Толстый и тонкий

[Prospero]

Mislim da je ovo prilično dobra analiza budućeg (i donekle trenutnog) ponašanja Rusije:

 

Russia’s New National Strategy

 

Posted by: DMITRI TRENINFRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 2014

 

Amid the ongoing crisis over Ukraine, the Kremlin has adopted a new national strategy that crystallizes trends that have been gaining ground in Russia over the past two years. This development goes beyond the current crisis in Russian-Western relations and has important consequences for Russia’s neighbors, especially the EU.

Essentially, the Kremlin sees Russia’s future as separate from the rest of Europe’s. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a Greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, cold-shouldered by many in the EU, has now been finally withdrawn by its author. Instead, Russia will largely rely on its own resources as it seeks to develop its economy, consolidate its political system, and build a strong military.

 

Russia’s development model will not be autarkic, but neither will it rely too much on exploiting the fruits of globalization. Recent sanctions against it have taught Moscow that these fruits can suddenly grow sour. Instead, Russia will be in the business of import substitution industrialization, promoting domestic agricultural production, and seeking to create a measure of financial autonomy.

 

The defense industry has long been designated the prime vehicle of industrial and technological innovation. Its main mission, however, will be completing Russia’s military modernization by equipping the country’s armed forces with a wide range of usable instruments of power, both for home defense and force projection.

 

Confrontation with the West—especially over economic sanctions and information warfare against Russia—has given Russian patriotism a powerful boost. Now, Moscow’s task at hand is to consolidate the bulk of Russian society on the basis of this platform, thus cementing national unity. Those few who disagree would be putting themselves beyond the pale as foreign agents.

 

Positive national consolidation will be achieved through the Kremlin’s promotion of traditional values. These include the overriding importance of the state; moral and spiritual guidance provided by established religious organizations, with the Orthodox Church playing a salient role; the sanctity of the traditional family; and peaceful cohabitation of different ethnic groups throughout the country.

 

Crimea, in this context, is simultaneously a symbol of Russia’s national unity across ideological divides and a sign of the country’s newly discovered capacity to push back against its competitors. Once reintegrated into Russia, Crimea will not be abandoned under any circumstances. To make this absolutely clear, the Russian military garrison on the peninsula is being beefed up. NATO, which is now positioning its forces closer to the Russian border, is again designated as a likely adversary.

 

In pursuing its new foreign policy, Russia will be firm but patient and cautious. Moscow's agricultural countersanctions against the West have hit a number of Central and Eastern European countries hard. At the same time, Russia will continue to avoid an open armed conflict with the United States and NATO, particularly in Ukraine.

 

Russia should not be expected to give up on Ukraine, but it can and will change tactics and strategy in its long game there. Moscow may shift its attention from the insurgency in the east to more political issues, in view of Ukraine’s forthcoming parliamentary elections, and economic priorities, as winter approaches.

 

Globally, Moscow will be building alliances with non-Western countries to diminish U.S. hegemony. China stands out as a premier partner, with Russia supplying it with more energy and more advanced military technology, while seeking cash and investment in return. India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, among others, are also being eyed by Moscow with enhanced interest.

 

Russia is joining forces with the non-West, but it will not seek to undercut the United States in the areas where U.S. actions do not harm Russian interests, for example, in Afghanistan or Iraq. Unlike in the wake of 9/11, however, Moscow—while having no sympathy whatsoever for Islamist extremists—will point its finger at Washington’s policies as the root cause of regional instability from Libya to Iraq.

 

Russia will also feel free to withdraw from international treaties and agreements if it concludes that they no longer serve its national interests. In particular, this may apply to the 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned both countries from having a whole class of missile systems, but left the rest of the world free to arm itself with them. Likewise, Russian participation in the European Court of Human Rights is in danger: Moscow considers the court to be too politicized. Neither decision has been taken yet, but warnings have been served.

 

Moscow is not completely ignoring Europe, but its European connection has been downgraded more severely than any other relationship. The Russians have been bitterly disappointed by the EU twice in the past six months. First, by France,Germany, and Poland failing to uphold the February 21 agreement they had brokered in Kiev between Viktor Yanukovych and the Ukrainian opposition. Second, by the EU aligning itself with the United States and imposing sectoral sanctions against Russia following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which both America and Europe blamed on Russia even in the absence of irrefutable evidence.

