Sirija

[Anduril]

u kom delu javnosti

Pa uglavnom socijal-demokrate, demokratski socijalisti, soc-liberali i libertarijanci, deo demohriscana - nekih 50% spektra.

Deo njih je vrsio pritisak jos od vijetnamskog rata, studentarija 70-tih, protiv militarizacije zap. Evrope 80-tih, protiv bombardovanja SRJ, itd.

Kod nas ili u Rusiji su taj levi deo zauzeli uglavnom smrtni neprijatelji ovih prvih - staljinisti, titoisti ili nacionalni socijalisti itd., koji malo mare za ljudske zivote i medju svojima a da ne govorimo o drugima. Zato se u bivsoj SFRJ malo i ko pobunio protiv klanja bivse brace.

 

Od tvrdih nacionalista ili fasista na svim stranama naravno ne mozemo nista drugo ni ocekivati posto je ubijanje fakticki deo ideologije.

[Meazza]

Vidim, bas se iz vojno industrijskog kompleksa obaziru na te pritiske, ubilo se... Sta bi tek radili da imaju odresene ruke kod kuce, pitam se.

[Anduril]

Vidim, bas se iz vojno industrijskog kompleksa obaziru na te pritiske, ubilo se... Sta bi tek radili da imaju odresene ruke kod kuce, pitam se.

Pa razumem da ti ocigledno nije jasno kako demokratija i pluralizam funkcionisu, ali, da, moraju i oni da se obaziru jer kad tad ti pritisci menjaju tzv. standarde. Da nije tako, imao bi si jos uvek carpet bombing, robove, vecinu bez prava glasa, bez soc. zastite, bez penzija, bez sudova, parlamenta - ukratko, bez bilo kojeg dostignuca Zapada. Ne funkcionise lepo, efikasno ili brzo, ali na duzi rok je za sada najbolji sistem u tom smislu.

[Meazza]

Kao prvo, nemoj da se pravis da ne znas da su ti domaci pritisci sada pedeset puta manjeg intenziteta nego sto su to bili pre 9/11. Sto je razumljivo - prvi put su imali zrtve na svojoj teritoriji. (Sta reci onda o Srbiji i Rusiji gde su ljudi u 20 veku ginuli milionima zbog stranih invazija sa zapada.)

 

Smesno je rezonovati na takav nacin - tipa Amerikanci ubijaju civile sirom sveta, ali makar u USA postoje ljudi koji sa njima saosecaju. To em nije nikakva uteha i nadoknada tim zrtvama i ljudima koji su im bili bliski, em je licemerje i orvelovstina podignuta na milioniti stepen. Niti je iko igde napisao da americka javnost ubija sve te ljude, vec americka vojna masinerija.

 

I jos nesto, kad vec poredis Srbiju i USA i pricas o rasizmu. Ja nekako recimo mogu da zamislim da Rasim Ljajic postane predsednik Srbije, a ti sam prosudi da li bi i ateista, da ne govorimo o muslimanu i u najludjim snovima mogao da vrsi funkciju predsednika Sjedinjenih Drzava.

 

Ovde makar nemamo Jesus Campove, dotle jos nismo dosli.

Edited August 7, 2016 by IndridCold

[Meazza]

PS. Ti u stvari treba da pokazes da amerikanci fakticki vise obracaju paznju na civile kod takvih napada iz vazduha (mozemo da krenemo od saveznickog bombardovanja Beograda, preko Hirosime, Vijetnama, Jugoslavije, Iraka, pa sve do savremenih dronova) nego Rusi/Sovjeti a ne da se krijes iza nekakve "javnosti".

 

Good luck with that.

Edited August 7, 2016 by IndridCold

[Anduril]

Cifre su kacene i nemam nameru da objasnjavam sto puta istu stvar...

[Prospero]

Al ste smorili.

 

 

Koga interesuje nega čita:

 

 

 

 

 

...

