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I Rusi su se oglasili na onanisanja pentagonskih mastiljara da ce obarati sve sto krene da bombarduje sirijsku vojsku.

Upozorene tek da se ne desi opet neka slucajna nezgoda.

Esh Karter nek vata beleske.

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I Rusi su se oglasili na onanisanja pentagonskih mastiljara da ce obarati sve sto krene da bombarduje sirijsku vojsku.

Upozorene tek da se ne desi opet neka slucajna nezgoda.

Esh Karter nek vata beleske.

Iz sopštenja MORF-a

 

(...)
 
"Поэтому любые ракетные или воздушные удары по территории, контролируемой сирийским правительством, создадут явную угрозу российским военнослужащим", — сказал генерал-майор.

 

Конашенков подчеркнул, что следует осознавать, что у боевых расчетов российских комплексов ПВО "вряд ли будет время на выяснение по "прямой линии" точной программы полёта ракет и принадлежности их носителей".

 

"А все иллюзии дилетантов о существовании самолетов-"невидимок" могут столкнуться с разочаровывающей реальностью", — добавил он.

 

(...)
 

 

 

 

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A u ovom našem ovakvom kakav je, u kojem su sve vrste normi sistematski relativizirane, to je samo izraz ni na čemu utemeljenog idealizma.

Sta ti bi bre Apostato  :D da u obracanju Andurilu pomenes idealizam kad je to odavno prevazidjena stvar: u njegovom svetu je vrhunski idealizam kad Amerika sirom sveta brani i zastupa interese i dobrobit siromasnih, potlacenih i ostalih ugnjetenih i to tako sto im uvodi demokratiju, gura im njuskice u nju ko stenetu u mleko.

Ali samo po pravilimatm, sredstvima pravne drzave i kroz uredjene institucije: bombe i ostalo se ne racunaju, to je samo kad su deca nestasna i nece da igraju po pravilima.

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Prva istorija borbe za grad je već napisana:

 

 

 

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The Battle of Aleppo: The History of the Ongoing Siege at the Center of the Syrian Civil War
by Charles River Editors
ISBN: 153773153X
2016
96 pages

In December 2010, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor’s self immolation triggered protests that spread from his hometown in Sidi Bouzid to cities across the country. The next month, on January 14, the country’s autocratic president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled the country. This would be the start of what became known as the “Arab Spring,” which ultimately saw anti-government protests responded to with violence, reform, or both in countries across the Middle East. In Syria, the protests that began as early as January 2011 and increased in intensity the following March devolved into a complex armed conflict that involves multiple armed groups and wages to this day. Like the other dictators, Bashar al-Assad faced popular demonstrations against his regime at the height of the Arab Spring, but he steadfastly refused to step down from power, and the protests against him and his government quickly turned violent, which eventually enveloped Syria in a civil war that has already killed over 400,000, created over 4 million refugees, and shows no signs of ending anytime soon.

In August 2016, over five and a half years after the initial protests, an image of a young boy captivated the world. Young Omran Daqneesh, who had been born around the time the Syrian civil war started, had been pulled out of a destroyed building in the Syrian city of Aleppo by a rescue squad and put inside an ambulance. He stared at the cameras - most likely in shock -covered in blood and debris from the collapsed building. His silence seemed more powerful than all the statements of condemnation from politicians around the world. This boy and his family were actually living the nightmare that Syrians across the country have experienced for more than five years. The video and image went viral and was picked up by several news outlets and spread quickly and globally across social media platforms.

Once again, the average citizen was faced with images depicting the consequences of this deadly and seemingly intractable conflict. While citizens and politicians again debate and discuss what to do about the Syrian Civil War, the people on the ground continue to suffer. The city of Aleppo is one of many battlegrounds in the war, but it has been directly in the war since 2012 when protests erupted against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and the rebels of the Free Syrian Army became involved in the conflict.

