Sirija

[Prospero]

ako neko nekad naleti nek baci pogled
 
 
 
 

Book Review: Christopher Phillips’ ‘The Battle for Syria’

by Ian Black

 

Syria’s war is far from over but it is already the subject of a large number of books – many about the internal dynamics of the conflict or the headline-grabbing jihadis who dominate perceptions of it. Christopher Phillips’ impressively-researched study of its international dimensions is an important contribution to understanding the bleak story so far. Based on interviews with officials and a mass of secondary sources, it identifies and examines the key external components of the worst crisis of the 21^st century: the fading of American power, Russian assertiveness, regional rivalries and the role of non-state actors from Hezbollah to ISIS.

The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the new Middle East (Yale University Press, 2016)

Phillips’ principal argument is that the Syrian uprising of 2011 – pitting ordinary people against an unforgiving regime – was transformed into a civil war because outside involvement helped escalate and sustain it – and of course still does. Bashar al-Assad’s brutal crackdown was followed by other actions that made a significant difference: ‘omni-balancing’ Qatar’s early backing for rebel groups despite its own limited capacity; ill-considered US and Western calls for the Syrian president’s departure; Turkish and Saudi sponsorship of anti-Assad forces; and, from the start, Russian and Iranian support for Damascus that raised the stakes and created an asymmetry of strategic commitment that persists to this day.

Inaction mattered too – whether in the lack of adequate assistance for the rebels or Barack Obama’s failure to response to the breaching of his famous ‘red line’ when Assad used chemical weapons in Ghouta in August 2013. Phillips correctly acknowledges the lingering after-effect of the false prospectus of the 2003 Iraq war on the British parliamentary vote against military action but I think underplays the wider paralysing role of that intervention.

It was the misfortune of Syrians that their chapter of the Arab uprisings opened in what the author succinctly characterises as ‘an era of regional uncertainty as the perception of US hegemony was slowly coming undone’. Obama’s reluctance to get involved may well have made sense after the lessons of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, but he was unable to manage his allies and, crucially, raised unrealistic expectations amongst Syrians and the Gulf states. Only ISIS, with its transnational agenda, moved him to act.

The landmarks of the crisis are familiar but they are illuminated by some fascinating details: Before 2011 knowledge about Syria was surprisingly limited, so there was insufficient understanding of the differences between its security-obsessed, ‘coup-proofed’ regime and those in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain. In 2009, the US Department of State Syria desk consisted of one official; of 135 Turkish diplomats working on the Arab world, only six spoke Arabic. Francois Hollande’s diplomatic adviser, wedded to the ‘domino theory’ that meant Assad would follow Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, didn’t want to hear the nuanced reports from the well-informed French ambassador in Damascus. Mistaken analysis drove what Phillips calls the ‘escalator of pressure’. Russia, with better intelligence, understood that Assad was more secure than others predicted (or wanted to believe) and that the appetite for western involvement was limited.

If underestimating Assad’s durability was a key failure, that was compounded by over-stating the capabilities and cohesiveness of the opposition. Sponsorship by rivals who prioritised their own agendas, misleading extrapolations from the Libyan example, inevitable tensions between the external opposition and fighters on the ground, and the exclusion of the Kurds were all highly damaging. Policy towards the armed rebel groups was incoherent: despite vast expenditure, no foreign state was able to gain leverage over them.

International and regional institutions performed little better, Phillips argues. The short-lived Arab League mission to Syria was led by a Sudanese general linked to the genocide in Darfur. UN envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi failed to overcome US and Arab resistance to Iran taking part in the 2012 Geneva conference, thus excluding a key player at a sensitive moment. Staffan de Mistura shuttled between parties who refused to even meet each other in Geneva, where the Syrian government delegation specialised in stonewalling and abuse. It has not been a case of third time lucky for the UN. ‘Everybody had their agenda’, in Brahimi’s words, ‘and the interests of the Syrian people came second, third or not at all’.

This judicious and measured book stands well back from the Twitter-driven ‘war of narratives’ that has distorted too much media reporting on the Syrian conflict. In the heat and controversy of complex and terrible events, it is helpful to pause and look coolly at the big picture. But it is sobering to contemplate the damning evidence of how outside actors helped fan the flames of ‘an internationalised civil war’ without any end in sight.

 

[Geo]

 

Ostao onaj zajebaniji deo bas gusto naseljen sa preostalim hard-core bradonjama™ ... Navodno Rusi i Turci(posle nekog sastanka) dali neki zajedicki ultimatum Nusri 24h da napuste Alep  

Edited December 3, 2016 by Geo

[Ayatollah]

Ostao onaj zajebaniji deo bas gusto naseljen sa preostalim hard-core bradonjama™ ... Navodno Rusi i Turci(posle nekog sastanka) dali neki zajedicki ultimatum Nusri 24h da napuste Alep  

 

Ovo već danas nije tako aktuelno. Tigrovi i Liwa al Quds jako pritiskaju Fateh Halab u severoistočnom delu preostalog džepa iz pravca aerodroma, i danas su ih potisli iz nekoliko delova na istoku Alepa (Tareeq al Bab, Karam al Tarab). Sa druge strane Harakat al Nujaba ne može da uradi apsolutno ništa na jugu džepa protiv Jaish Fataha, i ima problema da održi i dosadašnje položaje - juče ih je JF potisao iz Sheikh Saeeda, a danas su izgubili i delove Sadkopa. Ako se ovako nastavi, tj. ako se SAA probije istočnim pravcem do Citadele, Istočni Alep će praktično postati Južni Alep.

