Толстый и тонкий

[Roger Sanchez]

Baš sam htio staviti o njenom hapšenju - optužili su ju da je skrivila samoubojstvo nekog radio novinara. Vrijeđanjem. Totalno euroazijska sfera.

[Lord Protector]

 

Tanvi Madan | December 9, 2014 4:30pm

Mr. Putin Goes to India: Five Reasons the Russian President Will Be Welcomed There

 

On December 10, Russian president Vladimir Putin will head to India for the annual India-Russia summit. This time, Narendra Modi will be on the other side of the table. It is Modi’s first time leading the Indian delegation. However, he is not entirely unfamiliar with Russia, having visited the country three times when he was chief minister of the state of Gujarat. Nor is this his first meeting with Putin; the two leaders have met twice before this year on the sidelines of the BRICS and G20 summits and Modi has also met a couple of times with the Russian deputy prime minister. As Modi and Putin meet this week, however, the contrast in their domestic and global contexts is particularly striking. Modi has spent the last few months being feted around the world. Welcome mats aren’t really being rolled for Putin in too many countries. Sentiment about India is bullish; about Russia bearish. There’s talk of India as a rising power and Russia as a declining one. Though both Modi and Putin remain popular domestically, the Indian prime minister has promised his country that good times lie ahead; Putin, on the other hand, cautioned his people last week about the hard times ahead.

During the trip, there are expectations of agreements being signed, with deals on defense, diamond trade, energy and joint production of civilian aircraft reportedly on the agenda. This will be a short visit; Putin didn’t take up Modi’s request that he spend more than a day in India and travel outside Delhi. While there were reports that Putin would address a joint session of parliament – an honor last given to him when he first visited India as president in 2000 and most recently given to President Obama in November 2010 – this, too, hasn’t materialized. The reason offered for not taking up the invitation: “his tight schedule and pressing engagements.” Instead, there might be a joint Modi-Putin appearance at the World Diamond Congress. This indeed might be a way of demonstrating that the two countries intend to move their commercial relationship forward. Direct diamond trade, in particular, offers a mutually-beneficial opportunity with India by far the largest processor of rough diamonds in the world and Russia the largest producer.

It’s not difficult to see why a good relationship with Delhi continues to be important for Moscow. It doesn’t have too many friends right now and has been hit by sanctions. India offers an option, reiterating as it has that it “cannot be party to any economic sanctions against Russia.” India is a key market for Russian goods, especially military equipment. As India consolidates and expands its relationships with other key countries, the trip also offers Putin an opportunity to demonstrate continuing Russian relevance to India and to maintain or build its foothold, especially in two critical areas for India: defense and energy. 

Why will he be welcomed in India? Because even though India-Russia ties aren’t what they used to be, Russia’s utility for India remains.

Defense

Russia’s share of Indian defense imports has been declining, but it remains the largest supplier of military equipment to India. So, even though Russia doesn’t have the 79 percent share of Indian expenditure on defense imports that it did in 2003, it still had a 68 percent share in 2013 (the U.S. was next in line with an 18 percent share). There are also bilateral co-production and co-development projects in place or being discussed. As a senior Indian official put it bluntly, Russia is India’s “primary defense partner and will remain so for decades.” With a legacy relationship and years of experience in this realm, Russian companies and officials are familiar with the Indian defense acquisition system and process, and have developed networks and habits of cooperation that will ensure they remain critical players in this sphere.

On India’s part, there is a move to diversify away from the heavy dependence the country has had on imports from Russia. However, a number of Indian government officials and analysts continue to see Moscow as more willing to provide India defense technology that others won’t and less likely to subscribe to any potential sanctions against India that might result in a cut-off of spare parts. There are also areas like space cooperation where some see possibilities for the two countries to work together.

Energy (and Economics)

India is the fourth largest energy consumer in the world and imports some amount of its top three energy sources: coal, oil and natural gas. About three-quarters of the crude oil India consumes is imported and this percentage has been growing. Critically, 62 percent of those imports came from the Middle East in 2013. Indian policymakers would like to diversify its sources of supply. Russia, which currently is a source of less than 0.5 percent of oil imports, is seen as part of the answer. While India doesn’t currently import natural gas from Russia, this might be a possibility discussed as well. Russia is also active in India’s civilian nuclear energy space, though its two reactor projects have run into problems (associated with liability concerns) and this has thus far stalled any further development on this front.

