Толстый и тонкий

[Prospero]

What the West Gets Wrong About Russia

 

 AUG. 12, 2015

 

Photo

Vladimir Putin at a sporting event in Kazan, Russia, in July. CreditPool photo by Mikhail Klimentyev/Ria Novosti/Kremlin[/size]

 

Contributing Op-Ed Writer

By IVAN KRASTEV

 

SOFIA, Bulgaria — WHEN George Kennan wrote his famous “Long Telegram,” his 1946 letter to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that laid the foundation for America’s containment policy against the Soviet Union, he mentioned Joseph Stalin just three times — despite the fact that, by then, the Russian leader ran his country like an emperor.

 

Seven decades on, Stalin’s current heir, Vladimir V. Putin, finds his name emblazoned on nearly every page of the myriad memos and papers struggling to understand the mind-set driving Russia’s strategic behavior. To understand Mr. Putin, the thinking goes, is to understand Russia. But is that quite right?

 

In the heady days of the Cold War, Americans tended to view Soviet decision making as a black box: You know what goes in, you know what comes out, but you are clueless about what is happening inside. Soviet policy was thus believed to be both enigmatic and strategic. There was little room for personality or personal philosophy; understanding the system was the only way.

 

According to Gleb Pavlovsky, Mr. Putin’s former spin doctor extraordinaire, these days the Kremlin is still enigmatic, but no longer strategic. For Mr. Pavlovsky, Kremlin policy is fashioned rather like the music of a jazz group; its continuing improvisation is an attempt to survive the latest crisis.

 

Mr. Pavlovsky may not be a household name in the West, but he’s worth listening to. An erstwhile Soviet dissident trained as a historian who transformed himself into one of the interior designers of Mr. Putin’s regime, he performed in the Kremlin’s “jazz band” for over a decade. This year he published “The System of the Russian Federation,” which relies heavily on Mr. Kennan’s ideas to offer a timely critique of the West’s assumptions about Mr. Putin’s Russia (for now, it’s available only in Russian).

 

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Mr. Pavlovsky insists, after Mr. Putin took personal responsibility for the annexation of Crimea and won the support of more than 80 percent of the population, he lost interest in day-to-day decision making. He wants to be informed about everything, but is reluctant to play national housekeeper.

 

Ministers, Mr. Pavlovsky writes, spend endless hours waiting by Mr. Putin’s office to take orders, but in the end he doesn’t order, he only listens. What runs the Kremlin today is not Mr. Putin’s will but his ambiguity. Wars among different power factions, as a result, have escalated.

 

In Mr. Pavlovsky’s reading, Russia today is neither an ideological warrior seeking to remake the world order nor a hard-nosed realist desperately defending its sphere of influence. Far from grand strategy, what animates Mr. Putin’s Kremlin is the assertion of its right to break international rules. In fact, breaking the rules without being punished is the Kremlin’s peculiar definition of being a great power.

 

Russia, to Mr. Pavlovsky, is driven not by a search for external power but by internal weakness — a lack of vision for its impending post-Putin existence. Mr. Putin has successfully made any political alternative unthinkable, and his entire country is now trapped by his success. In other words, Mr. Putin’s enormous popular support is a weakness, not a strength — and Russia’s leaders know it.

 

The Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, concisely summed things up when he explained to international analysts at a private forum in Valdai last year, “There is no Russia today if there is no Putin.” The Russian political system implicitly functions on the assumption that its president is immortal.

 

But while Mr. Putin may be a czar, Russia is no monarchy. His daughters will not succeed him in the Kremlin. Mr. Putin is a popularly elected president whose political system has destroyed the legitimacy of elections as an instrument for the peaceful change of power. His United Russia party is a valuable instrument for winning rigged elections, but unlike the Chinese Communist Party, it lacks the autonomy and ideological coherence needed for securing power succession.

 

Deprived of a vision for the future, Russian elites are tempted by conspiracy theories and apocalyptic pronouncements. As Aleksandr A. Prokhanov, a writer and leading voice of Russian imperial nationalists, lamented, the elites know that if they attempt a Perestroika II, they will fail. Better, he said, to provoke another world war than try to dismantle Mr. Putin’s designs.

 

Reading Mr. Pavlovsky’s book, one realizes that what is totally absent in the Western analyses of today’s Russia is this “end of the world” mentality among Mr. Putin’s political and intellectual elites. In Mr. Pavlovsky’s view, the experience of the catastrophic collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than geopolitical interests or values, is the key for understanding Russia’s strategic behavior and the inner logic of Mr. Putin’s regime.

 

The Kremlin is populated not by mere survivors of the post-Soviet transition but by survivalists, people who think in terms of worst-case scenarios, who believe that the next disaster is just around the corner, who thrive on crises, who are addicted to extraordinary situations and no-rules politics.

 

That complex and unpredictable context, rather than the vagaries of Mr. Putin’s mind alone, is the key to understanding contemporary Russian politics.

