Толстый и тонкий

[bigvlada]

Dobro, znaci zakljucio si da su Britanci ustvari lopovi, da im je hiljadugodisnji pravni sistem shit a da je City poseban pakao.

A sta kazes recimo za Moskvu, inace tema ovog topika?

Kako se tamosnji pravni i finansijski sistem kotira u poredjenju sa ovim gore?

 

[Muwan]

Ja bih se uzdržao i od toga da najviše krivice bacim pred američke noge.

 

Postoje složeni odnosi koji uključuju i reigijske i etničke elemente, nasleđe kolonijalnih granica, distribuciju resursa, dinastička pitanja, što su sve u suštini destabilizacioni faktori, na koje su se tek nakačili spoljni igrači zadnjih decenija, dominantno SAD i u manjij i vremenski kraćoj meri SSSR, s tim da je ovaj drugi faktor naravno nepostojeći zadnjih 25 godina, i onda dođe Eras i kaže KABOOM - Rusi dominantno destabilizuju region.

 

Slažem se skroz. Možemo da kažemo da se Amerika u datim okolnostima snašla bolje ili lošije, ajde neka bude i da su se snašli potpuno katastrofalno ali taman da su odigrali najbolje i najkonstruktivnije to opet ne znači da bi u regionu danas cvetalo cveće i svi se grlili ispod duge.

 

Kada sam postavio pitanje Andurilu nisam uopšte hteo da insinuiram postojanje jednog, isključivog krivca. Pitanje je bilo kako se ovakav megahaos može pripisati Kremlju? (ili Vašingtonu, ili Downing Stu, ili bilo kome pojedinačno) Tek iza toga bi eventualno došlo pitanje poput: "OK, ajde da vidimo ukupan učinak Kremlja u regionu tokom prethodnih 20 godina, pa da ga sravnamo sa učinkom drugih velikih igrača, pa da vidimo da li su kremaljski režimi ti koji dominantno izvoze nestabilnost po svetu".

 

Možda bismo se složili, verovatno ne bismo, ali u svakom slučaju sada nema svrhe to počinjati jer je Eras lansirao ICBM i to je to.

[frn1782]

Americki intervencionizam inace svuda donosi blagostanje pa bi bilo mnogo bolje da se Rusi nisu mesali u Siriji.

Irak milion zrtava posle okupacije, Afganistan br. telefonskih prikljucaka smanjen na par hiljada nakon okupacije a o Libiji gde su Rusi bas saradjivali da ne govorimo kako cveta demokratija.

[Аврам Гојић]

[Eraserhead]

Russians tighten their belts for a great cause

 

Salary cuts and wage arrears but few signs of social unrest, writes Julia Ioffe

 

This week, Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed to freeze oil production at current levels in an attempt to halt the collapse in oil prices, which have pulled the Russian economy down with them. But the announcement did not give oil prices the bump that the Kremlin hoped for: the freeze is contingent on Iran and Iraq doing the same, which the former, fresh out of its sanctions prison, has very little incentive to do. And without oil prices rising, and doing so dramatically, there will be no end to Russia’s economic crisis .

 

As oil prices more than quadrupled in the first decade of Vladimir Putin’s rule, his spending ticked up along with it, although there was no investment in the kind of structural changes that could have assured Russia’s long-term economic health and resilience. By August 2012, when the federal budget was pegged to oil at $100 a barrel, the ministry of economic development calculated that the country would be in crisis should oil fall to $80 per barrel. Today, that price would be the answer to Mr Putin’s prayers.

 

So what happens now to the lavish social spending that the Kremlin has overpromised on? And what about the expensive military gambit in Syria?

Many in the west are hoping that Russia’s economic decline will do the work of stopping Mr Putin in the Middle East for them. But that is unlikely to happen, for the intervention does not seem to cost all that much. According to one recent report, all those planes and bombs over Latakia and Aleppo cost just $8m a day. The cost for the year would be $3bn. Even with overruns — the original Kremlin estimate had been $1.2bn — it is still a small fraction of Russia’s overall military budget of $44bn.

 

Far more likely is that, as Russia’s economic crisis deepens, it will be the social spending that takes the hit. In fact, this is already happening, though it is being done gradually, with the Kremlin tapping into Russia’s other natural resource: its citizens’ legendary reservoirs of patience and capacity to grind on, even as things fall apart around them.

