Толстый и тонкий

[MancMellow]

Class

[Muwan]

Ove poslednje strane topika ko neki groupie/fan online meeting.

 

Ima covek talenta  - peva, puca, jase, anektira, cak i lepu devojku -  sve sto ljudi vole pa i ne cudi kolektivna histerija.

 

Zamisli histeriju, molim te - na topiku o najvećoj svetskoj nuklearnoj sili mi pričamo o njenom apsolutnom vladaru koji je na čitavu nedelju ispario iz javnosti. I dok se čitav slobodoljubivi svet sprema na kolektivni orgazam ukoliko se uspostavi da je u pitanju prevrat, smrt ili atentat, mi se tu nešto zezamo i čekamo da stigne neka vest koju bismo mogli da prokomentarišemo. Stvarno smo histerične šiparice.

[Lord Protector]

Ove poslednje strane topika ko neki groupie/fan online meeting.

 

Ima covek talenta  - peva, puca, jase, anektira, cak i lepu devojku -  sve sto ljudi vole pa i ne cudi kolektivna histerija.

 

Možemo mi i kolektivno da te nataknemo, ali nam nije interesantno. Ne znaš da pevaš...

[apostata]

Jel' ovo bilo?

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azP2FOpbEYE#t=742

 

Fridman o USA, Rusiji, Njemačkoj i Ukrajini.

[Anduril]

samo si ti iznad svega...

 

Pa nisam iznad ali bar pokusavam da budem van toga - mislim, iz aviona se vidi sta i kako KGB igrac igra.

Ono sto je iznenadjujuce je koliko se ljudi pali na sve te argumente, poziranja i sada ovo.

Nego, zanimljiv detalj o dugoj tradiciji nestajanja vladara:

 

 

 

Putin's absence

All latest updates

When the tsar vanishes Disappearing acts have served past Russian leaders well

Mar 15th 2015 | Europe

VLADIMIR PUTIN has not been verifiably seen in public since March 5th, and no one knows why. The Russian president has postponed a planned visit on March 11th to Kazakhstan. Moscow is abuzz with rumours linking the president's sudden reticence to the murder of Boris Nemtsov. Some hint that tension between Mr Putin and his Chechen surrogate, Ramzan Kadyrov, over the arrest of five Chechen men accused of killing Mr Nemtsov is to blame. Other rumours have been more outlandish. Andre Illarionov, a former advisor of Mr Putin's, wrote in a blog post that a coup might be underway; a Swiss tabloid reported that Mr Putin had flown to Switzerland to attend the birth of a love child with a Russian gymnast. Russia's government says Mr Putin has simply been feeling a bit unwell.

What is one to make of it all? In the absence of better information, one might ask what it has meant in the past when rulers of secretive governments vanished from public view. Of course, analogising current Russian politics to a distant and vastly different past can easily mislead. But in situations like this such comparisons can be educational, and they are certainly lots of fun.

Take the year 1564, a rather bad one for Tsar Ivan IV (also known as the "Formidable" or "Terrible") and many of his more powerful subjects. The tsar's wife Alexandra had died several years earlier after a wasting illness. The tsar believed someone in the Kremlin had poisoned her. Disputes and suspicions of disloyalty among the boyars (as the senior nobility were known) led Ivan to engage in increasingly strict repression, including the execution of Daniil Adashev, a hero of Russia's 1559 military campaign in Crimea, along with his family.

After Adashev's execution, prince Andrei Kurbskiy, formerly a favourite general of Ivan's, defected to the West. From the safety of Lithuania, Kurbskiy sent Ivan a famous series of letters denouncing his oppression of the nobles and generals who had so patriotically conquered new territories for him. Ivan himself was a better stylist than Kurbskiy, and sent back lengthy, brutally witty replies that were distributed to a broad audience—perhaps the earliest examples of a Russian regime engaging in ideological propaganda. Ivan is generally seen as pioneering the combination of high ideological appeal and vulgar populist insults which so many Russian leaders have since deployed. Among other things, Ivan asks: "If you are as just and pious as you say, why did you fear a guiltless death, which is no death but gain?" In other words, if you're so righteous, why didn't you stay here and let me kill you? He compares Kurbskiy unfavourably to the latter's emissary Vaska Shibanov, who, he says, had the bravery to continue praising his master even as Ivan had him tortured to death.

Ivan faced challenges within and without. He had turned his attention from Crimea to invading the Baltics, but with Kurbskiy now fighting for the Lithuanians, the situation was developing not necessarily to his advantage. The boyars were increasingly nervous that defeats abroad would lead to accusations of treason at home. On December 3rd Ivan left Moscow with an unusually large retinue on what was presented as a routine pilgrimage to one of the monasteries that surround Moscow. Some historians describe Ivan's departure as "secret"; in any case, he made no arrangements for who would rule in his absence.

And then, for a month, nothing was heard from the tsar.

