Sirija

[mackenzie]

Glede cele te ISIS situacije imas to da su Iracani (uz pomoc USA) oslobodili Mosul SDF (uz pomoc USA) Raku a da su se Asadovci (uz pomoc Rusije) fokusirali na to da konsoliduju vlast tamo gde je skripalo (Alepo).

 

a postojeća FSA? 

[precog]

I saw this on the BBC and thought you should see it:

 

Secret Raqqa IS withdrawal deal revealed - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-41966911

[precog]

Cisto da utvrdimo gradivo oko oslobodilaca.

[Lord Protector]

Kraj utakmice

 

http://kremlin.ru/misc/56135/videos/3691

 

 

Meeting with senior officials of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

 

Vladimir Putin: I have asked the President of Syria to attend our meeting.

 

I want him to see those who have played the key role in saving Syria.

 

Of course, Mr Assad knows some of you personally. He told me at our talks today that the Russian Army has saved Syria as a state. Much has been done to stabilise the situation in Syria. I hope that we will close the chapter on the fight against terrorism in Syria, although some seats of tension will remain or will flare up again.

 

There are more than enough problems with terrorism in the world, including in the Middle East and Syria. But our main mission is almost accomplished, and I hope we will be able to say that we have accomplished it soon.

 

We have held very substantial talks with the President of Syria today on all aspects related to normalisation, including subsequent steps on the political track. As you know, we will hold a trilateral meeting here in Sochi. However, I would like to say that conditions for a political process could not have been created without the armed forces, without your efforts and the efforts and heroism of your subordinates. This goal has been achieved thanks to the Russian Armed Forces and our Syrian friends on the battlefield. Thank you for this.

 

Bashar al-Assad (retranslated): President of Russia Vladimir Putin and I have just held talks. I have conveyed to him, and on his behalf to the Russian people, our gratitude for Russia’s efforts to save our country.

 

I would like to highlight the contribution of the Russian Armed Forces and the sacrifices they have made to achieve this goal. I was very glad to learn that you, those of you who were directly involved in the operation [in Syria] and who commanded the activities of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria will be present here today.

 

The operation barely started when I met with President Putin in Moscow two years ago. In the two years since then we can see the success that has been achieved thanks to cooperation between the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Army. Nobody can deny this success in the fight against terrorism now. Thanks to your actions, as well as the actions of the Syrian Army and our allies, many Syrians have returned home.

 

Speaking on behalf of the Syrian people, I would like to express our gratitude for what you have accomplished. We will never forget this. Also, I would like to thank personally President Vladimir Putin, [Defence Minister] Sergei Shoigu and [Chief of the General Staff] Valery Gerasimov for their direct involvement in this operation.

 

Thank you very much.

Edited November 21, 2017 by slow

[Eraserhead]

Dve masovne ubice se potapsale po ledjima i cestitale jedan drugome veliki uspeh.

[namenski]

Dve masovne ubice se potapsale po ledjima i cestitale jedan drugome veliki uspeh.

A treci gleda sa strane, pa mu se sve to nimalo ne svidja, pa bi, eto, da ostane u igri, obaska sto nikako da objasni sta ce i on u Siriji:

 

Russian Fighters Test U.S. Boundaries In Skies Over Syria

 

Al DHAFRA AIR BASE, UAE—As Islamic State militants lose ground in Iraq and Syria, U.S. fighter pilots are seeing increasingly alarming behavior from Russian aircraft flying over the battlespace.

Lt. Col. “Ox,” a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor pilot and commander of the 95th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron assigned to Al Dhafra air base, UAE, said his pilots see unexpected, potentially threatening movement from Russian fighters flying over Iraq and Syria with growing regularity. The pilots have had numerous close calls in the past few weeks, with Russian aircraft frequently flying within weapons range of coalition ground troops, Ox said.

The Russians fighters—primarily Sukhoi Su-30s, Su-35s, Su-27 Flankers and Su-17 Fitters—have not made moves to attack U.S. or coalition forces, but their proximity to the ground troops is threatening, said Ox, who requested partial anonymity to discuss sensitive operations. Russian fighters regularly fly within range of coalition ground forces for twenty or thirty minutes at a time, he added.