 

In the past year, prices for basic food necessities have spiked dramatically: 42 per cent inflation for grain, 40 per cent for sugar and 31 per cent for sunflower oil. Pensions no longer pretend to keep up with rising inflation, while salary cuts and wage arrears are becoming increasingly common. Yet there are few hints of social unrest. Most Russians are adjusting. In response to rising food prices, for example, people are simply spending more time grocery shopping and looking for bargains.

 

Television does the rest of the work. Russians hear very little about the economic crisis in the media, which concentrate on what their leadership is doing on the world stage: Orthodox Patriarch Kirill sitting down for a historic meeting with the Pope or Russian fighter jets taking out terrorists in Syria.

On a recent trip to Russia, I was asked many times about how badly the US economy is hurting, while people did not seem particularly rattled by the gloomy domestic outlook. According to a recent poll by the independent Levada Center, just 21 per cent of Russians expect economic protests, and even fewer (10 per cent) say they would participate if they were to break out.

 

When the US and the EU announced their first round of sanctions in 2014, Dmitry Rogozin, the deputy prime minister, said that Russians have always been willing to suffer for a great cause. He was referring to the annexation of Crimea — portrayed in Russia as the righting of a major historical wrong — but his remarks could apply just as easily to Moscow’s campaign in Syria.

 

Russia sees itself as doing the hard work of protecting Judeo-Christian civilisation from Islamist radicals, and as the sole actor capable of bringing the warring sides to the negotiating table. This is a role Russians seem to enjoy, especially after the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil, poverty and reduced geopolitical status that followed. Russians, like Americans, like to live in a superpower, but are far more willing to pay for it.

In his third term, Mr Putin’s priority is to project power abroad. The propaganda apparatus helps him to do so, keeping public unrest at bay as money is spent on sorties in Syria instead of on pensions or the decaying healthcare infrastructure. In the 2016 budget, social spending has been slashed and military spending given a boost; the two are now basically equal.

 

Take another costly Russian intervention: Afghanistan in 1979. As that conflict ground on, the Soviet economy, hobbled by other factors, nosedived. Basic goods became scarce and productivity floundered as citizens spent hours waiting in line for whatever canned goods or motley clothing became available. Yet it was not the queues that ended the Soviet war in Afghanistan. And it was not Afghanistan or bread lines that brought the Soviet Union down. That was the work of a group of Soviet princes headed by Boris Yeltsin who carved up the country. And Russians tolerated that, too, accepting it with little unrest. They had already tightened their belts for a great cause. Why not this one, too?

 

The writer is a columnist for Foreign Policy

 

[porucnik vasic]

 

Russians tighten their belts for a great cause

 

Salary cuts and wage arrears but few signs of social unrest, writes Julia Ioffe

 

This week, Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed to freeze oil production at current levels in an attempt to halt the collapse in oil prices, which have pulled the Russian economy down with them. But the announcement did not give oil prices the bump that the Kremlin hoped for: the freeze is contingent on Iran and Iraq doing the same, which the former, fresh out of its sanctions prison, has very little incentive to do. And without oil prices rising, and doing so dramatically, there will be no end to Russia’s economic crisis .

 

As oil prices more than quadrupled in the first decade of Vladimir Putin’s rule, his spending ticked up along with it, although there was no investment in the kind of structural changes that could have assured Russia’s long-term economic health and resilience. By August 2012, when the federal budget was pegged to oil at $100 a barrel, the ministry of economic development calculated that the country would be in crisis should oil fall to $80 per barrel. Today, that price would be the answer to Mr Putin’s prayers.

 

So what happens now to the lavish social spending that the Kremlin has overpromised on? And what about the expensive military gambit in Syria?

Many in the west are hoping that Russia’s economic decline will do the work of stopping Mr Putin in the Middle East for them. But that is unlikely to happen, for the intervention does not seem to cost all that much. According to one recent report, all those planes and bombs over Latakia and Aleppo cost just $8m a day. The cost for the year would be $3bn. Even with overruns — the original Kremlin estimate had been $1.2bn — it is still a small fraction of Russia’s overall military budget of $44bn.

 

Far more likely is that, as Russia’s economic crisis deepens, it will be the social spending that takes the hit. In fact, this is already happening, though it is being done gradually, with the Kremlin tapping into Russia’s other natural resource: its citizens’ legendary reservoirs of patience and capacity to grind on, even as things fall apart around them.

 

In the past year, prices for basic food necessities have spiked dramatically: 42 per cent inflation for grain, 40 per cent for sugar and 31 per cent for sunflower oil. Pensions no longer pretend to keep up with rising inflation, while salary cuts and wage arrears are becoming increasingly common. Yet there are few hints of social unrest. Most Russians are adjusting. In response to rising food prices, for example, people are simply spending more time grocery shopping and looking for bargains.