 

I began this book with a simple question: Why do states target and kill
noncombatants in war? I argued that two factors account for the bulk of the
variation in civilian victimization. First, desperation to win and to save lives
causes civilian victimization in protracted wars of attrition. States seek to
win the wars they fight quickly and in an economical fashion. States rarely
begin wars with a strategy predicated on targeting civilians: the enemy
army is usually viewed as the opponent’s center of gravity because coercive
strategies that strike at civilians or civilian morale typically do not win wars
quickly. Moreover, states are sometimes deterred from targeting noncombatants
in a war’s opening phases by the opponent’s ability to respond in
kind or fear of alienating a powerful third party. In relatively short, bloodless
wars, therefore, civilian victimization is rare, but when armed confl icts
devolve into protracted wars of attrition, the probability mounts that noncombatants
will be victimized as a means to reduce costs and avoid defeat.
Second, the appetite to conquer and annex territory from another state
leads to the targeting of civilians when the territory contains a population
the conqueror views as a threat. Such “enemy” populations tend to
be viewed as a fifth column capable of rebelling at any moment in the rear
and causing a two-front war. In such cases, attackers often move quickly to
eliminate the threat rather than leave it in place where it may cause trouble
in the future.

I investigated this question using two complementary methodologies. In
the statistical analysis, I compiled data on a number of variables for all interstate
war participants between 1816 and 2003. I defined the dependent
variable—civilian victimization—as a military policy or strategy in war
that targeted noncombatants or refused to discriminate between soldiers
and civilians. I also collected data on the number of civilians killed by each

state. The results of this analysis strongly supported my hypotheses. Wars
of attrition—conflicts characterized by static, positional warfare, sieges, or
counterinsurgency—and wars in which a belligerent intended to conquer
and annex its neighbor’s land each significantly increased the likelihood
of civilian victimization and the number of civilian casualties a state inflicted.

Deterrence sometimes delays this escalation in particular cases, but
is typically unable to head it off altogether. By contrast, the quantitative
evidence for the alternative explanations for civilian targeting was more
mixed. Larger cultural differences between belligerents, for example—a
proxy for the argument that perceptions of the enemy as “barbaric” increase
the likelihood of civilian victimization—did not systematically increase
the chance that they would harm enemy civilians in a war between
them controlling for other factors. Concerning regime type, I found that
democracies were more likely than nondemocracies to victimize civilians.
This difference was driven by democracies’ conduct in wars of attrition,
where they were more likely to target noncombatants than nondemocracies.
There was also some evidence for the view that democracies have
become less likely to target civilians in the post–Vietnam War era, if not
inflict fewer civilian casualties.

 

 

...

 

Regime Type

The argument that democracies are guided by domestic norms that proscribe
killing innocent civilians in their conduct of warfare receives little
support here. According to the norms strand of democratic peace theory,
democracies externalize their domestic norms of peaceful conflict resolution
and respect for individual autonomy in their dealings with other democracies.
Norms arguments also imply that when democracies fight wars,
they should avoid harming innocent people not only because doing so increases
the bitterness of the conflict and makes it harder to settle, but because
liberal and democratic norms imbue leaders with respect for human
rights and prohibit killing those who bear no responsibility for the confl ict,
namely innocent civilians.

The historical evidence of democracies in interstate wars does not support
the argument that democratic states refrain from civilian victimization.
This appears to hold true in low-cost wars only. Democracies adhere to their
values when it is essentially cost-free for them to do so. When the costs of
remaining true to their beliefs rise, however, such states have jettisoned normative
restrictions and waged war against noncombatants. All that remains
of prewar liberal rhetoric is the way that politicians describe their actions to
their domestic audience. Rarely do leaders admit outright that they have adopted
a strategy designed or intended to murder enemy non combatants. This
is probably the case because public opinion firmly opposes targeting civilians
in peacetime, and leaders assume that this remains the public’s preference in

wartime as well. Publics in even the most liberal of democracies, however,
accept the killing of enemy noncombatants if doing so promises to end the
war more quickly and save the lives of their own soldiers. Liberal publics and
liberal leaders thus become decidedly illiberal in wartime.

