the North, basically the creditors, have been generous in their treatment of asylum seekers. So all the asylum seekers want to go there, particularly to Germany. But that is more than they can absorb, so they have put in place a European agreement called Dublin III, which requires asylum seekers to register in the country where they first enter the EU. That tends to be the South, namely, Italy, Spain, and Greece. All three are heavily indebted and subject to fiscal austerity. They don’t have proper facilities for asylum seekers, and they have developed xenophobic, anti-immigrant, populist political movements.

Asylum seekers are caught in a trap. If they register in the country where they arrive, they can never ask for asylum in Germany. So, many prefer to remain illegal, hoping to make their way to Germany. They are condemned to illegality for an indefinite period. The miserable conditions in which they live feed into the anti-immigrant sentiment.

Schmitz: Looking at other European issues, aren’t your foundations also very involved in the problems of the Roma (Gypsies)?

Soros: Yes, we have been engaged in those issues for more than twenty-five years. The Roma Education Fund has developed effective methods of educating Roma children and strengthening their Roma identity at the same time. If this were done on a large-enough scale it would destroy the hostile stereotype that stands in the way of the successful integration of the Roma. As it is, educated Roma can blend into the majority because they don’t fit the stereotype but the stereotype remains intact.

This is another instance where the European Commission is having a positive effect. I look to the European Structural funds to scale up the programs that work.

Schmitz: What do you think of Vladimir Putin’s recent policies with respect to Ukraine, Crimea, and Europe?

Soros: Now you are coming to the crux of the matter. Russia is emerging as a big geopolitical player, and the European Union needs to realize that it has a resurgent rival on its east. Russia badly needs Europe as a partner, but Putin is positioning it as a rival. There are significant political forces within the Russian regime that are critical of Putin’s policy on that score.

Schmitz: Can you be more specific?

Soros: The important thing to remember is that Putin is leading from a position of weakness. He was quite popular in Russia because he restored some order out of the chaos. The new order is not all that different from the old one, but the fact that it is open to the outside world is a definite improvement, an important element in its stability. But then the prearranged switch with Dmitry Medvedev from prime minister to president deeply upset the people. Putin felt existentially threatened by the protest movement. He became repressive at home and aggressive abroad.

That is when Russia started shipping armaments to the Assad regime in Syria on a massive scale and helped turn the tide against the rebels. The gamble paid off because of the preoccupation of the Western powers—the United States and the EU—with their internal problems. Barack Obama wanted to retaliate against Syria’s use of chemical weapons. He asked for congressional approval and was about to be rebuffed when Putin came to the rescue and persuaded Assad to voluntarily surrender his chemical weapons.

That was a resounding diplomatic victory for him. Yet the spontaneous uprising of the Ukrainian people must have taught Putin that his dream of reconstituting what is left of the Russian Empire is unattainable. He is now facing a choice between persevering or changing course and becoming more cooperative abroad and less repressive at home. His current course has already proved to be self-defeating, but he appears to be persevering.

Schmitz: Is Russia a credible threat to Europe if its economy is as weak as you say?

Soros: The oligarchs who control much of the Russian economy don’t have any confidence in the regime. They send their children and money abroad. That is what makes the economy so weak. Even with oil over $100 a barrel, which is the minimum Russia needs to balance its budget, it is not growing. Putin turned aggressive out of weakness. He is acting in self-defense. He has no scruples, he can be ruthless, but he is a judo expert, not a sadist—so the economic weakness and the aggressive behavior are entirely self-consistent.

Schmitz: How should Europe respond to it?

Soros: It needs to be more united, especially in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Putin prides himself on being a geopolitical realist. He respects strength and is emboldened by weakness. Yet there is no need to be permanently adversarial. Notwithstanding the current situation in Ukraine, the European Union and Russia are in many ways complementary; they both need each other. There is plenty of room for Russia to play a constructive role in the world, exactly because both Europe and the United States are so preoccupied with their internal problems.

Schmitz: How does that translate into practice, particularly in the Middle East?

Soros: It has totally transformed the geopolitical situation. I have some specific ideas on this subject, but it is very complicated. I can’t possibly explain it in full because there are too many countries involved and they are all interconnected.

Schmitz: Give it a try.

Soros: I should start with a general observation. There are a growing number of unresolved political crises in the world. That is a symptom of a breakdown in global governance. We have a very rudimentary system in place. Basically, there is only one international institution of hard power: the UN Security Council. If the five permanent members agree, they can impose their will on any part of the world. But there are many sovereign states with armies; and there are failed states that are unable to protect their monopoly over the use of lethal force or hard power.