For Ox and his pilots, it’s often tough to tell whether the Russian aircraft are deliberately testing their boundaries, or if such events are just honest mistakes. But as ground forces squeeze ISIS into a smaller and smaller area, these “uncomfortable” incidents are becoming more frequent, he said.

“We have to use our judgment to figure out, is this somebody getting close to attack our guys? Or is this somebody that is just flying a wide pattern?” Ox said. “You don’t know if they are doing this to test us, to see what our response is, or if it’s completely innocent. That’s the call that we have to make every day.”

Responding to these incidents is made even more challenging by the increasingly congested airspace, Ox said. The Raptor pilots must very quickly deconflict coalition forces in the area to make sure they have enough space to monitor the Russians and run interference if need be. 

Potentially threatening aircraft are often close enough to see visually, but the busy airspace makes identifying their type and allegiance a challenge, Ox said. This is particularly difficult at night because the Raptors do not have the advanced electro-optical/infrared capability integrated into the F-35 or fourth-generation fighters via external pod.

“It’s so crowded, the typical employment game plans, tactics that we use are happening at much longer ranges than the current fight,” Ox said. “It really accelerates our timelines and puts us into very short decision times, especially as those platforms we are trying to identify get closer and closer to our defending point.”

Once the Raptors have verified that the aircraft are non-coalition, the pilots must relay what they are seeing to tactical control, such as the airborne E-3 Sentry and the ground-based Combined Air Operations Center, coalition aircraft and ground troops. It is their responsibility to move the other aircraft in the area out of harm’s way in case a confrontation occurs, Ox said. 

In this defensive counterair (DCA) role, the main advantage the Raptor brings is its advanced sensor suite and fusion capability. But where the F-15 Strike Eagles performing DCA in the region are able to send and receive critical battlefield information over Link 16, the tactical data link used by most Air Force aircraft, the F-22s do not have full Link 16 capability. This means the Raptors can receive data and imagery from other aircraft in the battlespace over Link 16, but cannot send the advanced picture the fifth-generation aircraft generates to the rest of the force.

Instead, the F-22 pilots must rely on traditional voice communication to describe what they are seeing, Ox said.

Once the air pace around the threatening aircraft is deconflicted, it becomes a waiting game. The Raptors are closely monitoring the Russian fighters for any sign of aggressive behavior, and are ready to act at the slightest hint of a confrontation.

The U.S. pilots sometimes ping the Russian aircraft over the emergency Guard frequency, but usually do not get a response.

“I couldn’t tell if they are monitoring Guard like we are, I couldn’t tell you if maybe they are hearing it and not responding,” Ox said.

One factor that limits the Raptors’ ability to effectively monitor the Russian fighters is lack of a helmet-mounted cueing system, which equips many other fighters such as the F-35. Such a capability would make DCA operations more effective, particularly in congested airspace, Ox noted. In current operations, Raptor pilots lose time looking back and forth between the visual airspace and the information on the displays.

“It’s just that extra step, and now I’m having to look back outside and find this guy, and a lot of times I’m just looking where I last saw him instead of looking with the helmet and actually having some symbology that shows me exactly where he is,” Ox said. “It would be great to be able to keep our eye on the guy that you are watching and having all that information that is already known to the jet be presented to you.”

Since Ox’s squadron arrived at Al Dhafra at the end of September, they have not had to run interference, which would likely involve buzzing non-coalition aircraft. But a few recent instances have been “right on the edge,” Ox said.

“We don’t typically do those headbutt-type operations very often… but we’ve been close as of late,” Ox said.

 

[borris_]

Rusi lete sa Su-17?

[namenski]

Rusi lete sa Su-17?

Ne znam, moguce je, mozda ce neko ko aktivnije prati Siriju znati.

Ovakvi clanci, bez obzira na strucnost i autoritet izvora (AWST) su uvek u funkciji erazerisanja, eto sta nam losi momci rade, taj rad...

A i da se nadju, za zlu ne trebalo, mozda koliko sutra zatreba argument o agresivnosti^tm druge strane na koju se moralo da reaguje.

[laser lotus]

Više ni u Rusiji ne lete s njima a kamoli po Siriji.