My analysis, therefore, offers further evidence against liberal or democratic
norms as an explanation for peace among democracies. This argument
has come under increasing fire not only from realists but also from
proponents of the main rival explanation, democratic institutions. I find, in
agreement with these other analysts, that norms are of secondary importance
for explaining the conduct of democracies in wartime. Some studies,
however, have argued recently that liberal values are becoming more salient
in democratic foreign policy, particularly in small wars when survival is not
at stake. Even a hundred years ago in the Boer War, liberal politicians were
eventually able to help curtail civilian victimization—if not prevent it
initially—in South Africa. The United States, with its massive preponderance
of power in the post–Cold War world, may be particularly affected by this
trend. I would still argue, however, that sufficiently high costs of fighting or
a sense of desperation—even in small wars—or the wish to avoid the costs of
war altogether could still trigger civilian victimization by democracies.
The story is more nuanced when it comes to democratic institutions. My
theory began with the assumption that all states were equally sensitive to
costs. Institutional models of democracy, however, suggest that democracies
may be more cost-sensitive in warfare because of the greater ease with
which elected leaders may be sanctioned for costly or failed policies. The
statistical data tend to support the contention that democracies are more
likely than nondemocracies to target civilians, and that this trend is driven
by costly wars of attrition. There is some evidence, for example, that democratic
leaders worry about the possibility of future punishment by the electorate
if they fail to use all the means at their disposal to prevent casualties
among their troops and defeat the enemy quickly.

 

...

On the other side of the ledger, however, democracies rarely engage in
massive, face-to-face killing, preferring to do their killing indirectly via
bombing, blockade, or imprisonment in concentration camps. Democracies
also do not engage in truly massive killing of civilians, defined as
more than 1 million dead, but are at least as likely as nondemocracies to
kill more than 500,000, 100,000, or 50,000 noncombatants. Even though
democratic publics rarely object to killing enemy noncombatants in wartime,
democratic leaders behave as if the public disapproves and tend
not to declare openly that they are waging war against civilians. As described
above, this is because democratic leaders believe that their constituents
oppose such policies when in reality the public often supports
them wholeheartedly. Therefore it seems that leaders in democracies pay
little if any price for inflicting large-scale harm on civilians in a costly or
protracted war. The public is far more likely to turn against a war if they
believe it is unwinnable than because it kills significant numbers of noncombatants.

My findings also have implications for the literature on democracy and
victory in war. According to the selection-effects argument for democratic
victory, the reason democracies are so successful in the wars they initiate is
because elected leaders—knowing that going down to defeat in war will
likely cost them their job—choose to start only those wars they are sure
they will win. If democratic leaders choose correctly, we would expect to
find fewer instances of civilian victimization in wars started by democracies
because these conflicts should be cheap and easy. On closer examination,
however, it turns out that democracies are not significantly less likely
to victimize civilians in wars they initiate versus those in which they are
attacked. These findings constitute indirect evidence against the selection effects
argument for democratic victory.

....

 

http://libgen.io/get.php?md5=7F88CB247B9FD3A3936B04682B5388BE&key=UC5XYHXWIAKWQFKW

 

 

[Anduril]

Meni izgleda kao gomila generalizacija. Mislim, demokratije pre 50g i sada su sasvim druga stvar kao i ratovi regruta vs. tehnologiziranih profesionalnih armija. Ima tu mnogo vise faktora koji igraju ulogu...

[Prospero]

Pa okačio sam celu knjigu (na linku na kraju) a ne tekstić (to su delovi iz zaključka, nije to suma knjige), i svakako je pokrio gomile faktora.

 

 

edit: nebitno, otišli ste s teme.

Edited August 7, 2016 by Prospero

[Anduril]

Pa ne bih se slozio da nije tema jer i US i Rusia trenutno bombarduju u Siriji sa prilicno razlicitim ucinkom i motivacijom.