In many ways, the city of Aleppo and the ongoing battle there can almost be thought of as a metaphor or microcosm for the civil war in general. Historically, Aleppo has been a very large and diverse city, comprised of several religious and ethnic groups living side by side throughout its long period of human inhabitancy. Syria itself is a large and diverse country, whose citizens include Sunnis, Shi’a, Christians, and Druze that come from Arab, Kurdish, Armenian, and other ethnic backgrounds. Interestingly, Aleppo has indeed become a battleground in which all the forces (both domestic and international) have come to exercise their agendas and their might against each other. The longer the parties fight, the further away they seem to get from peace agreements, and the more difficult it becomes to deescalate the conflict.
Today, Syria remains a flashpoint in the Middle East, and Aleppo is at the center of it. The Battle of Aleppo: The History of the Ongoing Siege at the Center of the Syrian Civil War looks at the Syrian civil war’s most famous battle, and the way it has dominated the world’s attention. Along with pictures of important people, places, and events, you will learn about the siege of Aleppo like never before.

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Sta ti bi bre Apostato  :D da u obracanju Andurilu pomenes idealizam kad je to odavno prevazidjena stvar: u njegovom svetu je vrhunski idealizam kad Amerika sirom sveta brani i zastupa interese i dobrobit siromasnih, potlacenih i ostalih ugnjetenih i to tako sto im uvodi demokratiju, gura im njuskice u nju ko stenetu u mleko.

Ali samo po pravilimatm, sredstvima pravne drzave i kroz uredjene institucije: bombe i ostalo se ne racunaju, to je samo kad su deca nestasna i nece da igraju po pravilima.

Znaći opet sam naebo!

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A Safe Zone for Syria Kerry's Last Chance

 
Foreign Affairs
 

 

With the Syria ceasefire he strenuously advocated for in tatters, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry faces what might be the biggest test of his career. Russian and Syrian forces are relentlessly pounding Aleppo, with an intense focus on civilian infrastructure. And it might seem like there is no plausible step, besides threatening to suspend engagement with Moscow, that Kerry could take on Syria in the Barack Obama administration’s four remaining months.

But that is not correct. Kerry could convince the president to do what the presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump—and notably, their running mates in last night's otherwise contentious debate—have advocated: establish a safe haven in the north of Syria. Distinct from so-called safe areas, like the disastrous Srebrenica safe area in Bosnia, Kerry could advocate for a neutralized zone, a particular type of demilitarized zone set up under international humanitarian law by agreement of the belligerents. Neutralized zones can be created in areas where military operations are ongoing, but they cannot be exploited for military purposes; indeed, they need not even be defended by a military power like the United States.

Since the Russian and Syrian governments have shown no respect for UN humanitarian convoys and have even intensified their attacks on civilians in Aleppo, observers might assume that Moscow or Damascus would never agree to and then respect a neutralized zone. But that, again, isn’t necessarily true.

First, despite Russia’s brazen reaction to criticism of its strike on a humanitarian convoy, the bombing has hurt Russian interests. Moscow depends on the UN as a check on the unilateral exercise of American power. It routinely demands that any exercise of American or NATO power go through the Security Council, where Moscow can exercise its veto; moreover, it sees the UN as a multilateral institution through which it can blunt or sharpen criticism. Agreeing to a neutralized zone in Syria would alleviate some of the pressure to own up to its UN convoy attack.

Second, a neutralized zone would threaten neither Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nor Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s interests. As noncombatant displaced persons populate the zone, they will leave areas that both Syria and Russia want them out of, including a likely safe corridor from Aleppo. Indeed, Kerry’s bigger challenge may be to convince the opposition that the neutralized zone is not simply a repository for those chased out of Aleppo by the Russians and Assad.

Third, the zone’s primary guarantor would not be the United States, but ratherTurkey, which has advocated for such a zone for months. Putin and Assad know that Ankara is focused not on Assad, but on preventing the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Kurds from taking more power. With Moscow and Ankara on better terms now, it is plausible that Russia will tolerate a Turkish-controlled area.

When Kerry presents the concept to his counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, he should state that if the Russians do not agree to the creation of a neutralized zone, then Washington is prepared to set up a full-fledged safe area from which Turkey (on the ground) and the United States and NATO (in the air) would deter Russian or Syrian attacks. Moscow would have to consider whether this is bid is another Obama bluff—like the red line on chemical weapons—or a real commitment.

Putin knows that Obama has no appetite to use force in Syria against anything other than ISIS targets; at the same time, Moscow knows that the U.S. president is keen to save his legacy in Syria. Handing off a neutralized area to his successor, much the same way President George H.W. Bush handed off his end-term decision to back the UN’s Somalia intervention to his successor, Bill Clinton, would improve Obama’s record in Syria.