Along with potentially broader energy deals, Indian officials would also like to see Indian oil and gas companies get better terms and more investment deals in Russia. Currently, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), a subsidiary of India’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, has a 20 percent stake in the Sakhalin-I project and 100 percent ownership of Imperial Energy. In past years, as the energy-hungry consumer, India has found itself on the back foot in negotiating energy deals. It has also found countries like China (and its companies) with more buying power getting better terms. In recent years, with oil and gas producers looking to diversify their markets (or influence Indian decision-makers’ choices on other fronts) and the energy revolution in the U.S. changing global dynamics, India has found itself better placed in negotiations. With Russia now seen as the one on the back foot, Indian policymakers will hope to use that as an advantage. Just as Beijing got itself a nice energy deal recently, Indian officials and companies will be hoping for better terms on energy deals with Russia (though perhaps not to the same extent as China).

While, as is usual, there has been no pre-announcement of the agreements that will be signed during the visit, there is speculation ranging from investment opportunities for Indian oil and gas companies in Russia to an announcement of a feasibility study for a pipeline. However, there have been differences on the right price and terms on the former and doubts about the practicality of the latter. There’s also speculation about a long-term oil and/or gas supply deal. The attraction of such a deal for India at competitive prices (and on a long-term basis): it’ll help the country diversify its current sources of supply, as well as leverage this deal for better terms with other countries. However, such a deal will also perhaps most raise eyebrows in the U.S.

Beyond energy and defense, both India and Russia also want to expand the economic relationshp. There has been disappointment at the relatively stagnant nature of these ties. An Indian official recently stated that trade stands at $10 billion. Indian commerce ministry figures on trade in goods in 2013 to 2014 listed the amount as $6 billion, with India facing a $1.7 billion trade deficit with Russia (compare that with the trade in goods that India has with China or the U.S., which is ten times that between India and Russia). Regardless of which figures you take, the $20 billion target set for 2015 seems long forgotten. The investment relationship has never really taken off either. Of the $6.5 billion of estimated Indian investment in Russia, $4.3 billion is accounted for by two OVL investments (in Sakhalin-I and Imperial Energy).

Global and Regional Issues and Institutions

India has found Russia to have utility on the global stage as well. In the United Nations Security Council, Moscow has exercised its veto for India’s benefit in the past. It has also endorsed a permanent seat for India on the council and supported Indian membership in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Like India, Russia is a member of the BRICS grouping and in both the SCO and BRICS, Moscow could potentially help off-set some of Beijing’s influence.

India shares some concerns with Russia, including about external support for regime change, U.S. unilateral intervention, and sanctions. The latter is a particularly sensitive subject; India has been on the receiving end of western sanctions and Modi knows intimately what it’s like to be isolated by the U.S. and western countries. The Indian government has also found itself on the same page with Russia on issues like Iran, Libya and Syria in the past. Moreover, India believes it shares with Russia an interest in stability in Afghanistan (and a non-Taliban government there).

Issues related to “sovereignty” (and its protection) were another area of commonality. The Russian annexation of Crimea has, however, made this aspect complicated. While Delhi did not publicly condemn Russia or isolate that country, the previous Indian prime ministeremphasized to Putin the Indian position on “the unity and territorial integrity of countries” and Modi has broadly criticized countries with “expansionist mindsets” that encroach on others’ lands and seas.

China

Indian policymakers have watched with wariness Russia seemingly moving closer to the country that that encroachment remark seemed primarily targeted at: China. Indeed, one of the reasons Delhi has been concerned about Russia’s tension with and isolation from the U.S., Europe and others like Australia is that these are seen as pushing Russia toward China. This worries India because for the Indian government, Moscow, too, plays a role in managing China’s rise.