 

[barrcode]

Peskovu podmetnuli sat od 620.000$

 

podmetnulo mu i iznajmljivanje najskuplje jahte na svetu. 385000e/nedeljno.

ajde to, nego ne letuje na Krimu nego u Italji ?! Pa ko će u to poverovati???

https://navalny.com/p/4401/

[Lord Protector]

Pa koliko mažnjavaju drugi kad ovaj sa platom činovnika ovako divlja?

[Prospero]

"Sirijski ekspres" uredno šalje gvožđuriju Asadu - ovde su kamioni i oklopni transporteri, uslikani prilikom prolaska kroz Bosfor. Retko se dešava da se teret/gvožđurija vide i na palubi, obično su samo pod palubom.

 

 

[namenski]

Retko kod obicnih/klasicnih teretnih brodova sto ovaj nije: radi se o punokrvnom ex-sovjetskom desantnom brodu, onom pravom, za izkrcavanje direktno na neuredjenu obalu, pripadniku ratne mornarice, sa sve pripadajucim brojem i oznakama.

U ona vremena bio NATO poznat kao klasa Alligator, kod Sovjeta kao Projekt 1171 Тапир, inace starim borcima, od Angole pa na dalje i prvom pravom sovjetskom velikom desantnom brodu lukavo izvedenom iz jedne istocnonemacke komercijalne konstrukcije obicnog teretnjaka pa otuda slicnost trupa i narocito nadgradja.

Eno mu se vide na pramcu i vrata za iskrcavanje direktno na obalu, a teret na palubi je nuzda kod ove vrste brodova, jer bi, u suprotnom, kapacitet za prevozenje bilo kog tereta, a narocito vozila bio bitno smanjen.

Sad, dal' je prevoz ovakvim brodom u po bela dana poruka ili nuzda zbog nemogucnosti iskrcavanja u nekoj uredjenoj luci, odnosno potreba da se teret iskrca na neku plazu, druga je prica.

Vidi ti to tamo, ispitaj.

[Budja]

Inace, ova presuda ukrajinskom reziseru na 20 godina mi se cini kao teska, teska svinjarija. Sramno.

[Prospero]

@namenski

 

Ima dosta slika ovih brodova kako u po bela dana prolaze kroz Bosfor, nije to ekskluziva, nego samo komentar da se prvi put i vidi teret na palubi.

 

Oću, svakako ću se raspitati...

 

@buđa

 

Ma da, luđenje i tužilaca i sudija.

 

Mnijem da će, zajedno sa onim osuđenim Estoncem zapravo hteti da trguju za onih par ruskih vojnika/oficira koji su zarobljeni dok su se zagubili™ u prelasku granice.

 

via TT

Edited August 26, 2015 by Prospero

[namenski]

@namenski

 

Ima dosta slika ovih brodova kako u po bela dana prolaze kroz Bosfor, nije to ekskluziva, nego samo komentar da se prvi put i vidi teret na palubi.

 

 

Dosta kojih brodova?

Desantnih, ruskih, ratnomornarickih?

Ne pratim, ali rezim prolaska ratnih brodova, misli se na brodove pod takozvanom ratnopomorskom zastavom podleze pravilima prolaska kroz Moreuze, najava Turcima, itd, itd, taj rad, obaska sto se takav teret 'lakse' prevozi obicnim teretnjacima, osim ako nije neka tehnicka nuzda ili poruka.

[Prospero]

Isto BDK, ili Aligatori ili Ropuče, ima mnogo slika njihovih dnevnih prolazaka. Plus razni borbeni, ali to je druga priča.

 

Na stranu tehničko-pravne okolnosti, ovakvo slanje gvožđurije može nositi i javnu poruku da se nije odustalo od direktne pomoći Asadu.

 

Tj. osim ako ovaj #152 ("Nikolaj Filčenkov") ne završi recimo u Alžiru

 

via TT

Edited August 26, 2015 by Prospero

[namenski]

Kazem ti da nisam pratio, ne znam da li pod cestim prolascima ruskih ratnih brodova mislis na brodove koji nesto voze konkretno u Siriju ili inace.

Ovo drugo nista cudno, Rusi mogu Moreuzima da se setkaju po vazecim propisima.

Ne znam da li je neko pominjao glavnog igraca Lucky Brother, AKA Lucky Ned, kako kad, pod panamskom zastavom mada i zastava kako kad  , koji se jos od kako je Sirija pocela redovno mota po Istocnom Mediteranu, sve slucajno iz neke od ruskih, a bogami i ukrajinskih luka ka Siriji.

Najmanje jednom je tovario i u luci Ploce i prava je mera za tu vrstu poslova, ono ni preveliki ni premali.

Ti se brodovi prate, smesno je i pomisliti da u danasnje vreme takva rabota ostane nezapazena tamogdetreba i koga zanima, i s obzirom da imaju status obicnih trgovackih brodova, pomno se vodi racuna da papiri budu u redu.

Njihov tretman zavisi od dobre volje utoliko sto niko nece/ne sme, osim ako bas zagusti, da dira u slobodu mora i presrece trgovacki brod.

S druge strane, koriscenje obicnog trgovackog broda ostavlja svim zainteresovanim stranama slobodu akcije i/ili vadjenja iz sranja ako se dogodi, sto nikako ne bi bio slucaj da neko dirne u tudji vojnopomorski brod.