The neutralized zone would be established in northern Syria. It would stretch north from Aleppo to the Turkish border and east to just west of Kobani. The viability of the zone rests on Turkey’s ability to lead the effort—and militarily guard the zone on the ground—and on the fact that the Syrian regime does not at present fly in this area. In fact, a de facto safe zone is already in place there. Recent Turkish maneuvers have opened the space for thousands of Syrian refugees to cross back over into Jarabulus. For weeks, Ankara has been advocating that the United States and other Western allies work with it to install a formal safe zone.

Ironically, only after the failed coup attempt has Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gained full control of Turkey’s military for the first time. The newfound power has emboldened him. But Turkish maneuvering in Syria has complicated matters; Turkey has successfully pushed the Kurdish YPG forces back east beyond the Euphrates, something the United States laments since the West has relied on the Kurds as the most effective anti-ISIS force on the ground.

But now that Turkey feels that it has successfully created a wedge in Kurdish efforts to occupy the ground in northern Syria from west to east, it is focusing squarely on ISIS. And that brings Ankara and Washington back in sync. Erdogan and Obama have discussed joint operations against ISIS, Erdogan has repeatedly suggested a safe area be established, and he has assented to Obama’s suggestion that Turkey join the coming assault on ISIS’ stronghold in Raqqa.
 
With a neutralized zone in place and with Turkey fully engaged, Western and Gulf allies would be able to turn to dealing ISIS its most significant defeat to date. Kicking ISIS out of Raqqa would lend substantial momentum to the diplomatic track and put much more pressure on Assad to compromise.
 
Of course, if Russia were to reject the neutralized zone, then Washington could move forward with a true safe area, protected by the Turks on the ground and a no-fly zone in the air. It would be policed by U.S., Turkish, and select European forces—a collective presence that would make Russia quite nervous, thereby seizing back the initiative from Moscow.
 
Safe zones are not a radical concept; multiple, small-scale safe areas have already been in existence in western Syria, typically between Hezbollah and Syrian opposition forces. None of them has been bombed by either the Assad regime or Russia.
 
The last several years have seen the deaths of over half a million Syrians and the flight from the country of more than half of the country’s population. A neutralized zone will help ease the suffering of the millions who are left, seemingly a good enough reason for installing one.
 
So, the choice for the administration is clear. Leave the initiative with Moscow, hoping that the Russians will come around again to a highly tendentious ceasefire after the opposition gets battered in Aleppo. Or take the initiative and finally give full U.S. support to a zone in which Syrian displaced persons can be safe.
 

 

 

 

Edward P. Joseph is a foreign policy specialist and field practitioner who has served in some of the toughest locations in the world. Edward spent over a dozen years in the Balkans, including the war years in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia. In April 2012, as Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, he negotiated an eleventh hour breakthrough on Serbian elections that averted a brewing crisis between Serbia and Kosovo. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued written acknowledgement of Edward’s standout contribution in this role. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Edward served in a number of isolated, besieged locations including the Zepa ‘safe area’ near Srebrenica where Edward and one UN colleague coordinated the evacuation of thousands of Bosnian Muslim women, children and wounded men. His work required face-to-face dealings with indicted war criminal General Ratko Mladic. Edward has twice testified before the Hague Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Edward’s reports for the International Crisis Group in Macedonia broke new ground on the link between corruption and conflict, as well as the name issue with Greece. Edward has brought his extensive field experience to Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington where he teaches conflict management, and writes and speaks extensively on foreign policy issues. He has been published in most major media outlets including recent articles in The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy, as well as in academic journals. Edward appears frequently on television and radio as a commentator on major international events. Edward also served as Director of Communications for the Council on Foreign Relations.

In addition to the Balkans, Edward has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Haiti, where he served as Chief Election Observer for the USAID-funded observation mission in 2006. While serving In Pakistan in 2007, Edward held on 26 December what may have been the final international meeting with Benazir Bhutto, a 90 minute conversation in Peshawar. In late 2008-early 2009, Edward was a member of the three-person expert team that evaluated USAID’s largest local stability program in Afghanistan, visiting more than a dozen sites ‘outside the wire’, including Kandahar. Relief work, in particular humanitarian emergencies, is another specialty of Edward’s. Following the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Edward led InterAction’s effort to coordinate the NGO response. During the NATO air campaign in 1999, Edward co-managed the famed Stenkovec-I refugee camp that housed over 30,000 Kosovar refugees and was the site of high profile visits from President Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Kofi Annan and others.