Ivan, it turned out, had settled into residence in the fortress town of Alexandra Sloboda, west of Moscow. A month after the tsar's disappearance, two letters from him were read out by church prelates in Moscow. The first announced his intention to abdicate. He blamed the boyars' disloyalty and squabbling for his decision. The second addressed the people of Moscow, whom he praised for their Christian loyalty in the face of the boyars' impiety.

Unable to rule in Ivan's absence or to settle internal disputes, the boyars grew afraid that the state might disintegrate. Ivan's sudden departure had demonstrated Russia's complete dependence on his person. There were no plausible alternative rulers. The boyars sent Ivan a delegation requesting that he return to the throne. Ivan agreed, on the condition that he be allowed to arrest anyone on suspicion of treason, regardless of rank.

On returning to Moscow in 1565, Ivan established a new institution known as the oprichnina, effectively a type of secret police under his direct control. The ranks of the oprichnina were largely filled with lower gentry who swore personal loyalty to the tsar. For the next seven years, the oprichnina subjected Russia to a reign of terror, arresting and executing boyars for treason and confiscating their estates, which were promptly awarded to the oprichniki themselves. After some time, inevitably, the oprichniki began targeting each other for denunciation and execution, and in 1572 Ivan dissolved the increasingly chaotic organisation.

In the meantime the independent authority and privilege of the boyar class had been smashed. The tsar's sudden disappearance from Moscow at the end of 1564 had forced the aristocracy to acknowledge its weakness, and to give him free rein to reform as he saw fit. Ivan's state-building exercise had taken Russia another step towards solidifying the centralised, autocratic monarchy that would rule until 1917.

What does this have to do with Mr Putin's sudden absence? Probably nothing. Perhaps Mr Putin really has been sick. He is scheduled to meet with Almazbek Atamaev, president of Kyrgyzstan, in St Petersburg on Monday, which may dispel the rumours. In the meantime it is useful to recall that when an autocrat disappears, it is not always a sign of weakness. As many analysts point out, Mr Putin's vanishing act has Russians as keenly aware as ever of the government's dependence upon him. Mr Putin, if healthy and unbothered, will not mind the reminder.

[apostata]

Merkelova izgleda ipak dolazi na paradu.

 

http://ren.tv/novosti/2015-03-17/angela-merkel-reshila-priehat-na-parad-pobedy-v-moskvu

[Prospero]

Class

..less jerks

 

 

 

@anduril

 

kako dugoj "tradiciji", bilo jednom pre 450 godina pa sad drugi put? zar ne mora nešto da se dešava ipak mnogo češće da bi se smatralo tradicijom?

[namenski]

Merkelova izgleda ipak dolazi na paradu.

 

http://ren.tv/novosti/2015-03-17/angela-merkel-reshila-priehat-na-parad-pobedy-v-moskvu

U srecna vremena bi je priveli 

[apostata]

U srecna vremena bi je priveli 

 

Uhljubi na ruskim "patriotskim" forumima kažu da je skontala kako je bolje da ona dođe u Moskvu, nego da joj parada dođe u Berlin.

[Muwan]

Nego, zanimljiv detalj o dugoj tradiciji nestajanja vladara:

What does this have to do with Mr Putin's sudden absence? Probably nothing.

 

 

 

Duga tradicija koja se ponavlja jednom u pola milenijuma: :hail:

Edited March 18, 2015 by beowl

[Eraserhead]

Interesantan blog o Putinu i onome sto ce biti njegovo nasledje. Zaista ostaje pitanje sta bi se dogodilo da se njemu nesto desi i stice se utisak da su velike sanse da bi dosao neko jos gori. Zapad ima institucije, cak i Kina ima institucije koje su tu da ublaze turbulencije. Rusija deluje vrlo izlozeno haosu.

 

It was a coup, a stroke, a boy. That was the range of rumors published as analysis in both Russian and international media in the days after Russian President Vladimir Putin suddenly disappeared from TV screens: He’d been toppled, he’d died, his girlfriend had a baby. It was probably nothing, just a breather before Putin makes some obscurely worded announcement that will spell the next step in his ongoing crackdown. But this period of silence and rumor, which ended yesterday, has been instructive in a number of ways.

 

The first and most obvious should come as no surprise: We have no way of knowing what is happening inside the Kremlin. Putin’s disappearance and the resulting information vacuum show more clearly than anything that has happened before that there is only one way that information leaves the Kremlin: if it originates with Putin or his press secretary.

 

Second, there is also only one person in Russia who creates political news. This is why Putin’s absence was so eerie. It looked as though television news and, with it, time itself had come to a standstill. After a week of starvation news rations, Russian TV viewers were treated on the weekend to a film timed for the first anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. In it, Putin bragged of having planned the operation in advance – and personally – and that he had rattled every saber he could conjure. Life itself supplied two more news items: the death of nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin and a disastrous fire at Moscow’s historic Novodevichy Monastery. Between the similarity of the writer’s name to the president’s and the monastery’s magnificent dome in flames, things looked more and more ominous.

 

Third, in his absence Putin provided the clearest illustration yet of the concept of being accountable to no one. Dictators don’t need to call in sick, tired or in a bad mood. If the world has a hysterical fit because the man with the nuclear button is taking a weeklong nap, too bad for the world. This is precisely why the most likely explanation for Putin’s absence is that there is no explanation: Common colds are a lot more common than palace coups, but in Russia, their outward manifestations would be identical.