 

Television does the rest of the work. Russians hear very little about the economic crisis in the media, which concentrate on what their leadership is doing on the world stage: Orthodox Patriarch Kirill sitting down for a historic meeting with the Pope or Russian fighter jets taking out terrorists in Syria.

On a recent trip to Russia, I was asked many times about how badly the US economy is hurting, while people did not seem particularly rattled by the gloomy domestic outlook. According to a recent poll by the independent Levada Center, just 21 per cent of Russians expect economic protests, and even fewer (10 per cent) say they would participate if they were to break out.

 

When the US and the EU announced their first round of sanctions in 2014, Dmitry Rogozin, the deputy prime minister, said that Russians have always been willing to suffer for a great cause. He was referring to the annexation of Crimea — portrayed in Russia as the righting of a major historical wrong — but his remarks could apply just as easily to Moscow’s campaign in Syria.

 

Russia sees itself as doing the hard work of protecting Judeo-Christian civilisation from Islamist radicals, and as the sole actor capable of bringing the warring sides to the negotiating table. This is a role Russians seem to enjoy, especially after the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil, poverty and reduced geopolitical status that followed. Russians, like Americans, like to live in a superpower, but are far more willing to pay for it.

In his third term, Mr Putin’s priority is to project power abroad. The propaganda apparatus helps him to do so, keeping public unrest at bay as money is spent on sorties in Syria instead of on pensions or the decaying healthcare infrastructure. In the 2016 budget, social spending has been slashed and military spending given a boost; the two are now basically equal.

 

Take another costly Russian intervention: Afghanistan in 1979. As that conflict ground on, the Soviet economy, hobbled by other factors, nosedived. Basic goods became scarce and productivity floundered as citizens spent hours waiting in line for whatever canned goods or motley clothing became available. Yet it was not the queues that ended the Soviet war in Afghanistan. And it was not Afghanistan or bread lines that brought the Soviet Union down. That was the work of a group of Soviet princes headed by Boris Yeltsin who carved up the country. And Russians tolerated that, too, accepting it with little unrest. They had already tightened their belts for a great cause. Why not this one, too?

 

The writer is a columnist for Foreign Policy

 

 

Кад ће и тај Путин да попасе робију. Толике милијарде покрао...

[apostata]

Кадыров: "мое время на посту главы Чечни прошло"

http://ria.ru/politics/20160227/1381183464.html

[Аврам Гојић]

Bljuberi Hil!

 

[Prospero]

Суд выносит Савченко обвинительный приговор

 

11:1021.03.2016

 (обновлено: 

 

 

Cуд признал украинскую летчицу виновной в гибели российских журналистов ВГТРК, а также в незаконном пересечении границы Российской Федерации.

 

 

МОСКВА, 21 мар — РИА Новости. Донецкий суд Ростовской области выносит украинской военнослужащей Надежде Савченко обвинительный приговор, передает корреспондент РИА Новости из зала суда.

 

 

Cуд признал Савченко виновной в гибели российских журналистов  ВГТРК, а также в незаконном пересечении границы Российской Федерации.

"Савченко совершила убийство по предварительному сговору группой лиц по мотивам ненависти и вражды", — огласил решение судья.

 

Мотивом совершенных Савченко преступлений послужила ненависть по отношению к социальной группе жителей Луганской области, а также русскоязычным людям в целом, говорится в приговоре.

Чтение приговора продолжается.

По версии следствия, Савченко 17 июня 2014 вела корректировку артиллерийского огня по блокпосту луганских ополченцев в районе поселка Металлист, где находились мирные граждане, в том числе трое корреспондентов ВГТРК. Двое из них, Игорь Корнелюк и Антон Волошин, при обстреле погибли.

 

Прокуратура требовала приговорить Савченко к 23 годам лишения свободы, адвокаты и подсудимая настаивали на ее невиновности

 

Ruski sud je osudio N. Savčenko za smrt dva ruska novinara u junu 2014. u Ukrajini, jer je, prema presudi, bila korektor artiljerijske vatre od čije granate su ovi poginuli. Plus za nelegalni prelazak granice.

 

High profile case, videćemo političke reakcije sa strane.

Edited March 21, 2016 by Prospero

[borris_]

Ima na internetu clanak koji dokazuje (prema snimcima telefona) da je bila uhapsena prije ubistva ovih novinara i da nije mogla ucestvovati u tom bombardovanju.

