Толстый и тонкий

[apostata]

Yota je fakat dobar telefon, ali je i skup.

 

Početkom godine kontao sam dal' da ga kupim i na kraju se odlučio ipak za one plus one.

[Yoda]

mene je iznenadio nedavno sokurov, kada je dolazio u beograd, podrzava zahtev iz ministarstva da nema psovki u filmovima. kaze da bi umetnost trebalo da izrazava/izaziva najvisa osecanja, tu psovke ne pripadaju.

nisam ga pratio po stavovima van filma, ali dosta cudan rezon za umetnika. ili je i on krenuo putem mihalkova.

 

Voli Sokurov drustvo silovika, nije to nepoznato.

[Eraserhead]

Jos malo bolesti iz Rusije.

 

'The consequences will be catastrophic for the United States': Top Russian analyst advises blowing up Yellowstone in paranoid editorial

[Budja]

Nego je li stvarno "top" ili su mu to prikacili da izgleda ludje i opasnije?

[Eraserhead]

Kad ga guglas nadjes par clanaka na RT, Pravdi i Sputniku u kojima daje izjave na razne teme. Deluje da nije totalni anonimus ali nije ni prvi izbor. Verovatno je neki korisni klovn.

[Lord Protector]

MAGAZIN "TAJM" TVRDI Rusija preti nuklearnim oružjem i planira akcije na Baltiku

V. Filipović / Time | 02. 04. 2015.

 

Rusija je zapretila upotrebom "nuklearne sile" kako bi odbranila Krim i upozorila da "isti uslovi" koji su je naveli da sprovede vojnu akciju u Ukrajini postoje i u tri baltičke države, članice NATO pakta.

 

Prema beleškama magazina "Time", dobijenih sa sastanka ruskih generala i zvaničnika Stejt departmenta, "Moskva je zapretila različitim spektrom reakcija - od diplomatskih do onih koje uključuju vojnu silu", ukoliko NATO nastavi da gomila snage u baltičkim zemljama - Litvaniji, Letoniji i Estoniji.

 

Sastanak se održao prošlog meseca u Nemačkoj, a Rusi su tada navodno "naglasili da će svaki pokušaj vraćanja Krima pod okrilje Ukrajini biti shvaćen kao napad na koji će se odgovoriti nuklearnom silom".

 

U beleškama se takođe navodi da će "ruski narod zahtevati adekvatan odgovor ukoliko NATO nastavi da raspoređuje snage blizu ruske granice".

 

"Isti uslovi koji su postojali u Ukrajini, i koji su isprovocirali Rusiju da preduzme određene vojne mere, postoje i u baltičkim državama, u kojima, kao i u Ukrajini, postoji veliki broj stanovnika koji sebe smatraju Rusima", navodi se u beleškama koje je objavio "Tajm".

 

Rusija razmatra preduzimanje određenih koraka na Baltiku, ali to bi, prema beleškama, "bile tajne akcije koje bi za cilj imale destabilizaciju političke situacije u tim državama, i koje bi se jako teško povezale sa Rusima".

 

Takođe se navodi da bi "Moskva radije izbegla slanje trupa i teškog naoružanja, te da bi se pre okrenula sofisticiranijim metodama".

 

"Rusija želi da polako utiče na etnički rusko stanovništvo na Baltiku, i pokuša da ih okrene protiv NATO-a", navodi se u dokumentu.

 

Ukoliko bi alijansa reagovala, to bi bilo shvaćeno kao "agresija protiv ruske nacionalne manjine u baltičkim državama", i kao takva predstavljala bi situaciju mnogo opasniju od one u Ukrajini, naročito po SAD i njene saveznike.

 

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4399758.ece

Edited April 2, 2015 by slow

[Anduril]

Tekst je logican iako je takodje jasno da primarni cilj sankcija nije nada da ce srednja klasa zbaciti Kremlj.

Cilj sankcija je da oslabi Rusiju i ogranici na duzi rok njen vojno-politicki uticaj u Evropi.

 

 

Why Sanctions on Russia Don’t Work

MOSCOW – The Western approach to Russia is predicated on the supposition that continued pressure on the country will cause President Vladimir Putin’s regime to make concessions or even crumble. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The assumption underlying the efficacy of Western sanctions is that the sharp economic deterioration that results from them will turn the Russian public, particularly the financial and political elite, against the Kremlin. Putin will not be able to withstand mounting dissent from affluent urban areas and the country’s burgeoning middle class.

 

Meanwhile, the thinking goes, military pressure – in the form of potential lethal aid to Ukraine – will similarly mobilize ordinary Russians against Putin. Unwilling to see their boys die for the Donbas, they will form an anti-war movement that will force him to rein in his territorial ambitions. Pressed at once from above and from below, the Kremlin will be have to change its policies, and perhaps even begin to democratize.