The cold war was a stable system. The two superpowers were stalemated by the threat of mutually assured destruction, and they had to restrain their satellites. So wars were fought mainly at the edges. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief moment when the United States emerged as the undisputed leader of the world. But it abused its power. Under the influence of the neocons, who argued that the United States should use its power to impose its will on the world, President George W. Bush declared “war on terror” and invaded Iraq under false pretenses.

 

Angela Merkel; drawing by James Ferguson

That was a tragic misinterpretation of the proper role of hegemonic or imperial power. It is the power of attraction—soft power—that ensures the stability of empires. Hard power may be needed for conquest and self-protection, but the hegemon must look after the interests of those who depend on it in order to secure their allegiance instead of promoting only its own interests. The United States did that very well after World War II, when it established the United Nations and embarked on the Marshall Plan. But President Bush forgot that lesson and destroyed American supremacy in no time. The neocons’ dream of a “new American century” lasted less than ten years. President Obama then brought American policy back to reality. His record in foreign policy is better than generally recognized. He accepted the tremendous loss of power and influence and tried to “lead from behind.” In any case, he is more preoccupied with domestic than foreign policy. In that respect America is in the same position as Europe, although for different reasons. People are inward-looking and tired of war. This has created a power vacuum, which has allowed conflicts to fester unresolved all over the world.

Recently, Russia has moved into this power vacuum, trying to reassert itself as a geopolitical player. That was a bold maneuver, inspired by Putin’s internal weakness, and it has paid off in Syria because of the weakness of the West. Russia could do what the Western powers couldn’t: persuade Assad to “voluntarily” surrender his chemical weapons. That has radically changed the geopolitical landscape. Suddenly, the prospect of a solution has emerged for the three major unresolved conflicts in the Middle East—Palestine, Iran, and Syria—when one would have least expected it.

The Syrian crisis is by far the worst, especially in humanitarian consequences. Russia’s entry as a major supplier of arms, coupled with Hezbollah’s entry as a supplier of troops, has turned the tables in favor of Assad. The fighting can be brought to an end only by a political settlement imposed and guaranteed by the international community. Without it, the two sides will continue to fight indefinitely with the help of their outside supporters. But a political settlement will take months or years to negotiate. In the meantime, Assad is following a deliberate policy of denying food and destroying the medical system as a way of subduing the civilian population. “Starve or surrender” is his motto.

This raises the specter of a human catastrophe. Unless humanitarian assistance can be delivered across battle lines, more people will have died from illness and starvation during the winter than from actual fighting.

Schmitz: What about Iran?

Soros: There has been an actual breakthrough in the Iranian crisis in the form of a temporary agreement on nuclear weapons with the new president Hassan Rouhani. The sanctions imposed by the Western powers have been very effective. The Iranian revolution itself advanced to the point where it fell into the hands of a narrow clique, the Revolutionary Guard; the mullahs were largely pushed out of power. As head of the mullahs, the Supreme Leader could not have been pleased. He must also be aware that the large majority of the population has been profoundly dissatisfied with the regime. In contrast with previous attempts at negotiations, he seems to be in favor of reaching an accommodation with the United States. That improves the prospects for a final agreement. We must take into account, as Vali Nasr recently wrote, that Iran has, after Russia, the world’s second-largest reserves of natural gas; and it potentially might compete with Russia in supplying gas to Europe.

Schmitz: That leaves the longest-lasting crisis, Palestine.

Soros: Recent developments in Egypt have improved the chances of progress in the long-festering Palestinian crisis. The army, with the active support of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, has removed the legally elected president and is engaged in the brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. This otherwise disturbing development has a potentially benign side effect: it raises the possibility of a peace settlement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, to the exclusion of Hamas. This would have been inconceivable a few months ago. Secretary of State John Kerry became engaged in the Palestinian negotiations well before this window of opportunity opened, so he is ahead of the game. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is very suspicious but, for all his intransigence, cannot openly oppose negotiations because, having openly supported Mitt Romney in the American elections, he holds a relatively weak hand. Negotiations are making progress, but very slowly indeed.

If all three crises were resolved, a new order would emerge in the Middle East. There is a long way to go because the various conflicts are interconnected, and the potential losers in one conflict may act as spoilers in another. Netanyahu, for instance, is dead set against a deal with Iran because peace with Palestine would end his political career in Israel. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of a potential new order can already be discerned, although we cannot know the effects of the current crisis in Ukraine. Russia could become more influential, relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States may become strained, and Iran may emerge as America’s closest ally, second only to Israel. But the situation remains fluid and may change from one day to the next.