 

Given all this, the Kremlin will have even less reason than before to abstain from reaching out to individual EU member states: European unity today means Europe’s solidarity with the United States against Moscow. At the same time, it knows that Europe wants an end to violence in Ukraine more than Kiev’s military victory there. It further understands that the Europeans would want some cooperation with the Russians on Ukraine, as early as this coming winter. This promises a lively relationship, even if a highly transactional and competitive one.

[Lord Protector]

D. Trenin (uz N.Gvozdeva) ima najobjektivnije tekstove o Rusiji

Edited August 27, 2014 by slow

[Lord Protector]

[Roger Sanchez]

МОСКВА, 29 августа. /ИТАР-ТАСС/. Министерство юстиции РФ внесло в список некоммерческих организаций, выполняющих функции иностранного агента, фонд "Института развития свободы информации" и правозащитную организацию "Солдатские матери Санкт-Петербурга". Об этом сегодня ИТАР-ТАСС сообщили в пятницу в ведомстве.

Минюст предложил запретить чиновникам участие в НКО со статусом иностранного агента

"В соответствии с Федеральным законом "О некоммерческих организациях" в реестр некоммерческих организаций, выполняющих функции иностранного агента, внесены сведения о Фонде "Института развития свободы информации" и о Санкт-Петербургской региональной общественной правозащитной организации "Солдатские матери Санкт-Петербурга" на основании представлений прокуратуры Санкт-Петербурга", - сообщили в ведомстве.

E, da se toga Slobo sjetijo..

[Veletin]

Выступление Владимира Путина на молодежном форуме «Селигер-2014»

Edited August 29, 2014 by Veletin

[Filipenko]

Mislim da ovde i dalje radi

 

 

 

 

Fantastičan nastup. Rusi i Ukrajinci su jedna nacija, ovo je zajednička tragedija koju moramo zaustaviti, a nastupi studenata ujedaju za srce. Od devojaka koje se zahvaljuju u ime svojih baka tatara što je Krim objedinjen sa Majkom, preko momka koji u suzama moli predsednika da dozvoli pristup vojnim dosijeima o njegovom dedi, heroju Sovjetskog Saveza, koji unuku ništa o sebi nije pričao pa on sad želi da sazna sve o njemu, do priče o natalitetu, razvoju Krima, subvencija za poljoprivredu, priče o tome kako mali deo Ukrajinaca nasrće poput nacista na gradove, lika iz Dagestana koji ga poziva da nakon što okonča mandat dođe da vodi Dagestan, podele na republike donore i subsidirane republike, kako svi trebaju da se bore da budu u prvoj grupi pa će državi biti bolje...

 

Zaigralo mi srce, a ja znam da je sve izrežirano i namešteno. Mogu misliti kako je slabije upućenima :)

 

P.S. a omakne se par puta studentariji da lupi nešto usput, poput "meni su dali da vas pitam ovo pitanje" ili "tražili su da vas pitam..." - mora to da se oštrije disciplinuje

[Veletin]

.

 

Zaigralo mi srce, a ja znam da je sve izrežirano i namešteno. Mogu misliti kako je slabije upućenima :)

 

 

 

 

i ono molodec, molodec , onom mladom šegadžiji.

 

pa ko ne bi poželeo ovakvog predsednika.

[Filipenko]

i ono molodec, molodec , onom mladom šegadžiji.

 

pa ko ne bi poželeo ovakvog predsednika.

 

 

Ja ga ne bih poželeo. U više navrata je pričao o komunistima u negativnom kontekstu. Od boljševika koji su tobože želeli da zemlja propadne u WW1 za razliku od patriota, preko osude Staljina, do kritike jednopartijskog sistema i komunizma kao kočničara sveopšteg napretka Rusije (naspram silnog napretka u ranijim vekovima). Da ne ulazim u gomilu groznih interpretacija, mera i opaski sa kojima se apsolutno ne slažem.

 

No, daj šta daš. Ali mi je potpuno neverovatno da nekoga ko ovako govori na zapadu masovno optužuju da želi da "obnovi Sovjetski Savez"

 

P.S. ovo sve je samo danas govorio, ne ulazim u to šta inače govori kojekuda.