[theanswer]

Kraj utakmice

 

 

 

 

iz ove perspektive deluje da je jedan korisnik ovog foruma bio u pravu kad je rekao da ruska intervencija nije ništa promenila na terenu u Siriji

 

nego ono kad kažu da cnn nije ko rt, nego je rt poseban nivo

 

Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad, the Black Sea and a balcony corner of the Bocharov Ruchey State residence in Sochi, a favorite of the Kremlin head. You can also see one of Putin's many luxury watches peeking out from under his shirt, this one perhaps a Blancpain $10,000 piece, one that is often spotted on his wrist, according to activists.

Edited November 22, 2017 by theanswer

[borris_]

ALEPPO

War And Diplomacy

by 

Maria Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva

 

Ovu knjigu valja procitati da se cuje i druga strana (slagali se ili ne). Izdata je i na francuskom i italijanskom. Autor je ruska diplomatkinja koja radi u Zenevi.

Edited November 22, 2017 by borris_

[Budja]

 

Turska i Iran za istim stolom. Je l to iznenadjenje?

 

 

Vladimir Putin made the announcement after talks with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In a joint statement they urged the Syrian government and opposition to "participate constructively".

No date for the proposed congress has been announced. It is to be held in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi.

News of the latest initiative came as Syrian opposition groups met in the Saudi capital Riyadh to try to agree a joint position ahead of the latest round of UN-backed talks in Geneva next week.

However, the head of the High Negotiations Committee (HNC) - a Saudi-backed umbrella group that represented the opposition at the last round - stepped down on Monday.

[Budja]

 

"The congress will look at the key questions on Syria's national agenda," Mr Putin told reporters, sitting alongside Mr Rouhani and Mr Erdogan on Wednesday.

"First of all that is the drawing-up of a framework for the future structure of the state, the adoption of a new constitution, and, on the basis of that, the holding of elections under United Nations supervision."

Mr Putin said the process of reform would not be simple and would require "compromise and concessions from all parties, including obviously the Syrian government".

[hazard]

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-abrahms-glaser-isis-assad-20171210-story.html

 

The pundits were wrong about Assad and the Islamic State. As usual, they're not willing to admit it

 

The Islamic State is a shadow of its former self. In 2014, the extremist group seemed to make substantial inroads in achieving its stated goal of a caliphate. It boasted tens of thousands of fighters and territorial control over an area roughly the size of South Korea. By almost every metric, Islamic State has collapsed in its Syria stronghold, as well as in Iraq. As a former foreign fighter recently admitted, “It’s over: there is no more Daesh left,” using an Arabic acronym for Islamic State.

The rollback of Islamic State must come as a shock to the chorus of journalists and analysts who spent years insisting that such progress would never happen without toppling the regime of Bashar Assad — which is, of course, still standing. A cavalcade of opinion makers long averred that Islamic State would thrive in Syria so long as Assad ruled because the Syrian Arab Army was part of the same disease.

John Bolton, former United Nations ambassador under George W. Bush, insisted in the New York Times that “defeating the Islamic State” is “neither feasible nor desirable” if Assad remains in power. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham asserted that “defeating Islamic State also requires defeating Bashar Assad.” Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution prescribed a policy of “building a new Syrian opposition army capable of defeating both President Bashar al-Assad and the more militant Islamists.” Similarly, Max Boot, a contributing writer to this newspaper, argued that vanquishing Islamic State was futile unless the U.S. also moved to depose the “Alawite regime in Damascus.” Like other regime-change salesmen, he pitched a no-fly zone across the country to facilitate airstrikes against the Assad government, while boosting aid to the so-called moderate rebels.

For Islamic State, the “opportunity model” of terrorism was always a better fit than the “grievance model.”

Prominent Syria analysts also claimed that Assad supported, even sponsored Islamic State. CNN’s Michael Weiss pushed the line that Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin would not fight Islamic State and that Syria and Russia were the group’s “unacknowledged air force.” His co-author, Hassan Hassan, contended that the Syrian regime must go because “Assad has never fought [Islamic State] before.”