The role that countries like Japan and the U.S. might play in an Indian balancing strategy vis-à-vis China gets a lot more attention. That makes it easy to forget that Russia (and, before it, the Soviet Union) has traditionally been part of the strategy as well. Indian policymakers don’t necessarily expect Russia to take India’s side against China – though that would be a bonus – but they fear Moscow putting its thumb on the scale for Beijing. Sino-Russian (and, previously, Sino-Soviet) tension has been useful for India, either by keeping Moscow neutral or by distracting Beijing or by leading Moscow to aid India. Any Russian movement toward China is seen as having negative consequences for India and potentially requiring India to look too much to the U.S. and its allies to play that balancing role. 

Diversification

Russia is also seen as being a crucial component of India’s diversification strategy. This strategy involves establishing and maintaining relationships with multiple countries in order to maximize benefits and minimize risks to Indian objectives. For Indian policymakers, it allows them to keep their options open, spreads the risk of dependence, minimizes the leverage that any one country can have and facilitates freedom of action. Thus far, the Modi government has stayed with this key element of Indian foreign policy. Even as it has tried to consolidate and expand relations with countries like Australia, Japan and the U.S., it has also worked to maintain and build its relations with China and Russia.

Indian policymakers have reliability concerns about all external actors. Yet in the Indian foreign policy narrative, Russia is seen as more dependable than, say, the U.S. Analysts will particularly invoke Moscow not cutting off supply of spare parts during India’s 1965 war with Pakistan (when the U.S. and U.K. suspended military assistance to India) and Russia coming to India’s assistance during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Ask policymakers and analysts in the know and they will provide a more nuanced story – that Russia, like other external benefactors, has also been fickle. During the 1962 China-India war, it chose its brother China over friend India, even providing Beijing with intelligence on India. Yet, in relative terms, Russia is seen as more dependable. Thus, policymakers outline Russia’s“unstinting” and “long-standing and steadfast” support for India and Modi has described Moscow as “a time-tested and reliable friend that had stood with India in difficult times.”

The visit will be an opportunity to demonstrate (rhetorically at the very least) to Putin that Delhi won’t jettison Moscow in tough times and that Russia will continue to have a place in Indian foreign policy. But it will also likely give India an opportunity to express concern about Russia’s own diversification plans: not just vis-à-vis China, but also Pakistan. The Russian defense minister’s recent visit to Pakistan in November and the defence deals, after all, did not go unnoticed in India (and it was perhaps designed to be noticed).

Conclusion

These are also some of the reasons that the Indian government has tried to avoid taking a public stance on the Russia-Ukraine situation, with Modi refusing to get drawn into discussing the issue. The Obama administration has stayed relatively silent publicly about this Indian approach—partly because any public condemnation would likely be futile, at best, and counterproductive, at worst. However, Putin’s visit—and particularly any significant deals signed—might elicit a reaction from some quarters of Capitol Hill and the commentariat.

Chances are that some observers will also invoke the word “non-alignment” in response to the Putin visit, but it’s worth keeping this visit—and the India-Russia relationship—in perspective. Even as India has a “special and privileged” partnership with Russia, it has a “strategic and cooperative” one with China, a “special strategic and global” one with Japan, and a “broad strategic and global” partnership with the U.S., which is also a “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise.”

This is not the Cold War and today’s India-Russia relations are not the India-Soviet relations of then. As observers have noted, the relationship has indeed been “sagging,” with thedistance between the two growing. There are indeed strategic elements to and reasons for the relationship, but in recent years it has been mostly a transactional one. The sentimentalism is also missing. While Modi might state that “every child in India knows that Russia is a true friend of India,” it is not clear that younger generations of Indians share or will share that sentiment toward Russia or frankly even give it much thought. With half of India’s population below the age of 25, a significant proportion of Indians were born after the Cold War. Russia is not the country that Indian parents send their children to study and Russian is not the foreign language that students are rushing to learn. India’s strategic elite aren’t found as much in dialogues and conferences in Moscow as they are in Beijing, London, Singapore, Tokyo or Washington. In a Lowy Institute survey, those Indians polled about their feelings of warmth (or not) toward various countries ranked the U.S., Singapore, Japan, Australia and France above Russia.

Moreover, the diversification strategy mentioned above that means that India will continue to maintain its partnership with Russia is also why it will neither ally with nor move closer to that country. One of the main reasons Delhi gravitated as much as it did toward Moscow during the Cold War was that it didn’t have any other options. As long as those other options are available today – and especially if they expand – Delhi will limit its own relationship with Moscow.

Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and director of The India Project. Madan’s work explores Indian foreign policy, focusing in particular on India's relations with China and the United States.

Edited December 10, 2014 by slow

[Ravanelli]

zanimljiv baja, počujte

 

 

The ruble's collapse is not a big issue for Russian consumers, according to Oleg Tinkov, founder of TCS Group Holding Plc. He also discusses oil prices, sanctions and Ukraine

 

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/video/ruble-collapse-is-no-big-deal-within-russia-tinkov-LKo4_atyTiyFug9SJSuchw.html

Edited December 11, 2014 by Ravanelli

[Lord Protector]

Scarface baja :D

 

Mnogo žena voli ovakve tipove...bogat biznismen, ružnjikav, slatkorečiv, pomalo razbarušen i nonšalantan, samouveren, šarenih zelenih očiju ^_^

Edited December 11, 2014 by slow

[Marcus Wulffings]

Scarface baja :D

 

Mnogo žena voli ovakve tipove...bogat biznismen, ružnjikav, slatkorečiv, pomalo razbarušen i nonšalantan, samouveren, šarenih zelenih očiju ^_^

 

vala baš, dobro si opisao ovu pojavu

[Budja]

Oh, editirao si. Vidjeli smo za Snowdena i Asangea, ali Asangea ne ganja USA, nego njegova neutralna nemeza. Možda misliš na Manninga?

 

Koliko ja znam, tkogod je odao nešto rusko također je zbrisao iz zemlje i našao utočište na skroz drugoj strani. Ili je u slammeru. Osim recimo Mitrohina, ništa Snowden/Manningovske magnitude nije iscurilo. Ali, ako Snowden jednog dana slučajno popije čai s polonijem u Piteru, priznat ću ti tu paralelu neprijatnosti.

 

Hm, ja bih pre kao zrtvu video Politkovskaju nego Litvinenka ili Berezovskog. Kao sto su se Cane ili Ratko Knezevic predstavljali kao politicke zrtve.

 

 

Da dodam, Kadirov bi za ovu prekjucerasnju oko za oko akciju spaljivanja kuca trebalo da dobije kartu u jednom pravcu za Hag.

[Eraserhead]

Da, Litvenko se slucajno otrovao polonijumom.

[Budja]

Da, Litvenko se slucajno otrovao polonijumom.

 

Nisam to rekao, rekao sam da je tesko konceptualizovati Litvinenka ili Berezovksog kao politicku zrtvu rezima.

[Ravanelli]

[barrcode]

Au kakav spektakularan meltdown.

 

-8%

Edited December 15, 2014 by barrcode

[Eraserhead]

Russia raises key rate to 17% (from 10.5%), effective Tuesday

 

 

:o

[Dagmar]

Sad treba neki unutrasnji prevrat zbacivanja Putina da bi im skinuli sankcije, kapiram da je dobra sansa nekom scenariju slicnom onome sa Milosevicem, bar bih se ja kladila na to u narednih nekoliko godina.

[hazard]

Sad treba neki unutrasnji prevrat zbacivanja Putina da bi im skinuli sankcije, kapiram da je dobra sansa nekom scenariju slicnom onome sa Milosevicem, bar bih se ja kladila na to u narednih nekoliko godina.

 

Slabe su sanse za to, osim ako se skroz ne raspadne ekonomija tamo...a nece dok im je nafte i gasa

[Dagmar]

Slabe su sanse za to, osim ako se skroz ne raspadne ekonomija tamo...a nece dok im je nafte i gasa

 

 

Tamo je jako usporen tok ozbiljnog novca - dok su se tajkuni kod nas bogatili i nastajali 90ih, i tek zaskripali krajem 90ih, ovo sto se sad desava sa Rusijom mora da izaziva velike potrese nekim jako bogatim ljudima tamo. Putin je ovim sankcijama izbio i izbija neke nezamislive pare lokalnim igracima.