[Prospero]

To što je tragediju Lenjingrada 1941-44. uporedio sa pozicijom Donjecka i Luganska 2014. je poprilična odvratnost.

 

Štaviše, to što mu je stariji brat koga nikad nije upoznao umor u opsadi od difterije čini ovaj populistički egzibicionizam još luđim. 

[Filipenko]

Ne bih se složio. Sasvim je u pravu kada govori o tome, jer su aspekti vrlo slični. I u Lenjingradu nemačka armija nije imala dovoljno trupa za konačni udar, pošto je komanda Vermahta stalno oduzimala jedinice iz severne grupe da popunjava i ojačava centralnu i južnu grupu, i onda su se nemački divljaci odlučili na besomučno granatiranje, što je taktika veoma slična taktici ratnog zločinca Porošenka, a koja je pak razvijena po njegovom priznanju u saradnji sa Nato instruktorima.

 

To što takvo sistematsko uništavanje infrakstrukture i ljudi i naredbe za besomučnim granatiranjem ne izdaje stranac nego domaćin™ samo doprinosi da analogija bude još šokantnija po svojoj ispravnosti, a nikako netačna. Naravno, meni je drago što analogija nije sasvim ispravna u tom kontekstu što su građani Lenjingrada doživeli najstrašnije užase, uključujući neizrecivu glad i kanibalizam kome su morali da pribegnu da bi preživeli.

 

 

Videćemo šta će doneti opsade Mariupolja, sutra možda Dnjepropetrovska, Zaporožja, Harkova, Odese, Krivog Roga, Poltave, a zašto ne i Kijeva.

[Anduril]

 

Russian nationalism and the logic of the Kremlin's actions on Ukraine

Analysis: Putin’s motivations are best understood by looking at the political pressures he faces at home, writes Henry E Hale

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• Henry E Hale for the Carnegie Forum on Rebuilding US-Russia Relations
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• theguardian.com, Friday 29 August 2014 13.53 BST
• Jump to comments (198)

Russian president Vladimir Putin in Yalta, Crimea, this month. Photograph: Sergei Chirikov/EPA

It is not very productive to interpret the current international situation as a new cold war or to see Russia’s Vladimir Putin as a Russian Hitler bent on reconstituting the USSR at all costs.

The cold war was driven in substantial part by competing ideologies of world scope. Putin does not aim to take over Europe, much less the world, and has no ideology like communism that portends to global dominance.

Commentators often now refer to Putin as a “nationalist” leader and, to be sure, he is riding high on a surge of nationalist sentiment following the annexation of Crimea. These interpretations, however, are often overly simplistic and misunderstand major features of Russian nationalism.

Two kinds of nationalism

Perhaps most importantly, there are different types of Russian nationalism and these types do not always fit together comfortably.

One type defines “Russian” very broadly to include all of the peoples and religious groups that have traditionally lived in the territory of the former USSR or before that, the Russian Empire. The key call of these nationalists is to reintegrate the territory of the former Soviet states.

A second type of nationalism is a much more exclusive and even racist ethnic Russian nationalism, one committed to a pure Russia free of “polluting” peoples of other ethnicities, or at least those who are not Slavic. The key call of these nationalists is to prevent immigration of unwanted groups and, for some, to bring Russians or Slavs “stranded” abroad back into the Russian state’s domain.

Crimea hits the “sweet spot” for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian majority that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation.

Both forms of nationalism have substantial support in Russia, but they are in deep tension with each other. The nationalism of restoring the USSR would mean bringing into Russia and its major cities many of the very people whom the ethnic nationalists want to kick out, especially Islamic non-Slavs from former Soviet countries like Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Moreover, some of the ethnic nationalists would even prefer a smaller, purer Russia to a larger more diverse one — for example, a Russia without the Islamic parts of the troubled North Caucasus region — a vision once famously articulated by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

Crimea

Crimea hits the “sweet spot” for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian majority that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation. Beyond this, territorial expansion starts to become more complicated politically for Putin, potentially inflaming ethnically exclusive Russian nationalists. Unrest in recent years has shown the latter can take to the streets in substantial numbers, often violently.