[Prospero]

Ma dobro, smrdi na klasičan show trial

[Prospero]

:(
 
 

Организация «СтопХам» исключена из Единого государственного реестра юридических лиц, сообщается на сайте ЕГРЮЛ. Данное решение вступило в силу по решению суда 21 марта текущего года.

«СтопХам» как юрлицо был зарегистрирован в ГУ Минюста по Москве, и сведения о нем содержатся в ведомственном реестре зарегистрированных некоммерческих организаций, рассказали порталу «Фонтанка.ру» в пресс-службе Минюста России.
В ведомстве подчеркнули, что при проведении федерального государственного контроля управление «выявило в деятельности организации неоднократные грубые нарушения законодательства». После этого в 2015 году ГУ столичного Минюста обратилось в Московский городской суд с заявлением о ликвидации организации, а также об исключении сведений о ней из ЕГРЮЛ.

Исковые требования ведомства были удовлетворены судом 12 октября 2015 года. Решение обжаловано не было. После этого сведения об организации были исключены из ЕГРЮЛ в порядке, предусмотренном действующим законодательством РФ.

 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfiRFf1XOAg

[Pontijak]

kad vidim ove kretenoide u automobilima postaje mi jasno zasto se srblji toliko prze na ruse, slicno se slicnom raduje

[palikaris]

samo sto u srbiji nema sanse da bi neko imao muda da ovako postupa sa mandrilima

[Prospero]

čarobni štapić prezidenta...
 

Apr 15, 8:22 AM EDT

PROBLEMS FIXED ALL OVER RUSSIA AFTER APPEALS ON PUTIN'S SHOW
BY NATALIYA VASILYEVA
ASSOCIATED PRESS


MOSCOW (AP) -- In just one day, roads of a Siberian city were repaired, swindled fishery workers got wads of cash and a child prodigy was invited to go to a Crimean summer camp. One thing made it possible: President Vladimir Putin's Thursday call-in show where distressed Russians brought their problems to the leader.

Putin's annual television show has evolved in the past decade from a no-frills call-in program to a four-hour marathon with callers pleading for help and television crews going live from far-flung outposts.

And for one day, things get done.

In the first call, a resident of the Siberian city of Omsk complained about the state of the roads. Within hours, officials in Omsk reported that they had already got down to repairing the road. By Friday morning, the local government reported that it was repairing roads in all of the city's districts all day and night. Television footage Friday morning showed road workers briskly laying asphalt.

In the Far Eastern city of Birobidzhan, all it took was a recorded video appeal to Putin about the lack of an indoor skating rink for local officials to start scrambling: the governor told local media he would be meeting the boys on Friday to "personally find out what issues the young athletes face."

In arguably the most gut-wrenching complaint, a group of fishery workers told Putin via a video-link from the island of Sakhalin that they were kept in conditions close to slavery last year when they went to work to a remote island off the Russian Pacific Coast and are now owed millions in back pay.

A deputy prosecutor general immediately flew to Sakhalin while the local governor sat down with the workers after the show. Early on Friday the company's executive, Alexei Popov, was shown on Rossiya-1 apologizing to the workers, saying that he had no idea they were unpaid. He then handed out wads of 5,000 ruble ($77) banknotes to the workers in a 20,000 ruble payment to each worker.

Child prodigy Ilya Rayevsky may not be owed billions, but he got his problem solved too. The 8-year old complained to Putin that he was too young to get a place at summer camps for gifted children in Sochi and Crimea.

"Ilya, this is a bad mistake," Putin replied. "It shows that people in charge of this were not child prodigies themselves. We will put it right."

Hours later, Rayevsky got an invitation from the education ministry to pick the camp of his choice.

Putin's call-in show is "a form of psychotherapy, an outlet for speaking your mind and shedding a tear - there is no other shoulder other than Putin's to cry on," leading business daily Vedomosti commented.

The Kremlin on Friday lauded the hasty efforts of local officials to respond.

"We are keeping tabs on it," Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. "We should not demonize official agencies and officials. People are doing their jobs but of course they sometimes fail at it, there is a lot of responsibility and work to do. What is important is the willingness to put things right."

The sheer idea of the show and how it is executed - Putin alone on stage - is designed to portray the president as an impartial judge who is not to blame for what local officials are doing on the ground, which helps to keep his popularity high, analysts say.

"In popular perception, the president stands apart from other government institutions that Russians are quite unhappy about," Nezavisimaya Gazeta said in an editorial on Friday. "There are bureaucrats and ministers who get the rap, and there is the head of the state who is there to calm the citizens so that they don't ask any more unnecessary questions."