 

Edward holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia, and a B.A. and M.A. from Johns Hopkins University and the School of Advanced International Studies, respectively. He was a helicopter pilot in the US Army Reserve. He speaks and has worked professionally in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and French, Italian and Spanish.

 

Edited by slow
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^^ Ovo gore je čist BS.

 

Niti će Turska da se izlaže političkom i vojnom krljanju sa Asadom, Rusima, Iranom i povezanim igračima, niti će Asad u ovom trenutku rata (kada veruje da "dobija", ili da je barem stabilno jak) pristati na formalizaciju strane vojne kontrole dela sirijske teritorije, niti Ruse puno interesuje šta zapadni mediji misle o njihovim akcijama da bi baš žurili da peru svoj obraz pred njima, niti odsustvo takve zone na bilo koj način vezuje američke ruke u udaranju po ISIS-u.

 

U stvari takva "zona" već postoji a to su izbeglički kampovi na jugu Turske - tu je Turska da čuva, ne lete sirijski (ni ruski avioni) i niko ne može vojno da eksploatiše taj teren.

 

 

Amerika nema aduta za ovu igru bez da dramatično eskalira sukob, još je tu kraj Obaminog mandata (lame duck). Svi ovi pokušaji i najave su igra on the cheap.

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Vidim, neko šibanje između Jund al-Aqse i Ahrar al-Shama u Idlibu, ima i više mrtvih na obe strane.

 

Džund al Aksa je rekao bih najradikalnija van ISIS-a, možda čak i radikalnija od Nusre ako tu uopšte ima nekih poređenja. Vidim da se ostale rebel grupe mahom stavljaju na stranu Arara. Moguće da će Džaiš Nasr ostati uz al Aksu. JAA je najjača na severu Hame i tu su imali dosta uspeha u poslednje vreme, oni su započeli tu ofanzivu posle su im se pridružile još neke grupacije. Takođe je bitno da JAA nije učestvovala u onom all in rebel napadu na koridior oko akademije u Alepu kada su učestvovale praktično sve grupe rebela. Međutim, van Hame nisam siguran kolika je snaga JAA, ali tamo gde ih ima dosta su jaki.

 

Mislim da bi međusobni sukobi gomile ovih grupa bili svakodnevnica u posleratnoj Siriji da su rebeli pobednička strana. Možda se ne može onda reći posleratnoj ali bitno da ja znam šta sam hteo da kažem :D

Edited by theanswer
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Charles Lister Verified account @Charles_Lister

“Vetted” opposition groups in northern #Syria are receiving additional weapons supplies through the US & regional state-run MOM ops room.
 
#pt: In addition to small-arms, mortars and RPGs, “vetted” FSA units are receiving new Czech & Bulgarian 122mm Grad rockets & MRL launchers.
 
#pts: Select “vetted” FSA units have also received field artillery systems & ammunition, while TOW antitank missiles are also still flowing.
 
#pts: Finally - and most significantly - at least two shipments of MANPADS have arrived into northern #Syria, to “vetted” FSA groups.
 
#pts: New Grads (30-40km range) & mobile MRLs are intended for stand-off attacks against #Assad regime airports. MANPADS = a deterrent.

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Ima vec snimaka dejstva tog Grada. Majstori nisu spustali stabilizatore, tako da im shara gde ce da padne.

Bitnija pomoc od toga je bilo sto su se kod borbi za koridor kod Alepa pojavile ekipe koje znaju da koriste minobacace, i to sa dronovima. Tu se vec videla dobra obucenost, sto je retko u Siriji.

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Nije trebalo mnogo Sirijskoj armiji da iskoristi ovaj JAA AAS sukob na severu Hame, uspeli su da povrate dosta izgubljenih mesta. Na drugoj strani posle pada Handarat kampa sve ide lakše na severu Alepa, džihadisti su skoro u nemogućoj poziciji i samo je pitanje vremena na koji će način napustiti Alepo i koliko će civila povući sa sobom

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