[Lord Protector]

 

 

January/February 2015

REVIEW ESSAY

Generation Putin

What to Expect From Russia’s Future Leaders

Sarah E. Mendelson

No Illusions: The Voices of Russia’s Future Leaders. BY ELLEN MIcKIEWICZ. Oxford University Press, 2014, 

 

Twenty years ago, while working for the National Democratic Institute in Russia, I found myself observing a focus group in the town of Khimki, not far from Moscow. In a drab apartment, my colleagues and I strained to understand what local residents thought about candidates running in a by-election for the Russian parliament. It was a disorienting time, that early post-Soviet period, before the wars in Chechnya, the collapse of the ruble, and President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. But for some, it held a tantalizing hope: that Russia would ultimately transition to democracy. I, too, felt optimistic watching the men and women in that first group discussion. They seemed eager to debate the candidates’ relative merits and clearly relished their newfound political voice. 


In the decade and a half afterward, I observed dozens of Russian focus groups, in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a handful of other cities and towns. Each time, eight to ten randomly selected participants discussed critical players and moments in their country’s development. My colleagues and I then drew on their responses to conduct a series of nationally representative public opinion surveys. The results dimmed my initial optimism. For example, most respondents thought that Stalin had done more good than harm and were oblivious to the true scale of the purges that had occurred in the 1930s. Most expressed concern about the economic costs and the military casualties of the second war in Chechnya but were untroubled by the human rights abuses that took place. On the whole, the respondents felt ambivalent about democracy as an alternative to autocracy and often questioned whether Western-style liberalism was the best political system for Russia. 


In 2005 and 2007, we probed the views and aspirations of young men and women in their late teens and 20s—the Russian millennials. In Russian, they are best described as pokolenie Putina: “the Putin generation.” My colleagues and I wanted to know whether the trappings of Putin-era prosperity—cell phones, easy access to the Internet, foreign travel—had inspired these people to adopt more liberal values and a more international outlook than their parents held. The answer was no. Russian millennials wished to see their country restored as a hypersovereign power that would stand outside the Euro-Atlantic community and resist international legal norms. Most of them believed that Putin had set the country on the right path. They enthusiastically consumed the Kremlin’s steady diet of Soviet nostalgia, xenophobia, homophobia, and anti-Americanism. And the more educated they were, the more likely they were to hold anti-American views. 


As part of a broad crackdown on dissent after the eruption of antigovernment protests in 2011, Putin has managed to close nearly all space in which independent, critical voices can thrive. His government has also made it harder to conduct opinion surveys and focus groups of the kind we once organized, by restricting the ability of local organ­izations to collaborate with Western partners. The government now requires organizations that receive Western support or funding to register as “foreign agents,” an epithet that carries connotations of espionage and disloyalty. Such restrictions make Ellen Mickiewicz’s No Illusions a uniquely valuable piece of research. Mickiewicz had good timing: she conducted a series of focus groups with students at elite Russian universities in the spring of 2011. The following year, Putin began his third term as Russia’s president and, in July 2012, signed the foreign-agent legislation into law. 


Based on her exploration of the students’ views of their country, their president, the United States, democracy, and human rights, Mickiewicz sketches a portrait of contemporary Russia and imagines how its future leaders might shape its course. She finds these young people to be highly skeptical of politics and extremely passive. Their interests mainly center on completing their studies and landing good jobs in government agencies and leading private firms. They remain unmoved by the demands for greater freedom and dignity that brought young people to the streets in countries as diverse as Tunisia and Ukraine. Indeed, they share their president’s conviction that public protests do not occur spontaneously. In short, the rise of these aspiring new leaders looks likely to set back any prospect of a Russian democratic awakening by at least a generation. 


FOLLOW THE LEADER

The group discussions that form the core of Mickiewicz’s book took place 
in 12 sessions, each two hours long, conducted at three of Russia’s top educational institutions: Moscow State University, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, and the National Research University Higher School of Economics. Many of the 
108 student participants, in their last or next-to-last year of undergraduate study, are poised to enter the top echelons of the country’s public and private sectors. Tech savvy, well informed, and fluent in English, they represent a capable, if apolitical, crop of future technocrats. 