[theanswer]

Pad džihadista u Alepu je bio natpis na zidu od kako su zauzete Mallah farme. U onoj prvoj kontraofanzivi su otišli all in, ali postalo je prilično jasno da i pored otvaranja tog koridora kroz Ramouseh u dugom roku (we are all dead, eh ironije) nemaju šta da traže. Druga kontraofanziva mislim da im je više odmogla i bila je eto tako da malo možda poboljša moral unutra džepa. Očekivao sam dosta teže borbe unutar rezidancijalnih četvrti ali su kombinacija opsade, Tigrova, pomoći koju oni imaju jer gde oni idu ide i sve najbolje što Sirijska vojska ima kao i očigledno prilično rasulo i precenjivanje i broja rebela unutar grada učinili da to ide dosta lakše i brže. U ovom trenutku bi za rebele bilo najbolje da se predaju i da žive umesto što se uništava ovo malo grada što je ostalo i što će civili da stradaju i dalje. Jbg, valjda im je taj propagandni aspekt bitan. Rebeli su u dosta gradova i sela prihvatili sporazume kada su bili opkoljeni tako da je realno očekivati da će prihvatiti na kraju i ovde kada budu doterali cara do duvara.

 

Strateški je tok rata promenjen uletanjem Rusa, ako su do tad bili snovi o crnim zastavama u Damasku sada ostaje samo da se vidi ko će šta da uzme od ostatka Sirije.

[borris_]

https://mobile.twitter.com/AFP/status/804838366659215360

 

Ne znam postaviti twitter.

 

AFP reprtaza, prica porodice koja je pobjegla iz istocnog Alepa.

 

Prije nekoliko sedmica bio je clanak u Le Monde-u kako niko ne zeli da izadje iz Istocnog Alepa i kako ce se boriti do kraja (borci i civili zajedno). Kada su prvi civili presli na zapadnu stranu, malo su promjenili pricu govoreci da ima mali postotak (ono bas mali) onih koji zele da predju na zapadni dio. Sada ima sve vise ovakvih prica. Ne kazem da su svi ovakvi ni da ih je vecina (to ustvari niko ni ne zna) ali smo prije samo dvje tri sedmice imali brojku 0. Sramota zapadnih novinara (ovaj izvjestava iz Bejruta).

[hazard]

Sta ce biti sada sa ovim kurdskim delom (zuto)? Pretpostavljam da su se sada SAA i Kurdi mimoilazili, ali sta ce biti sada kada su Kurdi potpuno okruzeni asadovcima?

[Geo]

https://mobile.twitter.com/AFP/status/804838366659215360

 

Ne znam postaviti twitter.

 

AFP reprtaza, prica porodice koja je pobjegla iz istocnog Alepa.

 

Prije nekoliko sedmica bio je clanak u Le Monde-u kako niko ne zeli da izadje iz Istocnog Alepa i kako ce se boriti do kraja (borci i civili zajedno). Kada su prvi civili presli na zapadnu stranu, malo su promjenili pricu govoreci da ima mali postotak (ono bas mali) onih koji zele da predju na zapadni dio. Sada ima sve vise ovakvih prica. Ne kazem da su svi ovakvi ni da ih je vecina (to ustvari niko ni ne zna) ali smo prije samo dvje tri sedmice imali brojku 0. Sramota zapadnih novinara (ovaj izvjestava iz Bejruta).

I ovde na topicu je zavladala histerija, kada sam spomenuo mogucnost da ima ljudi koji zele da se sklone iz tog pakla ali da im verovatno neko brani ... 

 

Sta ce biti sada sa ovim kurdskim delom (zuto)? Pretpostavljam da su se sada SAA i Kurdi mimoilazili, ali sta ce biti sada kada su Kurdi potpuno okruzeni asadovcima?

Pa ostace kurdska cetvrt u velikom gradu, nista neobicno ... Mislim da je u tom delu nekad bilo i dosta hriscana ali da su prvi zapalili kad je pocelo sranje

[Prospero]

EU offers cash to Assad regime for Syria peace deal

 

Richard Spencer, Middle East Correspondent

December 3 2016, 12:00pm, The Times

 

 

 

 

 

The EU is offering financial support for a Syria still ruled by President Assad in a last-ditch effort to retain western influence on the outcome of the war, The Times has been told.

 

As the battle for Aleppo reaches an endgame, EU officials are said to have accepted that previous western demands that Assad step down are unrealistic. There is a growing sense that America has been sidelined as a western negotiating partner.

 

Instead, the EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, put new proposals to opposition leaders at a meeting two weeks ago, with an offer of aid and investment as a sweetener for all sides.