Schmitz: Recently the crisis in Ukraine has overshadowed all the others.

Soros: Indeed. Ukraine and in particular Crimea are of much greater interest to Russia than anything in the Middle East. Putin woefully misjudged the situation. Last autumn he had no difficulty in outmaneuvering the European Union, which was hamstrung by its internal political and financial problems. Under German leadership it offered too little and demanded too much. Putin could easily offer a better deal to Ukrainian President Yanukovych. But the Ukrainian people rebelled, upsetting the calculations of both sides.

The rebellion wounded Putin in his Achilles heel. The idea of a spontaneous rebellion simply did not enter into his calculations. In his view the world is ruled by power and those in power can easily manipulate public opinion. Failure to control the people is a sign of weakness.

Accordingly, he made it a condition of his assistance that Yanukovych should repress the rebellion. But the use of force aroused the public and eventually Yanukovych was forced to capitulate. This could have resulted in a stalemate and the preservation of the status quo with Ukraine precariously balanced between Russia and Europe, and a corrupt and inept government pitted against civil society. It would have been an inferior equilibrium with the costs exceeding the benefits for all parties concerned.

But Putin persisted in his counterproductive approach. Yanukovych was first hospitalized and then sent to Sochi to be dressed down by Putin. Putin’s instructions brought the confrontation to a climax. Contrary to all rational expectations, a group of citizens armed with not much more than sticks and shields made of cardboard boxes and metal garbage can lids overwhelmed a police force firing live ammunition. There were many casualties, but the citizens prevailed. It was a veritable miracle.

Schmitz: How could such a thing happen? How do you explain it?

Soros: It fits right into my human uncertainty principle, but it also reveals a remarkable similarity between human affairs and quantum physics of which I was previously unaware. According to Max Planck, among others, subatomic phenomena have a dual character: they can manifest themselves as particles or waves. Something similar applies to human beings: they are partly freestanding individuals or particles and partly components of larger entities that behave like waves. The impact they make on reality depends on which alternative dominates their behavior. There are potential tipping points from one alternative to the other but it is uncertain when they will occur and the uncertainty can be resolved only in retrospect.

On February 20 a tipping point was reached when the people on Maidan Square were so determined to defend Ukraine that they forgot about their individual mortality. What gave their suicidal stand historic significance is that it succeeded. A deeply divided society was moved from the verge of civil war to an unprecedented unity. Revolutions usually fail. The Orange Revolution of 2004 deteriorated into a squabble between its leaders. It would be a mistake to conclude that this revolution is doomed to suffer the same fate. Indeed the parties participating in the interim government are determined to avoid it. In retrospect the resistance of Maidan may turn out to be the birth of a nation. This promising domestic development was a direct response to foreign oppression. Unfortunately it is liable to provoke further pressure from abroad because successful resistance by Ukraine would present an existential threat to Putin’s continued dominance in Russia.

Schmitz: You are referring to the Russian invasion of Crimea. How do you see it playing out?

Soros: If it is confined to Crimea it will serve as a further impetus to greater national cohesion in Ukraine. Crimea is not an integral part of Ukraine. Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 by an administrative decree. The majority of its population is Russian and it is the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. That is exactly why Putin is liable to put military and economic pressure on Ukraine directly and they are not in a position to resist it on their own. They need the support of the Western powers. So Ukraine’s future depends on how the Western powers, particularly Germany, respond.

Schmitz: What should the Western powers do?

Soros: They should focus on strengthening Ukraine rather than on punishing Russia. They cannot prevent or reverse the annexation of Crimea. They are bound to protest it of course because it violates the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea, but they are not in a position to oppose it by military means. Even sanctions ought to be used sparingly in order to preserve them as a deterrent against the real danger, namely of direct military or economic assault on Ukraine. Russian forces have already occupied a gas plant in Ukraine supplying Crimea and may take more territory unless they are stopped.

Fortunately economic sanctions would be a potent deterrent provided they are used judiciously. Freezing the foreign assets of Russian oligarchs is the opposite of smart sanctions. Oligarchs sending their profits and their children abroad weaken the Russian economy. Until now capital flight was more or less offset by foreign direct investment. Effective sanctions would discourage the inflow of funds, whether in the form of direct investments or bank loans. Moreover, the US could release oil from its strategic reserve and allow its sale abroad. That could put the Russian economy into deficit. The Russian economy is fragile enough to be vulnerable to smart sanctions.

Schmitz: Wouldn’t that be cutting off your nose to spite your face? Germany has a lot of investments in Russia, which are equally vulnerable.