What Western policymakers fail to understand is that such an approach is less likely to undermine the regime than to cause Russians to close ranks behind it. Opinion polls show that Russians perceive Western pressure and sanctions to be aimed not at Putin and his cronies, but at Russia and its citizens. In January, 69% of Russians supported the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, according to a poll by the independent Levada Center.

To be sure, Putin’s support is not rock-solid; indeed, there is widespread suspicion about corruption in his government. But Russians have a long tradition of defending their compatriots from outsiders. And in this case, the compatriots under attack are Putin and his government.

Russian propaganda taps a deep well of nationalism, artfully playing off sentiments and imagery from World War II. Known in the country as the Great Patriotic War, the effort to defend the country from German invasion remains sacred to many Russians. That is why the Kremlin has repackaged derogatory historical terms like “Nazis” to refer to Ukraine’s current political elites.

Russian society has been militarized for decades, if not centuries. Military preparedness was one of the most important shared values in the Soviet Union – a sentiment captured in the slogan emblazoned on the badges issued to children who excelled in athletics: “Ready for Work and Defense.”

It is in this context that Putin has been able to use Western pressure as a tool to regain the support of many Russians, who only a few years ago would have felt detached from, if not alienated by, his government. Presented with a real or imagined threat to the fatherland, the average Russian supports the country’s leaders.

Nor is the Russian middle class, which makes up some 20-30% of the population, likely to pose much of a threat to Putin. With many of its members owing their recent wealth to high oil prices and the economic recovery of the 2000s, loyalty to the Putin regime is one of the Russian middle class’s abiding characteristics.

Russian opinion polling and sociological research tends to show that the higher one’s position in society, the more likely one is to vote for the incumbents. The motives behind such voting patterns may vary – some voters made a fortune during the economic recovery, while others are simply satisfied with the status quo. But the bottom line is that such voters demonstrate a fundamental loyalty to the state and the regime.

Indeed, only a small portion of the middle class attended the protests that gathered force in late 2011 and early 2012, most of them concentrated in Moscow. And, in any case, Putin’s clampdown on dissent was predictably ruthless. He tightened legislation aimed at throttling civil society, pursued lawsuits against protesters, and blocked the activity of Alexei Navalny, a promising opposition politician. These efforts have had a lasting effect on the groups that were at the heart of the protest movement.

Russians of all walks of life have shown that they prefer passive adaptation over protest. In the face of growing economic pressures, Russia’s middle class is steering clear of political involvement. The working class is no different. The more the West increases its pressure, the less likely it becomes that this will change.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-sanctions-backfire-by-andrei-kolesnikov-2015-03#uSLC9bwL2XsJFKDo.99

[dillinger]

Tekst je logican iako je takodje jasno da primarni cilj sankcija nije nada da ce srednja klasa zbaciti Kremlj.

Cilj sankcija je da oslabi Rusiju i ogranici na duzi rok njen vojno-politicki uticaj u Evropi.

 

Znači Rusi ih dobro kapiraju i opravdano zbijaju redove

[kobni zelaya]

Nisam siguran koliko je ovaj tekst realan, a ne prosto nekakva polu-propagandna spekulacija, ali svakako je interesantan.

[Cort0 Maltese]

Russian propaganda taps a deep well of nationalism, artfully playing off sentiments and imagery from World War II. Known in the country as the Great Patriotic War, the effort to defend the country from German invasion remains sacred to many Russians. That is why the Kremlin has repackaged derogatory historical terms like “Nazis” to refer to Ukraine’s current political elites.

 

Vrlo zanimljivo glediste u danima kad je vodja najpoznatije ekstremno desne politicke organizacije Yarosh postao dio vojnopolitickog establishmenta u Ukrajini.

[Eraserhead]

Russian propaganda taps a deep well of nationalism, artfully playing off sentiments and imagery from World War II. Known in the country as the Great Patriotic War, the effort to defend the country from German invasion remains sacred to many Russians. That is why the Kremlin has repackaged derogatory historical terms like “Nazis” to refer to Ukraine’s current political elites.

 

Vrlo zanimljivo glediste u danima kad je vodja najpoznatije ekstremno desne politicke organizacije Yarosh postao dio vojnopolitickog establishmenta u Ukrajini.

 

Doduse zemlja kojoj je Rogozin potpredsednik vlade ne nudi nista bolje od onih koje kritikuje.

[banecare1]

eraser na dezurstvu.  da propusti jednom makar 

[nesha taxista]

Kakav bi zapravo dil mogli da naprave s Grcima? Danas je Cipras bio u Moskvi.

[Cort0 Maltese]

Doduse zemlja kojoj je Rogozin potpredsednik vlade ne nudi nista bolje od onih koje kritikuje.

 

Zato Ukrajinci cak i iz zapadnih krajeva masovno bjeze u istu. ^_^

[nesha taxista]

Koliko ih je stvarno pobeglo iz zapadnih krajeva Ukrajine u Rusiju? Mislim, ako postoje pouzdani podaci.