While Putin has not advocated reconquering former Soviet territory and in fact has said that anyone who wants to restore the USSR “has no brain,” he has generally been closer to the first, more inclusive brand of nationalism than the second, ethnically exclusive sort.

Some have examined Putin’s language (especially in his speech after the Crimea annexation in March 2014) and concluded that he has switched to the more ethnically exclusive variety, noting his calls to serve Russians by using the term russkie instead of the more inclusive term rossiiskie to refer to them.

Pro-Kremlin activists rally at the Red Square in Moscow in March to celebrate the incorporation of Crimea. Photograph: Dmitry Serebryakov/AFP/Getty Images

This shift in rhetoric should not be overblown. Even the term russkie can be used in an inclusive sense. A March 2013 survey organised by the University of Oslo’s NEORUSS project thus found that when people used the term russkie (as in “Russia for the Russians”), only 39% actually meant just ethnic Russians. Another 30%t had in mind certain other groups when using the term and 25% interpreted it to refer to all citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of ethnicity.

Putin is trying to walk the tightrope between Russia’s two forms of nationalism, hoping he does not have to pick a side.

Anti-European?

Mainstream Russian nationalism is also often misunderstood as being anti-European. Marlene Laruelle’s research, among that of others, has shown that this is simply not the case. Putin reflects major strains of nationalism in which Russians see themselves as being part of Europe, just having a different vision as to what Europe is and represents, and what place Russia has in it.

Putin’s actions in Ukraine are best understood through the lens of his domestic political considerations. Russia is not a simple dictatorship in which whatever he says goes, no matter what

In light of all this, Putin’s actions in Ukraine are best understood through the lens of his domestic political considerations. Russia is not a simple dictatorship in which whatever he says goes, no matter what. Stability there depends heavily on public support for the leadership. The USSR and eastern Central Europe show that control over media cannot by itself generate support for a regime.

This is why events in Ukraine posed such a danger to Putin. With his regime’s popular support dropping since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, massive protests erupted in Moscow in late 2011 that he and his associates clearly perceived as a major threat to their political survival. They regrouped, found new bases of support, and went on the offensive against protest leaders.

The protests faded. But suddenly, demonstrators in next-door Ukraine succeeded in toppling Viktor Yanukovych, a leader openly backed by Putin, opening up the possibility that Russia’s own protest movement could be revived. And there was also the possibility that Putin could lose the faith of his current supporters by appearing helpless to protect his ally, not to mention Russian-oriented populations in Ukraine’s East who feared the revolution would not serve their interests. All this could have served as fodder for challenges from both the liberal and nationalist segments of society.

A dangerous position

Putin’s move in Crimea and the subsequent efforts to destabilise eastern Ukraine can be seen as an attempt to overturn the chessboard when the arrangement of pieces is no longer favourable, forcing a new game with different rules. By hitting the nationalist sweet spot with Crimea, and being fortunate in that it was pulled off largely without bloodshed, Putin benefited from a powerful rally-around-the-flag effect. That, and the destabilisation of the rest of Ukraine, also nicely fit a narrative Putin has long been weaving that revolutions — and protests that might develop into them — are fraught with the danger of state failure and territorial dismemberment. These are messages that serve him well at home, at least, for now.

Nationalist surges and rally-around-the-flag effects do not last forever. Putin is currently in a very dangerous situation that could lead him in any number of directions. Failure to move further in expanding Russian territory will disappoint some nationalists who now offer him their full-throated support. But actually attempting to bring unwilling populations under Russian control by force will cause other problems, including unrest within newly occupied territories and dissatisfaction at home among those who want an ethnically purer Russia. Even in Russia’s North Caucasus, it cannot fully control its own territory and stamp out a stubborn insurgency.

None of this provides a clear recipe for what the international community should do moving forward. The annexation of the territory of an unwilling state does threaten to create a troubling new precedent that must be resisted and that cannot be allowed to pass without cost to the violator. But we must understand how Russian politics and Russian nationalism actually work before we can confidently recommend courses of action that impose appropriate costs yet create incentives for future cooperation.