Soros: Effective sanctions against Russia should be threatened at first only as a deterrent. If the threat is effective, they wouldn’t be applied. But Chancellor Merkel faces a fundamental choice: should Germany be guided by its narrow national self-interests or should it assert its leadership position within the European Union and forge a unified European response? On her choice hinges not only the fate of Ukraine but also the future of the European Union. Her passionate speech to the German Parliament on March 13 gives me hope that she is going to make the right choice.

Schmitz: What is your idea of the right choice?

Soros: A large-scale technical and financial assistance program for Ukraine. The EU and the US, under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund, are putting together a multibillion-dollar rescue package that will save the country from financial collapse. But that is not enough: Ukraine also needs outside assistance that only the EU can provide: management expertise and access to markets.

Ukraine is a potentially attractive investment destination. But realizing this potential requires improving the business climate by addressing the endemic corruption and weak rule of law. The new regime in Ukraine is eager to confront that task. But only the EU can open up its domestic market and provide political risk insurance for investing in Ukraine. Ukraine in turn would encourage its companies to improve their management by finding European partners. Thus Ukraine would become increasingly integrated in the European common market. That could also provide a much-needed fiscal stimulus for the European economy and, even more importantly, help to recapture the spirit that originally inspired the European Union.

 

George Soros je idejni tvorac sankcija prema Rusiji...on je faktički imao i ima ulogu consiglierea američkog establišmenta po tom pitanju.

Edited December 17, 2014 by slow

[Lord Protector]

 

Trading Strategies – 3 Biggest Forex Trades of George Soros Posted on May 16, 2013by

Updated on May 05, 2014.

Uncover the trading strategies and analysis of the biggest and most notorious foreign exchange trades ever. Learn how George Soros shattered whole economic regions and made huge profits by betting on their weakness. Normally the big trades in forex stay unknown as the market is too big to spot individual traders. Also it is very unlikely that a single trader can influence the whole economies. But there are exceptions – and this exception is called George Soros.

G.Soros’ Strategy Revealed – his TOP5 most profitable stocks of 2014

George Soros has the ability to predict the market like no other. He is making big profits not only from currency trading but also from investing in stocks. By analyzing his stock portfolio we discovered a skyrocketing stock that many traders have not noticed yet – Baidu. Baidu is the chinese version of Google and it is showing fantastic growth in the recent year. By clicking on the chart links you can see the full stats of the stocks and also invest in them (minumum deposits from $100. Not available for US residents. Recommended alternative for US residents – Traderush).

Nr.1. Soros Breaks the Bank of England and earns $1 Billion in a day

This is certainly the most notorious forex market event which took place on September 16, 1992 which is called “the Black Wednesday” and Soros got his nickname “the man who broke the bank of England” from transactions he performed together with other traders. They didn’t break it directly, but they devaluated it so badly that Britain had to take it out from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).

Fig.1. How Soros Broke the Bank of England in 1992.

Britain was in a recession from 1990 but despite this the pound (also known as Sterling) joined the ERM in 1990 thus fixing the pound’s rate to deutschmark in order to make the investments more predictable and stable among Britain and Europe. But as the political and financial situation in Germany changed during the unification of Germany many ERM currencies were under big pressure to keep their currencies within the agreed limits. Britain had the most problems – its inflation rate was very high and the USD rate (many British exporters were being paid in USD) was also falling. So more and more speculators began circling and making plans on how to profit from this situation as it became clear that the pound was not able to artificially stand against the natural market forces. Speculators waited until the financial situation got as bad as it could naturally get and then created extra pressure on the pound by selling it in huge amounts. The most aggressive of them was G. Soros who performed this transaction every 5 minutes profiting each time as the GBP fell by minutes.

Watch the video on how United Kingdom was forced to leave the monetary union because of the Forex speculations performed by Soros and other traders:

“The money that I made on this particular transaction would be estimated at about $1 Billion dollars. We very simply used the forward market – you borrow sterling and you sell the sterling that you’ve borrowed. And then you buy back the sterling when the loan expires.”

– G. Soros.

[youtube id=9bXNt1ec2FQ" mode="normal]

Let’s look at a simplified example to understand the trading strategy of Soros:

In order to sustain the fixed rate the Bank of England was buying 2 Billion GBP an hour which as an unprecedented amount. The policies of the ERM demanded that the countries with the strongest currencies have to sell their currencies and buy the weakest to help maintain the equilibrium – in this case the Bank of Germany had to sell deutschmarks and buy pounds but they didn’t come to Britain’s rescue as apparently Germany had interest in seeing the GBP devaluated. All the Britain’s efforts of pumping in money and increasing the already high interest rates proved futile.