For a while, everywhere one looked, the media was peddling the same narrative. The Daily Beast described Islamic State fighters as “Assad’s henchmen.” The New York Times promoted the idea that “Assad’s forces” have been “aiding” Islamic State by “not only avoiding” the group “but actively seeking to bolster their position.” Time parroted the pro-regime-change line that “Bashar Assad won't fight” Islamic State.

But these popular arguments were, to put it mildly, empirically challenged.

The case for regime change in Damascus was reminiscent of the one cooked up for Baghdad in 2003: Interventionists played on American fears by pretending that the strongmen were in direct cahoots with Salafi jihadists (the ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam). The evidence of Assad sponsoring Islamic State, however, was about as strong as for Saddam Hussein sponsoring Al Qaeda.

As the Syria expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi noted in February 2014, Islamic State “has a record of fighting the regime on multiple fronts, including the Sheikh Said area of Aleppo province, Kwiris military airbase (where an offensive is ongoing under the leadership of muhajireen battalion Suqur al-Izz, in coordination with the Green Battalion, [Islamic State] and Jabhat al-Nusra), Nubl and Zahara, Brigade 17 airbase in Raqqa province, Tabqa military airport, Qalamoun, Sayyida Zainab, Sakhna in Homs desert, the Qamishli area, and Latakia province. Besides these locations, one should also remember [Islamic State’s] leading role in the capture of Mannagh airbase.”

The notion that Assad “won’t fight” Islamic State was always wrong. The notion that “defeating Islamic State also requires defeating Bashar Assad” was, likewise, always wrong. By now it should be obvious that the Syrian Arab Army has played a role in degrading Islamic State in Syria — not alone, of course, but with Russian and Iranian partners, not to mention the impressive U.S.-led coalition. In marked contrast to pundit expectations, the group’s demise was inversely related to Assad’s power. Islamic State’s fortunes decreased as his influence in the country increased.

Equally contrary to analyst predictions, the group imploded right after external support for the “moderate” rebels dried up. The weakening of the rebels was a major setback for Islamic State because Assad could finally focus his firepower on the group. Fewer weapon shipments into the theater, moreover, meant fewer arms fell into the hands of Salafi jihadists.

How strange, then, that we haven’t heard many pundits acknowledge their mistakes; they’re not itching to atone for having almost forced another regime-change mission based on discredited analysis.

The now-defunct conventional wisdom was not only stubbornly anti-empirical, but unmoored from the political science literature. With few exceptions, international relations scholars seemed content to stand back and watch think tank pundits do the day-to-day Syria analysis while ignoring the red flags dotting the research landscape.

Some of the best political science research over the past couple of decades finds that militants are less likely to emerge in response to political grievances than from propitious conditions for them to organize. For Islamic State, the “opportunity model” of terrorism was always a better fit than the “grievance model.” After all, this is a group that set up shop in the desert, far away from the Syrian military; preyed on soft targets like the Yazidis who never oppressed the Sunni population; and planted affiliates in countries known not for their anti-Sunni government, but the lack of a functioning one.

As in Iraq a decade earlier, regime change in Syria would have created the ultimate power vacuum for Islamic State to flourish.

Moreover, the notion that pumping arms and fighters into Syria would mitigate the unrest is actually the opposite of what study after study has established. The conflict literature makes clear that external support for the opposition tends to exacerbate and extend civil wars, which usually peter out not through power-sharing agreements among fighting equals, but when one side — typically, the incumbent — achieves dominance.

The Realist paradigm reminds us that the U.S. need not share the same ideology of a nasty international actor to countenance working with him against a mutual foe. With its sensitivity to overspending and blowback, Realism also emphasizes the dangers of militarily picking foreign governments around the world.

Although the Islamic State’s caliphate is dead, Assad’s war on terrorists in Syria is very much alive. Let’s hope future analysis of this conflict avoids the kind of anti-empirical ideological advocacy that helped give rise to Al Qaeda in Iraq and then Islamic State in the first place.

[Takeshi]

putin juce naredio povlacenje iz sirije teatralnom turnejom, u jednom danu je odradio asada, sisija i erdogana. trampovo naglaseno zblizavanje sa izraelom izgleda sve ostale gura na jednu gomilu.