 

 

Moscow has so far denied killing any civilians in its continuing air campaign in Syria. Lt. General Sergei Rudskoy of the Russian General Staff insisted to reporters that as of April 27th 2016 there had been no civilian casualties from its airstrikes.

Despite Russia’s claims, it is our provisional view at Airwars that to December 31st only, between 1,098 and 1,450 civilian non-combatants are likely to have been killed in 192 Syrian incidents where there is fair reporting publicly available of an event – and where Russian strikes appear to have taken place in the near vicinity on that date.

Indeed, more civilians appear to have been killed by Russia in the three months to December 31st than from all credibly-reported Coalition civilian fatality events since August 2014.

As well as inflicting excessive civilian casualties, Russia is credibly reported to have extensively targeted civilian infrastructure in Syria – with water treatment plants, bakeries, food distribution depots and aid convoys all struck.

Civilian neighbourhoods were also systematically targeted across rebel areas, often on consecutive days. More than 1,700 civilians are also credibly reported injured in the 192 lethal events we assess as likely having involved Russian aircraft – a reasonable indicator of the low-precision munitions presently favoured by Moscow.

https://airwars.org/russian-civcas/

https://airwars.org/civilian-casualty-claims/

[Lord Protector]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_EczBm-jhI

[Lord Protector]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9hIC09ZdOU

[Ayatollah]

Kakvi indijanci i jedni i drugi, majko moja mila. Lepo primećuje autor snimaka da ni 5 godina rata nije naučilo SAA da postavlja minska polja i bodljikavu žicu, ili da minira sredstva koja ne može da zadrži. Kod rebela kao da ne postoji nikakva komandna struktura, svi se nešto deru jedni na druge i alahakbaruju non-stop, ne zna se ni ko pije ni ko plaća. I jedni i drugi troše protivoklopne rakete na ubijanje pojedinačnih pešadinaca. Pet hiljada nekih Amera ili Izraelaca bi ovde počistilo skupa i jedne i druge, i bez vazdušne podrške.

Edited August 7, 2016 by Ayatollah

[Prospero]

Mislim da nije (samo) do loše taktire odbrane nego pre do strategije™ rata - SAA je "branilac Sirije od terorista", legitimna vojna sila u celoj zemlji i sad ako ona postavlja fortifikacije i zapreke to bi značilo da priznaje da je efektivno zadovoljna unutrašnjim razgraničenjem i da ne računa na skoru ofanzivu na tom prostoru. Prepliću se politika i rat u tom smislu. Uostalom, na kom delu fronta su pravili jake kombinovane zapreke do sada? Možda negde, ali izuzetak-pravilo....

 

Video sam razne suprotstavljene izveštaje oko sastava SAA u tom delu, od toga da su sve bili šiitski milicioneri™ iz Iraka, Irana i Avganistana do toga da su okosnicu činile malobrojne SAA trupe koje su se raspale. Istina je negde između.

 

Treće, ostavili su krš municije i nešto opreme (arti oruđa, okl. vozila) za koju nemam pojma da li je upotrebljiva ali to nije smelo da se desi. Ili nisu imali ljudstva/materijala da to miniraju, ili nisu imali takvo naređenje ili su se u velikoj brzini povukli.

 

Na mikro-nivou pobunjenička pešadija se čini spretnijom od SAA/satelita, i Asadovim snagama je uvek potrebna neka "specijalna" jedinica da odradi posao. Masa vojske se čini nesposobnom za ozbiljnije zadatke - složeni napad ili odbranu u nepovoljnim okolnostima. Uporediti u tom smislu kurdsku pešadiju, mada možda je i do morala, nemam pojma.

 

 

Ali svi ukupno deluju katastrofalno u smislu discipline, planiranja i taktike.

Edited August 7, 2016 by Prospero

[Eraserhead]

Ruski uterivaci stabilnosti su izgleda razvalili Idlib veceras.