Soros borrows 1 Million GBP, sells it at the current rate for 2 Million USD (GBP/USD = 2.00) and buys it back when the GBP/USD = 1.50 for 1.5 Million USD thus keeping the difference of 0.5 Million USD.

In the late afternoon of September 16 as the traders understood that the Bank of England has insufficient amounts of foreign currencies to buy in all the pounds that were sold, they pushed even more which resulted in a collapse and at 19:40 the British prime minister confirmed defeat and declared that Britain is leaving the ERM.

Nr.2. How Soros earns $790 Million, crashes the Thai Baht and triggers the Asian crisis.

The second most notorious trade of Soros came in 1997 as he saw a possibility that the Thai Baht could go down so he went short on the baht (by going long on USD/THB) using forward contracts. His actions are often considered to be a triggering factor which formed the big Asian financial crisis affecting not only Thailand but also South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Honk Kong and others.

Fig.2. How Soros gained $790 Million and destabilized Thailand’s and Asian economies in 1997 – 1998.

1. Soros goes short on the baht.
2. Thailand spends almost $7 Billion to protect the Baht against speculations.
3. Soros sells all his baht resources and keeps telling everyone to do the same by publicly scaring people with the fall of the baht and crisis. It works.
4. On July 2, Thailand is forced to give up the fixed rate of the Baht and it starts to float freely. Thailand asks for help from the International Monetary fund (IMF).
5. Thailand takes on hard austerity measures to secure the loan from the IMF.
6. Baht has fallen from 1$ for 25 baht to 56 baht thus Soros had gained more than 790 million USD.

Nr.3. Soros gains $1.4 Billion from the falling Yen

Japan’s economy was seriously damaged after the devastating tsunami in 2011 and the economic recovery didn’t happen so fast. Since then traders have been awaiting the weakening of the yen which started to form in the end of 2012 as Shinzo Abe (candidate for the post of Prime Minister of Japan) publicly spoke about his plans to weaken the Yen in order to boost the economic situation of Japan. Taking into consideration his high ratings this was a good signal for the investors to open big USD/JPY positions betting that the value of dollar would rise against the yen.

Fig.3. How Soros used the the economic situation in Japan to earn $1.4 Billion in 2013

The first one to jump in was George Soros who is legendary for his skills of shorting different currencies with high leverages and worldwide consequences. He forecasted the upcoming trend and Soros Fund Management allocated 10% of its $24 Billion to USD/JPY in mid-November 2012. Since then they have gained $1.2 – $1.4 Billion (according to sources close to the Fund) in this deal and the Yen still keeps going down. Other big players who opened similar positions include Daniel Loeb, David Einhorn, Caxton Associates, Tudor Investments and Moore Capital – and these huge bets helped the momentum of Yen’s slide to increase even more. This was not only beneficial for the traders who went short on the yen, but also for Shinzo Abe who knew that a weaker yen could attract more foreign investments and also make Japans export more competitive. This in turn was heavily criticized from the biggest EU countries who understood that such interventions would in turn lower their export potential as Japanese production would cost less and less.

Banks and hedge funds soon started telling their clients to bet go on this bet as well. The growth of dollar increased even more when Shinzo Abe was elected as the Prime minister on December 26, 2012. After this Even the Bank of America jumped in to make profits from this trend.

Luckily for Japan these moves of Soros and other traders didn’t threaten its currency as it did when Soros went short on GPB in 1992 and on Thai baht on 1997 thus damaging these currencies and creating financial collapses in both countries. The reason for this is that the biggest part of Japans resources and debts are owned by locals.

What can we learn from these super deals?

The main trading strategy of Soros and other traders is to spot upcoming economical vulnerability of a country and then go short on its currency right before the fall happens.  The highest potential of currency fluctuations and thus also gains is when a currency has a fixed rate to other currency – as in the case of pound and Thai Baht. In these cases the weak countries are very vulnerable to speculations as they try to artificially sustain the fixed rate by buying in its currency that is being sold as people sell it. This artificial currency balance is prone to collapse very dramatically when it can’t fight the natural market forces anymore – and this is exactly what happened here. In the case of Japanese Yen the signal to go short on it was when Japanese government said it would depreciate the currency in order to boost its economy and attract investors.

So as you can see from these examples once again – economic crises often offer the best opportunities for currency traders. Of course it all looks much easier when observed in retrospective, but still these are patterns which can be used by everyday traders as well.

Edited December 17, 2014 by slow