The comments these young men and women make at their roundtable discussions often betray the deep contradictions they contend with in their daily lives. They are disillusioned with the government but planning to serve it; critical of corrupt officials but unwilling to resist them; and intensely focused on the United States, a country they view as both Russia’s most dangerous adversary and its indispensable ally. One student, for example, faults the Russian authorities for aggravating social tensions but abhors the U.S. government even more—in fact, she is convinced that the United States could launch air strikes on Russia at any moment. Another cheers on Russian anticorruption activists but still plans to vote for the dominant political party, whose crooked practices these activists expose. Yet another criticizes Russia’s “ruling top” for hoarding resources but holds the West morally responsible for Russia’s runaway corruption and its citizens’ lack of trust in one another—problems that he thinks stem from Western assistance in reforming the Russian economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although these young people are patriotic and eager to change the system from the inside, they are more willing to accommodate the government than rebel against it. 


 

Putin spice latte: the Russian president's likeness in Moscow, February 2012 (Sergei Karpukhin / Courtesy Reuters)

 

Mickiewicz is best known for groundbreaking research she has conducted on the influence that Russian media wield over the country’s politics, and she pays particular attention to the role that mass media play in the lives of her subjects. Her book provides its most compelling insights when it dives deep into young Russians’ engagement with the Internet. Similar to elite millennials everywhere, these men and women live online and draw most of their information from news websites and social networking platforms. Although they watch state-controlled Channel One Russia on television, they recognize it as Kremlin propaganda—important to consider but, in the words of one student, “not worth trusting.” This skepticism extends to the government’s presence on the Internet. When then President Dmitry Medvedev started a blog in 2008, he impressed observers in the United States and Europe but failed to win the students’ attention. The future leaders ridicule his blog as nothing more than a public relations stunt; one of them even describes it as “generally idiotic.” 


The book includes many such insights. But the limitations of Mickiewicz’s research undermine the strength of her conclusions. It is sometimes difficult to know how much confidence to place in her assessments, given that Mickiewicz bases them on little more than 24 hours’ worth of conversations with preselected groups. She repeatedly defends her approach, arguing that the discussions offer a glimpse into how Russia’s future leaders will view the world. And yet, although focus groups yield valuable evidence, it is impossible to know whether the views expressed are representative of the entire cohort of young, educated Russians across the country. Only large random-sample surveys could have accomplished that. Mickiewicz claims that surveys would have yielded “vastly less information” than her focus groups. This is an odd proposition, especially because it suggests that Mickiewicz believes she had to choose between the two methods rather than letting them complement each other. 


HANDS-OFF EXPERIENCE

Mickiewicz’s approach might be imperfect, but it nevertheless provides a rare glimpse into how some young Russians think at a critical moment in Russia’s history. One of her most salient findings concerns their views on political activism and protest movements. Today, young people around the world—in Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and, most recently, Ukraine—have grown adept at using technology to pressure their governments for greater transparency and accountability. The combination of the Internet and affordable technologies has spawned organic citizen movements dedicated to combating corruption and abuses of power. 


But many of the future leaders profiled in No Illusions show little enthusiasm for such activism. They dismiss it by echoing a familiar Kremlin charge: antigovernment protests and demonstrations reflect the hidden hand of the United States. They simply do not believe that such protests could erupt without foreign sponsorship. Washington, the Russian students point out, has supported and funded many of the civil society groups that have taken part in pro-democracy uprisings in a few postcommunist countries over the past 15 years. To the students, such movements thus appear to be externally designed, to be illegitimate, and to represent a major threat to their country’s security. The fact that the United States has also funded several civil society organizations in Russia, such as the independent election-monitoring group Golos, only deepens their suspicions. The students call the United States a “competitor,” an “aggressor,” and, in Mickiewicz’s summary of their words, a “puppet-master everywhere in the world.” 


The focus groups took place just seven months before Russian citizens themselves poured into the streets in huge numbers to protest massive election fraud. The growing public discontent was met with a government backlash, including a drastic curtailment of the freedoms of assembly, speech, and association. Although Mickiewicz apparently did not follow up with any of her subjects to gauge their responses to those events, it is probably safe to assume that most of them felt at best ambivalent about the protest movement—and that few, if any, joined the anti-Putin demonstrators in their rallies. None of the roundtable discussions she describes suggests much passion for political activism. Rather, as Mickiewicz explains, the students accept that “change, if it comes, will come from the inside.”