 

The proposals were in line with United Nations resolutions calling for a “political transition” in Syria. The United States, Britain and France have always backed the opposition’s insistence that the words “political transition” meant Assad’s removal from office, but now discussion of the precise outcome of the “transition” is being left to a future date.

 

The EU proposals would involve devolution of power to Syria’s provinces, which would allow for “moderate rebel” forces to be integrated into local security forces. Central institutions of the state would remain, though eventually under more democratic control. The future of Assad is not mentioned.

 

“What Mogherini wanted to do was present an EU plan — this is how to solve the conflict,” a source close to the opposition said. “There’s a transition, but the details are vague. In return, if all sides agree and everyone does what the EU says, there’s a huge pot of money.”

 

The outline of the proposals was confirmed by European diplomats.

 

EU leaders’ renewed drive to find a solution to the Syrian crisis is driven by fears that it is destroying Europe’s political fabric, with the refugee crisis contributing to electoral chaos across the continent. Reconstructing Syria, however unpalatable it might be that Assad remains in the presidential palace, is the only way to reverse the exodus of its people.

 

The siege of Aleppo, along with the election of Donald Trump in the United States, has wrecked western efforts to end the war, and put Russia and Iran in the driving seat as Assad’s main external backers. Independent observers say that Assad forces now controlled more than half of rebel-held Aleppo.

 

Overnight the regime and its allies seized the district of Tariq al-Bab after heavy fighting, opening a route between Aleppo’s international airport and the government-held west, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said today.

 

A victory in Aleppo would all but confirm the impossibility of removing Assad, as demanded not just by the three western UN security council powers but also by the regional states that have backed the rebels.

The imminent rebel defeat in Aleppo has led to all sides readjusting their positions. Representatives of the armed rebels have been meeting Russian officials in Turkey this week, separately from either the external political opposition or their Gulf or American backers. They have offered to accept a UN proposal for an Aleppo ceasefire and aid supplies in return for fighters loyal to the Fateh al-Sham Front, the former al-Qaeda affiliate known as the al-Nusra Front, being forced to leave.

The regime has trumpeted its advances with broadcasts on state television which showed coachloads of residents returning to eastern neighbourhoods which have been retaken by the army.

Assad is also scoring victories elsewhere. His forces have forced a “reconciliation deal”, a surrender under which rebels are escorted to opposition-held Idlib province, in the town of Khan al-Shih, west of Damascus, and is mopping up other fronts near the capital.

 

In the south, under a widely believed but never confirmed deal between King Abdullah of Jordan and President Putin, rebels have largely called off attacks in return for not being targeted by airstrikes.

The king was concerned at the instability in southern Syria and, once it became clear that Assad was not going to give way, preferred stability to a chaotic regime collapse. The rebels’ “southern front” was largely controlled out of Amman.

 

It is unclear what incentive the regime has to be more amenable to EU proposals now that it thinks it is winning the war.

 

However, the rebels have vowed to continue fighting and in Idlib they have a whole province neighbouring their principal conduit for arms, Turkey, which cannot be encircled easily.

Many rebel groups have threatened to turn to tactics associated with guerrilla warfare, such as car bombings.

 

ovo je vrabac na grani za asada, kako stvari sada stoje i kojim putem idu.

 

 

ah da, naučio sam da se auto-bomba sada asocira za "gerilski rat". ako neki auto pukne u parizu ili briselu da znamo da su iza napada gerilci a ne teroristi

 

[theanswer]

Sta ce biti sada sa ovim kurdskim delom (zuto)? Pretpostavljam da su se sada SAA i Kurdi mimoilazili, ali sta ce biti sada kada su Kurdi potpuno okruzeni asadovcima?

 

Nisu se baš zaobilazili koliko su aktivno sarađivali. Bar u Alepu. Imaš i crvenih gde je svuda okolo žuto, u Hasaki i Kamišliju.

Edited December 3, 2016 by theanswer

[hazard]

Zanima me koji ce biti konacan dil Kurda i Asada...poceli su oni da saradjuju u nekom trenutku iz nuzde ali sta ce biti kada nestanu zajednicki neprijatelji?

[theanswer]

Zanima me koji ce biti konacan dil Kurda i Asada...poceli su oni da saradjuju u nekom trenutku iz nuzde ali sta ce biti kada nestanu zajednicki neprijatelji?

 

To je teško reći ali ne sumnjam da će u krajnjoj priči Kurdi najviše najebati.

[Geo]

Ja bas mislim da su velike sile vec iscrtale granice nekog buduceg Kurdistana i da ce najebati arapi i hriscani koji se nadju u njoj ...

[hazard]

Sumnjam da ce najebati hriscani, njih nema dovoljno da bi se otcepljivali, a svejedno im vise odgovara sekularni kurdistan nego islamisticki arabistan

[theanswer]

Definitvno poslednji dani za pobunjenike u Alepu. Sve severno od Citadele će pasti u roku od najviše dan,dva a moguće da je reč i o satima. Sve južno od toga neće potrajati dugo takođe.

[Krošek]

I ovde na topicu je zavladala histerija, kada sam spomenuo mogucnost da ima ljudi koji zele da se sklone iz tog pakla ali da im verovatno neko brani ... 

 

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