Henry E Hale is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and co-director of PONARS Eurasia

[Filipenko]

Studentarija je inače juče postavljala pitanja Putinu vezano za integraciju sa Kazahstanom, "koja ne bi trebala biti toliko problematična jer zemlja uprkos velikom prostoru ima svega 15-ak miliona stanovnika, od čega četvrtinu Rusa", na šta je Putin odgovorio da poštuje svog partnera, predsednika Kazahstana Nazarbajeva, koji je osmislio i projekat Evroazijske Unije.

[Eraserhead]

When Austrian transvestite Conchita Wurst won this year’s Eurovision song contest, many considered her triumph to be a victory for the LGBT community worldwide. However, while much western social media was awash with congratulatory support, with celebrities from Boy George to Lady Gaga sending Wurst messages of solidarity, the picture that emerged in Russia was more than a little different. Wurst was lambasted as a sign of the west’s moral decay, with one politician denouncing Wurst’s victory as “the end of Europe”. The schism between her reception in Russia and the west laid bare important cultural differences.

[apostata]

How to Solve the Putin Problem
 
(...)
 
That’s why the objective of our sanctions strategy should be to get the Russians who’ve been keeping Putin in power, or tolerating Putin in power, to throw that knockout punch.
The key to forcing these Russians to act, and thus to making the sanctions strategy succeed, will be to rapidly widen the gap that already exists between their financial interests and Putin’s political ambitions.
 
(...)
 
All they care about are their yachts, their private jets, and the blonde-bombshell-shopoholic mistresses they stash at their multi-million-dollar condos in London, New York, and on the Riviera, and like to flash around at swishy restaurants.
Are they really willing to give up all this for -- Donetsk?  Or for Riga, or Tallinn?  Are you kidding?
That’s why the sanctions will work if the president and his European counterparts will keep tightening the screws; if they keep making commerce more difficult for Russia’s serious business executives, for instance by blocking their access to capital, and if they keep making life more miserable for Russia’s playboy oligarchs, for instance by canceling their credit cards and denying landing rights to their private jets.  And if the president and European leaders keep telling these Russians -- bluntly and publicly -- that all this will end the moment Vladimir Putin leaves the Kremlin for good.

(...)
 
Simply put, we should make clear to the Russian business executives and oligarchs who are the target of Western sanctions that Putin is their problem, not ours.  These people may lack the spark of political genius or the high-minded patriotism that drove our country’s Founding Fathers -- but they aren’t stupid. 
It won’t be long before a bunch of them get together for a quiet conversation -- perhaps in a Moscow board room, more likely on a yacht anchored off the Cote d’Azur -- to, um, decide what might be best for Russia’s future.
 
Since subtlety doesn’t work with Russians, the president and his European counterparts should also make absolutely clear that we have no interest whatever in how these people solve their Putin problem. 
If they can talk good old Vladimir into leaving the Kremlin with full military honors and a 21-gun salute -- that would be fine with us. 
If Putin is too too stubborn to acknowledge that his career is over, and the only way to get him out of the Kremlin is feet-first, with a bullet hole in the back of his head -- that would also be okay with us.
 
Nor would we object to a bit of poetic justice.... For instance, if the next time Putin’s flying back to Moscow from yet another visit with his good friends in Cuba, or Venezuela, or Iran, his airplane gets blasted out of the sky by some murky para-military group that somehow, inexplicably, got its hands on a surface-to-air missile.

Herbert E. Meyer 
 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/08/how_to_solve_the_putin_problem.html

 

 

Herbert E. Meyer is a leading authority on the strategic use of intelligence. He is founder and President of Real-World Intelligence Inc., the world's leading designer of Intelligence Systems for business worldwide. During the Reagan Administration Mr. Meyer served as Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence and Vice Chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. In these positions he managed production of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimates and other top-secret projections for the President and his national security advisers. Mr. Meyer is widely credited with being the first senior U.S. government official to forecast the Soviet Union's collapse. He later was awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, which is the Intelligence Community's highest honor.
As an acknowledged authority on the process and techniques of writing, Mr. Meyer's career includes his being a journalist, an author, and a business entrepreneur.

Edited August 31, 2014 by apostata

[dillinger]

Kakvi paramilitarci, taj zadatak treba poveriti Poljacima kad ih Putin bude nadletao idući na neku obljetnicu iz WW2 na zapadu.(hint: Kačinski)