In general, the students do seem attuned to the ferment underneath Russia’s surface in the spring of 2011, and many foresee the major clashes that it will soon spark. But this recognition does not translate into active political engagement. For example, several months before the student roundtables took place, environmental groups and anti-Putin activists launched peaceful demonstrations against the government’s plan to build a highway through a beloved forest in Khimki that forms part of the greenbelt around Moscow. The rallies met with violent resistance. One journalist researching corruption linked to the project was severely beaten by unidentified assailants and eventually died as a result of his injuries. Another barely survived a similar attack. In a stunning move, the government later bowed to the activists’ demands and suspended the project—a response that made the event an anomaly in contemporary Russian politics. Yet during their discussions, the students demonstrate surprisingly little interest in the issue; only six of the 108 mention it at all, and even then, they mostly discuss it in an unemotional, detached way. Only one young woman appears to be aware of the personal sacrifices the protesters made for their cause.


The students express greater concern over another story that captured headlines in late 2010: riots that exploded steps from the Kremlin and were organized by far-right, nationalist, and neo-Nazi groups. Transcripts of the roundtable discussions register the students’ dismay at the breakdown of order and the scale of the violence. But they show little awareness of the role that Putin’s pro-Russian, nationalist rhetoric and brutal tactics in the North Caucasus have played in enabling the rise of the ultra-right. Moreover, although the students oppose the neo-Nazis, they generally share their hostility toward ethnic minorities from the North Caucasus. “I will not trust, most of all, people of Caucasian ethnic groups,” one participant admits, articulating a commonly held view.


FRESH FACES, SAME AGENDA


In a sense, Mickiewicz has produced 
a collective biography of the class of people who are likely to inherit the system constructed by Putin, and who might one day find themselves at odds with the reform-minded activists who unsuccessfully challenged that system in recent years. These activists now seem either thoroughly outgunned or reduced to a spent force, especially in the wake of the post-protest crackdown and the explosion of pro-Kremlin sentiment brought on by Russia’s occupation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine. Today’s liberals appear unable to collaborate effectively or coordinate their actions. They have been joined by a few interesting new characters, such as the charismatic but xenophobic anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny. But the basic building blocks of a coherent platform for civic action continue to elude many protesters, as they clash with one another or form impractical ideological alliances. 


On the other hand, the very same risk aversion, self-centeredness, and detachment from politics that lead many of Mickiewicz’s elite subjects to support the status quo might someday work to the advantage of the activists. Although members of the anti-Kremlin opposition have failed to put much of a dent in Putin’s machine, they have learned a great deal about politics and developed precisely the kinds of leadership skills that seem to be lacking among the more conventional elites that formed Mickiewicz’s groups. 


One Russian millennial, in particular, provides an intriguing counterexample to the young people profiled in No Illusions: Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, better known as a member of the protest punk band Pussy Riot, who studied at Moscow State University at the same time as the students in Mickiewicz’s focus groups. Tolokonnikova was months away from completing her philosophy degree when she created the band in 2011. In February 2012, she took part in the band’s famous protest inside the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which led to her arrest (along with two other performers). She served 21 months in jail for her activism but has since resumed her campaign for democracy and human rights with renewed dedication. Tolokonnikova is hardly representative of her generation, but her story hints at the possibility of another future for Russia, one in which nonconformism, tolerance, and individualism become virtues rather than crimes.


The prospects for this future, however, appear remote, given that Russia’s new leadership will surely be composed of many of the young men and women No Illusions profiles. In fact, their rise to power seems likely to perpetuate the status quo. These new leaders might be patriotic and eager to right their country’s course, but even the most reform-minded among them will run up against the unscrupulous, inefficient, and inert nature of the government they will join. At best, they could become capable technocrats—skilled and broadly sympathetic to the inevitable waves of discontent that will rock Russia in the future, but unable, and often unwilling, to upend the ruling establishment. It will take a major systemic shock to break this deadlock—a shock more powerful than either Russia’s current opposition or its aspiring leaders might be able to generate. Until then, Russia’s future rulers can only hope that their elite education has prepared them for the country that Putin, one day, will leave behind.

Edited December 15, 2014 by slow