[Takeshi]

putin i meda u akciji slanja slike u svet.  ^_^

 

 

 

 

[stooler]

Компензација

 

[Prospero]

Russia tells EU to abandon 'messianic' project of exporting democracy

EurActiv.com by Georgi Gotev

08:46

 

 

A prominent Russian diplomat has called on the EU to abandon his “messianic” project of exporting democracy and instead solve its problems together with Russia, and not at its expense.

 

Speaking at the Alpbach Forum panel “The EU and Russia: Rivals, Opponents, Partners?” on 31 August, Russia’s Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov blamed the Lisbon Treaty and the EU enlargement for having contributed to the current paralysis of relations between the EU and its largest neighbour.

 

In a speech full with historical references, Chizhov said his country had witnessed “with understandable concern” the establishment of “an exclusive ideological underpinning of the European Union”.

 

He reminded delegates that back in May 2013 EU high officials were making it clear that the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership would be about “winning Ukraine” in a “geopolitical battle of Europe”.

 

He didn’t name any officials, but archives show that such a statement has indeed been made by Lithuania’s foreign minister Linas Linkevicius, when his country was holding the rotating EU presidency.

 

“This was clearly a wrong approach. Ukraine should have never been viewed as a geopolitical playground,” Chizhov said, adding that the economically fragile and ethnically diverse country needed instead a common national identity, sufficiently ample to embrace all ethnic and linguistic groups inhabiting the country.

 

“But for such an identity to take root, time, stability and good relations with both the EU and Russia are of essence. This must be clearly understood,” the Russian diplomat said.

 

In his words, the internal transformation of the EU following the 'big bang' expansion of 2004 and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty reform, resulted in narrowing the flexibility of EU’s positions in the international arena.

 

“In other words, the price for 'speaking with one voice' has been the lowest common denominator of the resulting message,” Chizhov said. He didn’t spell it out, but in the context of the Ukraine crisis it has become obvious that the most hawkish countries in the EU are among its new members, especially Poland and Lithuania.

 

Regarding the Lisbon Treaty, Chizov said, “The inward-looking peace project has acquired a new somewhat messianic dimension – the EU now 'seeks to advance in the wider world… principles which have inspired its own creation' (Art. 21 TEU). The question is, however, whether this 'export of democracy' is consistent with the objective of maintaining peace inside and beyond the European continent, or the European Union will have to make a hard choice between the two.”

 

The Russian diplomat criticised EU’s aspiration to become a regional “normative power”, which in his words implied the growing projection of the EU acquis to its relations with third countries. He mentioned in this context the “Third Energy Package” and the EU Emission Trading Scheme.

 

The million-euro question

 

Chizov said the “million-euro question” was how to develop the EU-Russia relations into a win-win situation for both parties, and then provided an answer. First of all, he said that the relationship should become “a genuine partnership of equals, ensuring that mutual concerns are systematically and thoroughly addressed”. In this respect, he called on the EU to look at Russia’s regional project, the Eurasian Economic Union, as its counterpart.

 

“For a start, it would be expedient to set up initial working contacts between the European and the Eurasian Economic Commissions. It is welcoming that many within the EU are finally coming round to this idea,” the diplomat said.

 

Secondly, Chizov said, economic cooperation between Russia and the EU needs to be strengthened, not weakened. He quoted figures produced by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) according to which the restrictive measures against Russia are set to cost the EU as much as €100 billion and more than two million jobs.

 

“This, in my view, is hardly what the EU needs in the current volatile economic environment”, he said.

 

Thirdly, the relationship must become less ideological and more pragmatic, the Russian diplomat said. He quoted Otto von Bismark, the Prussian statesman who dominated German and European affairs from 1860 until 1890, who had said that one should either deal with the Russians in a fair way, or not at all.

 

Finally, Russia and the EU need to jointly deal with the manifold crises unfolding in their common neighbourhood, Chizhov said.

 

“In the Russian view, which, I understand, may not be universally shared by this audience, the disastrous turn of events in the region of the so-called 'Arab spring' as well as in Ukraine has a lot to do with the attempt to inject the notion of supremacy of Western values into highly complex regional environments.

 

"Certainly, the EU alone can hardly be blamed for regional instability. Nevertheless, the European Neighbourhood Policy, in my view, was not made any more attractive by the heavy-handed manner in which the EU sought to 'civilise' the region and impose its own norms and standards there”, Chizov said. He didn’t mention the USA by name in his speech.

 

Faced with the problems of terrorism, illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, Russia and the EU should make use of the channels of communication established, which have been largely closed in the context of the Ukraine crisis, Chizhov said, adding: “while Russia and the EU severely limited their cooperation, the terrorists did not”.

[banecare1]

putin i meda u akciji slanja slike u svet.  ^_^

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iskopase novinari cenu donjeg dela trenerke

 

USD 1425

[namenski]

Na kurac sve kojima je kineska 70 parada humanija, podobnija, politicki korektnija i prihvatljivija od ruske onomad.