 

One more thing was conspicuously missing from Russian-language media, including the few outlets that function independently of the Kremlin: discussion of what would happen next if Putin had indeed died or been toppled. In fact, the more reputable media, which did not traffic in rumors about Putin’s supposed new offspring, found themselves with as little to say as the official media on the subject of everyone’s preoccupation. Herein lies the biggest lesson of this Putin-less week.

 

The Russian president has monopolized not only the decision-making process in Russia but also the very ability to make decisions. Such is the nature of his regime that the price of admission to the elites is the forfeiture of agency. For his part, Putin has refused to engage the very idea that there can be a time after Putin. Not only has he made it clear that he plans to be president for life, but he also has acted in accordance with the apparent belief that this life will last forever.

 

Putin has engineered a change to the Russian constitution increasing the presidential term from four to six years and has interpreted the document’s ambiguous text to mean that he can serve as many sets of two-consecutive terms as he wants, as long as he takes breaks in between. He became prime minister in 1999, president in 2000, took a breather term in the prime minister’s office between 2008 and 2012, and is now set to stay in office until 2024 before being required to take another break. It is ironic that he originally took office thanks to some undemocratic actions by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who rigged the system to place his hand-picked successor in the presidential chair but did not dream of extending his own term beyond the two-term mark.

 

Putin may have once looked like a younger and more modern alternative to Yeltsin, but he has worked to take Russia back to the Middle Ages. Not only has he merged the state and the church into one mechanism of persecution; not only has he mobilized the Russian population behind the idea of “traditional values,” but he also has restored a centuries-old concept of state power. Like a tyrant of old, he believes himself to be deathless. This is why Russia, which has such essential trappings of a modern power as nuclear weapons, does not have a succession plan, a contingency plan or, really, any plan at all. This is why the media have nothing to say on the issue of what happens next. No wonder the burning dome of the Novodevichy Monastery looks so sinister to Muscovites today.

 

But then, the last time Russia was ruled by someone with a similar self-concept was less than a century ago. When Joseph Stalin lay dying, Russian news also went black for a while. American pundits wondered: Would the hard-liners take over now (there was the belief that there was such a thing as “hard-liners” in the party in relationship to Stalin); did Stalin have a hand-picked successor? What actually happened in the years immediately following Stalin’s death was the discovery that there was no succession plan or procedure. There was a mess, a shuffle followed by a reshuffle and then another. In this limited respect, history is probably not a bad guide. We can assume that when Putin goes, there will be no one who knows what’s happening or is supposed to happen.

 

[kobni zelaya]

Onaj koji je pisao ovaj blog je jedva nešto manji magarac od onog kome se taj blog dopada.

[Lord Protector]

Interesantan blog o Putinu i onome sto ce biti njegovo nasledje. Zaista ostaje pitanje sta bi se dogodilo da se njemu nesto desi i stice se utisak da su velike sanse da bi dosao neko jos gori. Zapad ima institucije, cak i Kina ima institucije koje su tu da ublaze turbulencije. Rusija deluje vrlo izlozeno haosu.

 

 

U Rusiji je poslednji institucionalni haos bio 1917. Kina je istrorijski gledano mnogo podložnija institucionalnom haosu i ranjivija od Rusije po tom pitanju. Čak i danas.

 

Problem Rusije je korumpiranost i neefikasnost vlasti. Dakle pravna država a ne sama egzistencija države.

Edited March 18, 2015 by slow

[Budja]

U Rusiji je poslednji institucionalni haos bio 1917. Kina je istrorijski gledano mnogo podložnija institucionalnom haosu i ranjivija od Rusije po tom pitanju. Čak i danas.

 

Problem Rusije je korumpiranost i neefikasnost vlasti. Dakle pravna država a ne sama egzistencija države.

 

Hm, puc 1990, pa bombardovanje parlamenta 1992 svakako nisu 1917, ali nije ni smooth transition.

[Lord Protector]

Sve su to neuspeli pokušaji, i oni su pre izuzeci nego pravilo. Retko ko je uspeo da zbaci sa vlasti ili ograniči vlast ruskog cara ili generalnog sekretara.  Niko od njih nije izgubio glavu u nekom prevratu ili državnom udaru sem poslednjeg ruskog cara. Svi su se održali na vlasti sem cara Nikolaja, koji je izgubio i vlast i glavu, i Hruščova koji je smenjen. Na Lenjina je pokušan atentat ali je umro prirodnom smrću, Staljin, Brežnjev, Gorbačov, Jeljcin, Putin...

Uporedi to sa Latinskom Amerikom, Afrikom ili nekim drugim delovima sveta...sam centar vlasti u Rusiji je uvek bio veoma stabilan. Oko njega se okretao krvavi žrvanj koji je lomio kosti političkih protivnika ali to nije promenilo stabilnost njihove autoritativne vladavine.

Edited March 18, 2015 by slow